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This research primarily investigated the Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) in the 
English NHS to identify factors influencing effective decision-making as perceived by 
General Practitioners (GPs) with formal roles in CCGs. A study by the British Medical 
Association (BMA) (2014a) revealed that GPs at practice level felt that CCGs were 
developing policies that restrict efficient delivery of health care. As such, I developed a 
hypothesised conceptual model demonstrating factors at play in the decision-making 
process, which I tested using Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modelling (PLS-
SEM). Alongside, informed by the conceptual model, was the qualitative strand, with 
the data that I analysed under interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA). 
Quantitative and qualitative data were collected simultaneously through a survey 
using a questionnaire in a convergent parallel mixed methods design, underpinned by 
a philosophical position of pragmatism. Data was collected in 2017. Research sample 
consists of 73 GPs in the UK. 
The hypothesis testing results show that GP Proportion has a significant and 
positive effect on Decision-making Process Effectiveness. Similarly, the effect of GP 
Influence has been found to be significant and positive on Satisfaction. In contrast, the 
effect of GP Influence on Decision-making Process Effectiveness has been found to be 
insignificant. This result is also observed regarding the effect of GP Influence on 
Member Practice Wishes Met. Five key themes were identified from the qualitative 
data analysis – namely, (1) Financial, focused on decisions influenced by financial 
concerns, (2) Bureaucracy, centred on decisions influenced by the bureaucratic 
hierarchy, (3) Clinical, to do with decisions that were perceived as having clinical 
implications, (4) Workplace culture, focused on behavioural patterns affecting 
decision-making within the organisation, and (5) CCG role, based on the way the role 
of CCGs was understood by member practices and the way that engagement of 
member practices was achieved by the respective CCGs. 
The results contribute to theory and practice. Regarding practice, 
notwithstanding the intended autonomy for the CCGs, which was aimed at improving 
patient care by aligning health care commissioning decisions with local needs, 
structure alone appears not enough to deliver effectiveness, as perceived by GPs. The 
proportion of GPs was found to be a relevant factor, while leadership and local CCG 
level culture, coupled with communication and governance, are also important. 
Finance was found to be significant, with many concerns about CCG policies attributed 
to this factor. On contribution to theory, the general observation is that the CCGs 
appear to be moving from professional to bureaucratic organisational model 
(Mintzberg 1979), thereby threatening the purported autonomy. 
This study also revealed new information on the formal roles that GPs occupy 
in CCGs, as previous research showed limited awareness in this regard (Checkland et 
al. 2016). Information gathered on committee memberships and the positions GPs 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Contextual Background 
“Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) in England, a flagship of the government’s 
health reforms, have failed to deliver overall improvements to patient care or involve 
more GPs in the running of services” (British Medical Association 2014a). This 
comment was made by the British Medical Association (BMA) following their survey in 
April 2014 of 1,393 General Practitioners (GPs) in the English National Health Service 
(NHS). The study discovered that, in general, the GPs were not happy about the 
policies produced by the CCGs as they felt that some of those policies restricted them 
from efficiently performing their function in the health care service of the English 
National Health Service (NHS). In this respect, some of the BMA’s findings are, 
1. Almost three out of ten GPs believe their local CCG has introduced policies 
that have adversely affected their ability to care for patients. 
2. Barely one in ten GPs feels that they have been given more freedom to 
make clinical decisions for their patients. 
3. Despite being members, almost two-thirds of GPs feel they either have 
little influence over their CCG or are told what to do by the CCG rather 
than being asked to contribute their views. 
(BMA 2014a) 
These findings implicate decision-making, a concept which this thesis centres on 
and extensively examines in the context of CCGs. As well as being crucial to any 
organisational success, effective decision-making also ensures the continued existence 
of the organisation. The structure under which an organisation operates influences the 
organisation’s decision-making routines (Jacobides 2007). In this thesis, I primarily 
consider structure from the perspective of organisational decision-making rather than 
the composition of how staff jobs are connected. Given this, decision-making in the 
NHS, a public service body (NHS England [Open Government Licence v3.0]), typically 
takes place within a hierarchical arrangement, a regular occurrence in the public sector 
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organisations (Ljungholm 2014). Decision-making in such contexts is usually fraught 
with low levels of autonomy, and a high degree of ‘red tape’, resulting in the 
“managers’ endeavors [being] obstructed by structural forces that are beyond their 
control” (Ljungholm 2014, p.43). Even so, the literature explores how centralisation 
and decentralisation at the macro as well as micro-levels can be employed to 
moderate the harmful effects of ‘red tape’, occasioned by hierarchy (Kim et al. 2014; 
Mintzberg 1979). I view centralisation and decentralisation from the position of 
Mintzberg (1979, p.181), which is “exclusively in terms of power over the decisions 
made in the organization”. As intimated above, to understand the influence of 
structure along with associated processes, I chose to investigate decision-making in the 
CCGs, as set out in the Health and Social Care Act 2012 (United Kingdom Government 
2012). A review of the literature indicates that the knowledge base lacks awareness of 
effective decision-making, as perceived by the GPs, under the NHS’s decentralised 
CCGs, a gap that the current study sought to fill. Additionally, investigation of the CCGs 
was of interest because previous research had identified limited awareness of what 
the GPs do in their respective local CCGs and the roles that they occupied (Checkland 
et al. 2016; McDermott et al. 2015).  
 CCGs were created to rid the English primary health care sector of the ‘red 
tape’ by decentralising decision-making for secondary and community commissioning 
to the local level, a phenomenon which McDermott et al. (2017, p.4) describe as 
“decision making closer to the patient”. Meanwhile, The King’s Fund (2018, p.2) 
describes this move as “intended to ‘liberate professionals and providers from top-
down control’”. Even so, as mentioned at the opening of this Chapter, a study by BMA 
(2014a) discovered that the GPs at practice level blamed the CCGs for producing 
policies that they perceived as hindering efficient service delivery within the primary 
health care sector in the English NHS. The study centred on the GPs since they were 
the intended key decision-makers but were apparently unhappy. Interest was 
specifically on those with formal roles in the CCGs where the criticised policies are 




1.1.1 Policy objectives and the context of CCGs 
The stated objective at the launch of CCGs was to devolve power to the clinicians such 
as GPs, consultants, and nurses, so that they could directly run health care services at 
the local level, thereby enabling them to improve patient care and increase 
accountability (NHS England 2015; Talbot 2014; United Kingdom Government 2012). 
GPs were intended to lead the system. The CCGs’ structure “was intended from the 
beginning to be "bottom up"” (Checkland et al. 2016, p.2), with no provision for a 
central blueprint. The relationship between the CCGs and GP Practices was intended to 
be on a “membership organization” basis which was enforced by law where the GP 
Practices subscribe as members of their local CCG, thus becoming known as member 
practices (Checkland et al. 2016; Naylor et al. 2013). Figure 1.1 demonstrates this 
relationship.  
In the new arrangement, NHS England was designated to directly commission 
primary care services at GP Practice level while the CCGs were to commission 
secondary and community care services on patients referred by the GP Practices. Also, 
the CCGs were charged by law to support GP Practices in quality improvement (Naylor 
et al. 2013; NHS Commissioning Board 2012a). The supportive roles for the GP 
Practices that the CCGs were set to fulfil included the development of policies which 
could impact the way primary care “referral and prescribing decisions” are made at GP 
Practice level. At the same time, the GP Practices were directed to “adhere to 
commissioning decisions made by the CCG” (Naylor et al. 2013, p.14). Further details 
about the CCGs in terms of legal status, GP Practice representation, and the degree of 
diversity of CCGs structures (especially for decision-making) allowed by law, are 




Figure 1.1 Relationship structure: NHS England, CCGs, and GP Practices (Source: Author’s own 2019, unpublished) 
1.2 Rationale of the research 
There are three reasons which supported this research. The principal reason pertained 
to the BMA study described above. Recent research, however, suggests a shift in the 
general climate within the CCGs wherein the concerns outlined in the findings by the 
BMA (2014a) seem to be getting redressed. In this regard, Robertson et al. (2016, p.6) 
discovered that “CCGs have developed a range of strategies to work more closely with 
general practice”. All the same, in this current research I intentionally decided to 
establish the factors influencing the perceived effective decision-making process 
following the findings of the BMA (2014a), as there is a gap in the knowledge base in 
that respect. The next element that motivated the study related to the formal roles 
that the GPs occupy in the CCGs. Research has indicated that CCGs are complex 
organisations comprised of diverse structures with different methods of task delivery 
for both internal and external purposes (McDermott et al. 2015). While the system was 
designed to be led by the GPs, the inherent complexity makes it so difficult to 
determine what roles individual GPs occupy. Considering this, McDermott et al. (2015, 
p.30) suggested that “asking what the role of GPs is or should be in CCGs is a complex 
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question with as many answers as there are CCGs”. In the same vein, Checkland et al. 
(2016, p.2) recommended further empirical exploration of CCGs to gain “a clear 
understanding of their internal structures and procedures”. For this reason, the 
current study sought to investigate the roles that the GPs occupied in their CCGs and 
the kind of service that they delivered in that capacity. 
Lastly, the conceptual structure of the CCGs appealed to a long-held personal, 
passionate regard, which is decentralisation of authority. The creation of CCGs was 
underpinned by this tenet in which autonomy of secondary and community health 
care commissioning was conferred to the local level (McDermott et al. 2017; 
Checkland et al. 2016; United Kingdom Government 2012). At the inception of this 
study, I had worked in the NHS in different capacities which covered clinical, technical, 
and leadership roles for nearly 15 years. Notwithstanding, CCGs were, and had always 
been, at ‘arms’ length’ from my core professional business. CCGs appealed to me 
because of the contexts that I worked under. My engagements, particularly technical 
tasks, were routinely run under a structure called Scrum, an agile framework for 
managing projects, which shares principles that parallel decentralised and flat 
organisational configurations. For this thesis, it will suffice to portray Scrum approach 
as a decentralised formation at micro-level which is light in weight of bureaucracy and 
typically operating by providing “a simple ““inspect and adapt” framework” (Hossain et 
al. 2009, p.175). It is worth stressing, nonetheless, that decentralisation in the context 
of the CCGs’ commissioning decisions is different from decentralisation set to a project 
team as decision-making in CCGs is set at a higher level – that is, it is strategic rather 
than operational.  
There are three reasons for investigating the GPs’ views in this study. First, the 
key reason was to maintain consistency with previous studies on the type of 
participants. These include Checkland et al. (2016), McDermott et al. (2015), British 
Medical Association (2014a), and other numerous studies by King’s Fund and Nuffield 
Trust.  The second reason emanated from the understanding that the GPs were 
intended to lead the CCGs, thereby raising a desire to hear directly from them about 
their experience and opinions regarding CCGs’ decision-making structures and 
processes. Lastly, I wanted to understand what the GPs do precisely in the roles that 
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they occupy to add to existing knowledge from previous research (Checkland et al. 
2016; McDermott et al. 2015). 
1.3 Research aims, objectives and questions 
Research aims: 
1. Primary aim: To explore decision-making profiles and associated processes 
within the CCGs to identify factors influencing effective decision-making, based 
on GPs’ views. 
2. Secondary aim: To discover the formal roles occupied by the GPs in the CCGs. 
To achieve the primary and secondary aims, I identified the below outlined research 
objectives, respectively, along with the related complementary research question for 
the primary aim.  
Primary Aim Objectives: 
1. To explore the experience of GPs participating in the decision-making process 
in CCGs. 
2. To investigate the way the Governing Bodies function. 
3. To identify actions in the continuum of the CCGs’ decision-making process that 
are conducive to support perceived effective decision-making. 
4. To identify actions in the continuum of the CCGs’ decision-making process that 
are not helpful in perceived effective decision-making.  
Research Question: 
How do the GPs with roles to perform in the CCGs explain and describe their 
experience regarding decision-making at their local CCGs; 
i. During the decision-making process, and  
ii. Once the decision-making process has concluded and the decisions have been 
made? 
Secondary Aim Objectives: 
1. To establish the formal roles that the GPs occupy in CCGs. 
2. To clarify the tasks that the GPs deliver in their formal roles in the CCGs. 
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1.4 Scope and key assumptions 
This section describes three aspects that were conceived to have the potential to 
affect the scope of my research. Discussed first are the delimitations in which the 
criteria for this study were set. This is followed by the key assumptions upon which this 
study was based. Next, are the access limitations, which were limitations that were 
foreseen but out of the researcher’s control, thereby presenting possible weaknesses 
to the study (Simon 2011). There is another section on limitations, referred to as 
‘Research limitations’, towards the end of the thesis in Section 5.4. The difference in 
the research limitations is that the limitations described in that section were not 
foreseen beforehand and were only discovered as the research progressed.  
1.4.1 Delimitations of scope 
There were two delimitations of scope that I conceived at the inception of the study – 
namely, the scope of the study in the fieldwork and the scope on the type of decision-
making committees to be considered for investigation. The scope of the study was set 
to embrace all the CCGs in England regardless of the individual sizes. The target 
population in that context was set to be the GPs, owing to their function in the CCGs. 
The criterion for inviting the participants to the study was that GPs were to be 
contacted by email only. As such, I contacted only those GPs whose email addresses I 
received from their local CCGs following the request that I made as detailed in Chapter 
3, Section 3.3.5. Consequently, if a CCG refused to supply the email addresses of its 
GPs or suggested a different means of communication than email, no communication 
was to be made to any of the GPs affected. No invitation was to be sent to the 
participants by post. This inevitably introduced sampling bias, described in Chapter 3, 
Section 3.3.5. I did not put any effort to correct biases introduced by sampling and 
other population-related parameters like coverage bias, a position that I pragmatically 
adopted, seeing that such a position is generally recognised by research practitioners 
involved with non-probability convenience samples, which this study was (American 
Association for Public Opinion Research 2013).  
Regarding the scope on the type of decision-making committees to be 
considered for investigation, I planned to focus on the Governing Body, specifically. 
There are two reasons for this. Firstly, regardless of the variation in structure and 
format of committees across the different CCGs, all the CCGs are mandated in statute 
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to have a Governing Body committee. Secondly, a Governing Body committee was 
designed to be the top decision-making committee where the CCG decisions are made 
and/or ratified. More about the internal structures and associated dynamics of the 
CCGs is discussed in Section 2.3.6.1. 
1.4.2 Key assumptions 
The first assumption was that the sample which was invited to take part in the study 
was representative of the GP population with formal roles in the CCGs. This is because 
the CCGs constitute a distinct population, so it should be possible to assess the 
representativeness of respondents using statistical methods. The second assumption 
was about the belief that the respondents were probably going to answer the 
questions candidly since the survey was anonymous and confidential, an assurance 
which was explained in the questionnaire. The third assumption had to do with the 
authenticity of the study, that is – if the study addressed a real problem recognised by 
the participants, and whether the study could get proper answers to the problem. A 
pilot study was performed to verify this assumption. The pilot study candidates not 
only concurred with the study but also enhanced the scope of the questions by making 
suggestions to cover some aspects which were not initially included in the 
questionnaire.  
1.4.3 Access limitations 
There was one main limitation that this study faced which was foreseen right from the 
onset. The limitation concerned the accessibility of the target population. GPs are 
‘notoriously’ known to be busy people, an observable occurrence which was 
commonly spoken about on the news prior and after the launch of the research. For 
example, in March 2015 the BBC News published a news item about how GPs were 
overstretched due to a shortage of doctors (BBC News 2015). The article mentioned 
how this phenomenon put pressure on the system thereby forcing some of the GPs to 
leave the profession while precluding the prospective applicants from taking up the 
profession as they viewed it as an “unglamorous” occupation. To mitigate this 
challenge (accessibility), I devised a strategy to make the study appealing to the 
potential respondents as much as was practicable. The course of action that was 
planned was to advertise the study on standard media of communication to the 
9 
 
medical professionals in general, the British Medical Journal (BMJ) and the BMA 
Newsletter. More details about how this progressed are in Chapter 3, Section 3.5.6. 
1.5 Methodology  
A general survey was performed on CCGs using an electronic questionnaire. The 
process encompassed both quantitative and qualitative study strands running 
simultaneously. To develop a useful outcome, several phases were involved, which 
included choosing the target population, picking a sample, determining the suitable 
analysis methods to analyse the data (quantitative and qualitative) that were collected, 
piloting the study, carrying out data collection, and performing data analysis. The key 
tenet of the methodology – that is mixing, was performed at the analysis phase in 
Chapter 4 and the interpretation phase in Chapter 5. More detail on the procedures 
that were followed is given in Chapter 3. Figure 1.2 summarises the design which 
guided this research.  
 
Figure 1.2 Research design outline 
1.6 Thesis structure 
The rest of this thesis is set out as follows. Chapter 2 builds a theoretical foundation 
upon which the research was based by reviewing the relevant literature. The research 
design, which includes methods associated with gathering, analysing, and interpreting 
the data, is presented in Chapter 3. As well as analysing the data collected from the 
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fieldwork, Chapter 4 discusses the findings reached in this study, comparing them with 
the existing knowledge. Conclusions, implications, recommendations, and limitations 




CHAPTER 2  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter builds a theoretical foundation upon which the research was based. While 
the primary aim of the study rested on identifying the factors influencing the perceived 
effective decision-making process within the CCGs, this was contextualised on the 
theoretical background of organisational structure, a concept considered in this thesis 
from the standpoint of organisational decision-making as opposed to relationships 
within staff hierarchies. Specific interest was on decentralisation, viewed from the 
position of Mintzberg (1979, p.181) in which this concept is exclusively considered “in 
terms of power over the decisions made in the organization”. As such, the 
organisational decision-making structure and the influence that it has on the decision-
making process is explored in this chapter. Other associated factors that may influence 
the efficacy of the decision-making process – factors like organisational culture, 
leadership, and communication, are also considered. 
Firstly, an outline of the key concepts underpinning the study is given in Section 
2.2. Next, the organisational structure and associated factors are discussed in Section 
2.3. Of specific interest in that discourse are concepts of centralised and decentralised 
organisational configurations which are explored in Section 2.3.5 and Section 2.3.6, 
respectively. The term configuration in this context is taken to denote arrangement of 
authority, whether it is centralised or decentralised. The concepts are considered at 
macro and micro-scale levels, evaluating their implication to the service delivery in the 
English primary health care sector. CCGs, the objects of interest in this study, are 
reviewed in Section 2.3.6.1, Section 2.3.6.2, and Section 2.4. As part of critiquing CCGs, 
a conceptual framework designed to understand decision-making structures and 
associated processes within the decentralised setting of CCGs is developed in Section 
2.5. In this setup, latent variables of factors influencing an environment conducive to a 
GP-led decision-making process are identified, and the associated propositions are 
developed. As well as providing a basis for statistical hypotheses testing, the 
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conceptual framework was intended to inform the formulation of the qualitative 
questions to complement the research hypotheses.  
2.2 Key Concepts 
Organisational structure: There are multiple ways that organisational structure can be 
defined. For example, organisational structure can be understood to denote a 
“framework of the relations on jobs, systems … people and groups making efforts to 
achieve the goals” (Ahmady et al. 2016, p.455). For this thesis, there are two 
standpoints from which I consider organisational structure. The first and primary 
position is organisational decision-making, as opposed to how staff jobs are connected. 
Organisational decision-making has broadly two configurations, centralisation and 
decentralisation (Mintzberg 1979). These are described in the next subsection. 
Secondly, I consider organisational structure in terms of the NHS, an organisation 
which involves complex inter-relationships between entities within it, which could also 
be considered as organisations in their own right, such as the CCGs, and indeed GP 
Practices. The thesis endeavours to formalise the structures assumed by the different 
NHS entities in line with the different organisational structure models discussed in the 
literature, specifically derived from Mintzberg’s theories (Mintzberg 1979).  
Centralisation and decentralisation: alternatively referred to as centralised and 
decentralised configurations in this thesis, are viewed from the position of Mintzberg 
(1979, p.181), which is “exclusively in terms of power over the decisions made in the 
organization”. Simply put, centralisation denotes a context where decisions are made 
at one centre “and then implemented through direct supervision” (Mintzberg 1979, 
p.182). In contrast, decentralisation denotes a scene where decision-making “authority 
is spread out” (Huber & McDaniel 1986, p.581). It is important to note that 
centralisation and decentralisation are not mutually exclusive, but rather, they should 
be viewed as “two ends of a continuum” (Mintzberg 1979, p.185).  
Decision-making: The literature and dictionaries give different perspectives on 
the term ‘decision-making’. For example, the Oxford Dictionaries define decision-
making as “the action or process of making important decisions” (Oxford University 
Press 2018), while Mintzberg and Westley (2001, p.89) portray this concept as, “first 
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define the problem, then diagnose its causes, next design possible solutions, and 
finally decide which is best”.  
Decision-making process: this thesis considers decision-making process as “a 
continuum of control” (Mintzberg 1979, p.188) in the act of decision-making. The 
process entails different steps where different actions are taken, as portrayed by 
Mintzberg (1979) in the continuum of control over the decision-making process where 
the steps range from “the original stimulus to driving the last nail [in the 
implementation of the decisions made]” (Mintzberg 1979, p.187). Section 2.3.6 
demonstrates the entailed steps. Different factors can influence the outcome at any 
point in the process. For example, once a decision is made, it may need authorisation, 
at which point it may be blocked, changed, or approved.  
Perceived effective decision-making process: this study considered any action 
that supports efficient delivery of health care service within the CCGs’ decision-making 
continuum as being ‘effective’. This view follows the concerns that the GPs raised 
about the decisions by the CCGs which were perceived as curtailing efficient service 
delivery in patient care (BMA 2014a). For this thesis, technicalities on how the 
predicted results are measured or tested will not be described, as the study was about 
the process as opposed to the specific decisions.  
2.3 Organisational structure and associated factors on decision-
making 
This section centres on the review of organisational structure and associated factors 
which supported the scheme of the current study about understanding decision-
making plus the roles occupied by the GPs in the CCGs. A brief background about the 
general history of organisational theory, which sets the contextual stage for 
organisational structure, is presented first.  
2.3.1 A brief history of organisational theory 
To adequately explain and address the issues linked to the concept of organisations, it 
is useful to define what an organisation is. There are numerous definitions of 
organisation, including the one by McAuley et al. (2014) which states that an 
organisation is a collection of people who gather to work towards a common purpose. 
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An organisation can also be described as a human network through which tasks are 
accomplished (Mosley et al. 2014). Alternatively, an organisation can be defined as “a 
group of people occupying different roles designed to achieve goals” (Anheier 2005, 
p.142).  
Organisations of a business nature are differentiated from ordinary social 
activities by the fact that goals drive them. The activities that these organisations 
perform are structured with distinct lines of demarcation to make them unique from 
their environments (Anheier 2005). Additionally, these organisations usually have 
agreed on strategies that are designed to facilitate the efficient running of their affairs 
to achieve set objectives through "effective decision-making and coordination of the 
available resources” (Mosley et al. 2014, p.6). How these processes are implemented 
differs from one organisation to the other, a phenomenon that historically elicited 
enquiry from intellectuals who sought to understand “why organizations take the form 
they do and why they behave as they do” (Jensen 1983, p.319). This led to 
propositions that attempted to explicate different observed phenomena, giving rise to 
organisational theory (Hatch & Cunliffe 2006), which is basically “the study of how 
organizations function and [how] they affect and are affected by the environment in 
which they operate” (Jones 2013, p.8). Numerous organisational theories have been 
developed over time, as depicted in Figure 2.1.  
The early 1900s organisations shown in Figure 2.1, explicated under the 
concept of classical theories advocated by intellectuals such as Frederick Winslow 
Taylor, Henri Fayol, and Max Weber, were perceived as being rigid and mechanistic 
(McAuley et al. 2014). This was due to the disproportionate emphasis on the 
organisation rather than the employees, in which, fundamentally, everything about the 
organisation was considered as a machine, including humans who were taken like 






Figure 2.1 Timeline of organisational theories 
An evolution of the classical theories promoted by characters like Elton Mayo, Chester 
Barnard, and Hebert Simon ensued, leading to a fundamental change of underlying 
assumptions which saw an emergence of what became known as neoclassical theories 
(McAuley et al. 2014). These proponents sought to understand the best way to 
motivate employees. Focus was removed from the product to the human element. A 
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realisation of the importance of the human element was best understood from the 
Hawthorne experiments where the social factors like showing interest to the workers’ 
well-being went a long way in boosting productivity (McAuley et al. 2014). Moreover, 
neoclassical theories proponents further argued that the purpose of the organisation 
was to serve human needs instead of vice versa (Shafritz et al. 2005). Viewed from a 
philosophical standpoint, the theories shifted from a positivistic orientation which 
characterised the classical theories to a subjective position in which many possible 
solutions could be construed about the same situation, depending on the assumptions 
and the understanding of the observer (Hatch and Cunliffe 2006). This may be possibly 
the reason for what appeared like an explosion of organisational theories after the era 
of classical theories.  
From the timeline in Figure 2.1, theories that the current study embraced are 
“Weber – Bureaucracy Model”, “Mintzberg – Organizational Design”, and “Schein – 
Organizational Culture”. Aspects of Weber’s Bureaucracy significant to decision-making 
as applicable to the current study are discussed in Section 2.3.5., whereas the works of 
Mintzberg, specifically centralisation and decentralisation (Mintzberg 1979), were the 
theoretical lens through which this research was framed. On the other hand, Schein’s 
theory of organisational culture, discussed in Section 2.3.3, enhanced the appreciation 
of the research topic. 
2.3.2 Organisational structure 
Firstly, structure in this thesis is viewed primarily from the standpoint of organisational 
decision-making rather than the composition of how staff jobs are connected, as 
mentioned in Chapter 1, Section 1.1. Notwithstanding, it is worth mentioning that 
organisational structure, broadly speaking, is a topic portrayed from so many 
perspectives in the literature that some may be confusing. For example, discussing 
about centralisation and decentralisation within the mix of organisational structure, 
Mintzberg (1979, p.181) identified these concepts as being “the most confused … in 
organizational theory”. One of the many different views portrays structure as an 
assortment of “relations between organizational elements” (Ahmady et al. 2016, 
p.455). In this vein, varied perspectives of the concept can be assumed based on two 
architectural dimensions, where relations can be established based on whether the 
dimension at issue is hard or soft (Janicijevic 2017; Ahmady et al. 2016). Hard 
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dimensions consist of jobs that, when grouped according to how they relate to each 
other, produce a construction of the formal organisational structure. Conversely, the 
soft dimensions are demonstrated in informal organisational structures seen in 
relationships such as social networks and organisational culture (Janicijevic 2017). The 
dynamics of these relationships and other associated dimensions are depicted below 
in Figure 2.2, a diagram adapted from a social network for business as it best illustrates 
a practical management perspective.  
 
Figure 2.2 Organisational structure elements relations 
There are many types of formal organisational structures discussed in the literature 
that organisations can assume. These include, but are not limited to, tall structures 
(Mosley et al. 2014; Fairtlough 2006; Kumar & Kant 2005; Ghiselli & Siegel 1972), flat 
structures (Rickards 2012; Langfred 2007; Meisel & Fearon 1999), heterarchical 
structures (Schumacher 2010; Dawson 2009; Fairtlough 2006; Crumley 1995), reverse 
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hierarchy structures (Mosley et al. 2014), responsible autonomy structures (Fairtlough 
2006; Friedman 1977), and triarchy structures (Fairtlough 2006). Also, Mintzberg 
(1979) created models of organisational structure, described in Section 2.3.4, which 
are dominating the literature of “organizational structuring”.  
Different formal structures described in the previous paragraph can be classed 
either as being centralised or decentralised when aligned with Mintzberg’s concepts of 
centralisation and decentralisation (Mintzberg 1979). These concepts, centralisation 
and decentralisation, underpinned this study, and in accordance with Mintzberg (1979, 
p.181), were considered exclusively “in terms of power over the decisions made in the 
organization”. In this respect, centralisation denotes a context where decisions are 
made at one centre “and then implemented through direct supervision” (Mintzberg 
1979, p.182) while the decentralisation denotes a scene where decision-making 
“authority is spread out” (Huber & McDaniel 1986, p.581). As Mintzberg contends, 
centralisation and decentralisation are not mutually exclusive. Instead, they should be 
viewed as “two ends of a continuum” (Mintzberg 1979, p.185) where tagging of the 
organisation in the continuum is based on the dominant manifested occurrence of 
either centralisation or decentralisation characteristics. Centralisation and 
decentralisation are discussed at length in Section 2.3.5 and Section 2.3.6, respectively. 
Before that, a brief review of organisational culture is made from the viewpoint of its 
relevance in influencing decision-making within the matrix of the concept of 
organisational theory. 
2.3.3 Organizational culture 
In its simple definition, organisational culture is, “how things are done here” (Drennan 
1990, cited in Belassi et al. 2007, p.14). However, the concept of culture is more 
profound than this, with Schein (2017) identifying it as being broad in breadth and 
depth, attended by numerous models. When considered from the standpoint of 
decision-making, Williams et al. (2018) portray the concept of culture as being 
minimally investigated in the health care literature. Notwithstanding, Williams et al. 
(2018, p.692) recognise “that culture shapes decision-making” albeit a lack of 
“evidence base on how this happens”. So, what is organisational culture? This thesis 
considers organisational culture through the lens of Schein (2017), who gives three 




Figure 2.3 Three levels of culture (Adapted from Schein (2017) 
The top level of Schein’s model of organisational culture is Artefacts, where discernible 
objects of the organisation are seen, like dress code or language style or even the 
structure of buildings. These artefacts are difficult to interpret though, as in trying to 
do so, someone may mistakenly apply their preconceived cultural beliefs which may be 
different from that of the organisation. The second level is Espoused Beliefs and 
Values, where standards and protocols about the behaviour of the organisation are 
defined, to represent the character of the organisation internally and externally.  
A fitting example demonstrating Schein’s second level of culture from the 
context of CCGs and decision-making is here drawn from the Gloucestershire CCG. In 
2014, Gloucestershire CCG purposed that, to maintain a high standard of the “NHS’s 
reputation locally”, they were going to promote an open culture between their 
organisation and the local population (Gloucestershire Clinical Commissioning Group 
2014). This strategy was supported by the statement, “We want to: ‘ensure effective 
communication and engagement with patients, carers, community partners, the public 
and clinicians’ and be ‘accountable and transparent in our decision making’” 
(Gloucestershire Clinical Commissioning Group 2014, p.2). The framework of this open 
Artefacts




Espoused Beliefs and 
Values
- Strategies, goals, values
- Rationalisation 
(May or may not be congruent 
with behaviour and other 
artefacts)
Basic Underlying Assumptions
- Unconscious taken-for-granted beliefs and 
values




culture approach was set to encourage “equality” in an environment that enabled 
“‘Anyone and Everyone’ to have a voice”. To achieve this, Gloucestershire CCG aimed 
to “provide ‘Information and good Communication’, focus on ‘Experience’ feedback 
and undertake good ‘Engagement and Consultation’” (Gloucestershire Clinical 
Commissioning Group 2014, p.3).  
Other attributes in the CCG context demonstrating Schein’s second level of 
culture are revealed on the baseline results of a study that North Durham CCG 
conducted which was focused on their culture (North Durham Clinical Commissioning 
Group 2013). Characteristics such as, (1) people feeling involved in the scheme and 
believing that they can make a difference (study found the CCG strong on this), (2) 
being clear about the “core values and the behaviour expected” (study found the CCG 
strong on this), (3) identification of leadership communication clarity (study found the 
CCG lacking on this), (4) the level of consistency and predictability (study found the 
CCG lacking on this), and (5) smarter approach to sharing information (study found the 
CCG lacking on this). 
The third level of Schein’s definition of culture is Basic Underlying 
Assumptions. This is where the shared assumptions that manifest in unconscious 
behaviour from the organisation’s employees exist. This space operates under 
unwritten rules, which could be the reason that it is widely known as a soft dimension 
because of its informal nature (Janicijevic 2017). Basic underlying assumptions of 
culture may unwittingly affect the decision-making process by obscuring the way 
decision-makers “interpret environments and evaluate decision-making process” 
(Strutton & Carter 2013, p.2). Ultimately, “the rationality of decision-making 
processes” is undermined. Culture is one of the main factors that “highly experienced 
executives” acknowledge has an impact on decision-making. A report by McKinsey 
indicated that 72% of the executives “admitted their organizations’ top decision-
making processes were as likely to be flawed as high quality” (Lovallo & Sibony 2010 
cited in Strutton & Carter 2013, p.1) because of the influence that culture has on 
decision-makers. From the standpoint of the CCGs, organisational culture could impact 
decision-making in several ways, which include communication, GP member practice 
engagement, accountability, transparency, equality, consistency, and kindness.  
21 
 
While it is desirable for everyone in the organisation to understand their organisational 
culture, it is even more crucial for the leaders to embrace this phenomenon (Schein 
2017). Failure to do this may result in resistance to development and change, from the 
employees (Schein 2017); thereby creating an environment that is “toxic” at work to all 
parties concerned. That kind of culture was an accusation levelled at Sheffield CCG, 
which was fraught with allegations of bullying (Collins 2019). Such culture can be 
characterised as “unhealthy” and “uncaring”, as was alleged by one of the employees 
in Sheffield CCG concerning their organisation. 
2.3.4 Mintzberg’s models  
Turning back to Mintzberg’s models in the structure of organisations, there are five 
that Mintzberg produced – namely, the simple model, the bureaucratic model, the 
professional model, adhocracy, and the divisionalized adhocracy (Mintzberg 1979). As 
stated earlier, for this thesis, technicalities of these models in organisational 
structuring will be kept to a minimum, with specific interest directed on the import 
that these structures have in influencing decision-making.  
Simple model: the simple model is principally used in small organisational 
settings. Control in this setup is typically autocratic with the top manager making all 
the decisions and the support staff following the orders. The structure is basic with the 
roles of the support staff frequently overlapping and run under the direct supervision 
of the top manager. Features like formalisation do not exist. A distinct advantage of 
this structure is that it is highly adaptable to change, although it is inefficient.  
Bureaucratic model: the bureaucratic model is highly formalised, typically 
found in mature organisations with workflows that are standardised and performed 
under predefined strict protocols, operating more like a machine. This model is 
characterised as being an epitome “of Weber’s (1947) ideal bureaucracy” (Lunenburg 
2012, p.4). Decision-making is predominantly centralised, with little contribution from 
the operations staff, thus resulting in a tall chain of command.  
Professional model: this variant has a similar bureaucratic structure like the 
bureaucratic model, and is also highly formalised, in which “programmes, protocols, 
and procedures … are prescribed in advance” (Janicijevic 2017, p.73). However, it 
differs from the bureaucratic model in that decision-making is consigned to 
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knowledgeable professionals who are experts in their fields. In this context, the 
experts are given operational autonomy; in that way typifying decentralised decision-
making style. Basically, the professional model employs both vertical and horizontal 
styles in its approach. 
Adhocracy: adhocracy model has similarities to the professional model in that 
decision-making is conferred to experts. However, in this background, there is no 
standardised blueprint of procedures that need to be followed. Experts have the 
entitlement to run intricate business processes, making decisions suited to the 
presenting needs, and using whatever innovative ways that they deem appropriate to 
address situations in hand. Formalisation in this model is very low, and so is 
centralisation.  
Divisionalized adhocracy: the divisionalized adhocracy model is typically found 
in large organisations where the business is broken down into different divisions with 
specific management appointed to the respective units. This kind of structure usually is 
run under a centralised approach per divisional unit, with a tendency to resemble the 
machinist style of bureaucratic model. 
Janicijevic (2017) grouped four of Mintzberg’s models into two classes based on 
their degree of centralisation and formalisation. The former classification is relative to 
the distribution of power over the decisions made in the organisation while the latter 
has to do with “the extent to which processes are covered by formal procedures and 
the extent of specialization and task standardization in the given structure” (Janicijevic 
2017, p.74), as demonstrated in Figure 2.4.   
 
Figure 2.4 Mintzberg’s models of organisational structure 
23 
 
The next sections look deeper into the concepts of centralisation and decentralisation, 
exploring these in broad general terms while at the same time specific application is 
made using two well recognised organisational structure examples derived from the 
NHS. These are the defunct Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) which were replaced by the 
CCGs, here being used to exemplify the centralised organisations, and the CCGs, here 
being used to illustrate the decentralised organisations.  Arguments about PCTs and 
CCGs are, at this stage, made from the ideal theoretical perspective which originally 
underpinned the development of these models as opposed to the real-world 
scenarios, which are reviewed later, accordingly. Considered from Mintzberg’s 
structuring of organisations models, the characteristics of the PCTs manifest the 
bureaucratic model while those of CCGs exhibit the professional model (Chapter 1, 
Section 1.1.1).  The NHS has a high level of formalisation, as demonstrated by the 
decision-making structures, which are discussed in the next sections (Sections 2.3.5 
and 2.3.6).  
2.3.5 Centralised organisational structures  
Whether a system is centralised or not depends on the way authority is 
wielded. Authority in this instance is taken to denote power, control, and 
accountability (Anheier 2005; Huber & McDaniel 1986) exercised “over the decisions 
made in the organization” (Mintzberg 1979, p.181). “If authority is closely held, the 
organization is said to be more centralized; if authority is spread out, the organization 
is described as more decentralized” (Huber & McDaniel 1986, p.581). Centralised 
designs are generally characterised by tall structures, also known as vertical structures 
in which the striking characteristic that they bear is “many levels of management” 
(Ghiselli & Siegel 1972, p.617). In other words, they are hierarchical. Hierarchy implies 
that the business is governed in layers, with those at the higher levels having more 
authority and responsibility than those at the lower levels (Mosley et al. 2014). In 
organisational theory, the traditional tall organisational structures fall under the 
classical theory where the classical theorists believe that a lack of hierarchy could 
mean the “loss of order, discipline, motivation and leadership” (Fairtlough 2006, p.5). 
While there has been a shift from the rigid conservative approach to hierarchical 
organisational configurations, many contemporary organisations still feature 
characteristics of this concept, specifically indicated by bureaucracy (McAuley et al. 
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2014) which is widely accepted in contemporary societies (Kumar & Kant 2005). The 
Business Dictionary (2018) defines bureaucracy as:  
“A system of administration distinguished by its (1) clear hierarchy of 
authority, (2) rigid division of labor, (3) written and inflexible rules, 
regulations, and procedures, and (4) impersonal relationships. Once 
instituted, bureaucracies are difficult to dislodge or change.” 
Max Weber conceived the concept of bureaucracy (Kumar and Kant 2005) 
which he modelled with protocols that had a rigid approach to ensure that everything 
in the organisation was done logically and orderly with employees directed by plainly 
described duties as well as rules and policies which stipulated their conduct while at 
work (Long-Crowell 2014; McAuley et al. 2014). This phenomenon led Weber to 
believe that if properly applied, bureaucracy would result in the most stable 
organisation (Long-Crowell 2014). Weber further believed that bureaucratic 
organisations are capable of handling more complex systems than those governed by 
traditional forms (Groth 2012). 
Applied to the NHS, the PCTs model well-represented bureaucracy in the sense 
of decisions about “who plans and buys treatment for patients” (BBC News 2013b).  
Established in 2001, the PCTs were delegated with the duty of commissioning and 
looking after the primary health care, including community and secondary services in 
the NHS (Wilkin et al. 2001). The structure of this model was characteristically 
hierarchical (see Figure 2.5) with the PCTs making commissioning decisions for the GP 
Practices while at the same time they (PCTs) received strategic direction from the 
centre, represented by the Department of Health and the Strategic Health Authority. 
In this background, the managers predominantly controlled the decision-making 
processes as well as the GPs. Whereas the GPs were at the service delivery point, 
looking after the patients, they had little or no input to the decisions made by the PCTs 
on how they should function, as depicted in Figure 2.5. This diagram is an illustration 
by BBC News at the level of the layperson’s understanding (BBC News 2013a; BBC 





Figure 2.5 PCT commissioning and reporting lines 
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Studies report that in some instances, managers in the PCTs did not have good 
relationships with the GPs (Naylor et al. 2013). The way PCTs functioned was almost 
uniform across the board from one geographical location to the other because of the 
policies that controlled them from the top. For example, concerning funds allocation to 
their local populations, all PCTs used a method called the weighted capitation formula 
which enabled them “to commission similar levels of health services for populations 
with similar need” (Department of Health 2011, p.7). On the contrary, CCGs vary in 
structure and operation with no one CCG similar to the other (Checkland et al. 2016; 
McDermott et al. 2015). 
One significant weakness that beset the PCTs, which is one of the leading 
reasons for the creation of the CCGs, was the lack of proper understanding of the 
needs of local patients, something which the CCGs were to remedy by involving “GPs 
from across their local area in the work [of commissioning]” (Robertson et al. 2016, 
p.20). The CCGs’ ethos is based on a “bottom-up” (Checkland et al. 2016) approach 
designed to meet the local needs of patients (Storey et al. 2018). This is different from 
the typical top-down arrangement characterising the bureaucracies. Lack of 
representation from the service delivery level in decision-making routines is a 
phenomenon generally recognised across bureaucracies. Often, in such settings, the 
top management’s depth and breadth of knowledge in specialist matters which may 
require expert knowledge may be deficient (Mosley et al. 2014). Typically, the level of 
specialist knowledge tends to be inversely proportional to the rank of seniority in the 
management hierarchy. This scenario is illustrated in Figure 2.6, which shows the 
“relative importance of managerial skills at different managerial levels” (Mosley et al. 
2014, p.16).  
As mentioned earlier, with regards to the PCTs scheme, the top management 
roles were typically occupied by non-medical personnel. Considering this, some 
experts argue for the expediency of involving relevant staff from the service delivery 
point in decision-making as they may be better qualified to determine whether the 
aspired “dreams” are achievable or not (Maughan 2010; Thompson 2010). This case is 
best illuminated using insights transferred from Maughan (2010), whose reasoning is 
set in a different context. Maughan (2010) claims that the exclusion of the relevant 
service delivery point personnel input to decision-making partly contributed to the 
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colossal failure of the infamous National Programme for IT (NPfIT) in the UK, which 
was designed to merge all patient records into a centrally managed repository across 
England (Parliamentary 2007). When the programme was abandoned in 2011 after 
running for almost ten years, the government had spent nearly £10 billion on it 
(Parliamentary 2013). A case in point here is about the importance of involving persons 
at the lower levels of the hierarchy if the perceived effective decision-making process 
is to be achieved.  
 
Figure 2.6 The relative importance of managerial skills at different managerial levels 
Another line of thought about bureaucracies is that they are efficient in matters 
of reporting relationships due to their unambiguous and well-defined structures that, 
according to Fairtlough (2006, p.7), “make life easier”. Decisions are reached quickly, 
as few people are involved in the process. Those who are involved are arguably more 
experienced in making decisions (Hummon 1970). On the other hand, there is yet 
another salient drawback worth highlighting about bureaucratic schemes. Decision-
makers are encouraged by the system to be “impersonal and rational” (McAuley et al. 
2014, p.76), a phenomenon that Merton (1968 p.253, cited in McAuley et al. 2014, 
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p.76) bemoans for developing leaders who are “bureaucratic virtuosos” with an ill-
defined view of the primary purpose of the organisation.  
2.3.6 Decentralised organisational structures 
As alluded earlier, decentralised organisations are, in this thesis, considered from the 
premise of decision-making authority, in line with Mintzberg’s position on this topic 
(Mintzberg 1979). Also, as mentioned earlier, all formalised organisational structures 
can be broadly classified based on the dominant manifested characteristics between 
the two ends of centralisation/decentralisation continuum (Mintzberg 1979). For 
example, adhocracy and professional models from the Mintzberg’s framework of 
organisational structuring exhibit more decentralisation than centralisation features, 
and therefore are viewed as decentralised configurations. While these structures may 
have some form of hierarchy, this phenomenon is a recognised feature in 
decentralised configurations as such is typically unavoidable in organisations of 
considerable size and complexity if chaos is to be avoided (Fairtlough 2006; Cooney 
1997).  
Another critical factor about decentralised configurations is their degree of 
formalisation, which, as pointed out earlier, is “the extent to which processes are 
covered by formal procedures” (Janicijevic 2017, p.74). As discussed earlier, 
adhocracies have low formalisation while the professional model has high 
formalisation. While the CCGs vary in many ways (Checkland et al. 2016; McDermott et 
al. 2015), they display high formalisation recognisable in processes covered by formal 
procedures that exist across the board. For example, (1) all CCGs should have a 
Governing Body, the highest authority for signing off decisions at CCG level 
(McDermott et al. 2015), (2) all CCGs are subject to an assurance framework where 
formal processes assessing the fitness of the CCGs in various factors are in place (NHS 
England 2016), and (3) CCGs are mandated by statute to formally support GP Practices 
in quality improvement (Naylor et al. 2013; NHS Commissioning Board 2012a).  
Mintzberg points out three forms of decentralisation as being discussed in the 
literature, which, for the present thesis, technicalities thereof will be kept to a 
minimum. The first is known as “vertical decentralisation”, where the dispersal of 
decision-making power is exercised by delegating decision-making authority to the 
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staff at the lower rank in a vertical hierarchy. The second form is “horizontal 
decentralisation”. In this variant decision-making authority is not only the preserve of 
managers but may also be dispersed to the non-management staff. The third and final 
form of decentralisation refers merely to services that are physically dispersed.  
There are further types of decentralisation from the standpoint of decisional 
powers alluded to by Mintzberg which this thesis will not describe as they were not 
relevant to this study. These are selective decentralisation and parallel 
decentralisation. Generally, whatever type of decentralisation that an organisation 
adopts, the decision-making process, in all cases, can be influenced at different stages 
of the process in one way or another. This situation is depicted in Figure 2.7 below, 
where a framework by Paterson (1969, cited in Mintzberg 1979) outlining different 
steps in the decision-making process is encapsulated.  
 
Figure 2.7 A continuum of control over the decision-making process (Adapted from Mintzberg 1979) 
SITUATION
•Presenting situation that needs to be resolved
INFROMATION
• Information for decision-makers
• Originator of information holds power to filter information that can be 
considered by decision-makers, thus influencing the choice that can be 
made
ADVICE
• Individual giving advice holds power to direct decision-makers' course
CHOICE
• At this point a choice from the given options is made. That is, a decision 
is made
AUTHORISATION
• Person authorising made decisions has power to control if those 
decisions are passed or blocked or even changed
• It is at this point that senior managers, frequently labelled as 
bureaucrats by media, wield their power over decision-making
EXECUTION
• Implementation of the decisions 
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There are several reasons for decentralisation, with two main ones relevant to the 
current research topic being, (1) the ability for “the organization to respond quickly to 
local conditions” (Mintzberg 1979, p.183), and (2) because of complexity of specifics 
that can be barely understood by the top manager, it is useful to assign decision-
making power to the persons “where knowledge is” (Mintzberg 1979, p.183). A third 
reason concerns motivation to the staff, particularly middle managers, which this 
approach could help them to prepare for higher responsibilities by enabling them to 
tap into their decision-making skills.  The discussion will now centre on CCGs under the 
auspices of the theoretical concept of decentralisation.  
2.3.6.1 Understanding the CCGs as decentralised bodies 
As already mentioned above, the objective of creating CCGs was to decentralise 
authority by getting the system to be run at a local level by clinicians who know their 
local population’s needs, with the aim of improving patient care (Moran et al. 2017b; 
NHS England 2015; Talbot 2014; United Kingdom Government 2012). The King’s Fund 
(2018), an independent charitable entity with interest in health and care issues in 
England, summarised the government’s vision in these words:  
“The reforms … are intended to ‘liberate professionals and providers from 
top-down control’ and to locate the headquarters of the NHS ‘in the 
consulting room and the clinic’”. (The King’s Fund 2018) 
The government’s literature describes the reforms as empowering the professionals by 
“giving them more autonomy” (Department of Health 2010, para 6.0, cited in 
Checkland et al. 2018, p.378). Andrew Lansley, the Health Secretary between May 
2010 and September 2012, illustrated the professed autonomy bestowed on the CCGs 
in a letter that he wrote to the CCGs’ clinical and managerial leads (Lansley 2012). He 
drew attention to the freedom of operation designed for the CCGs, stressing that they 
could operate under any structure that they deemed appropriate, so long as it 
supported the outcomes of the NHS budget. Additional to autonomy, Lansley’s letter 
introduces, as well as illustrates, the concept of self-managing teams, where 
organisational members self-regulate (Rickards 2012). The phenomenon of self-
managing teams with characteristics such as “freedom and discretion” (Langfred 2007, 
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p.885), has a bearing “in enabling rational decision-making” (Williams et al. 2018, 
p.691).  
Building on from the idea that the CCGs’ structure denotes Mintzberg’s 
professional model, it is useful at this point to mention the hierarchy that the CCGs 
have in their decision-making routines. In this respect, of all the different decision-
making units, the Governing Body is the highest authority (Checkland et al. 2016). In 
relation to the NHS as an organisation, the CCGs are part of a network of different 
schemes in the health care system comprising this wider organisation, the NHS. In this 
network, the CCGs are considered as organisations in their own right (Moran et al. 
2017b; McDermott et al. 2015; Imison et al. 2011).  
As discussed earlier, the decision-making process in decentralised structures is 
not only about the devolution of power to the decision-makers, but along with this, it 
is useful to be aware that the process of making decisions can be influenced at any 
point in the continuum of decision-making (see Figure 2.7). When viewed from this 
position (decision-making process continuum), CCGs can be regarded as being unique 
at micro-level in all the steps shown in Figure 2.7, in that they can control all those 
steps since they are self-managing entities which were granted autonomy to operate 
as they please. This means that they can collect their information from their local 
interested parties, they can analyse that information themselves, they can determine 
the best choice from the available options, they do not need to seek authorisation on 
the choice that they make, and they are the executioners of the made decisions. 
However, as will be seen later in Section 2.4, other players encroach those steps, in 
some instances, so much that the professed autonomy is negatively impacted.  
Shifting the focus back to the self-managing teams, Langfred (2004) calls 
attention to a potentially ‘crippling’ weakness in these schemes concerning their 
decision-making practices, particularly for those teams with high cohesiveness and 
trust. Langfred claims that such teams are susceptible to “groupthink”, whereby the 
team can fall into the trap of “group decision biases” (Janis 1982, cited in Langfred 
2004, p.386). To avoid being perceived as violating trust, some team members are 
likely to yield their views to their colleagues’ choices even if they may not agree with 
them. In this state, the team addresses “problems or issues as a collective group - no 
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matter what the facts are - instead of acting and thinking as individuals” (Pautz & 
Forrer 2013, p.1). To act otherwise may degrade the team’s unity, so they may think. In 
consequence, “People under groupthink begin to think alike and do not tolerate new 
ideas” (Wang & Wagner 2018, p.266), thereby, possibly, leading to sub-optimal 
decision-making. The literature refers to this kind of groupthink as negative groupthink 
(Pautz & Forrer 2013). There is also positive groupthink, a situation whereby a 
collective approach to a problem may produce better results than otherwise. For 
example, the team can “challenge each other with alternative strategies and solutions” 
(Pautz & Forrer 2013, p.3). Studies have shown that positive groupthink has produced 
better decisions in a group of non-experts than a group of experts (Solomon 2006, 
cited in Pautz & Forrer 2013). 
Internal dynamics of the CCGs 
To further understand the element of autonomy given to the CCGs, it is worth looking 
into the internal dynamics of these bodies as intended at their inception. To begin 
with, GPs with formal roles in their CCGs were designated to lead the system as they 
are the ‘vessels’ that deliver health care to the local communities, and hence should be 
better informed about the local needs (Checkland et al. 2016). All GP Practices were, 
by law, required to be a member of the local CCG, thereby making them be known as 
“member practices”. Member practices were set to be represented in different 
dimensions and different forms, depending on the CCG. As such, GP Practices have 
designated practice representatives who attend “meetings on behalf of the practice” 
(Naylor et al. 2013, p.12). The designated representative can either be “a GP or other 
health care professional, or, in some cases, the practice manager” (Naylor et al. 2013, 
p.12). As CCGs differ in structure and size, representation by respective practice 
personnel may be directly at CCG level or at a sub-committee level. As well as taking to 
the next committee level the interests of their local organs, the designated 
representatives are, in some instances, also held accountable for their practices. 
Naylor et al. (2013, p.14) best describe this scenario in the following words,  
“Most of the engagement and decision-making is conducted through 
practice representatives, who are expected to act on behalf of their practice 
… practice representatives will be held partially accountable for the 
behaviour of their practice colleagues … to ‘ensure that their practice… 














Figure 2.10 CCG commissioning and reporting lines 
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The authority with statutory responsibility for signing off decisions at CCG level is the 
Governing Body (McDermott et al. 2015), which is one of the three committees that 
every CCG is required to have under the Health and Social Care Act 2012. As hinted 
earlier, the top leadership of the Governing Body “was to be shared between an 
Accountable Officer (a GP or a manager) and Chair (clinical or non-clinical)” 
(McDermott et al. 2017, p.5). The other two committees mandated by statute are 
remuneration committee and audit committee. Outside these, individual CCGs were 
granted a prerogative to produce supplementary committees of any type and shape as 
they see fit. For example, Figure 2.8 and Figure 2.9 above illustrate two CCGs, 
Buckinghamshire CCG and Somerset CCG, with entirely different structures and 
hierarchies making up their committees.  
One aspect about the CCGs worth pointing out is that, although these entities 
were created to operate autonomously in terms of commissioning routines, they were, 
nonetheless, made to be accountable to the central authority, NHS England. Reporting 
lines of this setup are shown above in Figure 2.10. There are several layers of hierarchy 
above the CCG level, as depicted in the diagram (Figure 2.10). This should not be 
construed as an inconsistency over the notion of CCGs being decentralised entities.  
As explained earlier, centralisation and decentralisation are not mutually 
exclusive, but rather should be seen as two ends of a continuum (Mintzberg 1979). 
Instead of conflicting each other, the top-down (centralisation) and bottom-up 
(decentralisation) schemes can exist simultaneously in the same organisation, or 
network of organisations, to “serve complementary roles in the formation of 
operations strategy” (Kim et al. 2014, p.463). In this arrangement, the top-down 
approach operates at macro-level, outlining the overall organisation’s strategy – 
namely, goals and priorities, as well as allocating resources, whereas the bottom-up 
approach operates at micro-level fostering self-management in operational routines 
(Kim et al. 2014). That is, the operations strategy at service delivery point is informed 
by the way the operations staff perceive “the company’s direction, which may partially 
differ from top management’s [priorities]” (Kim et al. 2014, p.464). Mintzberg (1979, 
p.183) identifies this view as being one of the reasons to decentralise, as pointed out 
earlier, in which the specifics that the top management may barely understand are 
assigned to the persons “where knowledge is”. Applied to the CCGs, at macro-level 
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NHS England gives strategic direction along with the allocation of financial resources, 
as depicted in Chapter 1, Figure 1.1 (Department of Health 2012; NHS Commissioning 
Board 2012b). At micro-level, the CCGs were granted autonomy of self-management, 
already discussed in the previous paragraphs. 
PCTs had a slightly similar hierarchical arrangement to the CCGs in which layers 
above the PCT level had an overseeing role, which included the stipulation of strategic 
direction (see Figure 2.5). The theoretical difference between the PCTs and CCGs is 
that commissioning decisions in the PCTs were made with no direct involvement of 
personnel from service delivery point (GP Practices) whereas, in the case of the CCGs, 
the service delivery point leads in decision-making. The former used a top-down 
approach while the latter was created from onset to be a bottom-up approach with no 
provision for a central blueprint (Checkland et al. 2016). The literature describes the 
PCTs as having a “history of diminishing clinical involvement” (Naylor et al. 2013, p.x), 
something which the creation of the CCGs was meant to redress.  
In contrast to the initially intended purpose of the CCGs, which was getting 
commissioning decisions done at a local level and labelled as a service that knows the 
needs of the local population (described earlier in this section), the number of CCGs 
across England seems to be increasingly getting reduced through mergers and 
dissolutions. For example, just before launch in 2013, NHS England (2012) website 
listed a total of 212 CCGs across England. However, recently, the ‘GP Online’ website 
announced plans by NHS England to cut more than 75% of the CCGs through mergers 
or dissolutions citing the question of sustainability as the reason (Cook 2019). Already, 
at the time of writing of this thesis, several CCGs have been either merged or 
dissolved, with some sharing leadership as depicted on the map published by the 
Health Service Journal (Eddie 2018).  
2.3.6.2 Bureaucracy and CCGs 
At macro-level, the CCGs are subjected to schemes and policies meted through the 
arm of NHS England, requiring them (CCGs) to meet certain standards against which 
they are measured. For example, at the time when the current study was done, the 
CCGs were assessed against an assurance framework known as “CCG Improvement 
and Assessment Framework (CCG IAF)” (NHS England 2016). This framework centres 
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on “CCG’s performance in each of the indicator areas over the full year and balanced 
against the qualitative assessment of the leadership of the CCG” (NHS England 2016, 
p.9). Indicator areas that are assessed include patient health care – where conditions 
like “dementia” and “cancer” are evaluated, sustainability – in which factors like 
financial health and care models are appraised, leadership – in which aspects like 
“workforce engagement” and “CCGs’ local relationships” are considered.  
At micro-level, while the CCGs are accountable to NHS England where they are 
assessed under stringent indicators described above, it is likely, and possibly inevitable, 
that the same ‘draconian’ measures may have a ‘domino effect’ on other circles 
outside the CCGs. For example, the CCG Governing Bodies are set to hold the GP 
“practices to account for individual commissioning decisions” (Imison et al. 2011, p.5), 
while they (CCGs), in turn, are held to account by NHS England. Could this be the 
reason the GP Practices blame the CCGs for making policies that are an obstacle to 
efficient service delivery (BMA 2014a)?  
The scenario of bureaucratic clutches can be aggravated by the fact that CCGs’ 
top leadership roles of Accountable Officer and Chair are open to being occupied by 
non-clinical officers – that is, managers. These are strategic roles, so influential that 
the literature claims they have the power to steer the strategic direction of the local 
CCG (Storey et al. 2018). Opening these roles to the non-clinical persons raised 
eyebrows of the media, leading to one of the newspapers to publish an item about it 
contemptuously headlined, “Bureaucrats Return to Lead Doctors’ Groups” 
(Independent 2012).  Because of the critical influence that leadership has, the next 
section reviews the concept of leadership, with application to the CCGs where 
relevant. Communication is then discussed from the context of the influence that it has 
on the decision-making process. 
2.3.7 Leadership and governance  
Williams et al. (2018, p.685) designate governance jointly with leadership as being “the 
modes of practice in relation to leading and managing the organisations within which 
the decision-making function is embedded”. Meanwhile, as well as seeing governance 
as being about “performance management relating to the actions associated with the 
decision”, Robinson et al. (2011, p.63) identify this concept with politics that enables 
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coalition-building by commissioners, that goes beyond formal lines of performance 
management. Robertson et al. (2011) contend that in so doing, the commissioners 
place themselves in a more amiable position that will not only legitimise them and 
make them acceptable to their stakeholders but will also set their decisions to be 
equally treated. In this thesis, I similarly view the concept of governance as Robertson 
et al. (2011).  
Regarding leadership, interest in this thesis is focused on the CCGs’ top 
leadership; a function shared between the Accountable Officer and the Chair 
(McDermott et al. 2017; Clinical Commissioning Board 2012a). Leadership is a “critical 
determinant of success” (Williams & Brown 2014, p.11). Persons appointed to these 
positions usually hold credentials of previous experience in a similar role and/or have 
an education that has prepared them for the role (Mumford et al. 2000). When viewed 
from this standpoint, the situation with the CCGs concerning leadership may be tricky. 
It is because the CCGs’ leadership roles are not only occupied by managers, who 
usually get trained for this task but are also occupied by clinical personnel, who, by 
contrast, are not routinely trained for such responsibilities. One of the GPs in a recent 
study intimated this situation, commenting that, “I think the clinicians in those roles 
find it quite tough sometimes because it is not something that clinicians are trained 
for” (Storey et al. 2018, p.50).  
Additional to the challenge of whether one has training or not in leadership, is a 
layer of complexity existing within the CCGs’ scheme, which is service redesign. 
Regarding this, Storey et al. (2018, p.7) remark that “attempting to lead changes in 
service redesign across the complex boundaries in primary and secondary care is a very 
different challenge”. To this effect, Storey et al. (2018, p.7) discovered that leadership 
within the service redesign context was ‘spearheaded’ “by informal leaders, as well as 
those occupying formal roles within CCGs”. While CCGs were designed to be led by the 
GPs, and that the clinicians should be part of the leadership roles, studies have shown 
that, generally, there are fewer GPs in a leadership position in the CCGs than managers 
(Storey et al. 2018; Checkland et al. 2016). This observation can arguably be viewed as 
substantiating the allegation that was levelled by the Independent (2012) in its bulletin 
headed, “Bureaucrats Return to Lead Doctors’ Groups”. 
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Notwithstanding, Storey et al. (2018) identified obstacles to having a higher 
representation of GPs in leadership positions as being, (1) lack of time, a commodity 
that the GPs regularly complain about, (2) lack of capability – that is, GPs are not 
trained in leadership in general, (3) lack of influence. In this aspect, the GPs 
characterised the system as lacking autonomy because of control from the macro-level 
centre, organs like NHS England. As such, even if they were to try to steer the 
direction, their vision may not be realised, and (4) money, which the GPs complained 
about, citing that there was little incentive in that regard for them to take leadership 
roles. 
One aspect of leadership, which this thesis does not explore in depth as it is 
outside the scope of discussion, is leadership style. There is, however, an element 
closely related to leadership style which is of interest to this study. It is destructive 
leadership, a leadership behaviour which the literature characterises as being a dark 
side of leadership (Conger 1990). This leadership behaviour is associated with 
connotations like “toxic leaders”, “intolerable bosses”, “petty tyrants”, and “bullies” 
(Einarsen et al. 2007, p.208). The literature claims that the consequences of 
destructive leadership behaviour are not only limited to the affected individual 
members of the organisation but also have wider “negative outcomes” on the 
organisation as an entity (Padilla et al. 2007). For example, could it be the case that the 
recently reported news which took place in the Sheffield CCG was because of 
destructive leadership behaviour? Health Service Journal, a news service covering the 
NHS, recently reported about how Sheffield CCG “is facing serious questions over its 
leadership and culture, amid bullying allegations” (Collins 2019). This followed the 
period after the appointment of a new Accountable Officer. It is reported that the 
environment was soured with a “breakdown in relationships” and suspension of senior 
staff. Former and current CCG employees are said to have described the culture in this 
CCG as “toxic”.  
Contrary to the above leadership issues, Storey et al. (2018, p.6) discuss the 
need for leaders in the health service to be compassionate, thereby “keeping with the 
caring nature of the services provided in health”. Besides, whether clinical or non-
clinical, the candidates for leadership should possess an attribute of influence, being 
one of the most expressive qualities (Coleman 1990, cited in Gronn 2002). The kind of 
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influence alluded to here is the one which is so contagious that some scholars regard it 
as being “mysterious chemistry… that causes some individuals to be followed and 
others to follow” (Lorsch et al. 1978, cited in McAuley et al. 2014, p.194).   
2.3.8 Communication  
Communication, a central tenet to the organisational well-being and success 
(McDermott et al. 2017), is here reviewed from the standpoint of centralised and 
decentralised organisational configurations with the influence that this concept has on 
the decision-making process highlighted. In centralised organisational configurations 
communication across different lines is typically unidirectional (Mosley et al. 2014; 
Huber & McDaniel 1986), thus slow to get through as the message has to traverse 
different layers (Business Case Studies 2015). Conversely, in decentralised 
configurations where layers are relatively fewer, communication is usually quicker 
(Powell 2002). Regarding decentralised structures fostering a bottom-up culture, like 
the way CCGs were intended to be (Checkland et al. 2016), insights transferred from 
public relations and management research studies indicate that about 70% of the vital 
information comes from the ‘grassroots’ (Stoffels 1994 cited in Park et al. 2014).  
To achieve optimum communication, Grunig and Hunt (1984) proposed “the 
most effective way of communicating” that they named as “two-way symmetrical 
approach” (cited in Park et al. 2014, p.542). This method “uses communication to 
promote mutual understanding, resolve conflict, and establish respect between the 
organisation and its publics by encouraging communication symmetry” (Park et al. 
2014, p. 542). It would be difficult to apply the principles of effective communication 
to centralised formations in a manner described in the two-way symmetrical approach 
as communication in these structures is typically one-way, in a top-down direction 
(Mosley et al. 2014; Huber & McDaniel 1986). Park et al. (2014, p.542) identify the 
communication style seen in centralised structures with what they term, 
“asymmetrical communication approach”. Grunig and Hunt (1984, cited in Park et al. 
2014, p.542) characterised this communication style as being “selfish because the 
organizations in this approach assume that their interest or position is right or more 
important whereas that of publics is not”. Conversely, with symmetrical 
communication model fitting decentralised organisational structures like CCGs, 
employees are provided with “more opportunities for dialogue, discussion, and 
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discourse on issues” (ibid). Organisations fostering characteristics like communication 
openness are more predisposed to realising ingenuity and innovation from their staff 
whereas employees are likely to be dissatisfied at work if they feel that their 
organisations are poor at communication (Park et al. 2014). 
2.4  CCGs – What research has revealed  
This section looks at the real-life practical issues that occur within the CCGs as revealed 
by research. When considered from Mintzberg’s models of organisational structuring, 
the account from the previous studies demonstrates that the CCGs, in reality, straddle 
between the professional model and the bureaucratic model, with the perceived 
tendency supporting the latter, as will be gathered in the following sections. 
2.4.1 The question of autonomy  
To begin with, administration of the CCGs “was intended to be ‘bottom up’” 
(Checkland et al. 2016, p.1), structured in such a way that decision-making and policy 
formulation would be conducted at local level. In this context, GPs would lead, which is 
why given this reform The King’s Fund (2018) flagged that the NHS headquarters will 
be in the consulting room. Member practices would inform the CCGs about their 
wishes through appropriate channels that individual CCGs set up. Important as this 
scheme was designed to be, research has identified barriers to CCGs being wholly 
autonomous in decision-making matters to effectively meet local needs (Robertson et 
al. 2016). In fact, a study by Naylor et al. (2013, p.46) discovered that some GPs were 
sceptical about “the political narrative around local freedom and autonomy” and 
questioned if it would “manifest itself in reality”. There are too many constraining 
factors which suffocate the supposed autonomy both vertically and horizontally. 
Autonomy from the top-down administration, that is – at macro-level, is stifled by a 
“strict and prescriptive assurance regime” (Checkland et al. 2018, p.390) explained in 
Section 2.3.6.2. Research has revealed that some CCGs are disappointed by “the 
nature of the assurance regime, finding it to be hierarchical rather than collaborative 
or developmental” (Checkland et al. 2018, p.386). 
Autonomy at micro-level – that is, locally, is restricted by the inherent 
complexity of local environments. The complexity in question concerns the abundance 
of organisations that the CCGs are not only accountable to but must also deal with to 
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fulfil their mandate. These include bodies such as “local authority Health and 
Wellbeing Boards”, “Monitor”, “local government Health Scrutiny Committees”, 
“‘Commissioning Support Units (CSUs)”, “System Resilience Groups”, “Urgent and 
Emergency Care Networks”, “Specialised Commissioning Collaboratives”, and 
“Sustainability and Transformation Plans”, as noted by Checkland et al. (2018). To this 
end, Checkland et al. (2018, p.389) argue that “CCGs’ freedom to act, even if they have 
formal autonomy from the centre, is likely to be limited by the need to co-ordinate, 
collaborate and interact with other local actors”. Another dimension of complexity in 
the same question of CCG’s operations is intrinsic to individual CCGs. Research has 
shown that “CCG structures and governance arrangements” (McDermott et al. 2015, 
p.5) are dissimilar from each other and are attended by a high degree of complexity. 
While all CCGs have, by statute, Governing Body, Audit, and Remuneration committees 
– outside these, it is not possible to tell with accuracy what other committees there 
are and who comprises them across different CCGs (Checkland et al. 2016; McDermott 
et al. 2015). Of concern in this diversity is ambiguity about what GPs should do, leading 
to discovery by research that some roles that the GPs occupy duplicate tasks of others 
under the same CCG due to a multiplicity of committees (McDermott et al. 2015). This 
complication is compounded by the cost implication to the CCGs owing to the value 
that the GPs’ time carries (McDermott et al. 2015). Additionally, research has revealed 
that CCGs are handicapped by budgetary deficits respecting the funds that they 
receive from the central government in contrast to the actual needs at local level 
(Drake 2016; Robertson et al. 2016), an issue described and detailed next.  
2.4.2 Finance 
While the CCGs were given authority to run their budgets, barely a few months 
following their launch, “the Health Service Journal (HSJ) reported that nine CCGs were 
forecasting large overspends in their first year of operation” (Wood & Heath 2014, 
p.10). At the time, it was argued that possibly the CCGs underestimated “how much of 
their commissioning budget would be transferred to NHS England for commissioning 
specialist services under the changes to the health system” (Wood & Heath 2014, 
p.10). At the time of writing of this thesis just over five years from the official launch of 
the CCGs, Healthcare Financial Management Association (HFMA), a UK charitable body 
“promoting the highest standards in financial management and governance in 
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healthcare” (HFMA 2018), revealed that “a total of 83 CCGs reported an overspend 
against plan at the end of quarter two” (HFMA 2017, p.3). The research that HFMA 
(2017) conducted yielded an assortment of discoveries regarding the financial health 
of the CCGs and the entire NHS. The chief finance officers and financial directors 
indicated matters such as high risk to their 2017/18 financial plan, unachievable 
2017/18 budgetary control, and lack of confidence in making any savings. What is 
more, before the financial years just cited above, not long after the CCGs were 
launched, the Health Secretary is known to have conceded to the fact that the NHS 
was in its worst financial crisis (Mirror 2015).  
Because the CCGs were granted freedom to operate as they saw fit, a possible 
consequence of this included the rationing of services, imposed to save money given 
the low funding levels that the CCGs generally faced as described above. For example, 
it was reported that Devon CCG had announced that it was going to restrict all routine 
surgery for obese patients and smokers as well as restrict all routine shoulder surgery 
for all patients (The Guardian 2015).  
2.4.3 Member practice engagement   
Another aspect that research has revealed is a lack of constant engagement that CCGs 
should have with member practices (Drake 2016; Robertson et al. 2016). While 
previous research indicated a higher rate of satisfaction about the way GPs felt 
regarding the level of engagement that they have with the CCGs when compared with 
the previous system of Primary Care Trust (PCT) (Robertson et al. 2014; Naylor et al. 
2013), recent research has shown that CCGs struggle to engage “with all GPs in a local 
area” (Robertson et al. 2016). In a 2014 survey, 35% of the GPs without formal roles in 
the CCGs indicated that they felt they could influence decisions made by their local 
CCG whereas in a recent study only 20% could make the same claim (Bostock 2016). 
The most recent research suggests that the decline in member practice engagement 
could be due to practice workloads which “were impeding engagement with clinical 
leadership” (Storey et al. 2018, p.35). This corroborated the observation by 
McDermott et al. (2015, p.96) where concerns were raised “that GPs and other 
clinicians were too busy with their own practices and work to become engaged with 
the CCG”. Other possible reasons that Naylor et al. (2013) identified as being barriers 
to engagement are; first, the financial climate, which was perceived as being a limiting 
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factor to the GP Practices as some GPs did not see any value in spending time in 
commissioning matters, which they could use fruitfully on their main responsibility, 
thereby helping maintain good relationships with their patients. Secondly, 
communication was also found to be an issue. For example, relying on one person to 
act as a conduit between the CCG and the practice could be attended with delays in 
passing information. Also, there may be too much information from the CCG which 
overwhelms the practice staff, or simply that the information is provided in an un-
understandable format to the GPs.  
Studies have shown various ways that CCGs engage with their member 
practices. These include, (1) engagement “through quality assurance visits” 
(McDermott et al. 2015, p.83), in which focus is not so much directed on inspection 
than identification of areas where service could be developed, (2) “education and 
training” that involve a discussion of subjects such as the role of the CCGs and the 
function of the GPs with formal roles in the CCGs (McDermott et al. 2015), (3) direct 
‘ad hoc’ telephone calls to the Governing Body members using a ‘hotline’ (Naylor et al. 
2013); and (4) use of CCG websites to access information as well as giving feedback, in 
some instances (Naylor et al. 2013). Research has also revealed that CCGs have faced 
challenges in addressing conflicts of interest (Robertson et al. 2016), a subject 
reviewed next.  
2.4.4 Conflicts of interest 
Conflicts of interest, in the context of the CCGs relates to “GPs commissioning 
themselves or their practices to provide services” (Moran et al. 2017a, p.1), thus 
creating a risk that their “ability to apply judgement … could be, impaired” (Moran et 
al. 2017a, p.1). This puts the GPs in a predicament that, when undertaking their CCG 
responsibilities, they are actively encouraged to disconnect from being providers to 
avoid a conflict of interest (Baird et al. 2016). It appears like the question of conflicts of 
interest is like an ‘elephant in the room’ for the CCGs, flagged repeatedly in different 
studies (Storey et al. 2018; Moran et al. 2017a; Holder et al. 2016; McDermott et al. 
2015; Naylor et al. 2013). One CCG manager in a recent study remarked that the 
question of conflicts of interest was so huge that it worried him or her (Storey et al. 
2018). Some of the points of interest on this question that different studies have 
discovered are discussed next. 
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A study undertaken by McDermott et al. (2015) not long after the CCGs were launched 
did not only identify concerns touching commissioning on the question of the conflicts 
of interest but also stated an additional dimension that the respondents mentioned, 
which was allocation of time to the GPs with formal roles in the CCGs for them to 
perform their CCG related tasks. That is, the respondents expressed concern that time 
allocated to them was not enough, thereby leading them to work on CCG work in the 
evenings and weekends. As a result, one GP is reported as having “left their practice 
entirely to take up a full time CCG role” (McDermott et al. 2015, p.108). In the same 
study, it was discovered that the conflicts of interest were labelled as being “one of the 
greatest risks” (McDermott et al. 2015, p.17). In a study published in 2016, it was 
discovered that 20% of the GPs expressed concern about their CCGs’ ability to 
efficiently handle the matter of conflicts of interest (Holder et al. 2016). In 2017, 
Moran et al. (2017a) dedicated their entire study on this topic of the conflicts of 
interest in which they stated that, because of the conflicts of interest, NHS England 
published guidance to help the CCGs to manage this issue. The latest at the time was 
revised guidance produced in 2016 which was said to be an improvement on the 
guidance produced initially in 2014. Moran et al. (2017a) reiterated the criticality of 
the subject of the conflicts of interest, which they claimed to have “gained renewed 
attention”. While the CCGs have set governance structures to manage the conflicts of 
interest, Moran et al. (2017a, p.12) contend that they are not adequate given that 
“simply disclosing an interest does not prevent GPs and practice managers from 
influencing discussions about primary care, which may undermine their public 
stewardship role”. A striking example substantiating the above argument can be drawn 
from the Crawley CCG where the Chair “breached a conflict of interest rule” (Clover 
2019), as reported in the Health Service Journal (HSJ) bulletin. While this case did not 
directly concern commissioning decisions, it reflects the argument that “disclosing an 
interest does not prevent GPs” or managers from breaching the protocol. The case in 
question mentions that the Chair advocated “for a technology company that had paid 
his consultancy firm £35,000”.  
2.4.5 CCG roles occupied by GPs 
McDermott et al. (2015, p.30) suggested that “asking what the role of GPs is or should 
be in CCGs is a complex question with as many answers as there are CCGs”. This 
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viewpoint is supported by Drake (2016) who first references the NHS Commissioning 
Board (NHSCB) that provides a guideline of the roles that GPs should assume. Drake 
then goes on to mention that additional to the NHSCB guidelines, “there is scope for 
choice and variability in CCG roles and the mixture of clinical and non-clinical 
members” (Drake 2016, p.126), which could be the reason for this lack of awareness.  
Another interesting thing about the GP roles is what research has shown 
regarding leadership positions. In this respect, research has revealed that many CCGs 
have experienced challenges in getting the GPs who are willing to serve in leadership 
positions (Storey et al. 2018). Instead, non-clinical managers have assumed these roles 
bringing along “hierarchical structures”, thereby leading to the persistence of “the 
centre-led influence” (Storey et al. 2018, p.xvii). The possible reasons for having 
relatively fewer GPs in the top leadership roles are delineated in Section 2.3.7, where a 
focused discussion on leadership is made. 
2.4.6 Summary of Previous research findings and knowledge gaps 
The BMA (2014a) pronounced that, “Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) in England, 
a flagship of the government’s health reforms, have failed to deliver overall 
improvements to patient care or involve more GPs in the running of services”. At the 
time, the BMA’s study revealed that the GPs were not happy with the polices that the 
CCGs produced, which they felt were restricting them from efficiently performing their 
function of delivering health care service in the English NHS. To understand the CCGs 
and their decision-making routines which arguably produce what the GPs viewed as 
‘hostile’ policies, a summary of the literature has revealed the following.  
First, while at inception, the CCGs were originally intended to be autonomous, 
operating at a bottom-up style designed to effectively meet local needs (Robertson et 
al. 2016), studies have shown differently, as discussed in Section 2.4.1. This situation is 
exacerbated by the question of limited finances, reviewed in Section 2.4.2, that the 
CCGs must operate under yet at the same time being expected to deliver high quality 
services. Stifled autonomy and limited finances leads to questions as to whether the 
intended professional model (Mintzberg 1979) is happening in practice. Also revealed 
in the previous studies is a lack on the part of CCGs regarding constant member 
practice engagement which, consequently, may detach the CCGs from the local 
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services, as discussed in Section 2.4.3. Another striking phenomenon that studies have 
shown is the conflicts of interest, a factor which is a big challenge for many CCGs in 
their decision-making routines, as discussed in Section 2.4.4. While these factors may 
be viewed as contributing to the formulation of the policies that the GPs perceive as 
‘hostile’, there appears to be a void in the knowledge base about the factors 
contributing to the effective decision-making process, as perceived by the GPs, a gap 
that the current study sought to fill. Besides, there is a limited understanding of what 
the GPs do in their respective local CCGs because of the variability in their roles, as 
discussed in Section 2.4.5, another gap that the current study also sought to fill. 
The next section presents a conceptual framework where different elements 
gathered from the review of the literature are pulled together and then used to inform 
the direction of the study. 
2.5 Conceptual framework – CCGs and organisational structure  
In this section, a conceptual framework of decision-making structures and associated 
processes within the CCGs is developed. Here, latent variables of factors influencing an 
environment conducive to a GP-led decision-making process are identified, and the 
associated propositions are developed. As well as providing a basis for statistical 
hypotheses testing, the conceptual framework informed the formulation of the 
qualitative questions which related to the research hypotheses. To this end, six latent 
variables were derived from published studies done on CCGs cited elsewhere in this 
thesis (Checkland et al. 2018; HFMA 2018; Moran et al. 2017a; HFMA 2017; Checkland 
et al. 2016; Holder et al. 2016; Robertson et al. 2016; McDermott et al. 2015; BMA 
2014a; Naylor et al. 2013). “Latent variables”, also known as a latent constructs or 
unobserved variables (Lowry & Gaskin 2014; Carrascal et al. 2009; Henseler et al. 2009; 
Bozionelos 2003) represent concepts that cannot be measured directly but are 
estimated using proxies. In the interest of consistency, this thesis uses the term latent 
variable. Latent variables make it possible to model a complete estimate causal 
network simultaneously in which, for instance, “the effect of A  B can be estimated 
while also estimating the effects of A  C and B  C, as well as the indirect effect of A 
on C through B” (Lowry & Gaskin 2014, p.125).  
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The six latent variables mentioned above that I produced are Decision-making Process 
Effectiveness, Member Practice Wishes Met, Satisfaction, GP Influence, GP Proportion, 
and Higher Authority Control. The first four were dependent latent variables, which 
means that their impact was causally influenced by another variable linked to them 
using the principle of causal relationships while the last two were independent, not 
influenced by an external variable. As such, theoretical propositions explaining the 
causal relationships were developed accordingly. Theoretical proposition in this sense 
refers to the research hypotheses – that is, a ‘high-level’ version of statistical 
hypothesis (Presthus & Munkvold 2016) in which “a functional statement of cause and 
effect (e.g. changes in X cause changes in Y; Y is a function of X)” (Lowry & Gaskin 2014, 
p.126-127) is used to describe the relationship.  
While the preceding paragraphs in this section reference a phenomenon of 
causal relationships across different latent variables, it is essential to note that cross-
sectional studies, such as the current research, do “not allow causality assertions. 
Causality in cross-sectional research can be only speculated” (Bozionelos 2003, p.7). 
Conversely, longitudinal and experimental studies provide relatively stronger causal 
relationships rationales (Bagozzi and Yi 2012). Considering this, Bozionelos (2003, p.7) 
advises that “to assign causality in cross-sectional investigations ample theoretical and 
background knowledge of the nature of the included variables is imperative”. The 
current study achieved this requirement through an in-depth review of literature 
about the phenomenon of study, presented in the previous sections in this chapter. 
This exercise helped to justify the assumptions about causality in the model. Even so, 
because of the uncertainty over the causality assertion, the theoretical propositions 
(hypotheses) that I developed were nondirectional, meaning that they were not 
suggestive of any direction of causality, but simply indicated that a difference exists 
(Brewer & Stockton 2010). In contrast, directional hypotheses, which are typically 
based on foreknowledge of the phenomenon being investigated, derived from sources 
such as past research, assert the direction of causality by use of key words such as 
“higher, lower, more, less, increase, decrease, positive, and negative” (Brewer & 
Stockton 2010, p.366). 
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2.5.1 Independent latent variables 
GP Proportion: Related to the rest of the latent variables, was the question of the 
proportion of the GPs in the decision-making panels. Studies have shown that the GPs 
are perceived to be relatively less influential in meetings when compared to the 
managers (Holder et al. 2016; Naylor et al. 2013). As such, since GPs are perceived as 
being less influential in the Governing Body meetings, does the proportion of their 
numbers in the same platform have any significance on decision-making? This question 
prompted the creation of latent variable GP Proportion designed to empirically explore 
the bearing of the GPs’ proportion in the Governing Body from the context of the 
current study. The feeling that, if the proportion of GPs is generally higher in the 
Governing Body, GPs’ level of influence could possibly be augmented as well, led to the 
following theoretical proposition, 
Proposition 1 (P1): A high proportion of GPs in the Governing Body committee 
will cause a difference in the level of GP influence. 
Higher Authority Control: the conception of this latent variable was driven by 
two main aspects discussed in the literature concerning the CCGs directly and 
impliedly. These are the authority and control that leadership and bureaucracy have 
(McAuley et al. 2014; Williams & Brown 2014; Mintzberg 1979). The literature shows 
how influential leadership can be in steering the strategic direction of the organisation 
(McAuley et al. 2014; Williams & Brown 2014; Einarsen et al. 2007; Padilla et al. 2007; 
Gronn 2002). Regarding the CCGs, Storey et al. (2018) specifically mention the 
influence that the roles of the Chair and Accountable Officer have at local CCG level. 
What is more, it is possible that due to the “strict and prescriptive assurance regime” 
(Checkland et al. 2018, p.390) meted out by NHS England, explained in Section 2.3.6.2, 
leadership in various levels within the CCGs’ spheres of operation could have no choice 
but extend such severe measures to their domains of operation in order to meet NHS 
England’s requirements. As a result, the perceived decision-making process 
effectiveness along with the member practice wishes being met plus the degree of GP 
satisfaction about decision-making, may all be impacted. For this reason, I devised the 
following three propositions. 
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Proposition 2 (P2): Higher authority control in the Governing Body committee 
will influence the decision-making process effectiveness. 
Proposition 3 (P3): Higher authority control in the Governing Body committee 
will influence the member practice wishes being met. 
Proposition 4 (P4): Higher authority control in the Governing Body committee 
will influence the degree of GP satisfaction about decision-making. 
2.5.2 Dependent latent variables 
GP Influence: Closely related to the GP proportion, was another question that the 
current study developed to understand the degree of influence that the GPs had in 
decision-making routines. Although research has indicated that, in general, managers – 
that is, non-clinical officers, were more influential than GPs in the committee meetings 
(Holder et al. 2016; Naylor et al. 2013), it was useful to explore the same subject from 
the context of the current study. The premise of the argument in this study was that, 
since the CCGs were designed to be clinically led (Checkland et al. 2016; United 
Kingdom Government 2012; NHSCC [No Date]), with the GPs specifically named to lead 
the system, did the custodians of this responsibility wield enough influence 
proportionate with the ethos underpinning the CCGs? For this reason, the latent 
variable named GP Influence was created to evaluate the impact of the GPs’ influence. 
Three propositions were developed to this end,  
Proposition 5 (P5): The level of GP influence in the Governing Body will cause a 
difference in the effectiveness of the decision-making process. 
Proposition 6 (P6): The level of GP influence in the Governing Body will cause a 
difference in member practice wishes being met. 
Proposition 7 (P7): A high level of GP influence in the Governing Body will 
impact the degree of GP satisfaction about decision-making.  
Decision-making Process Effectiveness: The current study aimed to identify 
factors influencing the perceived effective decision-making process. Any action that 
supported efficient delivery of health care service within the decision-making process 
continuum (Figure 2.7) of the CCGs was viewed as being ‘effective’. As such, a method 
to estimate the effectiveness of the process would be useful, something which the 
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latent variable, Decision-making Process Effectiveness, was designed to do. The 
reflectance of the decision-making process effectiveness would essentially be captured 
using perceptual measures, represented by the observed variables, such as (1) The 
Governing Body is dysfunctional, (2) The Governing Body makes decisions unfriendly to 
the member practices, (3) Senior Authority veto decisions made by the Governing 
Body, and (4) other Governing Body members yield their decisions to those of their 
fellow board members.  
Satisfaction: Following on from the BMA (2014a) study, described in Section 
1.1, the general tone of the findings indicated that the GPs were not satisfied with the 
decisions that their CCGs made. As such, the current study sought to analyse GPs’ 
satisfaction with decision-making, three years on from the BMA (2014a) study. 
Member Practice Wishes Met: Member Practice Wishes Met latent variable 
was considered as a moderating variable between latent variables GP Influence and 
Satisfaction as well as Higher Authority Control and Satisfaction. A lack of fulfilment of 
member practice wishes was demonstrated by the grievances expressed in the BMA 
(2014a) research findings where sentiments such as limited “freedom to make clinical 
decisions” for the patients, “little influence over their CCG”, and not being able “to 
contribute their views” were made. The assumption that the current study adopted 
was that, for GPs to be satisfied with the decisions made by their CCGs, they needed 
their wishes to be addressed. These included, giving them the freedom to make clinical 
decisions, giving them more influence over their CCGs, and allowing them to 
contribute their views. Meeting those wishes depended on the level of influence of the 
GPs who sat in the Governing Body where they could facilitate in getting those wishes 
realised. To this effect, Proposition 8 was developed.  
Proposition 8 (P8): The level of GP influence and the higher authority control in 
the Governing Body will influence the scale of member practice wishes being met, 
thereby causing a difference in the degree of GP satisfaction about decision-making. 
The propositions and latent variables were linked together to produce a 









2.5.3 Conceptual model 
The diagram in Figure 2.11 depicts the perceived reality in terms of a network of causal 
effects across different latent variables, at the time when the research instrument was 
designed. The model is not designed to prove causation between two latent variables 
but to only indicate the compatibility of the model with the data being tested, thereby 
helping to ascertain causal effects strengths (Bozionelos 2003).  
The conceptual model was produced at the literature review phase with the view 
that it was subject to change depending on the data obtained and subsequent model 
fitness tests at the data analysis phase. The relationships in the model depict that 
Decision-making Process Effectiveness is an effect of GP Influence and Higher Authority 
Control. On the other hand, GP Influence is causally determined by GP Proportion. 
Satisfaction is the effect of GP Influence, Member Practice Wishes Met, and Higher 
Authority Control while at the same time Member Practice Wishes Met depends on 
Higher Authority Control and GP Influence.  GP Proportion and Higher Authority Control 
are exogenous latent variables, meaning that they are the causes of GP Influence, 
Satisfaction, and Decision-making Process Effectiveness. Member Practice Wishes Met, 
on the other hand, is an intervening variable with its causality role just being on 
Satisfaction, meaning that on its own it cannot exert that causation (Russo 2009). 
2.6 Summary  
More research is needed to understand perceived effective decision-making within the 
CCGs. To start with, CCGs were created so that they could commission health care 
services directly at the local level, thereby enabling them to improve patient care and 
increase accountability. The PCTs, which were replaced by the CCGs, were, on the 
contrary, run from the centre, which made it difficult to understand and appreciate the 
local needs. When viewed with the theoretic lens, CCGs resemble the professional 
model of Mintzberg’s models of the structure of organisations whereas their 
predecessor PCTs bore the structure of the bureaucratic model in the same 
Mintzberg’s framework (Mintzberg 1979). The latter have operational decisions made 
centrally in a top-down fashion while the former aims to yields the prerogative of 
decision-making to the local domains for them to self-manage their operations. 
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As decentralised organs, the CCGs have been perceived as not adequately fulfilling the 
wishes of the local services that they support due to the policies that they (CCGs) 
produce (BMA 2014a). Most of the challenges leading to this predicament are bigger 
than the CCGs. While on paper the CCGs were intended to be autonomous entities 
that should be free from the influence of the central blueprint, in practice the macro-
level centre imposes stringent bureaucratic controls on these bodies – for example, 
asking them to operate under restricted budgets yet at the same time setting targets 
hard to achieve without adequate funding (Checkland et al. 2018; HFMA 2018; HFMA 
2017).  Also, CCGs have been found to be so complex, with internal systems difficult to 
understand as well as intricate external relationships (Checkland et al. 2016; 
McDermott et al. 2015).     
With decisions that the CCGs make being critical to the delivery of health care in the 
English NHS, discovering the factors influencing the perceived effective decision-
making process within these organs is important. Also, getting insight into the roles 
that the GPs occupy in the CCGs will add to the existing knowledge which previous 
studies have cited as being partial in this regard. For these reasons, the primary goal of 
this study was to identify the factors influencing the perceived effective decision-
making process while the secondary goal was designed to assess the formal roles 
occupied by the GPs in the CCGs. To achieve this, a mixed methods design was 
employed.   
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CHAPTER 3  
RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this study, outlined in Chapter 1, was primarily focused on exploring 
decision-making profiles in the CCGs to identify factors influencing the effective 
decision-making process as perceived by the GPs, since they were the intended key 
decision-makers, but apparently unhappy. The secondary aim was to discover the 
formal roles occupied by the GPs in the CCGs. The background to the study as well as 
its supporting rationale is provided in Chapter 1. Section 1.5 introduces the 
methodology, mixed methods, which I used to gather the data for investigation to fulfil 
the research aims. This chapter, Chapter 3, is designed to build on that introduction, 
explicating the procedures that I followed in the development of the study under the 
mixed methods approach. Pivotal to the procedures was the philosophical foundation, 
pragmatism, which underpinned the design.  
Another aspect that will be noticed about this chapter is that it is longer than 
an average thesis Research Design one. This was because of the methodological 
approach, mixed methods, that I used, which resulted in twice the amount of written 
content when contrasted with other approaches like a single quantitative or 
qualitative study method (Creswell & Plano Clark 2011; Bryman 2007).  
3.2 ‘Philosophical position’ and methodological stance 
This study was conducted from the philosophical foundation of pragmatism in line with 
the recommendation of numerous academics who argue in favour of the suitability of 
this stance for a mixed methods research (Creswell & Plano Clark 2011; Morgan 2007; 
Johnson & Onwuegbuzie 2004). A key attribute of pragmatism, which makes it unique, 
is that it allows the researcher to use schemes and methods that the researcher deems 
suitable for his or her study (Mertens 2009). While the standard understanding of 
pragmatism holds that “multiple paradigms can be used to address the research 
problem” (Rossman & Wilson 1985, cited in Creswell & Plano Clark 2011, p.26), in this 
study pragmatism is viewed via Morgan (2007, p.68) who advocated that pragmatism 
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in social science research should not be seen from the conventional sense of 
philosophy, as “that is the province of philosophers”. Morgan argued for a shift from 
the traditionally held “metaphysical paradigms” characterised by excesses of 
philosophical knowledge on related methodologies. Paradigms in this context denote a 
collection of “beliefs and assumptions about knowledge that informs … [the] study” 
(Creswell & Plano Clark 2011, p.39). To this end, Morgan proposed an alternative 
model – the “pragmatic approach”. The pragmatic approach model is intentionally not 
referred to as a paradigm as Morgan argued that his naming convention might help 
avoid confusion “around the concept of paradigm” (Morgan 2007, p.65). Morgan was, 
nonetheless, quick to mention that his model is a direct challenge to the conventional 
metaphysical paradigms. The marked difference is that the pragmatic approach is 
purged of the weight of philosophical knowledge, which is why the phrase 
‘philosophical position’ in this section’s heading is placed in quotation marks.  
While the pragmatic approach model seeks to avoid the excesses of 
traditionally held metaphysical paradigms, it however acknowledges and embraces the 
epistemological implications underpinning the general approach that a researcher 
assumes. Emphasis is placed on how the epistemological implications of the 
knowledge generated by the research relate to the methods used to produce that 
knowledge. That is, this approach argues its case from the standpoint focused “on 
methodology as an area that connects issues at the abstract level of epistemology and 
the mechanical level of actual methods” (Morgan 2007, p.68). In this framework, the 
“strong tendency … to privilege epistemology over methods” (ibid), as commonly 
found in standard research approaches, which include typical mixed methods designs 
where pre-existing philosophical commitments are respectively applied to quantitative 
and qualitative strands (Creswell & Plano Clark 2011), is negated. Figure 3.1 
demonstrates how epistemology and methods are pivoted on methodology in the 




Figure 3.1 Methodology - A connecting link between epistemology and methods 
The pragmatic approach advocates a methodological framework that simply draws 
attention to central issues. For example, the focus is placed on explaining how theory 
and data are connected, how the researcher should relate to the research subject, and 
on explicating the question concerning how the empirical findings can be applied. 
Figure 3.2 illustrates this notion by drawing a comparison between the pragmatic 
approach and traditional research approaches. The pragmatic approach column in the 
diagram incorporates both quantitative and qualitative approaches. 
 
Figure 3.2 Pragmatic approach methodological framework versus traditional approaches 
 
3.3 Research methodology 
A mixed methods research design was used to achieve the aims of this study. Mixed 
methods encompass both quantitative and qualitative research strands in a single 
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study. The rationale for opting for a mixed methods design was “to develop a more 
complete understanding of [the phenomenon of study]” (Creswell & Plano Clark 2011, 
p.77) by synthesising complementary quantitative and qualitative data. The 
quantitative research provided a predictive framework (Lowry & Gaskin 2014; Hair et 
al. 2012; Henseler et al. 2009) while the qualitative strand provided an interpretive 
framework. The qualitative research afforded this by its virtue of access to rich 
information through descriptions provided by the participants about the phenomenon 
of study. The other reason for adopting mixed methods design was the time-factor, 
which is explained later in this section.  
Academics have “little agreement … about what mixed methods research is” 
(Morse & Cheek 2014, p.3). For example, some academics are not convinced about 
mixed methods because of the unconventional practices promoted in the concept, 
such as combining of different philosophical positions in a single study (Creswell & 
Plano Clark 2011; Mason 2006). The mixed methods methodology has also been 
criticised for privileging the quantitative research by relegating the qualitative research 
strand “to secondary or auxiliary status” (Creswell et al. 2006). Notwithstanding, I 
planned my research to be driven by the quantitative strand, as would be seen later in 
the text. Another thing worth mentioning about the mixed methods is that some see 
this approach as merely being a data collection technique, a view which Creswell and 
Plano Clark (2011) countered by explaining that, while mixed methods may be a data 
collection technique, it is also a methodology as it incorporates a scheme for managing 
research.  
There are six types of mixed methods designs, namely – Explanatory, 
Exploratory, Convergent, Embedded, Transformative, and Multiphase (Creswell & 
Plano Clark 2011). Most of these have different variants associated with them which 
are predicated on timing in the implementation of the design. That is, timing may be 
concurrent, where quantitative and qualitative strands happen at the same time; or 
sequential, where quantitative and qualitative strands are implemented in two 
separate phases, one after the other; or multiphase, where quantitative and 
qualitative data collection along with data analysis are done collectively in various 
segments over an extended time (Creswell & Plano Clark 2011). The current study 
adopted a convergent parallel design with concurrent timing. The convergent parallel 
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mixed methods was considered appropriate in the interest of time, as mixed methods 
designs are known to typically take a longer time in data collection and analysis than 
other research methodologies (Creswell & Plano Clark 2011).  
In the convergent parallel mixed methods, both strands are given equal 
priority, and both run concurrently in a single phase to collect data (Creswell 2013a; 
Creswell & Plano Clark 2011). Once the data have been collected, they are analysed, 
compared, and contrasted in line with the research strategy. Mixing, a central tenet in 
mixed methods where quantitative and qualitative data are integrated into one, must 
occur at some stage. Green (2007, p.120, cited in Creswell & Plano Clark 2011, p.64) 
designates this activity as the “most salient and critical” in the design. In this study, 
mixing happened at two points; each referred to as a “point of interface” (Creswell & 
Plano Clark 2011, p.66). These were at data analysis level, and at interpretation level, 
as depicted in Figure 3.3.  
 
Figure 3.3 Convergent parallel mixed-methods approach 
The mixing strategy employed at each point was merging. At the data analysis level, 
this was achieved by quantitising qualitative data for statistical analysis. The term 
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quantitising denotes transformation of qualitative data by converting it into codes or 
binary values which are then analysed statistically (Doyle et al. 2016). Quantitisation of 
qualitative data in a mixed methods design study is a recognised mixing technique ‘in 
its own right’, as advanced by Creamer (2011). At interpretation level, merging 
occurred when conclusions and inferences were drawn through synthesis and 
comparison of the combined results of quantitative and qualitative studies. Apart from 
the two points of interface, all other processes were done separately, tied to their 
respective strand as portrayed in Figure 3.3. 
Other than having mixing activity at analysis and interpretation points, mixing 
can also be done at other different points of the study (Creswell & Plano Clark 2011). 
For example, at the design stage, mixing can be achieved through embedding in which 
one study strand is embedded into the other. There is also “connecting”, a strategy 
normally applied at the analysis phase where analysis of one data type triggers a need 
for the other. Say, the analysis results of quantitative data triggering need for 
qualitative data to get a comprehensive picture of the phenomenon being 
investigated. Lastly, the mixing strategy can be at programme level where “multiple 
projects or studies” are joined “in a multiphase project” (Creswell & Plano Clark 2011, 
p.68).  
The mode that I utilised in connecting theory and data is abduction; an integral 
part of the pragmatic approach model, shown in Figure 3.2.  
Abduction  
Abduction, also known as abductive reasoning, is a term that implies “explanatory 
reasoning” in which a simple explanation is made to define evidence of the observed 
phenomenon (Magnani & Bertolotti 2017; Douven 2011b). While that may be the 
general understanding of the concept, Gabbay and Woods (2005) argue extensively 
that reasoning does not necessarily have to be explanatory, citing examples like the 
legal industry where non-explanatory abduction can be used in law. As can be seen, 
already, the concept of abduction is mired in controversy in academic circles as there is 
no agreed standard position on it (Magnani & Bertolotti 2017; Douven 2011b) so much 
that researchers have come to an agreement that they “have failed to secure the core 
meaning of abduction” (Magnani & Bertolotti 2017, p.134). As such, there are different 
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forms of abduction advanced by numerous philosophers who include Peirce, Harman, 
Thagard, Magnani, Gabbay and Woods, Schurz, and Hoffmann (Park 2015). This thesis 
is not intended to discuss the entire collection of the abduction variants. Instead, the 
thesis only focuses on Peirce’s abduction, which, along with additional insights from 
Mirza et al. (2014), informed the abduction that I adopted for this study.  
Peirce’s abduction was advocated by Charles Sanders Peirce, who is not only 
known for inventing the term “abduction” (Douven 2011a) but is also referred to as 
the “father of pragmatism” (Mirza et al. 2014). Peirce’s abduction entails the 
generation of hypotheses to explain the observed phenomenon, an occurrence which 
Peirce initially considered as “nothing but guessing” (CP [Charles Peirce] 7.219 1901, 
cited in Magnani & Bertolotti 2017, p.183). However, displeased with the notion of 
guesswork, Peirce is reported as having endeavoured “to uncover the logic through 
which new ideas come into existence” (Fann 1970, cited in Mirza et al. 2014, p.1982). 
His journey to this end caused him to be criticised for being vague and paradoxical. For 
example, on the one hand, Peirce stated that “hypotheses are the products of 
imagination” while on the other hand, he said hypotheses “are products of a certain 
sort of logical inference” (Frankfurt 1958, p.594). His position on this and several other 
components on his form of abduction changed with time, resulting in something that 
he called “qualitative induction” as opposed to a hypothesis (Park 2015), although 
both were essentially designed to serve the same purpose, but differently (Tuzet 
2007).  
The other thought of interest that Peirce advanced alongside his work on 
abduction is the argument that reasoning encompasses three forms – abduction, 
deduction, and induction, which he took as “different modes of inferences” (Park 
2015, p.228). Peirce, however, was faced with the challenge of conflating induction 
with abduction, something which led him to change his mind later in his career where 
he assumed the view that the three kinds of reasoning were in fact “different stages in 
inquiry” (Park 2015, p.228). Mirza et al. (2014, p.1981) enhance this view by stating 
that, while abduction is “the process of generating hypotheses, theories or 
explanations”, deduction and induction “allow for the consequent processing of those 
ideas”.  Deduction explains logically, “the consequences” of abduction while induction 
explains the same empirically. Based on this understanding, I developed my approach 
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of abduction which is described below. This approach basically encapsulates what 
Peirce identified as “different stages in inquiry” (Park 2015, p.228). 
Abduction: As the first stage of inquiry, the process of abduction in my study started 
from the footing of existing knowledge in the professional and academic domains, 
which I used as a basis for the development of the hypotheses. This process was 
enabled by retroduction; a form of reasoning which considers existing facts to 
extrapolate insight, which Peirce (1907) portrayed as a “process whereby from a 
surprising array of facts we are led to a conjectural theory to account for them” (MS 
318:21-3, cited in Bergman & Paavola 2018b). In this contextual background, I 
developed a conceptual model, described in Chapter 2, Section 2.5, designed “to 
explain meaningful underlying patterns” (Mirza et al. 2014, p.1982) of the perceived 
reality in the CCGs’ network of causal effects in decision-making. I then produced 
hypotheses, referred to as propositions at this stage, which explained the causal 
relationships across the different latent variables. The propositions were subsequently 
turned into causal (or explanatory) hypotheses for statistical analyses performed in 
Chapter 4, leading the process to the second stage of inquiry, deduction. 
Deduction: Deduction occurred at the testing stage of the explanatory (causal) 
hypotheses, which were tested based on the premise described on each hypothesis. 
The Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modelling (PLS-SEM) technique was used 
on the path model adopted and enhanced from the conceptual model initially created 
in Chapter 2. As explained earlier, as per Mirza et al. (2014), the purpose of deduction 
in the three stages of inquiry is to provide a logical explanation of the conclusions 
reached in the abduction stage. A unique characteristic of deduction is that it provides 
certainty of the conclusions about the premise being tested (Schurz 2008; Svennevig 
2001). However, deduction is not context sensitive (Svennevig 2001) – that is, it does 
not take into consideration the contextual background of the inferred premise. In 
contrast, induction, which is the next in the stages of inquiry, does consider the 
context of the inferred premise. 
Induction: Induction, a form of reasoning that I employed to produce the 
conclusions of the current study, is enumerated by Peirce as being “a much stronger 
kind of inference than hypothesis” (CP [Charles Peirce] 2.642; W 3, p.336, cited in Park 
64 
 
2015, p.224). Additionally, Schurz (2008, p.202) characterises induction as serving “the 
goal of inferring something about the future course of events – which is important for 
planning”, something which, when viewed from Mirza et al. (2014) standpoint, is 
realised by explaining “the consequences” of abduction empirically. To achieve this in 
the current study, I did not only consult the guaranteed conclusions proffered by the 
process of deduction applied to the quantitative data but, together with those, I used 
the data from the qualitative study strand which was so rich that ultimately the study 
conclusions were contextualised on it. The conclusions that I produced fulfilled the 
primary and secondary aims outlined in Section 1.1.  
The focus will now shift to the description of the data collection methods that I 
used.  
3.3.1 Data collection: Survey  
The study used a survey in a cross-sectional design setup adapted to handle both 
quantitative and qualitative study strands running in parallel on a single phase. The 
term survey, in this case, denotes a systematic collection of data “about a sample 
drawn from a specified larger population” (Sternberg et al. 2007, p.54), whereas cross-
sectional design signifies a one-off study on the sample (Callegaro et al. 2015). While 
surveys are traditionally associated with quantitative studies (Groves et al. 2004), 
incorporating qualitative data collection alongside quantitative data collection in the 
survey proved worthwhile. The reasons supporting this assertion, along with other 
factors addressing the question of using a survey in the current study, are discussed in 
the next section, Section 3.3.2. 
The qualitative survey is not widely adopted in research, and hence not 
extensively discussed in the literature (Jansen 2010). Qualitative survey essentially 
aims at determining “meaningful variation” (Jansen 2010, no page) in responses on the 
phenomenon of study as opposed to quantitative survey where a count of the number 
of respondents is done to establish characteristics like “frequencies, means or other 
parameters” (Jansen 2010, no page). To obtain “meaningful variation” in the current 
study, participants were drawn from different CCGs across the whole of England.  The 
survey was administered using a questionnaire through the web. There is, however, a 
limitation worth mentioning about the web-based qualitative research. This approach 
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restricts flexibility and in-depth access of insights that unstructured face-to-face 
interviews can offer as, in that setting, it is possible to adapt and change in line with 
the respondent’s answers (Rowley 2012; Rose 1994). Besides, unlike web-based 
questionnaires, in face-to-face interviews clarification can be provided instantly in the 
event of ambiguity on one or more questions (Williams 2003). The downside with face-
to-face interviews is interviewer bias that can be introduced. For example, visual or 
verbal cues can influence the participant to respond in a certain way. Besides, face-to-
face interviews may also “provoke anxiety and distress in participants” (Richards & 
Schwartz 2000, p.136). 
3.3.2 Why survey? 
Using a survey for my study presented several advantages, even though there were 
disadvantages and weak points too. The overarching advantage pertained to the 
coverage of a wide range of the CCGs across England. Cost was also a big advantage, in 
the sense of time and money (De Leeuw 2005; Williams 2003). It was relatively quicker 
and cheaper to deploy web survey (interchangeably referred to as online survey in the 
text) using free survey software, Google Forms, as opposed to face-to-face interviews. 
This was particularly useful considering that my research was based on a mixed 
methods design, meaning that with this kind of methodological approach I managed to 
address both strands of the design expeditiously. Another key advantage is related to 
the degree of freedom of expression on the part of the respondents. Previous research 
has suggested that respondents are relatively comfortable to disclose better quality 
information to sensitive questions on self-administered surveys than on face-to-face 
interviews (De Leeuw 2005). 
The main drawback that I faced was nonresponse, which studies have shown is 
“higher in self-administered questionnaires than in interviews” (De Leeuw 2005, 
p.245). Since I was already aware that I was likely to face this challenge due to the kind 
of population that I was dealing with, the effort that I ultimately put into boosting the 
response rate was considerable and financially costly because of the unexpected 
events which occurred around the time of data collection. The events in question 
pertained to a global cyber-attack which was discussed all over the news at the time, 
an event that risked severely impacting the willingness of the potential respondents 
from participating in the survey seeing that it was web-based. The cyber-attack in 
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question, along with the details of the actions that were taken to offset the likely 
associated consequences on response rate, is in Section 3.5.5.  
Overall, I believe that opting for a survey under the circumstances that constrained my 
research was the best choice that I could make. What is reassuring is that several 
studies examining the quality of different modes of data collection have shown that no 
data collection mode can be held more highly than the others. The point in case in 
those studies was a comparison between face-to-face interviews and web surveys. The 
results demonstrated no difference between the two (Revilla 2015). I view quality in 
this instance from the perspective of Revilla (2015, p.1219), which is, “the strength of 
the relationship between the latent concept of interest and the observed answers”. 
The discussion will now look at the associated epistemological implications on 
quantitative and qualitative strands.  
3.3.3 Epistemological Implications 
First, in keeping with pragmatic approach model adopted for this study from Morgan 
(2007), the excesses of traditionally held metaphysical paradigms are avoided while at 
the same time the epistemological implications underpinning the general approach 
that a researcher assumes are acknowledged. Since my study was deployed under the 
convergent parallel mixed methods design, an “umbrella” paradigm was assumed for 
that context in line with the recommended guiding principles (Creswell & Plano Clark 
2011). Pragmatism, already described at the beginning of this chapter, underpinned 
the study. What this means is that ““what works” to address research question [was 
embraced]” (Creswell & Plano Clark 2011, p.42).  
From the position of the pragmatic approach by Morgan (2007), I adopted a 
pluralistic attitude, which was characterised by epistemological dualism, where I 
worked back and forth between objectivity and subjectivity. I applied objectivity on the 
quantitative strand while subjectivity was on the qualitative strand, a scenario which 
Morgan (2007) labels as an intersubjective approach. Intersubjectivity is an important 
component in the pragmatic approach relating to the relationship of the researcher to 
the research process.  
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Concerning objectivity, I endeavoured to avoid the purist stance represented in 
positivism, which holds the notion that there is a single version of truth (Hatch and 
Cunliffe 2006). Instead, I leaned towards post-positivism, which recognises a limitation 
that a researcher has in influencing the observation that he or she makes (Reichardt & 
Rallis 1994). On the other hand, subjectivity, a derivative of subjectivism which 
contends that knowledge is developed from ways or experiences unique to the 
individual depending on their background (Lincoln and Guba 1989), was manifested in 
two areas in my study; the researcher and the researched. The best philosophical 
commitment that subjectivity could be practicably described from in this context, is 
interpretive phenomenology, because of the intention that I had to capture “the 
essence of the lived experience” (Williams & Paterson 2009, p.694) of the participants. 
Before making any further explanations about this, it is useful to set a brief contextual 
background of phenomenology to develop a better understanding of how subjectivity 
underpinned my study.  
Van Manen (1997) describes phenomenology as a “study of lived experience or 
the life world” (cited in Laverty 2003, p.22). Epistemologically, phenomenology has 
different typologies which are collectively grouped into two broad categories, 
descriptive and interpretive. Descriptive phenomenology, coined by Edmund Husserl, 
is characterised by descriptive disposition in which a researcher must put aside his or 
her personal assumptions about the phenomenon of study in order to gain an 
uncontaminated understanding of the case (Gill 2014; Laverty 2003). In this premise, 
the focus “is to examine the essence or structure of experiences in the way it occurs to 
our conscious … without the influence of any external theory” (Tuffour 2017, p.2). On 
the other hand, interpretive phenomenology, first developed by Martin Heidegger 
from Husserl’s conception and subsequently modified into several variants by other 
proponents, argues that a researcher, or observer, cannot be detached from the 
phenomenon of study but should be part of it (Cal & Tehmarn 2016; Gill 2014). 
Interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA), which the current study assumed, is 
one of the variants of Heidegger’s interpretive phenomenology, which was proposed 
by Jonathan Smith (Tuffour 2017).  
A question may be asked, what exactly did the current study intend to capture 
on the lived experience of the GPs respecting the decision-making process? Likewise, 
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another bigger question may be asked; why an emphasis on ‘the lived experience’ in a 
web survey, where there is no direct contact with the respondents? To appreciate the 
essence of these questions, the response below paralleled with an example of what 
lived experience could be, as described by van Manen (1990, p.5, cited in Arslan & 
Yildirim 2015), may be useful. In this example, lived experience is portrayed as being 
different from person to person even if the circumstances of the phenomenon being 
faced may be similar. 
 “Based on van Manen’s analogy, teacher A who has no experience 
in teaching as this is her first day on the job has different experiences 
compared to teacher B who has ten years of experience. The expert teacher 
forgets the presence of the students during the lecture while the novice 
teacher feels the glance of the students. According to van Manen, the 
novice teacher is constantly aware of her own experience on the first day of 
school. However, the expert teacher is unaware of her acts during the 
lecture because she is used to lecturing and behaves more spontaneously”. 
As explained in Chapters 1 and 2, when the CCGs were introduced in England, they 
were given the responsibility of “planning and commissioning of health care services 
for their local area” (NHSCC [No Date]), with the GPs intended to lead the system 
(Checkland et al. 2016). In the previous scheme under the Primary Care Trust (PCT) 
structure, the responsibility of making such decisions was centralised in the individual 
PCTs and was performed by non-clinical staff (managers) with no direct input from the 
GPs (see Figure 2.5). Given the GPs were relatively new to commissioning decision-
making activities, it is possible that most found the responsibility tricky. Like a novice 
teacher used in van Manen’s example of lived experience who is conscious of students’ 
eyes being on her, it is possible that the GPs also felt the pressure of their 
responsibility. Actually, regarding leadership role of a management nature in the CCGs, 
one of the GPs was quoted in the most recent research saying, “I think the clinicians in 
those roles find it quite tough sometimes because it is not something that clinicians 
are trained for” (Storey et al. 2018, p.50). In light of this, it was an exciting thought to 
seek what the GPs had to say about their experiences in their various role capacities 




Regarding the import of subjectivity in the premise of the researcher and the 
researched; as a researcher, I was placed in a position in which I was “attempting to 
make sense of the participant, who … [in turn, was] making sense of his or her 
experience” (Aisbett 2006, cited in Charlick et al. 2016, p.211). That is, as the 
participants try to make sense of their experience, describing it based on their 
subjective individual perceptions, the researcher, in the meantime, tries “to make 
sense of the participants’ sense making” (Tuffour 2017, p.4), similarly using his or her 
own subjective individual perceptions. This set of circumstances is known as double 
hermeneutics. Hermeneutics is described as “the art and science of interpretation or 
meaning” (Tuffour 2017, p.3).  
As a researcher, I was aware that I had preconceived ideas and biases that I 
held about the research topic, a paradox that risked obscuring the sense making 
process that I was supposed to deliver from the participants’ sense making. To 
accurately capture the experiences of the participants, the preconceptions that I held 
needed to be contained, and that was to be achieved through bracketing. Tufford and 
Newman (2012, p.81) describe bracketing as “a method used by some researchers to 
mitigate the potential deleterious effects of unacknowledged preconceptions related 
to the research and thereby to increase the rigor of the project”. The foreknowledge, 
or preconceptions, which may potentially predispose the researcher to bias, about the 
phenomenon of study are recognised and embraced in interpretation under IPA, but 
reflexively (Tuffour 2017). Accordingly, below is a description of two related 
preconceptions that I held: 
1. Leading up to my research, I had pre-existing passionate regard for 
decentralised configurations in decision-making owing to the professional 
contexts that I always worked in where such a system was fostered. This 
position is explained in Chapter 1, Section 1.2, where my experience in 
Scrum environments is outlined. While my enthusiasm for decentralised 
organisational structures was an asset that had the potential to contribute 
to the description of the concept positively, I, however, risked introducing 
unintentionally biased opinions in the study. Additionally, I also risked 
harbouring prejudicial feelings about what might have appeared 
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incongruent with what I viewed as logical in regard to decentralised 
organisational settings.  
2. When I engaged in my research, I had a strong affinity for the CCGs’ model, 
particularly moved by the idea that the clinicians held power to run their 
own affairs as specified in the Health and Social Care Act 2012 (United 
Kingdom Government 2012). While the CCGs had always been at ‘arms’ 
length’ from my core professional business, I held the notion that CCGs 
could perform brilliantly if the system did not nag them with bureaucracy. 
Because of these strong feelings, I realised that I needed to guard against 
premature and pre-drawn conclusions. What is more, I had to be careful 
about the quality and tone of my questions on the questionnaire so that 
they were neither leading nor had any “implicit assumptions” (Rowley 
2012). By contrast, having strong feelings about a given phenomenon may 
not necessarily be a bad thing as noted by Boden et al. (2016, p.1078) who 
argue that, “without the resonance of feelings [in the researcher] … words 
appear empty or disingenuous”. Similarly, Gemignani (2011, p.701) claims 
that it is almost impossible to dissociate one’s feelings as a researcher from 
the researched phenomenon, especially if the phenomenon involves the 
“core dimensions of the researcher’s identities and subjectivities”.   
3.3.4 Study authentication and generalisation 
The assessment criteria for authenticating the quantitative study strand in this 
research were validity and reliability. I believe that the same results from this study 
can be achieved “when the assumption is being made that the object being measured 
has not changed” (Scott & Morrison 2006, p.208), which is what reliability is about. In 
like manner, I believe that this survey measured and described decision-making 
profiles in CCGs to identify factors influencing the effective decision-making process as 
perceived by the GPs, which is what validity is about (Bell 1999).  
Authentication of a qualitative study is customarily based on confirmability of 
the collected data (Lincoln & Guba 1989). The collected data, along with their analyses 
and interpretation, should all be linkable to the researched subjects and their 
background circumstances. However, it gets complex when considered from 
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interpretive phenomenology position. The challenge concerns semantics and a lack of 
standardised process. In this regard, Laverty (2003, p.31) argues that “issues of rigor in 
interpretive inquiry are confusing to discuss, at times, as there is not an agreed upon 
language used to describe it or one universal set of criteria used to assess its 
presence”. Along the same line, but with a suggested approach in addressing the issue, 
Ajjawi and Higgs (2007, p.631) note that “the criteria used to ensure quality in 
interpretive research should be consistent with the philosophical and methodological 
assumptions”. Respecting the current study, as already explained earlier, interpretive 
phenomenology was embraced as the lens through which epistemological positioning 
was considered, but at an abstract level, in line with Morgan (2007) pragmatic 
approach. Having embraced IPA to guide the qualitative study, I was faced with the 
predicament that there is no specific way that can be used to evaluate the credibility 
of IPA (Cassidy et al. 2011). IPA is not intended “to produce a definitive analysis” 
(Cassidy et al. 2011, p.269) because of the assumed interpretative position. Therefore, 
to ensure credibility of the qualitative strand, my focus remained on the participants’ 
“attempt to make sense of their experience” (ibid). I allowed the text to “assert its own 
truth” (Smith et al. 2009, cited in McManus Holroyd 2007, p.208). Credibility, in this 
case, is regarded as denoting “vividness and faithfulness of the description to the 
phenomena” (Ajjawi & Higgs 2007, p.631).  
Arguments about generalisability and the context-bound nature of quantitative 
and qualitative studies’ findings do not apply when a pragmatic focus is assumed 
(Morgan 2007). Instead, studies conducted under the pragmatic approach model are 
transferrable. Transference is achieved through effusive descriptions where the 
context of the study is painted. The context should be adequately described “such that 
readers can judge for themselves the applicability of the research findings to their own 
contexts” (Ajjawi & Higgs 2007, p.207). If the described picture is comparable to the 
reader’s situation, the reader can “be informed by the findings” (Symon & Cassell 
2012, p.207). Lessons “learned in one context” can be transferred to other contexts 
irrespective of the methods used to generate that knowledge as long as the underlying 
factors warrant transference (Morgan 2007). Ajjawi and Higgs (2007, p.632) state that 
“transferability of the research findings to other settings has been proposed as an 
important indicator of quality in qualitative research”. 
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3.3.5 Research population and sampling 
To understand the factors influencing the perceived effective decision-making process 
in the CCGs, the research population was drawn from the GPs in England who had 
roles to perform in their local CCGs. A point of note that I should stress based on 
design approach is that, I chose to ask GPs involved with CCGs in the hope of getting 
their particular insights whereas the BMA (2014) study, which inspired this study, 
surveyed all the GPs. As well as increasing the validity and credibility of the survey 
results, I believe these persons were better informed about the decision-making 
process in the CCGs and thus, had the most useful contribution for improvement on 
the issues that the CCGs were blamed for by the GPs working in surgeries. The GPs 
working in surgeries expressed negative sentiments about the policies that the CCGs 
made, stating that they “adversely affected their ability to care for patients” (BMA 
2014a). These policies were also identified as restricting GPs’ “freedom to make clinical 
decisions for their patients … [with GPs being] told what to do by the CCG rather than 
being asked to contribute their views” (Ibid). This brings the thesis to the question of 
how the “appropriate number and type of people to take part” (Hicks 2004, p.24) in 
the study was determined – that is, sampling. 
Sampling  
Because my study embodied both quantitative and qualitative research methods 
which ran concurrently in a single phase using the same sample, one sample was 
obtained. The original plan was to involve all the GPs who had roles in the CCGs. That 
was not possible due to certain practicalities which fell outside the confines that 
delimited this study. The confines in question can be seen in Chapter 1, Section 1.4.1. 
This meant that I had to come up with a suitable sample from the wider research 
population. The only practical method for that purpose under the prevailing 
circumstances in my study was the non-probability convenience sampling technique, 
which means that a “sample is built from cases which are accessible” (Rowley 2014, 
p.319). I take accessibility in this case as denoting ease in contacting the participants, 
as opposed to participants’ response, which is an entirely different matter discussed 
elsewhere in this chapter. The non-probability convenience sampling technique 
harmonised with the delimitations that were defined for the study, particularly the 
criterion that the participants were to be contacted by email only, meaning that only 
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those participants whose email contact details I had were contacted. This kind of 
approach introduced sampling bias, which is a situation “when a sample is selected in 
such a way that it is not representative of the entire population” (Price et al. 2015, 
p.308). While this, and other biases such as coverage bias, could likely lead to a 
misrepresentation in the results of the study, the American Association for Public 
Opinion Research (2013) states that practitioners involved with non-probability 
convenience samples usually avoid correcting such biases, a stance that I assumed for 
this study.  
In contrast to non-probability sampling that I opted for; probability sampling technique 
would have been recommendable for the quantitative study strand as studies 
conducted under this sampling approach can be generalised (Rowley 2014; Sternberg 
et al. 2007). However, as explained in the previous section, the philosophical position 
assumed for this study, pragmatic approach, does not recognise generalisation of the 
findings (Morgan 2007). Besides, the prevailing conditions that I was faced with did not 
justify that avenue. For example, one of the prerequisites for probability sampling is 
that “a complete list of all members of the population from which the sample can be 
drawn” (Sternberg et al. 2007, p.56) should be obtained; after which a random 
selection of the participants is made. This was not possible and would have posed a 
huge logistical challenge concerning the time it would have taken and accessibility to 
the target candidates (Gill & Johnson 2010) owing to the disparate structures and 
protocols that individual CCGs operated under. By contrast, using non-probability 
technique opens the option for the researcher to use his or her subjective judgement 
to best suit the situation, affording easy access to the candidates and involving 
relatively lower execution costs (Hyman & Sierra 2010; Sternberg et al. 2007).  
Sample size 
Determining the sample size for my study was tricky. Whereas the traditional mixed 
methods studies normally fall back to the conventional sample size estimation 
techniques for the data collection methods that they employ, my data collection 
method was not consistent with that since both quantitative and qualitative studies 
were contained in a questionnaire. In a typical quantitative methods study that uses a 
questionnaire as a data collection method, Rowley (2014, p.310) approximates a 
sample size of “between 100 and 1,000” to be adequate. Compared with this, Ghauri 
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and Gronhaug (2005, cited in Rowley 2014) claim that a sample size of 400 will be 
optimal. On the other hand, Gill and Johnson (2010) do not give a specific 
recommended sample size, and neither do Creswell and Plano Clark (2011). A common 
argument that academics give is that an adequate sample size depends on factors like 
the complexity of the population, the research aims, and the forms of analyses that the 
researcher intends to conduct (Rowley 2014; Gill & Johnson 2010). Special formulae 
with “rather detailed and overly complicated process” (Gill & Johnson 2010, p.129) are 
used to calculate the individual sample sizes. Regarding a typical qualitative study 
sample size, Creswell and Plano Clark (2011) state that numerous researchers do not 
like the idea of constraining themselves with predetermined sample sizes. Instead, the 
matter of what the sample size should be is connected to the type of “the question 
and the type of the qualitative approach used” (Creswell 2007 cited in Creswell & 
Plano Clark 2011, p.174). Usually, qualitative studies have relatively lower sample sizes 
to avoid being inundated by a “sea of data” (Rowley 2012, p.263). 
In my methodological setup, I decided to determine my sample size from the 
premise of quantitative research. While I was cautiously optimistic of getting a modest 
response rate that would fall in line with the generally recommended range of 100 to 
1000 sample size (Rowley 2014), my consideration of sample size was also influenced 
by the statistical analysis technique that I had planned to use. The planned statistical 
technique was Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modelling (PLS-SEM). Even 
though various reasons made me go with PLS-SEM, one of the leading was that this 
method supports small sample size, as I did not expect a sizeable amount of response 
rate, something that I identified beforehand as a limitation (see Chapter 1, Section  
1.4.3). The limitations of small sample sizes are particularly evident on the first 
generation (1G) statistical analysis techniques, such as multiple regression. Some of 
the limitations in this regard include, (1) a small sample size does not provide 
satisfactory analyses to establish patterns of variance (Karimimalayer & Anuar 2012), 
(2) it is not possible to establish sampling distribution on a small sample (Ronkko & 
Evermann 2013). Consequently, (3) it is not possible to test for statistical significance 
using a small sample (Ronkko & Evermann 2013; Henseler et al. 2009). In contrast, the 
abovementioned limitations are not an issue when using PLS-SEM (Lowry & Gaskin 
2014; Hair et al. 2012; Henseler et al. 2009). Instead, PLS-SEM can provide satisfactory 
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statistical analysis results on samples as low as 18, as studies have shown (Hair et al. 
2012). More about PLS-SEM is discussed in detail under Section 3.6.1. 
Compilation of GPs’ email addresses 
The strategy for the study was that the sample population was to be contacted by 
email. As such, I had to compile the GPs’ email addresses first after which I sent out 
invitations to take part in the survey. 
To compile the GPs’ email addresses, I first contacted the British Medical Association 
(BMA), a professional association and a trade union for doctors in the United Kingdom 
(BMA 2017). The reason for this was the belief that the BMA had the information that I 
was looking for. The first email to the BMA was sent on 18 February 2016 at the time 
when I was working on the research proposal. At that time, I was planning to use a 
population of at least 500 GPs. In my email, I provided a brief background of my study 
along with the request of at least 500 GPs’ contact email addresses. The email, which 
can be seen in Appendix 1.1, also included information relating to ethical clearance 
subject matter. BMA declined my request citing the reason that they did not have 
enough resources to assist students in their work. Besides, BMA claimed that due to 
confidentiality laws in the UK, they were unable to release any of their members’ email 
addresses to me. The full response from BMA which I received on 18 February 2016 
can be seen in Appendix 1.2. Following BMA’s refusal, I temporarily put aside the idea 
of gathering the GPs’ email addresses as my time was diverted onto other aspects of 
the research process, and thus temporarily left this issue to be addressed later.  
On 20 December 2016, I decided to contact all the CCGs directly requesting for 
the GPs’ names and business email addresses under the Freedom of Information Act 
2000 (FOI). I got the list of CCGs in England from the NHS website (NHS England 2012). 
FOI is an Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom which “provides public access to 
information held by public authorities” (Information Commissioner’s Office [Open 
Government Licence v3.0]a). The Act stipulated that once a request was made, the 
public authority was required by law to respond within 20 days from the day they 
received the request. Out of a list of 212 CCGs, I contacted 178. The remaining 34 did 
not have email contact details on their websites. One hundred and twenty-five 
responded to my request with the GPs’ names and business email addresses. Some 
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CCGs refused to supply their GPs’ contact details citing internal policies and Data 
Protection Act 1998 (Information Commissioner’s Office [Open Government Licence 
v3.0]b). The outline of the email that I sent to the CCGs can be seen in Appendix 2.1. 
Also, the details of the CCGs that were contacted along with the information of the 
ones that responded and the ones that did not can be seen in Appendix 2.2. 
The number of GP Names that were received along with their corresponding 
email addresses was 1112. Some CCGs supplied individual specific email addresses, 
while others gave just one corporate email address to be used for all the names that 
were given for the CCG in question. Other CCGs gave the GPs’ Personal Assistants’ 
email contacts, while one CCG supplied a media-related email address for their GPs.  
Table 3.1 gives an outline of the types of email addresses that were received. 
Table 3.1 Email Address Count by Type 
Email Address Type Count 
Business – Corporate 594 
Business – Personal 476 
Business – Personal Assistant 32 
Business – Unconventional 10 
 
3.4 Measurement of variables 
 Five latent variables were identified in Chapter 2 (Section 2.5), of which measurement 
of those four; GP Proportion, GP Influence, Member Practice Wishes Met, and 
Satisfaction, was based on literature. In this background, GP Influence, Satisfaction and 
Member Practice Wishes Met were assessed using a 5-point Likert scale while GP 
Proportion was measured using multiple-choice. The scale for variable GP Influence 
was adapted from Holder et al. (2016) and Naylor et al. (2013) where 1 represented 
“Minimum Influence” and 5 represented “Maximum Influence”. Satisfaction was 
developed from BMA (2014a) in which in the Likert scale 1 represented “Deeply 
Dissatisfied” while 5 represented “Very Satisfied”. Similarly, Member Practice Wishes 
Met was adapted from BMA (2014a) in which in the Likert scale 1 represented 
“Strongly Disagree” and 5 represented “Strongly Agree”. Adopting a 5-point Likert 
scale was supported by the rationale that 5 points are thought to be adequate to 
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reflect “all possible feelings of a person towards a particular stimulus” (Stavroulakis 
2013, p.380). What is more, a 5-point Likert scale has been widely used and supported 
in investigating feelings and emotions (Hejase et al. 2017; Stavroulakis 2013; Bodena & 
Berenbaum 2011; Prieto 2010). A further discussion on the Likert scale is done in 
Section 3.5.1. Use of multiple-choice on variable GP Proportion was adopted from BMA 
(2014a).  On the other hand, variable Decision-making Process Effectiveness is a new 
concept which has not been measured in previous studies.  
3.5 Data collection 
My study employed an online self-complete questionnaire for data collection, which is 
one method amongst several that can be used in a survey. Other methods include 
face-to-face interviews, telephone interviews, and paper questionnaire (Moy & 
Murphy 2016; De Leeuw 2005). The reason for using a questionnaire was driven by the 
desire to “gather responses from a relatively large number of people in scattered and 
possibly remote locations” (Rowley 2014, p.309). Other advantages which supported 
the use of questionnaire mirror those discussed earlier on Section 3.3.2, where the 
justification for using a survey is outlined. To recapitulate, with a questionnaire, 
respondents can freely express their thoughts better than on a face-to-face interview, 
especially when responding to sensitive questions. Also, a questionnaire is relatively 
cheaper to deploy than other data collection methods, such as telephone or face-to-
face modes. Besides, a questionnaire can be completed at the respondents’ 
convenience (Williams 2003). It should, however, be noted that questionnaires require 
well-constructed questions to elicit insightful responses from participants (Rowley 
2012). 
3.5.1 Structure and design of the questionnaire 
To begin with, the questionnaire was developed based on the conceptual model 
described in Chapter 2, Section 2.5. While the quantitative questions were designed to 
fit as close as possible the latent variables and the hypotheses, the qualitative 
questions, directly informed by the conceptual model, were developed to generate “a 
more complete understanding of [the phenomenon of study]” (Creswell & Plano Clark 
2011, p.77).  
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The questionnaire was entitled “Decision-making Effectiveness Survey”. It was divided 
into three sections which were; “About you”, “Your CCG’s Governing Body”, and 
“General questions on decision-making”. The landing page first thanked the 
participants for agreeing to take part in the survey. The purpose of the survey was 
then explained as being part of the research for a Doctor of Administration Degree 
designed to seek the thoughts of the participants about decision-making in their CCGs. 
The estimated time to complete the survey was stated, which was 10mins. The 
participants were then reassured about the anonymity of their responses. On the 
question of anonymity, at the end of the questionnaire, the participants were explicitly 
asked to indicate by ticking a box if they wanted complete anonymity. Those who did 
not mind waiving their anonymity were asked to leave their email contact details so 
that they could be contacted for a follow-up study, should there be a need.  
Turning back to the landing page, information about the ethicality of the study 
was provided to the participants. That is, that the study was ethically reviewed and 
approved by the Sheffield Hallam University Research Ethics Committee, and that it 
complied with the university’s research ethics policy. A link for the website with the 
details of the university’s ethics policy was provided. The contact details of the 
student, the Director of Studies, and the Supervisor were then listed for those who 
preferred to contact any of the mentioned. A short message of appreciation for taking 
part in the study was given as the last item on the landing page. Figure 3.4 illustrates 




Figure 3.4 Questionnaire landing page (Source: Survey questionnaire) 
Immediately after the landing page was a consent statement where the participants 
were given the opportunity to indicate if they were happy to take part in the study by 
responding to a simple Yes/No question illustrated on Figure 3.5. The statement was 
set in such a way that if the participant selected the “No” option, the survey would end 
instantly by taking the participant to the closing page that had a thank you message for 
taking part in the study. 
 
Figure 3.5 Consent statement (Source: Survey questionnaire) 
The questionnaire had 24 questions which fell into two categories, open-ended and 
closed-ended questions. There were a few exceptions where a single question 
comprised of both open-ended and closed-ended variants. Table 3.2 displays a 
breakdown of the questions’ categories.  
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Table 3.2 Type of questions in the questionnaire (Source: Survey questionnaire) 
Closed-ended Questions Open-ended Questions Open and Closed-ended  
2 3 1 
5 4b 4a 
6 13 7 
8 14 23 
9 15  
10 16  
11 17  
12 20  
18 22  
19   
21   
 
Open-ended questions were set to allow the respondents to use their own words to 
express their opinions and feelings. There was no limit to the number of words on the 
comments that the respondents had, as illustrated in Figure 3.6 which shows the 
question in design mode where the designer is being informed that the provided 
answer space is of “Long answer text” type. This is contrary to the insinuation by 
Rowley (2014, p.314) that “open questions simply invite respondents to … offer short 
comments (typically between one and three sentences)”.  
 
Figure 3.6 Example of long answer text (Source: Survey questionnaire) 
There were some questions which were set for short answers, a sentence or two in 
length. Figure 3.7 illustrates this in the design mode of the question where the designer 




Figure 3.7 Example of short answer text (Source: Survey questionnaire) 
While there was no interviewer to guide the respondent, the process was interactive in 
different ways. For example, certain questions were displayed depending on the 
answer given on the previous question. Some questions were set to be mandatory 
while others were optional. On the mandatory questions, the respondent was required 
to complete the question before he or she could proceed to the next question. If the 
respondent did not answer a mandatory question, the system would prompt him or 
her to do so and will not allow him or her to proceed to the next stage until the 
mandatory question was completed.  
Closed-ended questions were of dichotomous, scaled, and multiple-choice 
varieties. Out of 15, two were dichotomous providing Yes/No options, eight were 
multiple-choice with all having radio-buttons from which to select a single option, 
while the remaining five were of Likert scale type. A Likert scale in this thesis is 
considered to be a psychometric scale where the level of agreement to an opinion, in 
“both the direction and strength” (Garland 1991, p.66) of the rating, is specified by the 
respondent. The key reason for adopting Likert scale was that Likert scales have not 
only been widely used in surveys, but they have also “been extensively tested in both 
the marketing and social science literature” (Garland 1991, p.67). 
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A 5-point scale was used on all the questions that had a Likert scale. A 5-point scale 
was chosen cautiously given how crucial the number of points on the scale is in 
determining the level of peculiarity within the rated items (Matell & Jacoby 1971). 
Most surveys normally adopt 5 or 7-point scales (Allen & Seaman 2007). Although the 
number of points can vary from 2 to 100 (Cummins & Gullone 2000), too many points 
may result in unwieldy faded lines of distinction between the rated items while too 
few may give rise to a coarse rating which risks loss of “discriminative powers of which 
the raters are capable” (Matell & Jacoby 1971, p.657). Notwithstanding, Cummins and 
Gullone (2000) support scale with the higher number of points than the customarily 
used 5 or 7 points varieties, as they argue that the higher number of points increase 
sensitivity. Reliability is another important element in the number of points on a scale 
(Matell & Jacoby 1972; Matell & Jacoby 1971). Reliability in this instance denotes 
internal consistency (Matell & Jacoby 1972), which research has indicated that it is 
inconsequential across different Likert scale variants. So, what is the optimal number 
of points on a Likert scale then and why was a 5-point scale selected for this study? 
The literature discusses that the decisive factors for the number of points on 
the scale are context bound (Matell & Jacoby 1972). For example, the type of aspects 
being rated must be taken into consideration. If it is time that is being rated, the 
number of points on the scale is likely to be considerably higher when contrasted with 
the number of points that could be used to rate emotions or feelings, for instance. The 
other question of interest concerns the subject of whether the central “uncertain” 
category or mid-point of the scale should be incorporated into the provided 
alternatives. Some schools of thought like Garland (1991) argue that it is not necessary 
for it to be on the scale, especially in research where the researchers will be looking for 
definite responses. In this respect, a 5-point scale would be 4 points or a 7-point scale 
would be 6 points.  
One more aspect worth considering about Likert scales is the controversy about 
whether the data from a Likert scale is interval or merely ordinal. Ordinal data in this 
thesis has been taken as “data in which an ordering or ranking of responses is possible 
but no measure of distance is possible” (Allen & Seaman 2007, p.64). On the other 
hand, interval data has been taken as “integer data in which ordering and distance 
measurement are possible” (Allen & Seaman 2007, p.64). Given that feelings may 
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never be accurately rated since the “feeling thermometers, like the Likert scale … 
collapse the subject’s emotional self-report to some summary state” (Redlawsk 2006, 
p.43) that flattens “subject’s self-report into a single valence response”, data from 
Likert scales are therefore, as a rule, regarded as ordinal (Stavroulakis 2013). The 
quandary respecting irregular classification of feelings is only apparent to the 
researcher while “from the standpoint of the subject, an equal interval modelling is 
adopted in order to classify a personal intensity of feeling” (Stavroulakis 2013, p.382). 
The assumption, therefore, is that, if the subject expressing his or her feelings assumes 
the cognition that the scale has equal intervals, it can be inferred that statistically, the 
data can be treated as interval data. Besides, Cummins and Gullone (2000) argue about 
the assumption made concerning the psychometric distance between the Likert scale 
categories, that the distance is equal as the scale is portrayed with equally-spaced 
points. As such, instead of naming the categories on the scale, Cummins and Gullone 
(2000) recommend the use of linear incrementally represented numbers to reinforce 
the assumed outlook of interval data, for example from 1 to 5. As such, all data collected 
from questions that used Likert scale in this study has been considered as being intervally 
scaled, consistent with the arguments discussed in the literature (Stavroulakis 2013; Cummins 
& Gullone 2010). 
Questions order 
Rowley (2014, p.315) advises about the order of the questions, recommending that 
questions should be “clustered under theme or section headings”, a phenomenon 
demonstrated in my questionnaire in which the questions were divided into three 
main sections, described next.  
About you: Questions under this theme sought to gather background 
information of the participants. The questions in this section ranged from focusing on 
the individual respondents’ professional background outside the CCG to the roles that 
the respondents held in their local CCGs. This theme aimed to build a profile of the 
respondents to demonstrate that they were qualified “to offer useful insights and 
comments on the research topic” (Rowley 2012, p.264). There were five questions 
under this theme. 
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Your CCG’s Governing Body: This theme had 12 questions which were designed 
to gather key data about CCGs’ decision-making approach at Governing Body level. The 
questionnaire was set in such a way that only those respondents who indicated that 
they sat on the Governing Body on the previous question could access this theme. 
Those who indicated that they did not sit on the Governing Body were automatically 
taken to the next theme, which was incrementally numbered from the previous 
theme.  
General questions on decision-making: All respondents had access to this 
theme which comprised of 7 questions. The purpose of this theme was to enhance 
understanding of decision-making approach in CCGs at a general level, as opposed to 
the preceding theme which was specific to the Governing Body.  
3.5.2 Survey questions 
Table 3.3 outlines all the questions that were asked along with the reasons for 
choosing those questions. The questionnaire was administered through an online tool, 
Google Forms. However, before data collection commenced, certain conditions had to 
be met. These included ethical clearance, piloting, and then questionnaire distribution, 
which all are described in the subsequent sections following this. 
Questions were either mandatory or optional, as indicated against each 
question outlined in Table 3.3. Additional to that, there is a delineation against each 
question specifying if the question was the product of my own work or was identified 
from the previous literature. The words, “own work” are used for the former and 
“identified from literature” are used for the latter. 
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Table 3.3 Outline of questions 






1. (Mandatory question – own work) 
Which of the following statement best describes your 
professional background outside CCG? Please select one. 
a. I am a GP 
b. I am a Specialist Secondary Care Consultant 
c. I am neither a GP nor a Specialist Consultant. (Please 
specify your professional background in the space 
provided below). 
This question sought to establish the kind of people who 
took part in the survey as this study was primarily 
targeted at clinicians, with particular interest directed on 
the GPs with roles in the CCGs. The question consisted of 
closed and open-ended responses. The open-ended part 
was to be attempted only by those who had no option to 
select from the close-ended answers. 
2. (Mandatory question – own work) 
How long have you been involved with your local CCG? 
a. Less than 1 year  
b. Between 1 and 3 years 
c. More than 3 years 
A close-ended question which sought to establish the 
participants’ level of experience and exposure to CCG 
routines in their capacity as CCG representatives. The 
working assumption was that the longer one was 
involved with their CCG, the more ‘mature’ in substance 
their response was going to be, thereby boosting the 
quality of the data received. 
3. (Mandatory question – identified from literature) 
In the space provided below, please briefly describe exactly 
what you do in your local CCG. 
An open-ended question which sought to understand the 
roles that the GPs do in their CCGs. Understanding the 
roles that the GPs are engaged in was intended to 
address the secondary aim of this study which was 
informed by previous research (Checkland et al. 2016) in 
which a lack of full awareness in understanding what GPs 
do at their local CCGs was discovered. 
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4. 4a. (Mandatory question – identified from literature)  
Which of the following statements best describes your 
involvement at various committees level?  
a. I sit on the Governing Body 
b. I sit on other committee(s) but not on the Governing 
Body 
c. I sit on both Governing Body and other committee(s)  
d. I have a different nature of involvement which is 
neither Governing Body nor any other committee. (If 
you have selected this option, please briefly describe 
what your involvement is in your CCG on the provided 
space below) 
This question, identified from the literature (Checkland et 
al. 2016; McDermott et al. 2015), was comprised of close-
ended and open-ended parts designed to simply establish 
the number of GPs who served in the Governing Body 
relative to the number of GPs with formal roles in the 
CCGs. The question was complemented by a proposition 
developed in the review of literature which stated that “A 
high proportion of GPs in the Governing Body committee 
will cause a difference in the level of GP influence.”.  
4b. (Optional question – identified from literature) 
If you have selected option “b” or “c” on the previous question, 
please list in the provided space below the “other committee(s)” 
that you sit on. 
This open-ended question was designed to capture other 
committees that exist in the CCGs, thereby illustrating the 
diversity of GP roles as intimated by previous research. 
McDermott et al. (2015, p.30) suggested that “asking 
what the role of GPs is or should be in CCGs is a complex 
question with as many answers as there are CCGs”. 
 
 
5. (Mandatory question – identified from literature) 
Which statement below best describes your status in the 
Governing Body? Please select one. 
a. I am a voting member 
b. I am a non-voting member 
This was a close-ended question, identified from the 
literature (Checkland et al. 2016; McDermott et al. 2015), 
which was designed to determine the level of 
contribution to final decisions that the respondents had 
in their local CCG from the standpoint of being able to 
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 Question  Reason for the question 
vote proposed decisions into policy. Collection of this 
type of data was purely numerically based with no other 
factors considered that might limit candidates from 
voting. 
6. (Mandatory question – identified from literature) 
How big is the membership of your CCG’s Governing Body?  
a. Less than 10 members 
b. Between 11 and 20 members 
c. More than 20 members 
Identified from Checkland et al. (2016), this was a close-
ended question designed to capture information about 
the sizes of different CCGs’ Governing Bodies simply to 
get a picture to that extent. 
7. (Mandatory question – identified from literature) 
Which of the following statements best describes the way 
your Governing Body functions.  
a. Our Governing Body is structured to receive reports 
and suggested decisions for endorsement from other 
committees. That is, the operational function of 
primary decision-making lies with other committees 
outside the Governing Body. 
b. Our Governing Body actively participates in primary 
decision-making routines in which operational 
discussions are made. 
c. Our Governing Body functions differently from the 
two above mentioned methods. (If your Governing 
Body functions differently, please describe briefly 
how it operates in the space provided below). 
A combination of close-ended and open-ended question 
type designed to get a picture of how different CCGs’ 
Governing Bodies operated in decision-making approach. 
This question was inspired by findings from McDermott et 
al. (2015) study in which different styles of operation at 
the committee level were discovered. 
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8. (Mandatory question – identified from literature) 
What would you say the proportion of GPs is compared to 
the whole Governing Body membership in your local CCG? 
a. Below 25% 
b. Between 25% and 50% 
c. Between 51% and 75% 
d. More than 75% 
While previous research has reported variation in 
Governing Body sizes (Checkland et al. 2016), this 
question did not only seek to substantiate that finding 
but also linked with latent variable GP Proportion. A 
working assumption made prior to empirical evidence 
was that the GPs were possibly being outvoted in 
decision-making routines in cases where they constituted 
a smaller proportion in the Governing Body. 
9. (Mandatory question – own work) 
Using a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 represents “Minimum 
Influence” and 5 represents “Maximum Influence”, how 
would you rate the level of influence that you think the GPs 
in your Governing Body have in decision-making routines. 
This question was designed to ascertain power-balance – 
that is, whether the GPs thought they were exerting 
adequate influence in decision-making. The question 
linked to the latent variable GP Influence. It also linked to 
the proposition, “The level of GP influence in the 
Governing Body will cause a difference in the 
effectiveness of the decision-making process”. 
10. (Mandatory question – own work and identified from 
literature) 
Using a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 represents “Strongly 
Disagree” and 5 represents “Strongly Agree”, please indicate 
your views on the following statements. 
i. I feel that our local Governing Body is dysfunctional in the 
way that it operates. 
ii. Often, decisions in my CCG’s Governing Body are 
influenced by a few strong personalities.  
This was a close-ended question broken down into three 
parts. All constituent parts bore connotations of factors 
that hindered a perceived effective decision-making 
approach. For this reason, this question was designed to 
gather a measure of the level that these perceived 
barriers to the effective decision-making process 
contributed to the primary aim.  
Part (i) and (ii) were my own devising while Part (iii) was 
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 Question  Reason for the question 
iii. To avoid being perceived as violating trust, I feel that 
some members in the Governing Body yield their views 
to their colleagues’ choices even if they may not agree 
with them. 
identified from the literature based on theory of 
















11. (Mandatory question – identified from literature) 
Has there been any time in your knowledge where a senior 
member or a government official used his or her authority to 
veto decisions that your Governing Body made?  
a. Yes 
b. No 
Considering the power that senior authorities have, as 
discussed in Section 2.5.1, this close-ended question 
sought to establish if it is possible for a higher authority 
to overrule decisions made by the Governing Body. This 
would help in determining the influence of bureaucratic 
control, if any. The question linked to the latent variable 
Higher Authority Control.  
12. (Mandatory question – identified from literature) 
From your standpoint as a GP, are there any decisions that 
your Governing Body has made in the past which you feel are 




These two questions (Questions 12 and 13) intended to 
get the views of the GPs as to whether there were any 
decisions that their respective CCGs have made that were 
potentially damaging to their profession. These questions 
were inspired by the BMA (2014a) study whose findings 
underpinned the primary aim of the current study. As 
such, these questions sought to ascertain if the 
characteristics described in the BMA (2014a) findings still 
existed in the CCGs about three years later from the time 
when the BMA study was done. 
13. (Optional question – identified from literature) 
If you have responded “Yes” to the previous question, please 
briefly describe the unfriendly decision in question and the 
impact that you think it had (or will have) on patient care or 
any other aspect in the primary health care delivery. 
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 Question  Reason for the question 
14. (Optional question – own work) 
What would you attribute the reason for unfriendly decisions 
to?  That is, what possibly fuelled or facilitated such 
unfriendly decisions to be passed?  
An open-ended question which sought to get insight into 
the reasons that the GPs thought were the cause for 
unfriendly decisions. In that way, it was hoped that 
barriers to the perceived effective decision-making 
process would be flagged in the respondents’ answers. 
 
 
 15. (Mandatory question – own work) 
Give up to three aspects that you feel your Governing Body is 
good at in decision-making. 
An open-ended question intended to extrapolate factors 
that are the enablers of perceived effective decision-
making from the respondents’ answers. 
16. (Mandatory question – own work) 
Give up to three aspects that you feel your Governing Body is 
bad at in decision-making. 
An open-ended question intended to extrapolate factors 
that are the barriers to perceived effective decision-




















17. (Mandatory question – own work) 
Briefly describe the mechanisms that you have in place to 
check that no persona or office in your CCG domineers 
others in decision-making routines? If there is none, please 
say so. 
An open-ended question intended to extrapolate factors 
of both the enablers of and barriers to perceived effective 
decision-making from the respondents’ answers.  
18. (Mandatory question – identified from literature) 
Using a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 represents “Strongly 
Disagree” and 5 represents “Strongly Agree”, please indicate 
your views on the following statement: Decisions made by 
This question acted as a follow-up probe to the BMA 
(2014a) study findings where it was discovered that the 
GP Practices perceived the CCGs as formulating policies 
that curbed effective patient care. Since GPs with formal 
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 Question  Reason for the question 
my CCG reflect the wishes of the members (GP practices) 
that my CCG serves. 
roles in the CCGs represent that interest of the GP 
Practices, gauging the degree of their responses to this 
question would indicate the fitness of the CCGs from the 
standpoint of the primary aim of the current study. This 
question linked with the latent variable Member Practice 
Wishes Met in the conceptual model.  
 
19. (Mandatory question – identified from literature) 
Using a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 represents “Deeply 
Dissatisfied” and 5 represents “Very Satisfied”, how satisfied 
are you with the way decisions are made in your local CCG? 
This does not apply to the Governing Body decisions only, 
but any other decision making processes. 
This question simply aimed to gather the general feeling 
from the respondents about the fitness of the decision-
making environments in the CCGs. It linked to the latent 
variable Satisfaction. 
20. (Optional question) 
If you have any comments to make about the preceding 
question, please do so in the space provided below. 
Any comments made here were designed to help inform 
the researcher with further insights about of the factors 
influencing the perceived effective decision-making 
process. 
21. (Mandatory question – identified from literature) 
Using a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 represents “Strongly 
Disagree” and 5 represents “Strongly Agree”, please indicate 
your views on the following statement:  I feel that my local 
CCG is GP led as defined in the Health and Social Care Act 
2012. 
Like Question 19, this question aimed at gathering the 
general feeling from the respondents about the fitness of 
the decision-making environments in the CCGs. 
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22. (Mandatory question – identified from literature) 
How is GP Practice member engagement achieved in your 
CCG?  In other words, how does your CCG engage different 
GP Practices falling under its remit? 
This question was suggested by one of the respondents in 
the pilot study and then linked up with the literature, as 
discussed in Section 2.4.3. The purpose of this question 
was to establish if the CCGs engaged with their member 
practices as that is key to learning their wishes, which 




















23. (Mandatory question – identified from literature) 
What is the professional background of the Accountable 
Officer in your CCG? 
a. GP 
b. Clinician other than a GP 
c. Manager 
d. Other (Please describe in the box below) 
The Accountable Officer is one of the two top leadership 
positions in the CCGs (NHS Commissioning Board 2012a). 
As such, at the time when I launched this study, I worked 
under the assumption that leadership normally influences 
decision-making, as the case is portrayed in the literature 
elsewhere (Tyssen et al. 2014; Rolfe 2011; Avolio et al. 
2004). Establishing the background of this office would 
help infer if this office could be implicated on the 





3.5.3 Ethical considerations  
Regarding the subject of ethical considerations, when the proposed research profiles 
of doctoral research students in my cohort were vetted, mine was identified as 
requiring formal clearance since my research was to be performed in the NHS. This 
decision parallels the research procedures outlined by one of the NHS Trusts, Norfolk 
and Suffolk NHS Foundation Trust (NSFT), which states that “all student research 
involving the NHS requires approval before you can start to conduct your study” (NSFT 
2014, V1 Jul14). The ethical considerations at issue denote norms and standards of 
conduct that need to be adhered to for research to be considered acceptable (Resnik 
2015; Fouka & Mantzorou 2011). To this end, there were several steps that I had to 
fulfil before the commencement of fieldwork. First, I had to complete Sheffield Hallam 
University’s research ethics approval form, which was to be reviewed by the University 
Research Ethics Committee (REC). This form is standardised across all the research 
institutions in the UK to overcome “the problem of inconsistencies in the paperwork 
required by different committees” (Jamrozik 2004, p.286). Alongside this, I had to 
submit a proposal of my planned research to REC to satisfy REC that my research 
satisfied the ethical guidelines of the university. Next, there was a second approval 
that I was advised I needed to obtain, also because my research was going to be 
performed in the NHS. This was to be achieved through a standardised system called 
Integrated Research Application System (IRAS), which acted as a single point for 
applications to gain permissions to conduct health and social care research in the UK 
(United Kingdom Clinical Research Collaboration 2005). IRAS application was online.  
Meanwhile, I received a conditional approval from REC indicating certain areas 
in my application that I had to address before getting full clearance. A copy of that 
approval email dated 15 September 2016 can be seen in Appendix 3.1. The identified 
areas for revision were addressed accordingly, and the full clearance was finally 
granted on 09 December 2016. 
Regarding the question of clearance from IRAS, there are significant logistical 
challenges both to me as a student and to the applicable immediate staff that handled 
ethical clearance matters at the Sheffield Business School that this presented. I was 
affected in a sense best described in Jamrozik’s words when he commented about the 
then just introduced nationally standardised research ethics form for local research 
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institutions. Jamrozik (2004, p.286) remarked that the form was “incredibly long … 
[and threatened] to overwhelm both committees and investigators with paperwork”. 
While the nationally standardised research ethics form did not overwhelm me, 
demanding as it was, it is the IRAS form that did overwhelm me. IRAS form did not only 
ask for information about my proposed study but also included in its requirements 
things like the curriculum vitae (CV) of both of my supervisors as well as a list of the 
contact names and contact addresses of all the CCGs that I intended to contact, which 
were more than 100. From the Sheffield Business School position, the challenge about 
the IRAS form was that no one in the immediate staff had a definite knowledge of how 
it operated. It was not until this case was escalated to the university’s Head of 
Research Ethics that the problems about IRAS were resolved, revealing that after all, I 
did not have to complete the IRAS form. To this end, the Head of Research Ethics sent 
me an email on 14 December 2016, which can be seen in Appendix 3.2.  
Once ethical clearance was fully granted, the study took to the fieldwork. The 
sample was drawn (see Section 3.3.5), the questionnaire had been developed (see 
Section 3.5.1), and the next step was to conduct a pilot study which preluded the full 
data collection exercise.  
3.5.4 Pilot study 
Prior to distributing the questionnaire to the sample, I ran a pilot study to ascertain 
how the respondents were going to “interpret and react to the questions” (Gill & 
Johnson 2010, p.144). This action was intended to expose any weaknesses in the 
research design. Piloting was done in two stages, in line with the recommendation by 
Rowley (2012). The first stage was conducted with my friends and my supervisors to 
determine whether the questions made sense. The second stage was done with a 
selected group of 45 candidates from the sample, randomly selected from all the CCGs 
across England. An email inviting these candidates to participate in the pilot study was 
dispatched in two batches, the first 15 were done on 10 April 2017 and the next 30 on 
14 April 2017. The reason for the additional 30 candidates on the second batch was 
prompted by fear of low response rate to the request. The subject of the email was 
“Decision-making Practices in CCGs: Pilot Study”. This email gave a brief background 
about the research topic, where the original purpose of introducing the CCGs by the 
government of the day was explained. A previous study which was run by the BMA in 
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June 2014, just a year after the CCGs were introduced, was also mentioned along with 
a summary of the findings of that study – that is, the findings which partly contributed 
to the rationale of the current study. An attempt to incentivise the candidates was 
made by including a sentence which highlighted the potential that the findings of the 
study had in streamlining the decision-making approach in the CCGs. What is more, the 
candidates were promised that the findings of the study would be communicated to all 
the CCGs when the study concludes. A link to the webpage that had the questionnaire 
was included. The full email which was sent to the 45 GPs inviting them to take part in 
the pilot study can be seen in Appendix 2.3.  
The pilot study questionnaire was a finished product, as it were, ready for the 
final deployment to the full sample pending appraisal by the pilot candidates. The pilot 
candidates were asked to provide feedback on the following points. 
1. How long did it take you to go through the questions? 
2. Were all the instructions and questions clear? 
3. Are there any inappropriate questions? 
4. Are there any critical issues about the subject under investigation that you feel 
should have been asked? 
5. What do you think about the layout of the questionnaire? 
The feedback that the pilot candidates were to provide was incorporated into the 
questionnaire. This was not only designed for convenience to the respondents but also 
ensured anonymity in the responses; something that I felt would give the respondents 
freedom of expression, including criticism, if there was any. 
Pilot study reminder emails 
Ten days after the last batch of 30 emails was sent out, there were no responses from 
the pilot study candidates. At that point, 24 April 2017, I decided to send out a 
reminder email, which De Leeuw (2005, p.243) cites as “an efficient tool to increase 
response rates”. The email, which had the subject “Reminder: Invitation to participate 
in a pilot study”, was sent to all the 45 pilot study candidates. It referenced the original 
invitation email which I had sent just over a week before that date. In that email, I 
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repeated in brief all the points that were in the original mail. The closing statements 
read “I look forward to your goodwill in participating in this pilot study. Please send 
your response by the end of April”. A link to the webpage with the questionnaire was 
also included. The full reminder email can be seen in Appendix 2.4. 
April ended without a single response from the pilot study candidates. This was 
20 days after the first batch of invitation emails to participate in the pilot study was 
dispatched. At this stage, the plan to run my study on a survey appeared dim. I nearly 
gave up on the idea of using a survey as I thought of just resorting to face-to-face 
interviews. That, however, threatened all the preparations that I had hitherto made 
based on mixed methods design. As a last resort, I thought of seeking confirmation 
from the candidates to find out if they received the original invitation, plus reminder, 
to take part in the pilot study. Alongside this, I decided to also ask for the possible 
reasons that held the candidates from responding to my request. To that end, on 03 
May 2017, I sent out an email with the subject, “Your advice in three minutes”, to all 
the 45 pilot study candidates. This email had the tone of entreaty, somehow pleading 
for support from the GPs. The full script of that email is shown below: 
Dear Dr First Name Surname, 
This email is a humble request seeking two to three minutes of your time. I just wanted to 
confirm if you received my invitation to take part in a pilot study based on Decision-making 
Practices in the Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs). Please note that this email is not asking 
that you complete the pilot study. All that I am looking for this time is a confirmation that you 
received the invitation. If so, can I please ask in a sentence or two for reason(s) why you didn’t 
respond to the invitation. Please rest assured that this is not a ‘witch hunt’ exercise. Instead, it 
is purely for academic purposes so that I can academically justify the reasons for non-response 
from the invitees. You are not the only one who did not respond to my invitation, but all the 
doctors that I invited did not respond. I need to justify this predicament. Hope you understand 
my dilemma. 
You can either reply directly to this email or respond anonymously by using the electronic form 
on Google forms which can be found on this secure link 
https://docs.google.com/a/my.shu.ac.uk/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSfJMPeS4VrryRFSr1txmVTR1cv9s_
vtp8BuASHIvp0ITprchA/viewform?usp=sf_link.  
As mentioned above, its only two questions that I need you to address.  
1. Did you receive the invitation to take part in the pilot study mentioned above?  
2. What do you think held you from responding to the invitation? 
Thank you in advance for supporting me in this matter. 
Kind regards, 
Mpumelelo Sibanda 




Soon after the ‘entreaty’ email, there was a change. I started receiving responses from 
the very day that I sent out that email, notwithstanding that ultimately the response 
rate was low. What mattered most under the circumstances was the value that I got 
from those responses, which contributed to the improvement of my questionnaire. In 
total, three candidates completed the pilot study questionnaire where they attempted 
all the questions while on the other hand, seven decided to email me directly. 
Respecting the completion of the questionnaire, the feedback indicated that it took 
the respondents approximately 10mins to go through the questionnaire contrary to my 
original estimate of 20 to 30mins. All respondents indicated satisfaction in the format 
of the questionnaire and the tone of the questions. One respondent suggested an 
additional question to be included, which he or she felt was crucial to the 
investigation. The question was, “how is GP member practice engagement achieved”. 
As such, suggested amendments were implemented accordingly.  
Turning to the seven replies sent directly to me, the candidates acknowledged 
that they received my invitations to take part in the pilot study. Some wrote to simply 
inform me that they had completed the pilot study. One of the candidates said the link 
to the questionnaire was not working. All that I could think of for being the cause of 
that was a security setting on the network that the candidate tried to open the link 
from since the link worked for others. The general overarching message in most of the 
replies was about workload and scarcity of time to attend to matters like my 
questionnaire because of being busy. Below are three of the examples from the seven 






On 3 May 2017 at 23:07, XXXX, xxxx (NHS SUNDERLAND CCG) <xxxx@nhs.net> wrote: 
 
Hi so sorry for the late reply- 
I did receive the invite for the questionnaire but due to a huge workload I didn’t get 
around to responding - I work a day a week for the CCG only and am a practising GP for 
3 days a week as a GP partner. I hold some strategic responsibility for urgent and 
ambulatory care for Sunderland so a large remit and limited time. If you wanted to 
resend the questionnaire I could try to find some time to look at it. Sorry again for the 
late reply to your request.  
Best wishes xxxx 
Dr xxxx xxxx 




On 3 May 2017 at 22:43, XXXX, xxxx (TUDOR PRACTICE) <xxxx@nhs.net> wrote: 
 
Dear Mpumelelo, 
To confirm I did receive your email. I do receive many unsolicited emails in my CCG role. 
I am terribly sorry but I just do not have the time to answer all. Time constraints and 
prioritising work are the main issues. 
Best wishes 
xxxx 




On 6 May 2017 at 12:48, XXXX, xxxx (NHS GLOUCESTERSHIRE 
CCG) <xxxx.xxxx@nhs.net> wrote: 
 
Hi - I have now responded! I would not have done due to pressure of work - over 100 
emails every day to manage! 






Once all the necessary final amendments were made to the draft questionnaire which 
was used for the pilot study, the questionnaire was ready for distribution to the rest of 
the sample population.  
3.5.5 Questionnaire distribution   
Questionnaire distribution was planned to take place on Sunday, 14 May 2017. This 
was going to be accomplished through emails in which all GPs who were on the email 
list, except the ones already contacted for the pilot study, were going to be sent emails 
inviting them to take part in the study. However, two days before the planned date a 
huge event which threatened to nullify my efforts occurred across the globe. On Friday 
12 May 2017 there was an international cyber-attack called WannaCrypt Ransomware 
which hit many organisations across the globe (The Register 2017a), with the NHS 
worst affected in the UK (The Guardian 2017; The Register 2017b).  In the wake of this, 
chances of getting a reasonable response to my survey were significantly reduced, so it 
seemed, especially considering the kind of population that I was dealing with. With this 
cyber-attack, it was likely to be even harder to get the GPs to participate in the study, 
in the sense that the GPs were possibly going to avoid opening an email from an 
unknown and unexpected source. What is more, that email had a weblink which the 
participants were instructed to click to access the questionnaire. To me as a 
researcher, all this painted a foreboding picture on my study. To circumvent these 
challenges, a pragmatic course of action had to be taken.  
Sending the invitations to take part in the study by email on Sunday 14 May 
2017 was halted, with a new course of action taken instead. The new course of action 
was to send a hard copy letter by post to all the GPs, 1067 in total, that were targeted 
for the invitation to participate in the study. The purpose of the hard copy letter was to 
go ahead as a forerunner to introduce beforehand the pertinent aspects of the study. 
First, I introduced myself and the study that I was planning to perform in the CCG from 
the beginning of June 2017. I then highlighted that the issuance of that letter was 
prompted by the recent developments in the cyberspace in which WannaCrypt 
Ransomware attacked several IT systems around the world. At that point, I informed 
the prospective participants that my planned study was web-based and as such, I was 
shortly going to be sending them invitation emails to take part in that study. I then 
advanced the fact that, for that reason, the purpose of the hard copy letter was to 
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create awareness, as a precautionary measure, about the legitimacy of the emails 
inviting them to take part in the study. I mentioned that my emails would be 
identifiable by my name, “Mpumelelo Sibanda”, as a sender, coming from a Sheffield 
Hallam University (SHU) email domain. Last in the hard copy letter were the email 
contact details of the Director of Studies (DoS) and the researcher (myself), along with 
the SHU postal address directed to the researcher with the care of (c/o) DoS. A copy of 
this letter can be seen in Appendix 2.6. All the letters were posted on 22 May 2017 
using first-class postage (Royal Mail 2018).  
There were mixed responses to the hard copy letters. First, on 23 May 2017, I 
received a complaint from one of the CCGs’ front desk staff raising concerns about the 
volume of letters which suddenly arrived at the same time in their letterbox. The best 
that I could do about this was to send an apology for the inconvenience caused, which 
was well received. The complaint letter can be seen in Appendix 2.7. Another 
interesting response was from one of the GP leaders, sent directly to the DoS on 24 
May 2017. The email sought to confirm if my research was legitimate. Further, the 
email applauded my efforts of advising the targeted recipients about the emails that I 
was planning to send them in the face of the recent cyber-attack. One of the 
statements in the email read, “I have to say it is full credit to Mpumelelo that he has 
recognised the recent cyber-attack and is warning the directors to except an email 
from him”. The full email can be seen in Appendix 2.8. There is another email which 
was sent directly to me at a later stage, 27 June 2017, expressing the same sentiment 
as above about what the respondent called “a good idea to introduce yourself prior to 
sending the survey request”. That full email can be seen in Appendix 2.9. One of the 
GPs emailed on 25 May 2017 in response to the letter expressing interest to 
participate in the study. That email can be seen in Appendix 2.10. One of the striking 
responses was an absolute refusal by the whole CCG to take part in the study. Part of 
the email read, “I have however been asked to advise that we as a CCG do not wish to 
take part on this occasion. We would, therefore, request that you do not email your 
survey to those you addressed the letter to”. The full email can be seen in Appendix 
2.11. Finally, one of the responses advised about a doctor who had retired. 
 A period of two weeks was given from sending out of the hard copy letters to 
sending out of the emails inviting the GPs to take part in the study. On 04 June 2017, 
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the survey went live, with a total of 1058 emails sent out to the GPs inviting them to 
participate in the study. The candidates who had been excused from further 
communications about this study due to retirement or non-interest were excluded 
from this list. The email was presented in such a way that it would be obvious to those 
who had received and read the hard copy letter. The subject of the email depended on 
the email address category that each recipient fell under. These categories are shown 
in  
Table 3.1, Section 3.3.5. For the GPs with personal email addresses, the email 
subject was “A Survey of Decision-Making in CCGs: Sheffield Hallam University”, while 
for those with personal assistants plus those grouped under their respective corporate 
or unconventional email accounts, the email subject was “For the attention of Dr First 
Name Surname – A Survey of Decision-Making in CCGs: Sheffield Hallam University”.  
The salutation on all emails was specific and personalised, for example, “Dear 
Dr John Smith”, if the GP’s name was John Smith. The email message opened with a 
reference to the hard copy letter, as a way of establishing continuity to 
communication. The invitation to participate in the study was then extended with the 
indication that it would take about 10minutes to complete the survey. A brief 
background of the CCGs along with the studies that had been previously done on the 
CCGs, where CCGs’ decision-making routines were implicated, was explained. At that 
point, the purpose of the current research was given using the statement, “I am using 
a doctoral research project to try to better understand the CCGs’ current structure and 
decision making”. The recipients were then provided with a link to the webpage of the 
questionnaire. A reassurance about the anonymity of responses to the questionnaire 
was provided. Just to make sure that my email was received, a statement to this end 
which read, “Would you please be so kind as to acknowledge receipt of this mail”, was 
included in the invitation followed by a “thank you for your support” note. The full 
content of the invitation email can be seen in Appendix 2.12. 
After the invitation emails were dispatched, 17 had failed delivery notifications, 
20 recipients confirmed receipt, and seven recipients/centres requested to be 
excluded from further communication due to various reasons. The reasons included, 
“Sorry no time to complete surveys due to excessive work load”, GP not at the CCG 
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anymore, and GP retired. One of the recipients who confirmed receipt of the invitation 
email indicated that, in light of recent cyber-attack, their IT department instructed 
them not to open any weblinks of any kind. The email in question can be seen in 
Appendix 2.13. One response from the administration staff of the CCG that supplied an 
email contact which I categorised as unconventional indicated that none of the 
invitation emails sent to that CCG was forwarded to the intended participants, as the 
CCG was comprised of “enormous amounts of units in the 3 Boroughs and some staff 
not listed on the system”. The response in question can be seen in Appendix 2.14. Ten 
of the target recipients could not be contacted as a result.  
Main survey reminder emails 
After 11 days from the survey go-live date, 48 participants had responded. Sixteen 
days after the go-live date, there were no further responses, and so I decided to send 
reminder emails to the target sample. This was on 20 June 2017. Like the original 
invitation email, the subject on the reminder email depended on the category that the 
recipients’ email addresses fell under. For those with personal email addresses, the 
subject was “REMINDER: A Survey of Decision-Making in CCGs – Sheffield Hallam 
University”, while for the rest of the other categories the subject was “For the 
attention of Dr First Name Surname – REMINDER: A Survey of Decision-Making in CCGs 
– Sheffield Hallam University”. 1032 emails were dispatched from which there was one 
failed delivery notification. Those who indicated that they were busy, or retired, or no 
longer at the CCG, or with an unconventional email address were excluded from the 
mailing list. The emails’ salutation was personalised, just like the first email. The 
reminder email first referenced the original email where GPs were invited to 
participate in the survey. As such, assumption was overtly made that the recipients 
had previously received the original email. Since the survey was anonymous, a word of 
appreciation was given to those who had already completed the questionnaire. Those 
who had not completed the survey were encouraged to do so. A weblink to the 
questionnaire was likewise provided. Two crucial points were made about possible 
weblink failures to access the questionnaire further to the indication that one of the 
respondents made on the original invitation email. The respondent in question 
mentioned that the link was not working. However, immediately after, she emailed 
stating that she eventually managed to access the survey after using a different web 
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browser. It was for this reason that something had to be said on the reminder email to 
that end with the two points in question being: 
If the link appears as if it does not work, please try one of the following as the link has 
been tested and proved to work. 
1. Use a different web browser. One of the respondents has advised that they 
could not access the questionnaire on Internet Explorer but when they tried it 
on Google Chrome it worked. 
2. Try accessing the questionnaire from a different network environment. It could 
be that security settings on your work network are blocking the link from 
launching; especially in the wake of the recent WannaCry ransomware cyber-
attack, some organizations have intensified their security settings.  
The full reminder email can be seen in Appendix 2.15. 
After the reminder email, there were additional 26 responses, which brought 
the final response rate to 74. Data collection closed on 02 July 2017 with no further 
reminders sent to the sample. The next section describes the effort schemes that were 
employed to elicit a high response. 
3.5.6 Effort on eliciting high response rate 
When I embarked on this research project, I knew beforehand that the population that 
I was going to deal with was difficult to access telling from the trending news of the 
day about the way doctors were pressed for time due to excessive workload (BBC 
News 2015; The Financial Times 2015; The Telegraph 2015). For that reason, there are 
ways and means that I tried to employ to elicit a high response. To begin with, I tried 
to engage BMA by exploring the possibility of getting my research mentioned in one of 
their Newsletters as I imagined that action would add credibility to my study. To this 
end, on 16 May 2017, I emailed BMA explaining my research and the rationale behind 
it along with the reason for why it would be useful to get it publicised on their 
Newsletter. Following on from my email, BMA replied on 17 May 2017 advising me 
that they were not able to carry out my request. Instead, they referred me to the 
British Medical Journal (BMJ) citing that BMJ was better placed to advertise my 
research. As such, they gave me BMJ’s postal address and contact telephone number. 
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The following day I phoned BMJ about my request upon which they told me that they 
do not deal with issues of that type, and they referred me back to BMA. After a few 
communication exchanges, BMA informed me that my request was forwarded to their 
web team. I never heard anything from that despite the attempt of sending them a 
follow-up email on the 08 June 2017 when my survey was already live. The full email 
trail of my communications with BMA can be seen in Appendix 1.3. 
3.6 Data analysis methods 
Data collected from each study strand of the convergent parallel mixed methods 
design was analysed “separately and independently, using the techniques traditionally 
associated with each data type” (Creswell & Plano Clark 2011, p.78). While the 
literature argues about no right or wrong answer concerning the “adequacy of a 
dataset” from the fieldwork, I was acutely aware right from inception that my study 
was likely to receive a relatively low response rate for the reasons outlined in Chapter 
1 under Section 1.4.3. As such, the strategy that I set for data analysis was formulated 
from a pragmatic stance. For example, I determined to consider if the received 
responses were “likely to provide some reasonable and interesting insights (despite 
potential reservations regarding representativeness and statistical significance)” 
(Rowley 2014, p.317). My interest was also focused on getting a variety of 
respondents; respondents “with different roles, experience, backgrounds, and any 
other source of variability that might influence” (Rowley 2014, p.317) the diversity of 
responses on approach to decision-making in CCGs (Jansen 2010). Diversity of 
responses was particularly pertinent to the qualitative study strand as that is central to 
the qualitative survey (Jansen 2010), while the former strategy was noteworthy for 
quantitative data analysis.  
3.6.1 Quantitative data analysis 
The analysis of quantitative data was split into two stages. The first stage focused on 
basic descriptive analysis. Basic descriptive analysis was taken to denote a production 
of summaries of the applicable data which were displayed in simple graphs and charts. 
In this approach, statistical measurements like central tendency and dispersion, which 
normally are associated with descriptive statistics, were not considered. The reason for 
this was largely attributed to the question of sampling distribution, which was not 
105 
 
observed in this study owing to the adoption of Partial Least Squares Structural 
Equation Modelling (PLS-SEM) statistical technique, described and detailed shortly in 
the next sections. The rationale behind the concept of sampling distribution with 
respect to PLS-SEM is also explained in the process along with the reasons why PLS-
SEM was preferred than other alternatives. 
The second stage of data analysis, inferential analysis, was completed using 
PLS-SEM on SmartPLS 3 statistical software. Partial Least Squares (PLS) belongs to a 
group of variance-based techniques in Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) method. 
SEM is a series of statistical methods often used in social sciences to estimate causal 
relationships across multiple and interrelated variables at the theoretical level (latent 
variables) and observational level (observed variables) (Hair et al. 2012; Hox & Bechger 
1998). In this context, several traditional multivariate processes such as “factor 
analysis, regression analysis, discriminant analysis, and canonical correlation” (Hox & 
Bechger 1998, p.354) are performed in a single run.  
Additional to PLS-SEM, SEM method also contains a group of covariance-based 
techniques, abbreviated as CB-SEM. Often, PLS-SEM and CB-SEM have been mistaken 
as rivals by some researchers, a misconception which Hair et al. (2012, p.415) clarify by 
stating that, it is “Not “CB-SEM versus PLS-SEM” but “CB-SEM and PLS-SEM””. It is 
because each of these two approaches has its place in data analysis, hence should not 
be taken as competitors. While both methods are used to analyse structural path 
models, there are different in several ways, with some listed in Figure 3.8. Whether the 
data analysis should use CB-SEM or PLS-SEM is determined by different factors that 
should be carefully considered. Two main factors were of interest to the current study. 
The first pertained to theory, with CB-SEM widely used for theory testing while “PLS-
SEM … often serve as a basis for theory development” (Hair et al. 2012, p.424). This 
respect facilitated in achieving the primary aim, which is described in Chapter 1, 
Section 1.1. The second is about sample size, where CB-SEM proffers more reliability 
with a high sample, whereas PLS-SEM can “yield acceptable parameter estimates when 
the sample size is restricted” (Hair et al. p.423). More about how PLS-SEM suited this 
study is discussed in Section 3.6.1.1.  
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While there is an array of statistical techniques that can be used in SEM, Linear 
Structural Relations (LISREL) and path modelling are leading, with the former widely 
used in CB-SEM and the latter prominently used in PLS-SEM (Henseler et al. 2009).  
 
Figure 3.8 Recommendations on when to use PLS-SEM or CB-SEM 
3.6.1.1 PLS-SEM: why and how it fitted the current study 
This subsection explores how PLS-SEM fitted into my data analysis. I adapted six key 
subjects from Hair et al. (2012, p.419) over which this discussion is outlined, the 
subjects being “(1) reasons for using PLSSEM; (2) data characteristics; (3) model 
characteristics; (4) outer model evaluation; (5) inner model evaluation; and (6) 
reporting”. Outer model evaluation and inner model evaluation were considered 
under the subject “Evaluation of PLS-SEM path model”, Section 3.6.1.3. 
Occasionally, arguments are advanced where SEM, a second generation (2G) 
statistical method, is compared to the widely used statistical techniques like multiple 
regression, which are first generation (1G) techniques (Karimimalayer & Anuar 2012). 
It is, therefore, useful to note the naming convention of these statistical methods, 1G 




(1) Reasons for using PLS-SEM 
There are four primary reasons which were drivers for selecting PLS-SEM. These are 
explanation of variance of the endogenous latent variables, theory development, 
sample size, and non-normal data.  
Explanation of variance: Variance here is viewed as denoting a measure of data 
distribution from the mean or expected value (Bird 2004). Patterns of variance are 
commonly established using 1G statistical methods like multiple regression, a 
technique which Karimimalayer and Anuar (2012, p.326) claim to be “one of the best 
variance predictor in an interval dependent variable”. However, 1G techniques do not 
support latent variables, which underpinned this study, as described in the conceptual 
framework (Chapter 2, Section 2.5). Conversely, PLS-SEM supports latent variables and 
is acclaimed for being originally purposed for explaining the variance of the 
endogenous type of latent variables (Hair et al. 2012). 
Theory development: The primary aim of my research was to identify factors 
influencing perceived effective decision-making in the CCGs based on GPs’ views. 
Achieving this correctly using conventional statistical techniques such as found in 1G 
approaches would not be possible owing to the small sample, which was predicted at 
the inception of the study (Chapter 1, Section 1.4.3). PLS-SEM would, however, be 
useful in this context given that PLS-SEM emphasises prediction in situations that may 
not be amenable to other statistical methods like CB-SEM or 1G techniques (Lowry & 
Gaskin 2014; Hair et al. 2012; Henseler et al. 2009). Herman Wold, the originator of 
PLS, accentuated the role that PLS plays in theory development in these words:  
PLS is primarily intended for research contexts that are simultaneously 
data-rich and theory-skeletal. The model building is then an evolutionary 
process, a dialog between the investigator and the computer. In the 
process, the model extracts fresh knowledge from the data, thereby putting 
flesh on the theoretical bones. At each step PLS rests content with 
consistency of the unknowns. (Lohmoller & Wold 1980, p.1 cited in 
Henseler et al. 2014, p.200) 
Sample size: The question of sample size threatened to stifle this research, as was 
forecasted at the inception of the study (Chapter 1, Section 1.4.3). This was due to the 
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kind of the population that I was dealing with, the GPs. It was likely that the sample 
size was not going to be large enough for satisfactory analyses using techniques like 
multiple regression to establish patterns of variance, which do not work accurately 
with small samples (Karimimalayer & Anuar 2012). In contrast, PLS-SEM can accept 
small sample size, and therefore can be applied in situations less ideal for other 
techniques (Lowry & Gaskin 2014; Henseler et al. 2009). More about sample size is 
discussed in the next section which looks at data characteristics. 
Non-normal data: I did not have to be concerned about this as PLS models do 
not have distributional requirements; which means “path modeling can be used when 
distributions are highly skewed” (Henseler et al. 2009, p.278).  
There are a plethora of additional reasons that researchers who have 
previously adopted PLS-SEM for their studies have given to justify their choices.  
Several, which are not considered in this thesis as they were not relevant to my 
situation, are reviewed by Hair et al. (2012). 
(2) Data characteristics 
Two aspects were considered about data characteristics, which are, sample size and 
data type. While the general understanding is that PLS-SEM supports small sample size 
(Lowry & Gaskin 2014; Hair et al. 2012; Henseler et al. 2009), there is however no one 
agreed standard method for determining the acceptable “small” sample size, thus 
leaving the researcher with the question, “how small is small sample size”? Research 
has indicated that there are more than 300 models that have been used in the past, all 
for actually calculating sample size for PLS-SEM, with the smallest sample size being 18 
and one of the largest being 16 096 (Hair et al. 2012). There is, nonetheless, a widely 
promoted “rule of thumb” instigated by Barclay et al. (1995, cited in Henseler et al. 
2009) that I adopted. The rule of thumb is designed to guide the researchers in getting 
around the sample size question for PLS-SEM. It states that the minimum sample size 
should be either ten times the maximum number of outer model paths on a latent 
variable affiliated with the maximum count of indicators, or ten times the number of 
the maximum inner model relationships directed at single latent variable, depending 
on whichever is larger (Hair et al. 2012; Henseler et al. 2009). The way that this 
approach worked in this study is discussed in Chapter 4, Section 4.2.2.1. Regarding the 
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data type, the current study data was of interval (continuous) type, which is suitable 
for PLS algorithms (Garson 2016; Hair et al. 2012). While PLS-SEM can also 
accommodate categorical data, Hair et al. (2012) discourage its use on standard PLS-
SEM algorithm’s application as it is not adequately supported. 
Turning again to sample size, despite the widespread acceptance of PLS-SEM’s ability 
to support a small sample size, Goodhue et al. (2006, cited in Henseler et al. 2009) 
challenge that notion, denouncing it as misleading. The argument supporting this 
refutation is that, while PLS has statistical power in small sample sizes (Hair et al. 2012; 
Henseler et al. 2009), it lacks accuracy. Instead of statistical power, statistical 
significance should take precedence, as statistical power without statistical significance 
does not contribute to scientific knowledge (Henseler et al. 2009). On the contrary, 
Klein (2005, p.644) rejects “the overwhelming emphasis on p-value” which mandates 
the analyses results to be described in terms of statistical significance. Instead, Klein 
contends that researchers should look beyond statistical significance, to factors like 
“confidence limits, effect sizes, and meta-analyses” (Klein 2005, p.644). In this respect, 
PLS-SEM does consider the effect size criterion. However, it goes beyond that, utilising 
p-value in null hypothesis significance testing, but not without sharp criticism by some 
scholars (Ronkko & Evermann 2013) of the process used to that end, which is 
bootstrapping. Further discussion about PLS-SEM and p-value is done in Section 
3.6.1.5. Another test provided by PLS-SEM is confidence limits (confidence intervals). 
Overall, when considered from the grand scheme of statistical factors such as complex 
research models, handling of endogenous latent variables to explain variance, along 
with the question of small sample size, PLS-SEM is more favourable (Hair et al. 2012; 
Henseler et al. 2009). Commenting on the same line of argument, Wold (1985, p.589-
590, cited in Henseler et al. 2009, p.294) states that “in large, complex models with 
latent variables PLS is virtually without competition”. 
(3) Model characteristics 
Research has revealed different metrics about the average number of latent variables 
and the average number of inner model relationships in a typical PLS path model. For 
example, Hair et al. (2012) mention an average number of 7.94 latent variables 
whereas Shah and Goldstein (2006, cited in Hair et al. 2012) mention an average of 
4.70 of the same. While Hair et al. (2012) research notes that the number of latent 
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variables in studies published after 2000 has been significantly higher, reading 8.43 on 
average, the current study only had 5, which may appear relatively low. A count of 5 
variables is within the recognised range in academic circles, as demonstrated in Table 
3.4, which is adapted from Hair et al. (2012). Details of the number of inner model 
path relationships, number of indicators per reflective latent variable, number of 
indicators per formative latent variable, and the total number of indicators in models 
are also listed in Table 3.4. All the results shown in Table 3.4 about Mean, Median, and 
Range have been directly taken from Hair et al. (2012) research findings. Results under 
the row “Current study”, relate to this current research.  
Table 3.4 Descriptive statistics for model characteristics (Adapted from Hair et al. 2012) 
Criterion Results 
Number of latent variables Current study 5 
Mean (Previous studies) 7.94 
Median (Previous studies) 7.00 
Range (Previous studies) (2; 29) 
Number of inner model path 
relations 
Current study 6 
Mean (Previous studies) 10.56 
Median (Previous studies) 8.00 
Range (Previous studies) (1; 38) 
Number of indicators per 
reflective latent variable 
Current study  4 
Mean (Previous studies) 3.99 
Median (Previous studies) 3.50 
Range (Previous studies) (1; 27) 
Number of indicators per 
formative latent variable 
Current study range (1; 3) 
Mean (Previous studies) 4.62 
Median (Previous studies) 4.00 
Range (Previous studies) (1; 20) 
Total number of indicators in 
models 
Current study  11 
Mean (Previous studies) 29.55 
Median (Previous studies) 24.00 
Range (Previous studies) (4; 131) 
The path model developed for the current study is balanced, which is one of the two 
varieties that are said to be a good fit for utilising the predictive power of PLS-SEM 
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(Hair et al. 2012). A model is said to be balanced if it neither has a high proportion of 
exogenous latent variables nor a high proportion of “endogenous latent variables and 
mediating effects” (Hair et al. 2012, p.421). The other type is a focused model, in which 
there would be a high proportion of the exogenous latent variables, “at least twice as 
high as the number of endogenous latent variables” (ibid). 
3.6.1.2 CCGs’ PLS-SEM Path model 
This section provides a brief theoretical overview of PLS-SEM path models along with a 
review of the path model that I developed for the CCGs based on the conceptual 
model discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.5.  In Chapter 2, only latent variables were 
described along with postulated influences between the variables in question. To 
recapitulate, latent variables represent concepts that cannot be measured directly but 
are estimated using proxies (Lowry & Gaskin 2014; Henseler et al. 2009; Bozionelos 
2003). Further explanation about this can be seen in Chapter 2, Section 2.5. In SEM, 
the latent variables are complemented with observed variables, commonly referred to 
as indicators or manifest variables (Lowry & Gaskin 2014; Henseler et al. 2009). The 
resulting relationship between the indicators and the latent variables is called a 
measurement model or outer model. This and other aspects of the SEM model 
environment are illustrated in Figure 3.9.  
 
Figure 3.9 SEM Model Ecosystem Illustration 
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If the outer model is in reflective mode, the latent variable is treated as being the 
cause of the indicators, with the direction of the relationship pointing to the indicators.  
In this arrangement, the indicators are meant to reflect variation in the latent variable, 
thereby suggesting that “changes in the construct are expected to be manifested in 
changes in all of its indicators” (Henseler et al. 2009, p.289). In other words, indicators 
denote the mode of the latent variable, as illustrated in Figure 3.9. In contrast, if the 
outer model is in formative mode, the direction of causality flows from the indicators 
to the latent variable (Henseler et al. 2009), with the indicators collectively 
determining the import of the latent variable (Temme et al. 2014). In this 
arrangement, the latent variable material will be made up of the indicators (Garson 
2016). Figure 3.9 illustrates this situation.  
 
Figure 3.10 CCGs Final Phase PLS-SEM Path Model (Source: Author’s own 2019, unpublished) 
The PLS-SEM path model for the current study, shown above in Figure 3.10, had all its 
latent variables modelled in the first-order. This means that all the latent variables, 
regardless of their mode, had direct relationships with the associated indicators (Lowry 
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& Gaskin 2014). In contrast, latent variables that have relationships with other latent 
variables are known as higher order latent variables. As shown in Figure 3.10, the 
current study path model was comprised of both formative and reflective indicators.  
This path model is complemented by Table 3.5, which outlines the items that were 
measured along with the associated indicators and latent variables, presented in a 
format derived from Bharati and Chaudhury (2004). The names of the shortened 
indicators outlined in Table 3.5, as well as those outlined in Table 3.6, were derived 
from the items that were measured, which are described in the same tables. 
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The path model structure which was initially developed, here referred to as early 
phase path model, is demonstrated in Figure 3.11. This model had to be modified in 
accordance with the tests for what at this point I will loosely call goodness-of-fit. The 
tests in question facilitated in increasing the model fitness. Goodness-of-fit ensured 
that the ensuing tests of the statistical hypotheses were credible. More about 
goodness-of-fit tests is discussed at length under Section 3.6.1.3. What is useful to 
note at this point is that some indicators and/or latent variables which returned 
unsatisfactory results from goodness-of-fit tests were removed from the early phase 
model in line with the recommended actions to that end (Lowry & Gaskin 2014). For 
this reason, this thesis only discusses the relevant aspects of the early phase model 
which will inform the reader about the reasons which led to its alteration. The rest of 
the individual components in the early phase model are not described as that model 
was rendered obsolete, and therefore had no bearing on the final results and findings. 
It is worth mentioning at this point that getting a model wrong in some subparts of the 
research is a recognised occurrence in the research process. This phenomenon is 
featured by Henseler et al. (2014, p.201) who state that, “in early phases of research, it 




Figure 3.11 CCGs Early Phase PLS-SEM Path Model (Source: Author’s own 2019, unpublished) 
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Figure 3.11 gives a list of indicators that were used in the early phase path model along 
with their related latent variables and items that they measured. The format of this 
table was adapted from Bharati and Chaudhury (2004).  
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3.6.1.3 Evaluation of PLS-SEM path model  
In PLS-SEM path models, there is no provision of a global measure for goodness-of-fit 
(Henseler et al. 2009). Goodness-of-fit is an assessment used to measure the fitness of 
a path model in which a comparison between the observed values is made against the 
values expected from the model at issue (Garson 2016). As PLS-SEM does not support 
global measurement for goodness-of-fit, model fitness in PLS-SEM is measured 
through two steps. The first step evaluates the fitness of the outer (measurement) 
model while the second step evaluates the inner (structural) model (Lowry & Gaskin 
2014; Henseler et al. 2009). This two-step process is summarised in Figure 3.12.  
 Assessment of the outer model is performed on both reflective and formative 
constructions. The reflective outer models are assessed for reliability and validity 
whereas the formative outer models are assessed for indicator collinearity and 
indicator relevance (Henseler et al. 2009). Satisfactory assessment of the inner model 
can only be achieved if the outer models yield acceptable assessment tests (Hair et al. 
2012; Henseler et al. 2009). The next sections describe the strategy that I set to 
achieve acceptable statistical assessments. This is a continuation of the arguments 




Figure 3.12 A Two-step PLS-SEM Path Model Assessment 
(4) Outer model evaluation 
The focal function of the outer model evaluation is to ensure the fitness of the model 
in the sense of reliability and validity by removing or rearranging all the redundant 
items in each latent variable (Nazim & Ahmad 2013; Hair et al. 2012; Henseler et al. 
2009). The phrase “redundant items” refers to the items that fail related tests based 
on the matching benchmark indices described and detailed in Appendix 4.1. A baseline 
of acceptable indices per measured feature, along with a list of criteria used in this 




Table 3.7 A list of criteria used in this study to evaluate outer path models 
Outer Model 
Type 
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Inner model evaluation 
Inner model estimates can only be safely and appropriately analysed when there is 
evidence of the validity and reliability of the outer model (Hair et al. 2012; Henseler et 
al. 2009). Assessment of the inner model’s quality is assumed from the premise of 
“variance-based, non-parametric evaluation criteria” (Hair et al. 2012, p.426). Five 
tests were considered for this purpose – namely, R² of endogenous latent variables, 
Significance of path coefficients, Effect size f2, Prediction relevance Q2. Like the outer 
model assessment, the technical details of these tests have been moved to the 
appendices, Appendix 4.2. However, a baseline of acceptable indices per given test, 
along with a list of criteria used in this study to evaluate the inner path model, is 
outlined in Table 3.8. 
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Table 3.8 A list of criteria used in this study to evaluate inner path models 
Category Name Feature Measured  Name of 
index 





Individually explained the 
amount of variance of all 
endogenous latent 
variables 
R² 0.67, 0.33, and 0.19 
(substantial, 
moderate, and weak) 
Effect size Measures the magnitude 
of effect between two 
variables 
f2 0.02, 0.15, and 0.35 




Assesses the inner 
model’s capability to 
predict 
Q2 >0 
(0.02, 0.15, 0.35) 
(small, medium, high) 
Significance of 
path coefficients 
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(5) Reporting 
Reporting of the PLS-SEM results of the outer and inner models was organised in line 
with the tests criteria outlined in Table 3.7 and Table 3.8, respectively.  
3.6.1.4 Final phase conceptual model propositions 
As mentioned earlier in this section, the early phase path model structure, displayed in 
Figure 3.11, had to be modified following the model fitness tests just described in the 
preceding paragraphs. The process that led to the modification of the early phase 
model is described in Chapter 4, Section 4.2.2.2. This meant producing a revised 
conceptual model (Figure 3.13). While the description of the latent variables remained 
the same as explained in Chapter 2, Section 2.5, the causal relationships changed, 
meaning that a new set of propositions had to be defined. These are outlined below.  
Proposition 1 (P1): A high proportion of GPs in the Governing Body committee 
will improve the decision-making process effectiveness. 
Proposition 2 (P2): The level of GP influence in the Governing Body will cause a 
difference in the effectiveness of the decision-making process. 
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Proposition 3 (P3): A high level of GP influence in the Governing Body will 
increase the degree of GP satisfaction about decision-making. 
Proposition 4 (P4): The level of GP Influence in the Governing Body will 
increase the scale of member practice wishes being met thereby causing a difference 
in the degree of GP satisfaction about decision-making, such that the positive impact 
on satisfaction about decision-making is stronger with increasing values of member 
practice wishes met. 
 
Figure 3.13 Final Phase CCGs Decision-making Conceptual Model 
The relationships in the model depicted in Figure 3.13 above denote that Decision-
making Process Effectiveness is an effect of GP Proportion and GP Influence. On the 
other hand, Satisfaction is causally determined by GP Influence, and Member Practice 
Wishes Met, which, in the relationship matrix, depends on GP Influence. GP Proportion 
and GP Influence are exogenous latent variables, meaning that they are the causes of 
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Satisfaction and Decision-making Process Effectiveness. Member Practice Wishes Met, 
on the other hand, is an intervening variable with its causality role just being on 
Satisfaction, meaning that on its own it cannot exert that causation (Russo 2009). 
3.6.1.5 Inner model statistical hypotheses 
Statistical hypotheses for this study were derived from the four propositions, which 
were developed from a revised conceptual model shown in Figure 3.13 above. While 
typical statistical hypotheses are generally stated in two formats, Null Hypothesis (Ho) 
and Alternative Hypothesis (HA), where Ho suggests the absence of statistical 
significance in a set of given observations and HA suggests the opposite (Scheff 2016), 
some scholars argue that null hypothesis cannot be used in PLS (Ronkko & Evermann 
2013). The reason for this lies in the fact that null hypothesis significance testing 
(NHST) relies on “statistical inferences [that] are … based on the p value … [with] a 
known sampling distribution” (Ronkko & Evermann 2013, p.438). In PLS, the precise 
distribution of the path coefficients is unknown since it is dependent on the indicator 
weights. Therefore, Ronkko and Evermann (2013, p.439) contend that bootstrapping, 
an approach which they criticise, must be performed “to obtain the p value”. On the 
contrary, other scholars view bootstrapping favourably, as it is not restricted by 
statistical assumptions such as normal distribution of the underlying data, thereby 
offering “a solution to situations where conventional methods may be difficult or 
impossible to find” (Streukens & Leroi-Werelds 2016, p.2).  
Henseler et al. (2014) make a direct counterargument to the criticisms 
advanced by Ronkko and Evermann (2013) of the use of NHST in PLS-SEM. First, 
Henseler et al. (2014, p.195) argue that “PLS is routinely used for testing relationships 
derived from formal hypotheses … and that prior simulation studies have underlined 
PLS’s suitability for hypothesis testing across a wide range of model setups”. The 
second argument pertains to the distribution of parameter estimates, which Ronkko 
and Evermann (2013) suggested that they are ‘adulterated’ with bootstrapping. 
Henseler et al. (2014, p.198) state that an array of tests that performed under different 
conditions did not reveal “any problematic behavior of PLS in combination with 
bootstrapping”. This argument holds even for relatively low sample sizes. What is 
more, Henseler et al. (2014) remark that researchers using SmartPLS are unlikely to 
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face problems with NHST because of the way bootstrapping default settings are set, 
consistent with the recommended approach.  
Testing approach adopted for this study  
The current study adopted the widely assumed approach to hypothesis testing, where 
the Null Hypothesis (Ho) and Alternative Hypothesis (HA) are both used. Hypotheses 
were generated based on perceived causality effects between latent variables 
displayed on the path model in Figure 3.10. All the hypotheses generated for this study 
are nondirectional, which, accordingly, were created in the rival formation of Ho and 
HA. The reason for nondirectional hypotheses is because this research was cross-
sectional, and therefore, it was not possible to assert causality with accuracy on the 
latent variables as that, under the circumstances, “can be only speculated” (Bozionelos 
2003, p.7). In contrast, directional hypotheses predict the direction that one variable 
will have on the other and only allow a one-tailed test of significance (Brewer & 
Stockton 2010). More details about this can be seen in Chapter 2, Section 2.5, where 
theoretical propositions upon which the causal hypotheses are based were developed. 
As can be seen in Figure 3.10, all the latent variables are linked to each other by a 
causal effect path relationship. The Decision-making Process Effectiveness is an effect 
of GP Proportion and GP Influence. Satisfaction is causally determined by GP Influence 
and Member Practice Wishes Met, which depends on GP Influence. The latent variable 
GP Influence is called a moderating variable. Its influence antecedes variables Member 
Practice Wishes Met and Satisfaction. This arrangement presents spurious effects and 
suppression. “Spurious effect”, is when “two variables share an anteceding cause” that 
can be incorrectly inferred as being “correlated but this effect may be spurious” 
(Garson 2016, p.24). Alternatively, suppression denotes a situation whereby “the 
anteceding variable is positively related to the predictor variable … and negatively 
related to the effect variable” (Garson 2016, p.24). As a result, the anteceding variable 
suppresses the effect variable, making it appear weaker than it really is. Below is a list 
of the statistical hypotheses that I generated, and subsequently tested in Chapter 4.  
Causal Hypothesis 1: A high proportion of GPs in the Governing Body committee will 
influence the decision-making process effectiveness. 
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Ho: There will be no change in the decision-making process effectiveness as a result of 
a high proportion of GPs in the Governing Body committee.  
HA: There will be a change in the decision-making process effectiveness as a result of a 
high proportion of GPs in the Governing Body committee.  
Causal Hypothesis 2: The level of GP influence in the Governing Body will cause a 
difference in the effectiveness of the decision-making process. 
Ho: There will be no change in the effectiveness of the decision-making process as a 
result of the level of GP influence in the Governing Body.  
HA: There will be a change in the effectiveness of the decision-making process as a 
result of the level of GP influence in the Governing Body.  
Causal Hypothesis 3: A high level of GP influence in the Governing Body will impact the 
degree of GP satisfaction about decision-making. 
Ho: There will be no change in the degree of GP satisfaction about decision-making as 
a result of a high level of GP influence in the Governing Body.  
HA: There will be a change in the degree of GP satisfaction about decision-making as a 
result of a high level of GP influence in the Governing Body.  
Causal Hypothesis 4: The level of GP influence in the Governing Body will impact the 
scale of member practice wishes being met, thereby causing a difference in the degree 
of GP satisfaction about decision-making. 
Ho: There will be no change on the degree of GP satisfaction as a result of the level of 
GP influence in the Governing Body impacting the scale of member practice wishes 
being met. 
HA: There will be a change on the degree of GP satisfaction as a result of the level of GP 
influence in the Governing Body impacting the scale of member practice wishes being 
met. 
The study achieved hypotheses testing by use of p-values and confidence 
intervals. These results were produced using SmartPLS 3 in which a bootstrap of 4,999 
samples was performed in a single run. P-values were used to verify if the causality 
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relationships between the latent variables in the path model were due to chance or 
not. If not due to chance, then the relationships are considered as significant in 
research domains. The significance threshold in the current study was set at .05, 
meaning that if the p-value was below this “pre-defined α-level” (Henseler et al. 2016, 
p.12) the coefficient path was regarded as significant, while a p-value above .05 
indicated an insignificant relationship. The smaller the p-value, the stronger the 
probability that the results are not due to chance. Since the relevance of the p-value 
only shows the level of significance on the causal relationships; to understand the 
strength and direction of causality effect on the relationships, confidence intervals had 
to be assessed in line with recommendations for statistical testing of this kind 
(Henseler et al. 2016; Wasserstein & Lazar 2016). Confidence intervals supplement p-
value method as they emphasise estimation over testing (Wasserstein & Lazar 2016). 
Confidence intervals provide a range of values that a researcher is confident contain 
the actual population mean for the parameter of interest being measured. The 
confidence interval for the current study was set at 95%. To be regarded as significant, 
confidence intervals should not cross zero (0), a point known as the line of no effect 
(Henseler et al. 2016). A narrow confidence interval suggests that “the estimated value 
is relatively reliable” (Clarke 2012, p.1) while wider confidence intervals may suggest 
high variability in the sample being measured.  
3.6.2 Qualitative data analysis 
A dual approach was implemented in the analysis of qualitative data. First, the 
qualitative data were quantitised, after which a basic descriptive analysis described 
next, in Section 3.6.2.1, was performed. Secondly, the analysis was done using an 
interpretive approach within a phenomenological framework, discussed in Section 
3.6.2.2. To help me “simplify and focus on specific characteristics of the data” (Nowell 
2017 et al. 2017, p.5), I generated codes that I attached accordingly to applicable data 
cases. These codes served on both descriptive analysis and interpretive analysis. For 
the latter, the devised codes shaped “the basis of themes across the data set” (Nowell 
2017 et al. 2017, p.6). More about themes is discussed later in this section. Focus for 
now will be turned to the approach that was used in the descriptive analysis of the 
data that were quantitised. 
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A Data Dictionary with a full list of codes that were developed along with the 
associated code descriptions is provided in Appendix 5. 
3.6.2.1 Qualitative data analysis: Quantitisation and descriptive analysis approach 
On the data that were collected, some of the responses from individual participants 
spanned across several codes which were formulated in line with the set data analysis 
framework.  For example, Question 3 asked the participants about the roles that they 
were involved in at their local CCGs. Most of the respondents in that question gave the 
roles which fell into more than one code. To demonstrate this, Respondent 17 
indicated that his or her roles were executive member as well as clinical lead in mental 
health. From the codes that were formulated out of all the received responses for this 
question, those two roles fell under Executive and Lead, with codes EXEC and LEAD, 
respectively. This demonstrates that Respondent 17’s answer had two codes. Given 
this, to extrapolate more descriptive meaning from such qualitative data, a two-
pronged approach was adopted in the presentation of the statistical results. The first 
branch was named Format 1 Analysis while the second was Format 2 Analysis. In 
Format 1 Analysis, all the codes per given question were pooled together. Proportions 
based on each code were then computed. The product of this computation was 
intended to paint a picture of the prevalence of certain characteristics occurring within 
the contextual background described in the related question regardless of who 
contributed to it. Figure 3.14, below, gives a pictorial outline of the Format 1 and 
Format 2 Analysis approaches. 
Format 2 Analysis focused on weighting. In this case, codes were collected into 
groups in line with the contextual background described in the question. For example, 
Question 3, which sought to identify the kind of roles that the GPs were involved in 
had five groups allocated to it, with each group based on the number of roles that a 
participant said they occupied – that is, “1 Role”, “2 Roles”, “3 Roles”, “4 Roles”, and 
“>=5 Roles”. The assigned naming convention of each group was developed in such a 
way that it denoted an incremental count, or incremental weight, on associated 
names, thereby painting a logical picture of the estimated weight that each group 
represented. A bar column chart was then used to paint a picture of the weight that 




Figure 3.14 Qualitative Data Statistical Analysis Approach (Source: Author’s own 2019, unpublished) 
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This approach, Format 1 and Format 2 in descriptive analysis collectively 
complemented interpretive analysis, thus generating a rich insight into the roles that 
the GPs do in the CCGs as well as shedding light about factors influencing the 
perceived effective decision-making process.  
In the interest of clarity and brevity, all accompanying tables to support Format 
2 Analysis descriptions have been put under the Appendices section, where necessary, 
as some of those tables are unwieldy long. 
3.6.2.2 Qualitative data analysis: Interpretive approach 
The second approach performed analysis within the parameters of a 
phenomenological framework using an interpretive approach. As explained earlier in 
Section 3.3.3, the qualitative data analysis was guided by the interpretative 
phenomenological analysis (IPA) approach by Jonathan Smith (Tuffour 2017). Because 
of the preponderance of hermeneutical underpinnings in IPA, this thesis 
interchangeably refers to IPA as a hermeneutic phenomenology or interpretive 
phenomenology in line with the convention used by other scholars such as Tuffour 
(2017), Charlick et al. (2016), Sloan and Bowe (2014), and Laverty (2003). McManus 
Holroyd (2007) alternatively identifies the approach as interpretive hermeneutic 
phenomenology. 
The “commitment to explore, describe, interpret, and situate the participants’ 
sense making of their experiences” (Tuffour 2017, p.3) inspired interest to embrace 
IPA. What is more, the appeal for IPA was enhanced by its capacity to embrace the 
fore-knowledge that the researcher may have about the phenomenon of study. The 
key concepts of hermeneutic phenomenology, consistent with pragmatic approach 
that I embraced in the generation of knowledge in this study, are fore-structure of 
understanding, the context of the phenomenon, and bracketing. An apt description of 
these concepts can be seen in Appendix 5.1. Notwithstanding, it suffices at this point 
to say that fore-structure of understanding recognises the projected understanding 
that the researcher may have about the phenomenon of study. As a result, instead of 
detaching the researcher from the phenomenon of study, the researcher is 
incorporated to be part of the study (McManus Holroyd 2007; Wojnar & Swanson 
2007). Ultimately, the researcher interprets the lived experience of the researched 
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through the lens of his or her (researcher) fore-structure of understanding. 
Meanwhile, components like the culture and social context in which the lived 
experience happens should be considered, which is the context of the phenomenon.  
To uphold the rigour of the study, preconceived ideas about the phenomenon of 
the study should be mitigated, which, in hermeneutic phenomenology is done through 
bracketing (Tufford & Newman 2012; Laverty 2003). In IPA, bracketing is done 
beforehand to bring into awareness the researcher’s preconceptions. Striking a 
balance between bracketing of preconceptions while at the same time using them as a 
source of insight is a challenge that is tackled by approaching interpretative 
descriptions reflexively (Palaganas et al. 2017; Tuffour 2017; Gill 2014; Brannick & 
Coghlan 2007; Laverty 2003). A brief description of the concept of reflexivity within the 
context of hermeneutic phenomenology is provided in Appendix 5.2. For now, it 
suffices mentioning that reflexivity allows the researcher to take advantage of his or 
her presuppositions, and thus “articulate tacit knowledge … and reframe it as 
theoretical knowledge” (Brannick & Coghlan 2007, p.60). 
Data analysis procedure 
To begin with, the objective of the qualitative strand is well illustrated in Wojnar and 
Swanson (2007, p.177) statement, which was “to identify the participants’ meanings 
from the blend of the researcher’s understanding of the phenomenon, participant-
generated information, and data obtained from other relevant sources”. To this end, 
the setting of the study was as follows: the object of the phenomena was the decision-
making process in the CCGs while the subject was the GPs with roles to fulfil in the 
CCGs. The latter comprised the participants who were chosen to take part in the study. 
Put together, the phenomenon of the study was the GPs’ experiences with decision-
making processes in their local CCGs. To produce rich descriptions of lived experience, 
the research question was formatted in a way that symbolised the desired need, as per 
recommendation by Giorgi (1997). To that effect, the current study’s research 
question, which is also presented in Chapter 1, was: 
Research Question: How do the GPs with roles to perform in the CCGs explain 
and describe their experience regarding decision-making at their local CCGs; 
i. During the decision-making process, and  
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ii. Once the decision-making process has concluded and the decisions have 
been made? 
In keeping with the epistemological alignment assumed for this study’s qualitative 
strand, data analysis was developed from phenomenological and hermeneutic 
principles recommended for a systematic qualitative data analysis approach. Guiding 
principles were drawn from the experts in the field such as Smith et al. (2009, cited in 
Charlick et al. 2016, p.210), Benner (1994), and Colaizzi (1978, cited in Wojnar & 
Swanson 2007, p.177). Having said that, it is useful to mention that hermeneutic 
analytic methods, which include IPA, lack a standardised formal approach, with the 
context of the phenomenon given the prerogative to determine how data analysis can 
be performed (Langdridge 2007, cited in Sloan & Bowe 2014, p.9). In this respect, Gill 
(2014, p.126) describes IPA as the approach that “employs flexible guidelines, 
rendering it more of a craft than a technique”. In the same vein, Charlick et al. (2016, 
p.210) state that “there is no single, definitive method employed to undertake IPA … 
data analysis”. As a result, Tuffour (2017, p.4) highlights that the lack of 
standardisation exposes IPA to “being riddled with ambiguities”, something which IPA 
is criticised for. What is more, IPA is perceived by some scholars as being “mostly 
descriptive and not sufficiently interpretative” (Tuffour 2017, p.4). Owing to the lack of 
standardisation, a method specific to this study was thus formulated. This method, 
which comprised of four main steps outlined below in Figure 3.15, was largely derived 
from Benner’s (1994) hermeneutic analysis.   
What Figure 3.15 depicts is a process that I followed in my data analysis 
management. First, I read and reread several times all the textual data that was 
collected to get a feeling of the participants’ experiences. Reading was performed in a 
question by question basis. My approach to this was of an inductive disposition. This 
means that I viewed the data in a bottom-up manner, which led me to derive general 
concepts from the data in question (McAbee et al. 2017). In other words, instead of 
trying to fit the emergent concepts into a pre-existing conceptual framework, 
something done in a top-down approach, observations from the collected data were 
allowed to lead to conclusions. In this process, I isolated paradigm cases with 
outstanding accounts from which I drew emergent themes, still on a question by 
question basis. At the same time, I also selected associated EXAMPLE QUOTES to 
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illustrate the themes. EXAMPLE QUOTES were tagged with unique identifiers of the 
matching respondents who contributed them. All respondents had unique identifiers 
which were individually assigned to them.  
 
Figure 3.15 Qualitative data analysis steps (Adapted from Benner 1994) 
Further analysis through rereading identified repetitious themes in the text from 
within and between the cases per given question. I also put effort into identifying 
inconsistencies with the original main themes as well as ensuring that the themes did 
not overlap. This meant that some themes were merged, some separated, and some 
even removed. At the end of this phase, I intended to have internal coherence within 
individual themes and clearly defined distinctions across different themes. Cases which 
did not fall under any of the themes that were developed from the construed 
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paradigm cases were grouped into what Braun and Clarke (2006, cited in Nowell et al. 
2017, p.8) called “miscellaneous” theme. While the literature characterises 
“miscellaneous theme” as being a group made up of marginal themes, this study 
pragmatically considered only those cases that were insightful, and not necessarily 
marginal, if they did not fall under any of the main themes.  
The next phase was abstraction and integration of themes across the questions. In this 
step, the concepts from the emerging themes were described and combined 
accordingly. That is, the themes that were similarly named under different questions 
were analysed, “identifying the story that each theme told while considering how each 
theme fit into the overall story about the entire data set in relation to the research 
questions” (Nowell et al. 2017, p.10). This resulted in the construction of a thematic 
based theoretical model regarding the participants’ experiences with decision-making 
processes. Throughout the process, there was a continuous interpretation of the 
participants’ descriptive responses based on the pre-structure of understanding that I 
had about the phenomenon of study. Alongside this, was a continual process of 
reflexivity in which I challenged and tested the perspectives and assumptions that I 
held prior to the research. This exercise helped to allay any biases that I held which 
were possibly developed from what I had previously “heard, read about, or seen on 
TV” (McGraw 2012, p.75).  
3.6.3 Interpretation  
Interpretation involved two sets of data, with one dataset from the quantitative strand 
and the other from the qualitative strand. The analysis method that was assumed for 
qualitative data incorporated a scheme that inherently performed some interpretation 
in the process. With inferential analysis of the quantitative data, interpretation of the 
results that were generated was made using the criteria defined in Table 3.8. Further 
interpretation was realised from the descriptive data analysis of both quantitative and 
qualitative data, with the latter being quantitised where applicable. The next level of 
interpretation was performed in Chapter 5 at which point conclusions were drawn. At 
that point, results of the quantitative and qualitative strands were mixed using a basic 
approach that Creamer (2011) identified as linking or juxtaposing of two types of data 
with no data transformation conducted. In that process, questions such as the 
following were addressed (adapted from Creswell & Plano Clark 2011): 
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1. Do the respondents’ views expressed in the quantitative and qualitative 
responses converge or diverge?  
2. Are there any contradictions or relationships between the two datasets? If 
so, to what extent and in what ways? 
3. In what ways do the qualitative responses explain the quantitative results?  
The conclusions that were drawn demonstrated “what was learned from the 
combination of results from the two strands of the study” (Creswell & Plano Clark 
2011, p.67).  
3.7 Conclusion  
This chapter has described the research methodology that I adopted for my study. To 
establish a more complete understanding of the phenomenon of study, a mixed 
methods design was adopted positioned on pragmatic approach, a variant of 
pragmatism advocated by Morgan (2007). Pragmatic approach is stripped of the 
weight of philosophy, only recognising epistemological implications at abstract level on 
the acquired knowledge. A convergent parallel mixed methods was assumed in which 
a survey was performed utilising a questionnaire for both quantitative and qualitative 
studies. The participants were recruited through purposive sampling technique from a 
population of GPs with formal roles in the CCGs. The quantitative data were analysed 
using Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modelling (PLS-SEM) on SmartPLS 3 
tool while the analysis of qualitative data was performed manually, guided by 
interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA), due to the small sample of 
participants. Mixing, a core tenet of the mixed methods approach, was performed in 
data analysis and interpretation of the results. The results of this study are discussed in 




CHAPTER 4  
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter presents and analyses the data which were collected from a survey 
conducted on CCGs across England to address the problems presented in Chapter 1 of 
this thesis, using the method outlined in Chapter 3. A discussion of the findings is also 
made alongside the analyses. Data analysis was split into two sections comprising 
quantitative and qualitative data. There is, however, a point of interface where mixing 
occurs, a process achieved through quantitisation of qualitative data. Quantitisation of 
qualitative data is a mixing method recognised and advanced by some academics; for 
example, Creamer (2011). The discussion starts with a review of the response rate 
after which quantitative data analyses and qualitative data analyses are presented.  
It will be noticed in the text that frequently there is reference to managers 
which, unless otherwise stated, refers to the non-clinical management staff.  
4.1.1 Response rate 
1058 invitations to take part in the survey were sent out. 74 participants agreed to be 
part of the survey. Of this, 73 were considered valid for the study, of which 72 were 
GPs and one a Specialist Secondary Care Consultant (Figure 4.1). This resulted in a 
response rate of 6.9%. The one response which was considered unusable out of the 74 
was completed by a non-clinician. It is not clear how a non-clinician managed to 
complete the survey considering that the questionnaire was intended for, and 
addressed to, the doctors only. In the interest of smooth flow of arguments, all 
clinicians, including the specialist consultant, who participated in the survey, will 





Figure 4.1 Respondent’s professional background breakdown (Source: Analysis of survey data) 
4.2 Quantitative Results 
The quantitative data were taken from close-ended questions and open-ended 
questions. All questions that were close-ended were analysed quantitatively in which 
descriptive and inferential results were produced. On the other hand, the relevant 
open-ended questions constituting qualitative data were quantitised and used to 
produce descriptive results while the responses to other open-ended questions were 
analysed using Interpretative phenomenological analysis presented in Section 4.3. 
There was no missing data as all the questions were completed in their entirety. 
4.2.1 Quantitative study strand: Descriptive statistics  
The descriptive statistics were considered from four levels, with first three in line with 
the structure of the questionnaire described in Section 3.5.1, and the fourth level 
based on the correlation matrix of the latent variables in the path model described in 
Section 3.6.1.2. As mentioned in Section 3.6.1, statistical measurements like central 
tendency and dispersion were not considered in this study because of non-normal 
sampling distribution owing to the small sample, which was part of the reason for 
adopting PLS-SEM (see Section 3.6.1.1).  
Apart from the general response rate, attention was given to the personal 




Response Frequency Total = 74
I am a GP
I am a Specialist Secondary
Care Consultant
I am not a clinician
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was followed by consideration of factors related to decision-making, discussed under 
subsections “Your CCG’s Governing Body” and “General questions on decision-
making”. It is worth reiterating that, of the various decision-making committees that 
the CCGs may have, specific focus was put on the Governing Body as mentioned in 
Chapter 1, Section 1.4.1. 
4.2.1.1 About you 
First, the participants were asked about their professional background to inform the 
research about who did or did not meet the planned selection criteria. Table 4.1 
outlines the details according to the professional background (PB), length of service in 
CCG (LOS), involvement at committees (IAC), and Governing Body Voting status 
(GBVS). Only the 51 participants who sat on the Governing Body answered the GBVS 
question. 

















































































I am a GP 72    
I am a Specialist Secondary Care 
Consultant 1 
   
I am not a clinician 1    
LO
S 
Less than 1 year  1   
Between 1 and 3 years  24   
More than 3 years  48   
IA
C 
I sit on the Governing Body   11  
I sit on other committee(s) but not on the 
Governing Body 
  15  
I sit on both Governing Body and other 
committee(s) 

















































































I have a different nature of involvement 
which is neither Governing Body nor any 
other committee 
  7  
G
BV
S I am a voting member    50 
I am a non-voting member    1 
 Grand Total 74 73 73 51 
 
 
Length of time with CCG 
The question about the length of time with local CCG was designed to establish how 
well the GPs knew the development of the CCG that they served. The working 
assumption was that the longer one was involved with their CCG, the more ‘mature’ in 
substance their response was going to be, thereby boosting the quality of the data 
received. This is noteworthy especially considering that CCGs had only been in 
existence for just over 4 years at the time when the study was done. 65.8% of the 
respondents indicated that they had more than 3 years while 32.9% said they had 
between 1 and 3 years, and 1.4% had less than 1-year.  A breakdown of these results is 
displayed in Figure 4.2.  
The aspect of GP service in the CCGs has received remarkable attention in the 
literature (Storey et al. 2018; Moran et al. 2017b; Checkland et al. 2016; Drake 2016; 
Holder et al. 2016; Robertson et al. 2016; Robertson et al. 2014). For example, Storey 
et al. (2018) and Robertson et al. (2016) review the situation about leadership 
responsibility that the service redesign assigned to the GPs. On the other hand, Moran 
et al. (2017b) and Holder et al. (2016) discuss GPs planning to continue with or quit 
their service in the CCGs. There is no awareness in the existing knowledge accessed at 
the time of this study about the length of time that the GPs have served their local 
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CCG. The current research discovered that most of the GPs (65.8%) had served their 
CCGs for more than 3 years, which was beneficial for this study as the gathered data 
about decision-making processes in the CCGs was perceivably going to be ‘mature’. 
 
Figure 4.2 Length of time with local CCG (Source: Analysis of survey data) 
There is something that the current study also demonstrated, which possibly supports 
findings from previous research. The question at issue concerns the minuscule 
proportion (1.4%) of GPs who had served their CCGs for less than a year. The same 
tendency is reproduced on the proportion of the GPs who had served their CCGs for up 
to 3 years, whose proportion account for scarcely a third of the whole sample in the 
current study. As demonstrated in Figure 4.2, the remaining proportion was taken up 
by those with more than 3 years of service. What could be the reason accounting for 
that low proportion of new entrants to the system? Could it be solely what Checkland 
et al. (2014) discovered in their study, which is a lack of enthusiasm in taking up roles 
in the CCGs? Checkland et al. (2014, p.33) associated this occurrence with a threat to 
service continuity in the event of existing “GPs retiring or leaving the profession”. 
Another possible reason, as will be seen later under a different context, is a decline of 
GP representation in the CCGs, owing to factors such as lack of time and the question 
of money, with the roles that the GPs should play increasingly being occupied by 
managers (Rosser 2018; Storey et al. 2018; Checkland et al. 2016; Drake 2016). Apart 




Length of time with local CCG
Response Frequency Total = 73
Less than 1 year
Between 1 and 3 years
More than 3 years
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roles are filled up until such a time that new ones are created, or the existing GPs 
retire or leave the profession. 
Description of GP roles in CCGs 
The participants were then presented with an open-ended question which asked them 
to describe what they did in their local CCGs. When the responses were quantitised, 
numerous work streams were identified, with most of the responses indicating that 
the GPs predominately occupied lead (LEAD) roles. This accounted for 34.6% (Figure 
4.3). The groups or teams in which the GPs held lead roles include Cancer, Care Homes, 
Planned Care, Prescribing, Eyes, Diabetes, Medicines Optimisation, and Mental Health. 
In some instances, GPs presented as leads of what can be labelled as less-conventional 
work streams, when viewed from the standpoint of clinical background. These include 
finance, integration, governance, safety, and equality. One of the roles that appeared 
unique was “clinical lead for CCG in Rightcare commissioning for value”. Next to the 
LEAD roles, the widely occupied function was that of the chair (CHR) accounting for 
18.8% of the responses, followed by board member (BM) and OTHER, both with 
responses of 18% each. The roles that were categorised under OTHER had a frequency 
count of one during data analysis, and in the interest of clarity, they were thus 
grouped. These include “Member of medicines committee”, “GP advisor to the CCG”, 
and “Caldecott guardian”. Other codes were roles in which the GPs indicated that they 
were engaged in being a director (DIR) or an executive (EXEC). For example, “Clinical 
director mental health”, “Children, young people and maternity”, for the former, while 
executive portfolio included “Executive GP”, and “Joint Locality Executive Board”.  
Responses that had unusable data were allocated with code N/A. Such did not have 





Figure 4.3 GP CCG Roles Distribution by Code (Source: Analysis of survey data) 
The data about the roles that the GPs occupied in their local CCGs were also 
considered and presented in such a way to provide insight into the number of roles 
that individual respondents held. Based on this, the highest proportion of the 
respondents (53.4%) fell under the group “1 Role”, denoting that most of the 
respondents were engaged in only one role in their respective CCGs, as demonstrated 
in Figure 4.4. Such roles included Lead, Director, and Board Member. 24.7% of the 
respondents indicated that they held two roles. The associated two-role combinations 
included ‘Board Member, Chair’; ‘Board Member, Lead’; and ‘Executive, Lead’, while 
13.7% of the respondents had “3 Roles”. These included combination examples such 
as, ‘Board Member, Chair, Lead’; ‘Board Member, Chair, Other’; and ‘Board Member, 
Lead, Other’. The group, “4 Roles”, was constituted by 1.4% of the respondents with 
the combination of roles such as one shown in Table 4.2 below, where Respondent 47 
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Figure 4.4 Number of Roles Measure per GP (Source: Analysis of survey data) 
 
Table 4.2 Question 3 Format 2 Analysis Example: 4 roles per GP (Source: Analysis of survey data) 
Respondent 
Identity 
Code Description Sub-code Description  
47 Board Member 
 
47 Other Governor, Children’s Hospital 
47 Other Other, Health and Wellbeing Board 
47 Other Partner governor for … Children’s Hospital 
 
The last group in this weighted analysis, group “>=5 Roles”, constituted 6.8% of the 
respondents. Two examples of such role combinations are displayed in Table 4.3 
where Respondent 33 and Respondent 64 are used to illustrate this occurrence. 
Table 4.3 Question 3 Format 2 Analysis Examples: 5 or more roles per GP (Source: Analysis of survey data) 
Respondent 
Identity 
Code Description Sub-code Description  
33 Chair Vice chair 
33 Lead Clinical lead on cardiovascular 
33 Lead Clinical lead on governance  
33 Lead Clinical lead on mental health 
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Code Description Sub-code Description  
33 Lead Clinical lead on training & education 
64 Board Member 
 
64 Chair Vice chair 
64 Lead Clinical lead for primary care 
64 Lead Clinical lead for urgent care 
64 Lead Lead for finance 
 
GP involvement in various committees 
On the next question, the respondents were asked about their involvement at various 
committee levels at their local CCGs. A combined total of 69.9% indicated that they sat 
on the Governing Body. This total was made up of the two sections specified in the 
questionnaire – namely, the GPs who exclusively sat on the Governing Body and the 
GPs who sat on both the Governing Body and another additional committee. On the 
surface, one would assume that a high proportion of respondent GPs in the Governing 
Body could be beneficial to the decision-making process seeing that the Governing 
Body forms part of, or is the final point where decisions are either made or ratified, 
depending on the setup of individual CCGs. While this may be true, it is not necessarily 
the case as there may be conditions to that, depending on whether the GPs in question 
also sit on other committees like commissioning committees that may limit their 
freedom due to factors like conflicts of interest.  
Still on the committee involvement, about a third (30.1%) of the participants 
indicated that their engagements in their local CCGs had nothing to do with the 
Governing Body. The implication of this from the position of the current study is that 
the influence of the GPs in question to decision-making processes was possibly 
minimal when the consideration that the final decisions are ratified at Governing Body 
level is made. The good thing about this discovery though is that it adds to existing 
knowledge regarding the roles occupied by GPs in the CCGs, to the best knowledge of 
the researcher.  
Figure 4.5 displays a breakdown of the various committee involvements that 




Figure 4.5 Committee Involvement Status (Source: Analysis of survey data) 
The next phase on the question of committee involvements sought to understand the 
other committees outside the Governing Body that the participants sat on. This 
question was open-ended and optional. It was set to be completed by the respondents 
who indicated that they sat on both the Governing Body and other committees, or that 
they sat on other committees but not the Governing Body. A total of 54 participants 
attempted this question. The various committees that the participants listed were 
assigned into 23 distinct groups, illustrated in Figure 4.6. The description of the codes 
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Table 4.4 Question 4b List of CCG committees 
Assigned Code Question 4b Assigned GP Committee Codes 
AUDIT Audit 
CCBT Clinical cabinet 





HWB Health and Well Being 
LOCALITY Locality 
MedMGT Medicine Management 




PCC Primary Care Committee 
QUALITY Quality 
REFGRP Reference Group 
REM Remuneration committee 
SG Steering Group 
STRATEGY Strategy 




The code OTHER displayed in Figure 4.6 had the highest frequency ratio of 25.8%. This 
code represented a group formed up of a collection of committees which had a count 
of 1 on analysis. A total of 38 discernible committees were represented in this category 
and these included, Assurance, CCG Clinicians Group, Clinical Guidelines, Charitable 
Funds, Clinical Effectiveness Group, Clinical Pathway Development, Clinical Policy, and 
Clinical Senate. It should be noted that these 38 committees were extrapolated at ‘face 
value’ from the respondents’ answers, hence referring to them as discernible 
committees. In other words, there is no way of telling if the different names could be 
denoting the same or very similar functions.  
146 
 
The code Commissioning Committee (CC) had the second highest frequency ratio of 
14.2%. Likewise, this group was composed of commissioning committees of different 
settings such as Joint Commissioning Committee, Mental Health Commissioning, and 
Children’s Joint Commissioning Group, for example. This trend of a descriptive 
identifying character in each group was displayed in most of the committees that were 
identified. A full list of all the committees that were identified with associated details 
that are at respondent level can be seen in Appendix 7.2. Some of the respondents did 
not name the committees that they sat on but only mentioned that the committees 
were too many for them to record while, of note, one respondent stated that their 
CCG “Committees have strange names” (Respondent 61). Unfortunately, the 
respondent in question did not supply the committee names that he or she considered 
strange!! When comparing these results to those of older studies, this discovery ties 
well with Checkland et al. (2016, p.4), who asserted that “GPs roles were many and 
various”. What is more, elsewhere McDermott et al. (2015, p.30) suggested that 
“asking what the role of GPs is or should be in CCGs is a complex question with as 
many answers as there are CCGs”; a fact which the current study has strengthened.  
Another dimension that the current study sought to achieve was to explain the 
perceived weight of responsibility that the GPs bore with respect to the committees 
that they sat on. This was achieved by computing the ratio of committees that 
individual GPs were involved in at their local CCGs. Five groups were developed for this 
analysis – namely, “1 Committee”, “2 Committees”, “3 Committees”, “4 Committees”, 
and “>= 5 Committees”. It was discovered that the highest proportion of the 
participants, accounting for 43.4%, sat in one committee, as illustrated in Figure 4.7 
where the rest of the associated ratio breakdown details are displayed. This is an 
important finding which may be used as a basis for estimating the time that the GPs 
are likely to devote to the CCG tasks depending on how demanding their allotted roles 
are. This line of thought is especially pertinent when considering the recommendations 
that McDermott et al. (2015) made for policymakers where they argued about how 




Figure 4.7 Number of Committees Measure per GP (Source: Analysis of survey data)   
 
4.2.1.2 Your CCG’s Governing Body 
Questions in this section were focused on those participants who sat on the Governing 
Body. A total of 51 participants said they sat on the Governing Body.  
When the participants were asked to indicate what their status was concerning 
voting in the Governing Body, 98% stated that they were voting members while one 
respondent said he or she was a non-voting member, as illustrated in Figure 4.8. 
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Response Frequency Total = 51
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The interest in the voting status of the GPs was driven by a desire to evaluate the level 
of representation of clinical interests in the voting platform. While the current study 
simply sought to understand GP voting status, research by Moran et al. (2017a) gives 
insight that even if a GP has a status to vote in the Governing Body, it does not 
necessarily mean that he or she will be able to do so in all motions. This scenario is 
occasioned by the conflicts of interest which GPs may find themselves faced with. 
Regarding this issue, Holder et al. (2016) discovered that “One fifth of GPs were 
concerned about their CCG’s ability to effectively manage conflicts of interest” (Slide 
4). On the other hand, Moran et al. (2017a) discovered that, while the conflicts of 
interest were generally faced in the commissioning committees like Primary Care 
Commissioning Committee (PCCC), which is different from the Governing Body, 
membership between the two overlapped in some instances. To manage the conflicts 
of interest, some CCGs excluded the conflicted GPs from “the discussion and vote for 
the relevant item” (Moran et al. 2017a, p.10) while other CCGs allowed the conflicted 
individuals to remain in the room but not vote. Excluding the GPs to vote owing to 
their conflicted position is an element of note in the factors influencing the perceived 
effective decision-making process in the CCGs. Whether such impacts the effective 
decision-making process from the standpoint of this study, requires further research.  
Governing Body size 
The participants were then asked about the membership sizes of their CCGs’ 
Governing Bodies. An overwhelming majority of 92.2% indicated that their Governing 
Bodies had between 11 and 20 members. On the other hand, Governing Bodies with 
membership less than 10 and those with membership more than 20 each had 3.9% 
respondents, respectively. Figure 4.9 shows a percentage breakdown of these 
representations. A study by Checkland et al. (2016) in this respect indicated variation 
in Governing Body sizes, as demonstrated in the graph below in Figure 4.10. What is 
more, the same study noted that the sizes of Governing Bodies “appeared to have no 





Figure 4.9 CCGs’ Governing Body sizes (Source: Analysis of survey data) 
 
 
Figure 4.10 CCGs’ Governing Body sizes (Source: Checkland et al. 2016) 
 
Governing Body role in decision-making 
Inspired by findings from McDermott et al. (2015) study in which different styles of 
operation at the committee level were discovered, the next question in the current 
study asked the participants about the way their Governing Bodies functioned in 




CCGs’ Governing Body Sizes
Response Frequency Total = 51
Less than 10 members 2
Between 11 and 20
members 47
More than 20 members 2
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were actively made in the Governing Body or not. 58.8% indicated that their Governing 
Bodies were structured to receive reports and suggested decisions for endorsement 
from other committees. This was by far the largest method of decision-making 
approach across the CCGs which were represented in the survey. Meanwhile, 25.5% 
stated that their Governing Bodies actively participated in primary decision-making 
routines in which operational discussions were made while 15.7% indicated that their 
Governing Bodies functioned differently from the two above mentioned methods. 
Figure 4.11 shows a breakdown of these different decision-making approaches. 
 
Figure 4.11 Governing Body decision-making approach (Source: Analysis of survey data) 
The question of how Governing Bodies function is reviewed at length by Checkland et 
al. (2016) and McDermott et al. (2015). Aspects like how the meetings are held and 
where they are held, public or private, and at what frequency rate per given 
timeframe, are discussed in those articles with supporting empirical evidence of 
example sites supplied. While the current study did not go into the same level of 
detail, the results demonstrated in the current study are in accordance with the 
findings reported by McDermott et al. (2015, p.25) who discovered that some 
Governing Bodies sign “off decisions made elsewhere … while others are involved in 
substantive discussions and operational decisions”. From the results of the current 
study, it is clear that most of the CCGs’ Governing Bodies are not “involved in 
58.8%25.5%
15.7%
Governing Body Decision-making Approach
Response Frequency Total = 51
a. Our Governing Body is
structured to receive reports
and suggested decisions for
endorsement from other
committees 30
b. Our Governing Body
actively participates in
primary decision-making
routines in which operational
discussions are made 13
c. Our Governing Body





substantive discussions and operational decisions”. This is useful to know as it helps to 
understand the extent of engagement that the Governing Bodies have in the whole 
question of decision-making, and therefore to deduce the level of influence that the 
GPs are likely to have on the decisions made.   
GP proportion in the Governing Body  
The participants were then asked about the proportion of the GPs in the Governing 
Body when compared to the rest of the membership. Linked with latent variable GP 
Proportion, this question sought to disclose any possible disproportions within the 
individual Governing Bodies’ internal structures from the perspective of numeric 
balance between GPs and other professionals. A bulk of 56.9% indicated that GPs 
constituted “Between 25% and 50%”. At the same time, there was an equal proportion 
of 21.6% for each of the other two segments that the question specified. These were 
GP membership representation of “Below 25%” and GP membership representation of 
“Between 51% and 75%”. None of the Governing Bodies had a GP proportion of more 
than 75%. These results tie well with previous studies wherein “the percentage 
representation of GPs on GBs … showed considerable variation” (Checkland et al. 2016, 
p.4). A breakdown of these proportions is displayed in Figure 4.12. It does not appear 
like the proportion of GPs in the Governing Body has been considered in previous 
studies. 
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Perceived GP level of influence  
The participants were then asked to rate the level of influence that they thought the 
GPs had in their local Governing Bodies in decision-making routines. This question had 
two links to the conceptual framework discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.5. Firstly, it 
linked to the latent variable GP Influence, and secondly, it linked to the proposition, 
“The level of GP influence in the Governing Body will cause a difference in the 
effectiveness of the decision-making process”. The perceived influence was set to be 
rated on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 represented “Minimum Influence” and 5 
represented “Maximum Influence”. Most of the respondents thought that the GPs had 
an above average influence, with a combined total of 52.9% rating the GPs’ influence 
at 4 or better (see Figure 4.13). While most of the GPs thought their degree of 
influence was significant, the paradox in this perception is that previous research 
discovered that the “GPs on governing boards tended to be the least convinced that 
GPs were influential in the redesign of services” (Storey et al. 2018, p.35). Besides, 
empirical evidence has indicated that managers, in general, were perceived to be more 
influential than GPs in committee meetings (Storey et al. 2018; Holder et al. 2016; 
Naylor et al. 2013). 
Turning back to the current study results, a combined total of 11.8% of 
respondents thought that the GPs did not have significant influence as they rated that 
level of influence at 1 and 2, depicted in Figure 4.13. The interesting thing worth noting 
is that just over a third (35.3%) of the respondents rated their views at 3 on the Likert 
scale, which could be translated as being not sure about the level of influence that 
their local CCG GPs had. 
Combined, the findings of the current study and the previous research 
discoveries appear to suggest that although the GPs may think that they are 
significantly influential, that capacity may be overshadowed by other actors in the field 
such as the managers. Storey et al. (2018, p.87) corroborate this insinuation citing the 
observations that they made that; “there were a significant number of cases where 
managers acted as the most influential players”. This does not negate the influence 
that the GPs in the current study thought they had, a perception substantiated by 
Storey et al. (2018) who observed that “GPs sitting on the governing bodies were seen 
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as the most influential of the GP categories” (Storey et al. 2018, p.24). What is more, 
this same observation is augmented by the comment that “inside the CCGs, 
respondents were just as likely to judge managers as being the most influential as to 
judge clinicians as wielding the influence” (Storey et al. 2018, p.93). 
 
Figure 4.13 GP Level of influence measure in Governing Body (Source: Analysis of survey data) 
Is my Governing Body dysfunctional? 
Another Likert scale of 1 to 5 was presented to the participants so that each could rate 
how he or she felt regarding the suggestion that his or her local Governing Body was 
dysfunctional. The purpose of considering this factor was designed to ascertain the 
level of attitude that the respondents had about their Governing Bodies which, 
arguably, may indicate the strength of their local decision-making processes. 1 
represented “Strongly Disagree”, and 5 represented “Strongly Agree”. A combined 
bulk of 76.5% respondents disagreed with the suggestion. This was constituted by 
those who strongly disagreed in conjunction with those who mildly disagreed, depicted 
by ratings of 1 and 2, respectively. Figure 4.14 shows a distribution of these ratings. 
Conversely, 15.7% respondents neither agreed nor disagreed with the suggestion as 
they rated it at 3, while 7.9% agreed with the suggestion. None of the previous studies 
that the researcher reviewed seems to have attempted to investigate the views of the 
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Figure 4.14 Measure: Local Governing Body is dysfunctional (Source: Analysis of survey data) 
Are decisions in my Governing Body influenced by a few? 
Next, the participants were presented with yet another statement in which they had to 
express their feelings on a 5-point Likert scale, where 1 represented “Strongly 
Disagree” and 5 represented “Strongly Agree”. The statement suggested that a few 
strong personalities influenced decisions in the Governing Bodies of the participants’ 
respective CCGs. The implied meaning was that if a few strong personalities can 
influence decision-making in the Governing Body, then that board could be 
dysfunctional – that is, not balanced in its decision-making approach. A combined total 
of 52.9% of respondents disagreed with this statement, thereby suggesting a balanced 
decision-making process. 25.5% of the respondents, however, rated their views at 3 on 
the Likert scale, which was interpreted as being not sure about the suggestion made. 
On the other hand, a combined total of 21.6% respondents agreed with the statement, 
in which 7.8% expressed that they strongly agreed by giving a rating of 5 while 13.7% 
mildly agreed by giving a rating of 4. Figure 4.15 displays a distribution of these ratings. 
There is no evidence in the existing studies that the researcher has reviewed indicating 
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Figure 4.15 Measure: Few strong personalities influence GB decisions (Source: Analysis of survey data) 
Do some GB members yield their views to others easily? 
Another statement seeking the opinions of the respondents was presented with the 
suggestion that, to avoid being perceived as violating trust, some members in the 
participants’ respective Governing Bodies yielded their views to their colleagues’ 
choices even if they did not agree with them. While there is no evidence in the existing 
studies that this factor has been examined before, the desire to establish if some 
Governing Body members yield their views easily was driven by a discussion in the 
literature of shortcomings that self-managing teams, organisational setups which CCGs 
have been likened to in this study, have. For example, some decentralised 
configurations are said to have a potentially ‘crippling’ weakness called “negative 
groupthink” (Pautz & Forrer 2013, p.1), in which the team can fall into the trap of 
“group decision biases” (Janis 1982, cited in Langfred 2004, p.386). This happens 
especially in teams where there is a strong cohesion of members. As such, some 
members who may hold different views to their colleagues’ choices may yield their 
views even if they do not agree with what has been tabled to avoid being perceived as 
violating trust. 
Regarding this factor, respondents in the current study had to rate their opinions on a 
5-point Likert scale, in which 1 represented “Strongly Disagree” and 5 represented 
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implies a healthy atmosphere of decision-making. The interesting thing is that of all the 
loci on the Likert scale which were presented to the respondents, the highest 
incidence of response was on those who disagreed strongly as they rated their opinion 
on 1, constituting 43.1%. Another interesting observation was that, while there were 
indications of this phenomenon taking place in some CCGs, such was relatively very 
low in relation to the whole sample data in this study, with a combined proportion of 
15.7%. A distribution of these ratings is displayed in Figure 4.16. 
 
Figure 4.16 Measure: Some GB members yield their views easily (Source: Analysis of survey data) 
Are decisions vetoed by senior officials? 
When the participants were asked if there was ever a time, to their knowledge, where 
a senior authority or a government official used his or her power to veto decisions that 
their Governing Body made, 86.3% said no while 13.4% said yes (see Figure 4.17). 
Linked to the latent variable Higher Authority Control (Chapter 2, Section 2.5), the 
purpose of this question was to ascertain if senior authorities exercised bureaucratic 
control by interfering with the decision-making process at the step of authorisation of 
decisions, as per Mintzberg (1979) control of decision-making process continuum (see 
Figure 2.7). The imposition of decisions by a higher authority is a characteristic of a 
top-down bureaucratic control style. The existence of senior authorities imposing their 
agenda on the CCGs’ decision-making processes has been discovered in the most 
recent research. Storey et al. (2018, p.60) revealed that, in some instances, senior 
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crowding out the “bottom-up, clinician-led approaches to service redesign” with top-
down plans which consequently are prioritised.  
 
Figure 4.17 Senior authority influence measure (Source: Analysis of survey data) 
Existence of unfriendly decisions 
Another question was asked in which the participants were to confirm or reject if their 
respective local Governing Bodies had ever made decisions in the past that they felt 
were unfriendly to their profession. This question was prompted by previous research 
conducted a year after the CCGs were launched where it was discovered that the GP 
Practices were not happy with the policies that the CCGs made. The GP Practices 
perceived the CCGs as creating policies that “adversely affected their ability to care for 
patients” (BMA 2014a). As such, the purpose of this question in the current study was 
to examine if the CCGs still made decisions perceived as unfriendly to the GP 
profession – that is, decisions which the GPs thought hindered efficient delivery of 
health care service in the primary care sector. The results indicated that 37.3% of the 
respondents thought their Governing Bodies made decisions that they perceived as 
unfriendly (Figure 4.18). It is worth mentioning that at the time, BMA conducted its 
study on a sample taken from all the GPs, at which point about 30% of the respondents 
felt that the CCGs were unfriendly to their profession whereas in this study, with a 
sample from a subset of GPs (those with active involvement in CCGs), the same feeling 
has persisted. The difference is that the current findings suggest that the percentage of 
GPs expressing this sentiment has gone up. 
13.7%
86.3%
Senior Authority Influence Measure





Findings from recent studies suggest that there may still be differences between the 
CCGs and the clinical division of the primary care sector. For example, following their 
research, Storey et al. (2018) made recommendations which included a closer working 
relationship between the managers and the GPs. In those recommendations, the 
managers were proposed to formulate the policies while the GPs would support the 
process with clinical input. 
 
Figure 4.18 Unfriendly decisions measure (Source: Analysis of survey data) 
The respondents who indicated that they felt their local CCGs have, in the past, passed 
decisions that were unfriendly to the GP profession were then asked in an open-ended 
question to describe the decisions in question. Alongside this, the respondents were 
asked to define the impact that they thought such decisions had on patient care or in 
any other aspect in the primary health care delivery. 18 participants responded to this 
question from which 30 codes were extrapolated after the responses were quantitised. 
Two themes emerged from the responses – namely, reasons for unfriendly decisions 
and the perceived impact that such decisions may have.  
On the reasons for unfriendly decisions, an incidence of 14 codes was 
observed, with the principal reason being finance (FINANCE), where a proportion of 
42.9% was received, as illustrated below in Figure 4.19. Research has repeatedly 
revealed that the CCGs struggle with budgets (HFMA 2018; HFMA 2017; Wood & 









context of such are made. At the same time, subsequent research has also indicated 
“external political pressure … as a cyclical factor” (Checkland et al. 2018, p.387) 
subverting the autonomy of the CCGs, a factor which the current study discovered as 
being the second most described context for unfriendly decisions. Political pressure 
(PP) had a 28.6% ratio on the described reasons with the other codes being OTHER and 
Self-interest (SI), constituting 14.3% and 7.1%, respectively. The description attributed 
under the code “OTHER” included, for example, “Contractual issues around Primary 
Care” (Respondent 73). Some responses to the question could not be categorised 
under any usable codes and were thus labelled as not applicable (N/A), accounting for 
a proportion of 7.1% as displayed in Figure 4.19. 
 
 
Figure 4.19 Reasons for unfriendly Decisions to GP Profession (Source: Analysis of survey data) 
Concerning the perceived impacts that the unfriendly decisions were likely to have, 16 
occurrences of the extrapolated codes, which were two in number, were identified. 
The leading perceived impact was detriment to patient care (PTNTCARE), which 
accounted for a proportion of 62% of the respondents’ views, as demonstrated below 
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proportion of 38%. A detailed list of unfriendly decisions, along with the associated 
comments linked to the supplied codes, can be found in Appendix 7.3. 
 
Figure 4.20 Unfriendly Decisions Perceived Impact (Source: Analysis of survey data) 
Reasons for unfriendly decisions to GP profession 
Another open-ended question explicitly asked the participants about what they 
thought the reasons for decisions that they identified as being unfriendly and 
potentially detrimental to the GPs’ profession were. When the responses were 
quantitised, most had answers which were categorised under the code financial causes 
(FINANCE), with that accounting for a proportion of 33.3% in the codes pool. This high 
incidence attributing finance as the leading cause of unfriendly decisions substantiates 
the specific descriptions of the same that the respondents gave in the previous 
question. As alluded earlier, CCGs have been found to operate under severe financial 
strain. Following financial reasons, the next code that had the highest frequency rate 
was other (OTHER), with a proportion of 22.2%. Items which were collected under this 
code were those that were mentioned only once in the received answers. They 
included aspects such as lack of leadership, patient safety, hitting of targets, and 
excessive scrutiny that the primary care receives from the statutory bodies. Code, lack 
of clinical understanding (LCU), was also identified on the answers as a reason for 
unfriendly decisions, with that receiving a proportion of 18.5%. LCU had to do with 
62%
38%
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decisions that ignored the clinical factor. This is worth considering seeing that in 
previous studies (BMA 2014a) the CCGs were perceived as making it difficult for the GP 
Practices to deliver their patient care efficiently. Political control (POLCNTRL) and 
misbalanced authority (MA) were also identified on the answers, with these 
respectively accounting for 14.8% and 7.4% proportions on the codes pool. Finally, 
there was a proportion of 3.7% of the responses which were categorised as not 
applicable (N/A), as they were unusable in the context of the current question. Figure 
4.21 displays a breakdown of these distributions. 
A detailed list of the codes of the reasons that were supplied along with the 
related comments can be seen in Appendix 7.4. 
 
Figure 4.21 Unfriendly decisions to GP profession by codes (Source: Analysis of survey data) 
4.2.1.3 General questions on decision-making 
The questions which were asked from this point on were each answered in their 
entirety by 73 participants, Governing Body members and non-Governing Body 
members alike. These questions were intended to gather the data to complement the 





























Reasons for Unfriendly Decisions to GP Profession Distribution 
Grouped by Code
Code Frequency Total = 27 
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Mechanisms for moderating dominating characters in decision-making routines 
First, an open-ended question was asked in which the participants were to describe 
the mechanisms that they had in place to check that no persona or office in their CCG 
domineered others in decision-making routines. When the responses were quantitised, 
13 codes were extrapolated (see Table 4.5), all jointly appearing 113 times in the 
answers that the respondents gave. Most of the derived codes fell under the category 
where no mechanisms (NONE) in participants’ CCGs were in place to deal with 
domineering personalities. This accounted for a 20.4% proportion, as displayed in 
Figure 4.22. Next in the ratings was code ‘Overseen by Leadership’ (OBL) with 16.8% 
frequency rate. Examples of checking mechanisms in this code included things such as 
“An alert chair who ensures all voices are heard”, and “Exceptional AO [Accountability 
Officer]”. Most of the responses under this code (OBL) mainly related their 
mechanisms to the aptitude of the chairperson. These views are consistent with what 
previous studies have discovered. For example, McDermott et al. (2017, p.7) identified 
the importance of good leadership, about which they argue that it proffers “a 
facilitative environment which assures GPs that it is safe and easy to express their 
concerns, and contribute to or attend meetings”. The rest of the codes and the related 
ratings can be seen in Figure 4.22.  
A detailed list of the codes derived from the answers to this question along 




Figure 4.22 Domineering Persona Checks (Source: Analysis of survey data) 
Table 4.5 Domineering persona checks code list (Source: Analysis of survey data) 
Question 17 Assigned Code  Code Description 
BCS Balanced Committee Structure 
CIM Conflict of interest management 
GG Good governance 
GK Gate Keeping 
MNTD More needs to be done  
MR Mutual Respect 
N/A N/A 
NONE None 
OBL Overseen by Leadership (e.g. 
Chairperson/Accountability Officer)  
OC Open Culture 
OTHER Other 
PS Procurement Support 
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Code Frequency Total = 113
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Member practice wishes versus CCG decisions 
The respondents were then asked to express their opinions regarding whether the 
decisions made by their local CCGs reflected the wishes of their CCGs’ members (GP 
Practices). This question acted as a follow-up probe to the BMA (2014a) study findings 
where it was discovered that the GP Practices perceived the CCGs as formulating 
policies that “adversely affected” the ability to provide effective patient care. A 5-point 
Likert scale was given where 1 represented “Strongly Disagree”, and 5 represents 
“Strongly Agree”. A bulk of 41.1% of respondents indicated that they neither agreed 
nor disagreed with this suggestion by giving a rating of 3. From this, it appears like 
most of the GPs’ decisions were in the middle, which was construed as being not sure 
if decisions made at their local CCGs were reflective of the wishes of the GP Practices 
which they represented. Other than this, most of the GPs indicated that they agreed 
with the opinion that decisions made by their CCGs reflected the wishes of their 
members. Of these, a combined proportion of 36.9% agreed with the suggestion, with 
2.7% of that lot strongly agreeing as they gave a rating of 5 while 34.2% gave a rating 
of 4.  In contrast, those who disagreed – that is, ‘Strongly Disagree’ and ‘Mildly 
Disagree’, had a combined percentage of 21.9%. The intriguing thing worth noting 
about this whole question is that there were more GPs who strongly disagreed with 
the statement that the decisions that their CCGs made reflected the wishes of the 
member practices than those which strongly agreed, with their percentage shares 
being 8.2% and 2.7% respectively. It is, nonetheless, possible that these observed 
differences may not be significant if the same question is applied to bigger sample size. 
Figure 4.23 shows a breakdown of these ratings. Previous research does not show any 
evidence of specific investigation of this phenomenon except for the inferences 
derived from the BMA (2014a) findings outlined in the Background section of this 




Figure 4.23 My CCG Decisions Reflect Members’ Wishes (Source: Analysis of survey data) 
Satisfaction about decision-making 
Another question based on a 5-point Likert scale sought the respondents’ opinions 
about their level of satisfaction concerning the way decisions were made at their local 
CCGs. This question was linked to the latent variable Satisfaction. It stressed that the 
kind of decisions referred to did not only apply to those made by the Governing Body 
but to other decision-making processes as well. Most respondents (61.7%) expressed 
that they were satisfied. Of these, 9.6% indicated that they were very satisfied as they 
rated their level of satisfaction at 5, while 52.1% gave a rating of 4, as Figure 4.24 
shows.  
Getting around two-thirds of the respondents giving positive feedback about 
the level of satisfaction that they had regarding the way decisions were made in their 
CCGs is a significant finding. This is so, especially when considered from the standpoint 
of the BMA (2014a) survey where about 30% of the GP Practices perceived the CCGs as 
creating policies that “adversely affected their ability to care for patients”. A similar 
sentiment was repeated in the current study by a slightly increased percentage of 
almost 40%. The striking thing about this is a discernible counterbalance between the 

































My CCG Decisions Reflect Members’ Wishes 




Figure 4.24 Local CCG Decision-making satisfaction measure (Source: Analysis of survey data) 
On the surface, the portrayed impression could be that the respondents who 
perceived their CCGs as making decisions unfriendly to the GP profession are the same 
who expressed dissatisfaction concerning the way decisions are made at their local 
CCGs. To establish if that was the case, I performed a simple descriptive analysis, 
results displayed in Figure 4.25. Contrary to the inferential statistical sense, I have used 
the term “Correlation” shown in the graph to simply denote if there is a pattern in the 
way the respondents answered the question about decisions unfriendly to the GP 
profession and the question about the degree of satisfaction. Table 4.6 shows the 
description of the correlation statuses used in the x-axes of Figure 4.25.  
Table 4.6 Correlation Status Description 
Correlation Status Description 
Correlated_DUDE Correlated – Dissatisfied and Unfriendly Decisions 
Experienced 
Correlated_SNUDE Correlated – Satisfied and No Unfriendly Decisions 
Experienced 
NonCorrelated_DNUDE Noncorrelated – Dissatisfied and No Unfriendly Decisions 
Experienced 
NonCorrelated_SUDE Noncorrelated – Satisfied and Unfriendly Decisions 
Experienced 





























Local CCG Decision-Making Satisfaction Measure




Figure 4.25 Unfriendly Decisions versus Satisfaction (Source: Analysis of survey data) 
The results demonstrate that most respondents (51%) either (1) were satisfied with 
the way decisions were made at their CCGs, and had, along with this, never 
experienced decisions unfriendly to their profession (47.1%), or (2) they had 
experienced decision unfriendly to their profession, and, along with this, were 
dissatisfied with the way decisions were made at their CCGs (3.9%). The results also 
demonstrate that a sizeable minority (27.4%) had either (1) not experienced decisions 
unfriendly to their profession yet were dissatisfied with the way decisions were made 
in their CCG (7.8%), or (2) had experienced decisions unfriendly to their profession yet 
they were happy with the way decisions were made at their CCG (19.6%). The last 


















Unfriendly Decisions versus Satisfaction
Respondents' Answers Correlation Graph
168 
 
the Likert scale on the question about the level of satisfaction. Locus 3, in this case, 
was seen as denoting “Neither Satisfied nor Dissatisfied”; hence the degree of 
correlation with the question of decisions unfriendly to the GP profession was 
interpreted as “Indeterminate”.  
An optional open-ended question followed the question about the degree of 
satisfaction in decision-making explained above. The open-ended question asked the 
participants to give whatever comments they had about decision-making at their local 
CCGs. 31 respondents attempted the question. The responses were quantitised from 
which 15 distinct codes were derived, outlined in Table 4.7. The key finding from Table 
4.7 is that, although the previous question indicated more respondents were satisfied 
than dissatisfied, almost all the comments are negative, except ‘Collaborative Decision-
making Approach’ (CDA) and ‘Good approval ratings’ (GAR). Of particular note is 
‘Member practice GPs disregarded or poorly engaged’ (PMGDPE), which was leading in 
frequency rate, accounting for 14.3%. Examples of views expressed in that code 
included “There is no good involvement from practices”, “Our CCG seems to disregard 
GP views…”, and “We have become disconnected to GP practices”. 
Next on the rating was code ‘Imbalanced approach to decision-making’ (IARM) 
with 11.9% share. Here, respondents expressed views such as “Decisions are made at 
top level with little consultation and feedback”, “Biased by the people attending, if one 
person objects I do not feel that their difference in opinion is factored into the final 
decision that is made”, and “GPs can be excluded from decision making in view of 
‘conflict of interest’ but when an officer is making a decision that he knows will affect 
his future career this isn’t regarded as a conflict of interest”. The rest of the code 




Figure 4.26 Additional comments: Decision-making satisfaction Format 1 (Source: Analysis of survey data) 
 
Table 4.7 Additional comments: Decision-making satisfaction code list (Source: Analysis of survey data) 
Question 20 Assigned Code Code Description 
CDA Collaborative Decision-making Approach 
CR Commissioning responsibility not clear between NHSE 
and CCGs 
CRPU CCG role poorly understood 
DMBFC Decision-making based on financial constraints 
DMIGP Decision-making influenced by government policy 
DMPD Decision-making politically driven 
DMR Decision-making rushed or poor due to time constraints 
GAR Good approval ratings 
IARM Imbalanced approach to decision-making 
LOTDM Lack of transparency in decision-making 
N/A N/A 
OTHER Other 
PIDM Partially informed decision-making 
PMENM Member practice expectations not met 
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Is my local CCG GP led? 
Next, the participants were asked to indicate their feelings concerning this statement, 
“I feel that my local CCG is GP led as defined in the Health and Social Care Act 2012”. A 
5-point Likert scale was provided through which the participants were to express their 
opinions. 1 represented “Strongly Disagree” with the statement and 5 represented 
“Strongly Agree” with the statement. A combined total of 49.3% participants agreed 
with the statement, of which 19.2% gave a rating of 5, while 30.1% gave a rating of 4. 
Just over 50% of the respondents neither agreed nor disagreed or flatly disagreed with 
the idea that their CCGs were GP led. A breakdown of these responses is demonstrated 
in Figure 4.27. 
 
Figure 4.27 Is my local CCG GP led measure (Source: Analysis of survey data) 
Commenting on the subject of “GP representation on CCGs being eroded”, published 
in Pulse website which produces news on British primary health care monthly, one 
respondent who identified himself or herself as a GP Partner decried the CCGs, arguing 
that they are not GP led (Rosser 2018). The article in question demonstrated how GP 
representation in the CCGs is declining over the years, as demonstrated in Figure 4.28 
below. This is a useful insight into the current study, notwithstanding that the current 
study was not focused on indicating trends over time. Meanwhile, studies by Kings 
Fund and Nuffield Trust are reported to have revealed that some CCGs are purposely 
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the GPs should play increasingly being occupied by managers. Drake (2016) also 
reports about the same phenomenon of decreased GP representation in the boards. 
This leaves a question that, if the GP representation is low in the CCGs committees, are 
the CCGs truly GP led? 
 
Figure 4.28 Declining GP representation in CCGs (Source: Rosser 2018) 
Professional background of the Accountable Officer 
The last question in the quantitative strand asked the respondents to indicate the 
professional background of the Accountable Officer in their local CCG. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, Section 2.3.7, an Accountable Officer is one of the two shared overall 
leadership positions in the CCG, the other being that of a Chair. This can be occupied 
either by a clinician or a manager. For this question, the participants were given four 
options to select from, and these were “GP”, “Clinician other than a GP”, “Manager”, 
and “Other”. A majority of 60.3% of respondents stated that their Accountable Officer 
was a Manager. This was followed by a tie between “GP” and “Clinician other than a 
GP”; with each option receiving 16.4% responses. Subsequent research has found the 
same pattern, which reveals that “the number of accountable officers who are GPs has 
been in steady decline across the country” (Storey et al. 2018, p.50). The same study 
indicated how rewarding and credible it might be for the clinicians to have a GP in this 
position. Notwithstanding, the feeling of one respondent cited in that study (Storey et 
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al. 2018) noted the challenges that this position carries for clinicians, alleging that 
clinicians are not trained for leadership.  
A breakdown of the professional background of the Accountable Officer is 
shown in Figure 4.29. 
 
Figure 4.29 Accountable Officer professional background (Source: Analysis of survey data) 
An option was given to the respondents who indicated their Accountable Officer as 
being “Other” on the close-ended question to specify what the professional 
background of that Accountable Officer was. This was to be done on an open-ended 
question. Five respondents whose answers were “Other” completed this question. The 
responses were quantitised, and two codes were derived. These were “post currently 
unfilled” (PCU) and other (OTHER). Two respondents contributed to OTHER (Figure 
4.30), with one of the answers indicating that their Accountable Officer was a “Former 
accountant” while the other said they used to have an Accountable Officer “Many 
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Figure 4.30 Other: Accountable Officer Background (Source: Analysis of survey data) 
4.2.1.4 Correlation matrix 
Table 4.8 shows correlation coefficients across the different latent variables of the 
path model developed for this study (see Section 3.6.1.2). Pearson’s correlation, one of 
the widely used statistical estimators, is here employed. Each value in the matrix 
represents “the degree of linear relationship between two variables” (Colman 2015). 
The values range “from 1.00 for perfect positive correlation, through zero for 
uncorrelated variables, to −1.00 for perfect nega ve correla on” (ibid). Table 4.9 
outlines the criteria, adapted from Hinkle et al. (2003), for interpreting the correlation 
coefficients. Only positive correlations are defined in Table 4.9. Leading with a very 
high positive correlation are variables GP Proportion and Decision-making Process 
Effectiveness (0.932). A high positive correlation is also demonstrated between 
variables GP Proportion and GP Influence (0.837) as well as variables GP Influence and 
Decision-making Process Effectiveness (0.800). Also, of interest is a moderate positive 
correlation between variables Member Practice Wishes Met and GP Influence (0.572). 
The rest of the remaining correlations have either low positive or negligible positive 
correlations or have altogether a negative correlation as demonstrated in Table 4.8.  
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Decision-making Process Effectiveness 1.000 0.800 0.932 -0.092 0.031 
GP Influence  0.800 1.000 0.837 0.112 0.357 
GP Proportion  0.932 0.837 1.000 -0.118 0.055 
Member Practice Wishes Met  -0.092 0.112 -0.118 1.000 0.572 
GP satisfaction  0.031 0.357 0.055 0.572 1.000 
 
 
Table 4.9 Correlation matrix interpretation (Source: Adapted from Hinkle et al. 2003) 
Correlation size Interpretation: Strength of linear relationship 
1 Perfect positive 
0.900 to 1  Very high positive correlation  
0.700 to 0.900 High positive correlation 
0.500 to 0.700 Moderate positive correlation  
0.300 to 0.500 Low positive correlation 
0.00 to 0.300  Negligible correlation  
 
4.2.1.5 Summary of descriptive analysis findings 
A summary of the descriptive statistics is here presented in three parts – namely 
confirmatory findings, new findings, and subsequently published findings. 
Confirmatory findings are the findings in this study that confirm the results of the 
existing studies. New findings are the findings that, to the best knowledge of the 
researcher, have never been published before. On the other hand, subsequently 
published findings are those that were published after the fieldwork for this study but, 
all the same, have been included in the arguments in support of the related results. 
Confirmatory findings: firstly, the current study confirmed a recurrence of what 
the BMA (2014a) study described as GP Practices perceiving the CCGs as creating 
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policies that “adversely affected their ability to care for patients”. Secondly, also 
confirmed was a low number of new GPs taking up formal roles in the CCGs as 
observed by Checkland et al. (2014), who attributed this occurrence to a lack of 
enthusiasm. Thirdly, in line with previous findings, the current study discovered that 
some Governing Bodies sign “off decisions made elsewhere … while others are 
involved in substantive discussions and operational decisions” (McDermott et al. 2015, 
p.25). Fourthly, is the question of pressurised budgets, which, in the current research 
was identified as a leading cause for decisions perceived as unfriendly to the GP 
profession, while in previous and subsequent studies it has repeatedly been revealed 
as a point of struggle to achieving smooth running of the CCGs (HFMA 2018; HFMA 
2017; Wood & Heath 2014). Finally, the current study confirmed the importance of 
good leadership, which McDermott et al. (2017, p.7) discovered that it provides “a 
facilitative environment which assures GPs that it is safe and easy to express their 
concerns”. In this study, good leadership was explicitly mentioned from the position of 
curbing of domineering personalities from destabilising the decision-making process. 
New findings:  (1) while previous research has observed aspects like a lack of 
enthusiasm in GPs taking up formal roles in the CCGs (Checkland et al. 2014) as well as 
a decline of GP representation in CCGs (Rosser 2018; Storey et al. 2018; Checkland et 
al. 2016; Drake 2016), there is no awareness in the existing knowledge accessed at the 
time of this study about the length of time that the GPs have served at their local CCG. 
This study discovered that most GPs (65.8%) had served their CCGs for more than 
three years. (2) The current study delivered insight about the perceived estimated 
weight of responsibilities that individual GPs have at their local CCGs. This awareness 
was achieved through the computation of (a) the number of roles that individual GPs 
occupy, and (b) the number of committees that the same sits in. It was discovered that 
the GPs held between one and more than five roles per person with most of the 
respondents (53.4%) holding one role. Similarly, the number of committees that 
individual GPs sat on ranged between one and more than five, with most of them 
sitting on one committee (43.4%). (3) Contrary to the findings in the previous studies 
(Holder et al. 2016; Naylor et al. 2013), most GPs (52.9%) in the current study indicated 
that they felt that their level of influence was high in their CCGs’ Governing Bodies. The 
afore-cited previous studies state that managers were, instead, more influential. The 
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difference is that the current study did not compare the level of influence between the 
two groups. (4) The study also investigated the suggestion that the Governing Bodies’ 
decision-making processes were influenced by a few domineering personalities, with 
most of the respondents (52.9%) rejecting that idea. (5) It was also discovered that 
most respondents (72.6%) did not think that their Governing Bodies had a problem of 
negative groupthink as they disagreed with the suggestion that some of their members 
yielded their views to their colleagues’ choices even if they did not agree with them. 
(6) Also discovered was a pattern demonstrating either that, (a) the respondents who 
indicated that they experienced decisions unfriendly to the GP profession at one point 
also expressed dissatisfaction about the way decisions were made at their local CCG, or 
(b) that if they (respondents) had never experienced decisions unfriendly to the GP 
profession from their local CCG, they also indicated that they were happy with the way 
their CCG made decisions.  
Subsequently published findings: Firstly, while the current study discovered that, 
overall, most respondents thought that the decisions made by their Governing Bodies 
are not vetoed by senior authorities, subsequent research (Storey et al. 2018, p.60) has 
revealed that senior managers, in some instances, are “empowered to take the lead in 
an assertive way” crowding out the “bottom-up, clinician-led approaches to service 
redesign”. Secondly, external political pressure, identified in the current study as a 
second leading cause of decisions unfriendly to the GP profession, was observed and 
described by Checkland et al. (2018, p.387) as being “a cyclical factor” subverting the 
autonomy of the CCGs. Thirdly, the current study found that GPs regard themselves as 
having high influence in the Governing Body, a view substantiated in a subsequent 
research by (Storey et al. 2018, p.93) where they state that “inside the CCGs, 
respondents were just as likely to judge managers as being the most influential as to 
judge clinicians as wielding the influence”.  
4.2.2 Quantitative study strand: Inferential analysis 
I achieved inferential analysis using Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modelling 
(PLS-SEM). The reasons for adopting this technique are described and detailed in 
Chapter 3, Section 3.6.1.1. Analysis results in this chapter are split into two segments 
which represent the journey that transpired to arrive at the final path model that I 
used to draw conclusions. It is because the structure of the model had to change along 
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the way after I performed statistical testing for model fitness (‘goodness-of-fit’). As 
explained in Chapter 3, Section 3.6.1.3, model fitness testing in PLS-SEM is done on the 
outer and inner models. Latent and observed variables which fail the test are removed 
from the model, under the recommendations for this technique (Lowry & Gaskin 
2014). The model is rearranged and retested, with this cycle repeated until the 
‘goodness-of-fit’ tests are passed.   
Considering the above ‘goodness-of-fit’ tests, I refer to the first attempt model 
as an “early phase model”, while the model that I ultimately used for the study outturn 
is referred to as the “final phase model”. For this reason, I have divided the layout for 
statistical tests into two broad parts; early phase model and final phase model. The 
former is designed to inform the reader about the reasons which led to the change of 
the early phase model while the latter contains the results from which the findings and 
conclusions of the study were partly drawn. Before describing statistical tests, the 
sample size had to be validated. 
4.2.2.1 Sample size validation 
The sample size had to be validated first to ascertain if the sample was suited for the 
required tests described in Chapter 3. To achieve this, the rule of thumb test by Barclay 
et al. (1995) was used. To recapitulate – the rule of thumb states that the minimum 
sample size should be either ten times the maximum number of outer model paths on 
a latent variable affiliated with the maximum count of indicators, or ten times the 
number of the maximum inner model relationships directed at single latent variable, 
depending on whichever is larger (Hair et al. 2012; Henseler et al. 2009). Figure 4.31 
below reiterates a general view of the components that constitute a typical path 
model, with full details of what the inner model and outer model are, described in 




Figure 4.31 Path model illustration 
Early phase PLS-SEM path model sample size validation: First, the indicators affiliated 
with one latent variable in this path model was larger than the number of inner 
relationships directed at a single latent variable, as shown in Figure 4.32 below. The 
former had a count of four, latent variable GP Influence, while the latter had a count of 
three, latent variable Satisfaction. Therefore, according to the rule of thumb test, the 
minimum sample size required for the early phase model would be four times ten, 
which is 40, while the current study had a sample size of 73.  
Final phase PLS-SEM path model sample size validation: Like the early phase model, 
the minimum sample size required for the final phase model was also 40, while the 
current study had a sample size of 73. The indicators affiliated with one latent variable 
in this path model was larger than the number of inner relationships directed at a 
single latent variable, as shown in Figure 4.34 below. The former had a count of four, 
latent variable Decision-making Process Effectiveness. Meanwhile, the maximum inner 
model relationships directed at a single latent variable was two, and there are two 
occurrences of this – which are, (1) directed at latent variable Satisfaction and (2) 
directed at latent variable Decision-making Process Effectiveness. Therefore, according 
to the rule of thumb test, the minimum sample size required for this model would be 
four times ten, which is 40.  
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4.2.2.2 Early phase model analysis – why the change was necessary 
To appreciate the discussion in this section, the reader is referred to the early phase 
path model illustrated below in Figure 4.32. The early phase path model was first 
tested for validity and reliability.  
Outer Model: Reflective measurement model 
 The model successfully passed all the reliability and validity tests on the reflective 
measurement model except for one. The test that failed was the validity test – that is, 
the convergent validity test which in SmartPLS 3 is referred to as Outer Loadings. To 
pass this test, a reading of at least 0.5 should be attained, thereby demonstrating that 
the latent variable being considered “is able to explain more than half of the variance 
of its indicators on average” (Henseler et al. 2009, p.299). In this study, three 
indicators had a reading of less than 0.5. The indicators in question were “AccOffBG”, 
“LenInCCG”, “YieldOpin” (see below Table 4.10 for the description of what these 
indicators were intended to measure). Two actions were taken to address this issue. 
First, all possible combinations of latent variable to indicator were tried and tested, 
after which indicator “YieldOpin” was found to be compatible with the latent variable 
Decision-making Process Effectiveness. 
The other two indicators were not successful in all the combinations that could 
be possibly created. As such, those two had to be removed from the model in line with 
PLS-SEM procedures where the recommendation is that items that fail the test should 








Table 4.10 Early phase model (Reflective): Reliability and validity test affected indicators 
INDICATOR ITEM MEASURED 
AccOffBG Accountable Officer Professional 
Background 
LenInCCG Length of Service In CCG 
YieldOpin Governing Body Members Yield Opinions 
to Others to Avoid Contention 
 
Outer Model: Formative measurement model 
Validity only, was tested on formative measurement model. The formative 
measurement model is an occurrence when the measured indicators are considered to 
be the cause of the latent variable (see below Figure 4.33).  
 
Figure 4.33 Reflective versus Formative models 
Of the two validity tests that were performed on the formative measurement model – 
that is, test for indicator relevance and test for multi-collinearity between indicators, 
there was a failure on the latter. To pass the test, the indicators should have a reading 
of variance inflation factor (VIF) of not more than 10. Two of the indicators 
demonstrated high collinearity between themselves. These were “MembSize” and 
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“VotStatus”, which both had a relationship with the latent variable GP Proportion (see 
below Table 4.11 for a description of indicators in question). Indicator “VotStatus” had 
to be removed as indicator “MembSize” showed stronger relevance to the latent 
variable GP Proportion.  
Table 4.11 Early phase model (Formative): Validity test affected indicators 
INDICATOR ITEM MEASURED 
MembSize CCG Governing Body Membership Size  
VotStatus Governing Body Voting Status 
 
If the model is altered in any way, such as removing one or more indicators, the whole 
model evaluation should be done again in line with PLS-SEM path model assessment 
recommendations. This applies to all cases of inner and outer model structures given 
“the highly interrelated nature of variables in SEM analyses” (Lowry & Gaskin 2014, 
p.137). Respecting the current study, a successful path model displayed in Figure 4.34 
below was created after several test runs and recompilations. The test results of that 
path model are described and detailed next. 
4.2.2.3 Final phase model analysis 
To appreciate the discussion in this section, the reader is referred to the final phase 
path model illustrated below in Figure 4.34. After test computations on the path model 
using SmartPLS 3, the results that were returned are displayed in the path model in 
Figure 4.34. The results indicated incorporate different kinds of tests which were 
computed simultaneously in a single run. The evaluation results are described in the 









       Figure 4.35 Path model results summary
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Outer path model evaluation 
The outer model evaluation was designed to verify the validity and reliability of the 
path model to ensure the fitness of the model. The first check was performed on the 
reflective outer model items, beginning with “Composite Reliability” (see Figure 4.33 
to establish how reflective model components look like). Table 4.12 shows the results 
for “Composite Reliability” evaluation. 
Table 4.12 Reflective outer model: Composite Reliability evaluation 




GBDysFunc 0.847  





ReflGPWish 1.00 1.00 
 
As can be seen, all the results demonstrated a high level of internal consistency 
reliability for the two latent variables, with all individual readings higher than the 
acceptable level of at least 0.6 (Hamid et al. 2017). Similarly, the results for convergent 
validity evaluation demonstrated a high degree of indicator correlation on both latent 
variables as the latent variables’ Average Variance Extracted (AVE) was higher than the 
recommended minimum of 0.5 (Henseler et al. 2009). The convergent validity 
evaluation results are shown in Table 4.13. 
Table 4.13 Reflective outer model: Convergent validity evaluation 




GBDysFunc 0.847  









The final check for reflective outer model fitness was to confirm the discriminant 
validity. I used Heterotrait-monotrait (HTMT) correlation coefficient method. The 
literature suggests that “HTMT ratio should be below 1.0” (Garson 2016, p.70), an 
argument supported by experts in the field like Henseler et al. (2015), who specifically 
argue that the level of acceptance should not be greater than 0.85. If the ratio is 
greater than 0.85, then “there is a lack of discriminant validity” (Henseler et al. 2015, 
p.121). The results derived from the current study’s evaluation demonstrated latent 
variable distinctiveness as all the ratios were below 0.85, as displayed in Table 4.14.  









   
Member Practice 
Wishes Met 
0.215   
Satisfaction 0.176 0.572  
 
The next set to be evaluated on the outer path model was the fitness of the formative 
measurement model. Under this set, indicator weights had to be considered in which 
the check for indicator multicollinearity was performed. This was achieved by use of 
Variance inflation factor (VIF). As can be seen in Table 4.15, no indicator 
multicollinearity was identified in the model, notwithstanding the borderline reading 
of indicator “GPInflInGB” which fell just below what Garson (2016, p.72) calls the 
“lenient criterion of 5.0”. See Table 4.16 below for the description of the indicator 
names listed in Table 4.15. 
Table 4.15 Formative outer model: Variance inflation factor evaluation 
















Table 4.16 Final phase model: Description of indicators 
INDICATOR ITEM MEASURED 
GBDysFunc Governing Body Is Dysfunctional 
GBUnfrieDec Unfriendly Decisions 
GPInflInGB Level of GP Influence in Your Governing Body 
GPPropInGB The proportion of GPs In CCG Governing Body Membership 
MembSize CCG Governing Body Membership Size  
ReflGPWish Decisions Made by My CCG Reflect the Wishes of GP Practices That My CCG Serves 
SatisDecMak Level of Satisfaction About the Way Decisions Are Made at Your CCG 
SnrVetoDec Senior Member or Government Official Vetoed Decisions Made by Governing Body 
StrPersInfl Governing Body Influenced by Few Strong Personalities 
WayGBFunc The Way Your CCG Governing Body Functions 






Inner path model evaluation 
Evaluation of the inner path model was designed to ensure the model’s ability to 
predict the latent variables. Four tests were performed to that end. The first was the 
R² test to evaluate the endogenous latent variables’ explained variance. Table 4.17 
shows the results of this test. Given that the maximum number of inner paths joining 
to any given endogenous latent variables from exogenous latent variables in this 
study’s path model was two, a test result of at least “moderate” R² had to be attained 
(Henseler et al. 2009). The test results were “substantial”, “moderate” and “weak”, as 
displayed in Table 4.17. While a “weak” result is said to be suggestive of doubtful 
“theoretical underpinnings” (Henseler et al. 2009, p.303) of the model, and thus 
meaning that the model may not be capable of explaining the implicated endogenous 
latent variable, I decided to retain that latent variable on purpose. As suggested by 
Garson (2016, p.80) on the question of less favourable readings, the “weak” reading 
obtained in this study may be a benchmark for future research, thereby affording the 
ensuing research to treat the reading “relative to the field”. A “moderate” is 
acceptable considering that endogenous latent variable Satisfaction has only one inner 
path joining to the exogenous latent variable (Henseler et al. 2009).  
Table 4.17 Inner model: R-Square evaluation 




Member Practice Wishes Met 0.013 Weak 
Satisfaction 0.414 Moderate 
 
The second test for the inner model fitness was performed to establish the effect size – 
that is, the magnitude of effect that exogenous variables have on endogenous latent 
variables. The results of this evaluation are displayed in Table 4.18. As can be seen, just 
like the other R² readings, the suggestion in these results is that the effect size across 
the latent variables ranged from “small” to “large”. That is, exogenous variable GP 
Influence has a “small” effect size on two endogenous latent variables, Decision-
making Process Effectiveness and Member Practice Wishes Met. On the other hand, 
the same exogeneous variable GP Influence has a “medium” effect size on endogenous 
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latent variable Satisfaction. A “large” effect size was realised on exogenous variable GP 
Proportion towards endogenous latent variable Decision-making Process Effectiveness.  
Another “large” effect size was noted on variable Member Practice Wishes Met 
towards variable Satisfaction. 



























































     
GP Influence 0.068   0.112 0.296 
GP Proportion 0.875     
Member Practice 
Wishes Met 
    0.490 
Satisfaction      
 
Next to be evaluated was the Q2 prediction relevance which assessed the inner 
model’s capability to predict. The evaluation results are displayed in Table 4.19. 
Table 4.19 Inner model: Prediction relevance 




296.000 121.653 0.589 
GP Influence 222.000 222.000  
GP Proportion 148.000 148.000  
Member Practice 
Wishes Met 
74.000 74.068 -0.001 




According to the evaluation results, there was a high degree of predictive relevance for 
endogenous variables Decision-making Process Effectiveness and Satisfaction. On the 
other hand, endogenous variable Member Practice Wishes Met demonstrated no 
predictive relevance as it returned a reading less than 0. 
The final fitness test of the inner model was to evaluate the significance of path 
coefficients. This test is designed to indicate the strength of relationships between 
latent variables. As shown in Table 4.20, all path coefficients indicated valid 
relationships between latent variables. The strongest relationship in this collection was 
between variable GP Proportion and variable Decision-making Process Effectiveness 
while the weakest relationship was between variable GP Influence and variable 
Decision-making Process Effectiveness.  



























































     
GP Influence 0.068   0.112 0.296 
GP Proportion 0.875     
Member Practice 
Wishes Met 
    0.539 
Satisfaction      
 
4.2.2.4 Statistical hypothesis testing 
Table 4.18 shows the results of hypotheses testing based on the statistical hypotheses 
discussed in Section 3.6.1.5. Since the hypotheses were nondirectional, two-tailed 
tests were used, as the results of each test had two possible directions – namely, Null 
Hypothesis (HO) and Alternative Hypothesis (HA). I achieved this by calculating p-values 
and confidence intervals using SmartPLS 3 in a single run where a bootstrap of 4,999 
samples was performed. 
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a) p-values: I set the significance of test results at .05, meaning that if the p-
value was below this “pre-defined α-level” (Henseler et al. 2016, p.12) the 
coefficient path was regarded as significant as chance would be ruled out as 
a possible explanation. Similarly, if the p-value was above .05, this indicated 
an insignificant relationship meaning that we would not be able to rule out 
chance as an explanation for the result. The smaller the p-value, the 
stronger the probability that the results are not due to chance. 
b) Confidence intervals: I used this measure, which emphasises estimation 
over testing (Wasserstein & Lazar 2016), to supplement the p-value 
method. That is, confidence intervals provide a range of values which 
contain the actual population mean for the parameter of interest being 
measured. The range should not cross zero (0) for the confidence interval to 
be regarded as significant. The confidence interval for the current study was 
set at 95%. 
Hypotheses testing results, along with other related statistical implications, are 
described next.  
Causal Hypothesis 1 (H1): A high proportion of GPs in the Governing Body committee 
will influence the decision-making process effectiveness. 
Ho: There will be no change in the decision-making process effectiveness as a 
result of a high proportion of GPs in the Governing Body committee. 
RESULTS: The test for this hypothesis yielded a p-value of 0.000. Since this p-
value<0.001; that is, smaller than α=0.05, it is unlikely that the sample results 
happened by chance. Therefore, the Null Hypothesis (Ho) stating that “There will be no 
change in the decision-making process effectiveness as a result of a high proportion of 
GPs in the Governing Body committee” is rejected.  A mean of 0.879 (95% Confidence 
Interval between 0.660 and 1.078) has been shown in the current study sample.  
INTERPRETATION: These results suggest that a proportion of GP in the 
governing Body committee is positively associated with the effectiveness of the 
decision-making process.  
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Table 4.21 Hypotheses 1 to 3 results 
 



















































































H1: GP Proportion  Decision-
making Process Effectiveness 
0.875 0.879 0.107 8.200 0.000 Yes P < 0.05 0.660   1.078 Yes 0 ∉ CI 
H2: GP Influence  Decision-
making Process Effectiveness 
0.068 0.067 0.118 0.578 0.563 No P > 0.05 -0.159   0.302 No 0 ∈ CI 
H3: GP Influence  GP 
satisfaction 






Causal Hypothesis 2 (H2): The level of GP influence in the Governing Body will cause a 
difference in the effectiveness of the decision-making process. 
Ho: There will be no change in the effectiveness of the decision-making process 
as a result of the level of GP influence in the Governing Body. 
RESULTS: For this hypothesis testing, the p-value was 0.563. Since this p-value is 
larger than α=0.05, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that “There will be no change 
in the effectiveness of the decision-making process as a result of the level of GP 
influence in the Governing Body”. The mean for the sample is 0.067, with 95% 
Confidence Interval between -0.159 and 0.302.  
INTERPRETATION: These results suggest that the level of GP influence in the 
Governing Body will not cause a difference in the effectiveness of decision-making 
process as the 95% confidence interval crosses zero, the line of no effect. Therefore, 
the p-value, mean, and 95% confidence interval suggest that the level of GP influence 
in the Governing Body is not significant to cause a difference in the effectiveness of the 
decision-making process. 
Causal Hypothesis 3 (H3): A high level of GP influence in the Governing Body will 
impact the degree of GP satisfaction about decision-making.  
 Ho: There will be no change in the degree of GP satisfaction about decision-
making as a result of a high level of GP influence in the Governing Body. 
RESULTS: The test for this hypothesis yielded a p-value of 0.000. Since this p-
value<0.001; that is, smaller than α=0.05, it is unlikely that the sample results 
happened by chance. Therefore, the Null Hypothesis (Ho) stating that “There will be no 
change in the degree of GP satisfaction about decision-making as a result of a high 
level of GP influence in the Governing Body” is rejected. A mean of 0.300 (95% 
Confidence Interval between 0.132 and 0.437) has been shown in the current study 
sample.  
INTERPRETATION: These results suggest that GP influence in the Governing 




Table 4.22 Hypotheses 4 results - Indirect effects 
 



















































































GP Influence  Member Practice 
Wishes Met 
0.112 0.114 0.125 0.898 0.369 No P > 0.05 -0.144   0.340 No 0 ∈ CI 
Member Practice Wishes Met  
GP satisfaction  
0.539 0.533 0.090 5.999 0.000 Yes P < 0.05 0.351   0.704 Yes 0 ∉ CI 
GP Influence  Member Practice 
Wishes Met  GP satisfaction 
0.060 0.059 0.068 0.893 0.372 No P > 0.05 -0.076   0.194 No 0 ∈ CI 
 
Causal Hypothesis 4 (H4): The level of GP influence in the Governing Body will impact the scale of member practice wishes being met, thereby 
causing a difference in the degree of GP satisfaction about decision-making. 
Ho: There will be no change on the degree of GP satisfaction as a result of the level of GP influence in the Governing Body impacting the scale 
of member practice wishes being met. 
RESULTS: This hypothesis was generated from a causal setting that involved a moderating latent variable which resulted in an indirect effect, 
giving rise to the results displayed in Table 4.22.   
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GP Influence  Member Practice Wishes Met: The test results for this causal 
relationship yielded a p-value of 0.369. Since this p-value<0.001; that is, smaller than 
α=0.05, it is unlikely that the sample results happened by chance.  The mean for the 
sample is 0.114, with 95% Confidence Interval between -0.144 and 0.340.  
INTERPRETATION: These results suggest that the level of GP influence in the 
Governing Body will not cause a difference in member practice wishes being met as 
the 95% confidence interval crosses zero, the line of no effect.  
Member Practice Wishes Met  Satisfaction: The test results for this causal 
relationship yielded a p-value of 0.000. Since this p-value<0.001; that is, smaller than 
α=0.05, it is unlikely that the sample results happened by chance. A mean of 0.533 
(95% Confidence Interval between 0.351 and 0.704) has been shown.  
INTERPRETATION: These results suggest that member practice wishes being met 
is positively associated with the level of GP satisfaction.  
GP Influence  Member Practice Wishes Met  GP satisfaction: For this 
hypothesis testing, the p-value was 0.372. Since this p-value is larger than α=0.05, we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that “There will be no change on the degree of GP 
satisfaction as a result of the level of GP influence in the Governing Body impacting the 
scale of member practice wishes being met”. The mean for the sample is 0.059, with 
95% Confidence Interval between -0.076 and 0.194.  
INTERPRETATION: These results suggest that GP influence will not cause a 
difference to the level of GP satisfaction by raising the scale at which the member 
practice wishes are met as the 95% confidence interval crosses zero, the line of no 
effect. Therefore, the level of GP influence in the Governing Body is not significant to 
cause a difference to the level of GP satisfaction by raising the scale at which the 
member practice wishes are met. 
Overall, while the GP influence was found not significant in changing the scale at 
which the member practice wishes were met, the latter was, on the contrary, found to 
be positively associated with the level of GP satisfaction. In other words, latent 
variable Member Practice Wishes Met, and latent variable Satisfaction shared an 
anteceding cause of latent variable GP Influence which was incorrectly inferred as 
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being correlated. That inferred correlation turned out to be spurious, as revealed by 
hypothesis testing. 
4.2.2.5 Summary of inferential analysis findings 
To start with, the path model on which the inferential analysis was performed proved 
to be effective in giving reliable predictive results following the tests that were done to 
that effect. Notwithstanding, routine tests on different parameters consistently 
flagged out the latent variable GP Influence for different reasons which, in general, 
meant that this variable presented a point of weakness on the model. Accordingly, all 
the tests of hypotheses that returned insignificant effect levels were linked to latent 
variable GP Influence. While GP influence could be important in many aspects at CCG 
level, it would appear like when it comes to impacting decision-making process 
effectiveness or fulfilling the wishes of member practices in decision-making routines, 
it is insignificant, according to the hypotheses test results. This situation seems to be 
so regardless positive correlation in the correlation matrix (Table 4.8) of this variable 
with other implicated variables at issue. Conversely, the same factor, GP influence, was 
found to be significant in influencing the levels of GP satisfaction. 
The Proportion of GPs in the Governing Body committee, on the other hand, was 
found to be crucial in influencing the perceived effective decision-making process. The 
relationship between the variables GP Proportion and Decision-making Process 
Effectiveness was demonstrated to be substantial by the model fitness tests. Another 
variable relationship of note that the model fitness tests as well as the hypothesis tests 
identified as having a considerable significance was between variables Member 
Practice Wishes Met and Satisfaction.  
4.3 Qualitative Results 
The qualitative data were drawn from the open-ended questions outlined below in 
Table 4.23. All the questions were attempted in full by all the eligible participants. 
The interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) approach was used as a 
guide in the analysis of the qualitative data. Because IPA lacks a standardised formal 
approach as mentioned in the literature (Charlick et al. 2016; Gill 2014; Sloan & Bowe 
2014), the approach that I used in my study is described in Chapter 3, Section 3.6.2.2. 
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In brief, the model consists of four steps, which are, (1) data familiarisation, (2) 
identification of emergent themes, with example quotes to illustrate the theme (3) 
elimination of repetitious themes, and (4) integration of themes. 
In the interest of clarity, components in the text that are identified, or referred 
to, as “macro level” denote the wider influence that CCGs may receive emanating from 
offices outside the CCGs’ local level spheres. Example sources of such influence could 
be offices like NHS England and the Department of Health. In contrast, where the 
phrase “micro-level” is used, that will be denoting influences constrained by the CCGs’ 
local level domains. 
 
Table 4.23 Outline of qualitative data questions 
Question Number Question  
Question 13 If you have responded “Yes” to the previous question, 
please briefly describe the unfriendly decision in question 
and the impact that you think it had (or will have) on 
patient care or any other aspect in the primary health care 
delivery. 
Question 14 What would you attribute the reason for unfriendly 
decisions to?  That is, what possibly fuelled or facilitated 
such unfriendly decisions to be passed?  
Question 15 Give up to three aspects that you feel your Governing Body 
is good at in decision-making. 
Question 16 Give up to three aspects that you feel your Governing Body 
is bad at in decision-making. 
Question 17 Briefly describe the mechanisms that you have in place to 
check that no persona or office in your CCG domineers 
others in decision-making routines? If there is none, please 
say so. 
Question 20 If you have any comments to make about the preceding 
question, please do so in the space provided below. 
Question 22 How is GP Practice member engagement achieved in your 
CCG?  In other words, how does your CCG engage different 




4.3.1 Data familiarisation 
The qualitative strand data analysis was started with an in-depth reading of all the 
participants’ responses to the open-ended questions listed above in Table 4.23, which 
involved going through the textual data several times. After reading and rereading, 
interesting aspects in the data were identified, isolated, and classified as paradigm 
cases. Alongside these actions, the data were thematised accordingly on a question by 
question basis. The themes that were discovered are detailed in the next section.  
It is worth mentioning that all the sorting and categorising of the data was done 
manually with no recourse to any software programme to assist me with those tasks. 
All data items were given equal attention in the analysis activity. 
4.3.2 Discovering themes 
The discovery of themes was an activity performed on a question by question basis on 
the responses to the open-ended questions listed above in Table 4.23. Of the themes 
that were discovered, there is one called ‘Miscellaneous’, a theme made up of 
insightful cases which did not fall under any of the main themes, as described in 
Chapter 3, Section 3.6.2.2. 
Following on from Question 12, a close-ended question, where the respondents 
were asked to indicate if there were any decisions that their respective Governing 
Bodies had made in the past that they felt were unfriendly to the profession, a related 
open-ended question was asked, Question 13. This question was directed to the 
respondents who indicated that they felt unfriendly decisions were made in their local 
CCGs. An opportunity was given to those respondents to describe the unfriendly 
decisions in question. Table 4.24 outlines the themes that were developed from the 
responses that the respondents supplied. 
Table 4.24 Themes for unfriendly decisions 
THEME, 
DEFINITION 
SUB-THEMES EXAMPLE QUOTES 
Financial 
Decisions that are 
influenced by 
financial concerns.  
1. Financial gain • Respondent 20: Asking GPs to do 
too much in order to win extra 
enhanced services and hence funding 
at a time when General Practice was 





SUB-THEMES EXAMPLE QUOTES 
2. Cost-savings • Respondent 62: Cash incentives for 
reducing referrals to an arbitrary level 
… is pernicious for the profession and 





is, if decisions are 




 • Respondent 15: We were forced to 
stop enhanced services, which has 
meant a reduction in service offer. 
Bureaucracy   
Decisions 







• Respondent 40: National guidance 
laid down by statute means that NHSE 
has undue influence over local 






• Respondent 18: A decision to push 
ahead with 7-day working in spite of 
initially saying they would oppose 
politic rhetoric without evidence of 
need. 
 
The respondents were then asked, in Question 14, to give reasons for whatever 
purpose they thought their CCG made decisions unfriendly to the GP profession. The 
responses that were supplied led to the development of the themes displayed in Table 
4.25. 
Table 4.25 Themes for reasons of unfriendly decisions 
THEME, 
DEFINITION 
SUB-THEMES EXAMPLE QUOTES 
Financial 






at a micro 
level 
 
• Respondent 32: Lack of finance, 
desperation to make books balance. 
2. Financial 
considerations 
at a macro 
level 
 
• Respondent 62: Finances and 





SUB-THEMES EXAMPLE QUOTES 
Bureaucracy   
Decisions 






the micro level  
• Respondent 69: Partially strong 
influence of senior CCG officers and 
partially rules applying to FTs that 
allowed the secondary provider to 





• Respondent 18: Political agendas 





is, if decisions are 






• Respondent 20: Poor understanding 





 • Respondent 73: Sometimes Primary 
Care unduly examined compared to 
other providers. 
  
The next question, Question 15, asked the respondents to give three aspects that they 
thought their CCG was good at. This question was designed to gather information 
about the positive aspects of the internal workings of the CCGs to extrapolate the 
enablers of decision-making from the supplied responses. Responses to this question 
led to the development of the themes displayed in Table 4.26. 
Table 4.26 Themes for aspects local CCG good at 
THEME, 
DEFINITION 
SUB-THEMES EXAMPLE QUOTES 
Workplace 
culture 
Aspects to do 






• Respondent 20: We have a well 
governed decision-making process. 
2. CCG internal 
membership 
relationships 
• Respondent 22: Genuinely inclusive 
(e.g. lay members, Health watch on 






SUB-THEMES EXAMPLE QUOTES 
the organisation, 
as described in 
Section 2.3.3.  
3. Conflicts of 
interest 
• Respondent 20: We have a well-
rehearsed conflict of interest process. 
4. Review of 
issues 
• Respondent 34: Our GB is very open 
and honest. 
5. Governance • Respondent 20: We have a well 
governed decision-making process. 
6. Quality • Respondent 25: Good and accurate 





That is, if 
decisions are 




 • Respondent 22: Clinically led. 
• Respondent 25: Clinical input to 
commissioning decisions is high. 
• Respondent 67: Recognition of the 
value of clinical input. 
Miscellaneous 
Marginal themes. 
 • Respondent 62: The Lay members are 
poorly informed, but are bright and ask 
awkward questions quite often.  The 
committee can be embarrassed into 
reconsidering things.   
 
The respondents were also asked in Question 16 to give three aspects that they 
thought their CCGs were bad at in order to extrapolate the barriers to decision-making 
from the supplied responses. The respondents’ responses gave rise to the themes 
displayed in Table 4.27. 
Table 4.27 Themes for aspects local CCG not good at 
THEME, 
DEFINITION 
SUB-THEME EXAMPLE QUOTES 
Workplace 
culture 
Aspects to do 




• Respondent 18: Some elements to 
be decided are too complex for a 
clinician to understand well (e.g. 
finance) and so a great deal of steer 










as described in 
Section 2.3.3.  
2. Relationship with 
external bodies 
• Respondent 73: Not enough 
holding [of the] Acute Trust to 
account. 
3. Conflicts of 
interest 
• Respondent 25: Worries about 
conflict of interest hilst VERY 
important can potentially block 
some important clinical decisions. 
4. Preoccupied focus  • Respondent 63: Overwhelming 
focus on efficiency/cost-savings. 
5. Governance • Respondent 63: Poor governance 
structure and lack of clarity on 
decision-making roles. 
6. Planning • Respondent 61: Agenda is poorly 
designed and clunky. 
7. Communication • Respondent 73: Not enough 
reporting back on commissioned 
schemes. 
8. Time  • Respondent 56: Decisions are 
pushed for lack of time. 
• Respondent 68: [Inadequate] time 
to have a good debate as there are 
so many things on the agenda. 
Bureaucracy   
Decisions 
influenced by the 
bureaucratic 
hierarchy.  
1. The bureaucratic 
hierarchy at the 
micro level  
• Respondent 63: ultimately very 
hierarchical structure which 
particularly doesn’t work as CCGs 
upscale with collaborations with 
other CCGs. 
2. The bureaucratic 
hierarchy at macro 
level 
• Respondent 50: NHSE dictates 




 • Respondent 45: Reactive – i.e. 
‘firefighting’ culture, not good at 
encouraging ‘horizon scanning’ 
• Respondent 66: Sorry too tired - 
doing this at past midnight after 
doing a 12 hour day at CCG and the 
practice and then 3 hours at home 





The respondents were also asked, in Question 17, to briefly describe the mechanisms 
that their CCGs had in place to check that no persona or office in their CCG dominated 
others in the decision-making process. The themes in Table 4.28 were developed from 
the responses that were given.  
Table 4.28 Themes about curbing domineering personalities 
THEME, DEFINITION SUB-THEME EXAMPLE QUOTES 
Workplace culture 




patterns within the 
organisation, as 




• Respondent 40: Quite a few on the 
GB are quite opinionated, so 
unpopular (with GPs) …. 
2. Governance • Respondent 52: thorough attention 
to these potential problems in 
organisational development sessions 
and our regular informal meetings. 
Miscellaneous 
Marginal themes. 
 • Respondent 46: I am not aware of 
‘mechanism’ to avoid domineering 
but can say from experience that in 
practice it does not happen. 
 
 
When the respondents were asked to rate their level of satisfaction about the way 
decisions were made in their local CCGs in Question 19, which was a close-ended 
question, a complementary open-ended question, Question 20, was also asked where 
the respondents were to say anything they liked regarding the idea of satisfaction 
mentioned in Question 19. The themes displayed in Table 4.29 were developed from 
the responses that were supplied. Also included in Table 4.29 are themes from a 
question, Question 22, which dealt with how the participants’ local CCGs achieved GP 
member practice engagement. The GP Practice engagement question was designed to 
derive some of the possible factors influencing the perceived effective decision-making 






Table 4.29 Themes about decision-making satisfaction 
THEME, 
DEFINITION 
SUB-THEME EXAMPLE QUOTES 
CCG role  1. CCG role poorly 
understood 
• Respondent 24: There is a wide 
misunderstanding of the role of the CCG 
by grass-roots GPs with frequent 
confusion of the role of NHS England with 




• Respondent 21: All practices have a 
member representing them on a locality 
board. Hard to get every member 
engagement, as so big and daily life so 
busy. The 4 locality boards seem to have 
relatively little input into the whole CCG. 
• Respondent 14: Bulletins and 
newsletters. 
• Respondent 46: Regular meeting with 
GPs and Practice Managers, regular email 
communications. Annual events. 
Workplace 
culture 













• Respondent 36: Decision making feels 
rushed, biased by the people attending, if 
one person objects I do not feel that their 
difference in opinion is factored into the 
final decision that is made, decisions are 
not based on high quality and relevant 
evidence. 
• Respondent 68: it is not always clear 
how the final decisions are made; the local 
GPs certainly feel that decisions are made 
behind closed doors. 
2. CCG internal 
membership 
relationships 
• Respondent 6: CCG has been challenged 
on many occasions and has its own 





 • Respondent 74: GPs and practice 
managers are deeply suspicious about 
how decisions are made by the CCG. I 
don’t think they realise quite how 
supportive the CCG is of Primary Care and 
how aware folk are of the challenges. GP 
practices are often disappointed that the 





SUB-THEME EXAMPLE QUOTES 
extent they would like. I would say that 
the CCG is often too slow at arriving at a 
response. There is still a lack of clarity 
about the division of commissioning 








enforced at a 
macro level 
• Respondent 40: The difficulty with 
member practices is lack of understanding 
of the restrictions rules and regulations 
CCGs have to work to.  In an ideal world, 
funding would be ample and we would 
have a chronic shortage of GPs in our 
area.  Sadly the CCG has to make the 




 • Respondent 56: Not enough staff to deal 
with agenda. 
• Respondent 65: NHSE Primary care 
commission is unresponsive. 
  
4.3.3 Abstraction and integration of themes – Question  
This phase was a detailed analysis for each theme, on a theme by theme basis. In the 
IPA approach that I used for this study, this phase is Phase 4, named ‘Abstract and 
integrate themes by use of related meanings across emergent themes’. Six themes, 
including the miscellaneous theme, emerged to explain how the GPs experienced the 
decision-making process in their local CCGs. Table 4.30 outlines a list of all the themes 
and sub-themes that emerged from all the qualitative questions outlined in Table 4.23, 
followed by a textual description of these themes.  
Table 4.30 List of themes 
THEME, DEFINITION SUB-THEME 
1. Financial 
Decisions that are influenced by 
financial concerns. 
i. Financial gain 
ii. Cost-savings 
iii. Financial consideration enforced at micro 
level 




THEME, DEFINITION SUB-THEME 
2. Bureaucracy   
Decisions influenced by the 
bureaucratic hierarchy.  
1. The bureaucratic hierarchy at the micro 
level 
2. The bureaucratic hierarchy at macro level 
3. Clinical  
Decisions with clinical 
implications. That is, if decisions 
are supportive of, or disregard 
GP interests for patient care. 
None 
4. Workplace culture 
Aspects to do with conscious or 
unconscious behavioural 
patterns within the 
organisation, as described in 
Section 2.3.3.  
1. Decision-making process 
2. CCG internal membership relationships 
3. Relationship with external bodies 
4. Conflicts of interest 
5. Review of issues 
6. Leadership 
7. Governance 
8. Preoccupied focus  
9. Planning 
10. Communication 
11. Time  
12. Liaison events outside local CCG 
13. Quality  
5. CCG role  
 
1. CCG role poorly understood 





4.3.3.1 Theme 1: Financial (decisions that are influenced by financial concerns) 
Decisions made because of financial concerns instead of a balanced approach were 
repeatedly reported. Five sub-themes were developed under this focus – namely, 
financial gain, cost-savings, financial consideration enforced at the micro level, and 
financial consideration enforced at the macro level. The recurrent challenges 
occasioned by insufficient funding, first reported scarcely a year from the inception of 
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the CCGs in 2013 (Wood & Heath 2014), subjected the CCGs to difficult choices, forcing 
some to make decisions that were perceived as being unfriendly to the GP profession. 
While the desire for cost-savings actuated some of such decisions, others were 
construed as being motivated by the pursuit for financial gain. For example, regarding 
the latter, some of the respondents expressed that they were asked “to do too much 
in order to win extra enhanced services” (Respondent 20). On the other hand, 
concerning cost-savings, some CCGs trod on the delicate ground by promoting to their 
GP Practice members “cash incentives for reducing referrals to an arbitrary level” 
(Respondent 62). What this means is that, the fewer the patients that the member 
practices sent for secondary and community services, the more money that the 
involved CCGs saved. Respondent 62 frowned at this attitude as being “pernicious for 
the profession”, identifying it as being a risk that “may undermine patient trust in us 
[(GPs)]”. On the same subject of cost-savings, several of the respondents indicated 
withdrawal of certain incentive schemes from member practices by their CCGs. 
Respecting this, Respondent 24 cited “removal of prescribing incentive scheme after 
the work had been done”. Unfortunately, when the CCG that Respondent 24 belongs 
to withdrew the prescribing incentives; that action damaged the relationships between 
the CCG and the member practices, taking “years for the relationships between certain 
practices and the CCG to improve” (Respondent 24). 
When asked what they thought the reasons were, for such decisions which 
hinged on finance, thereby resulting in the unfriendly air to the GP profession, one 
principal cause mentioned related to bureaucratic control. That is, a higher authority, 
micro or macro, was implicated as having imposed the decisions. At a micro level, 
Respondent 24, for example, mentioned that his or her CCG reached such decisions 
because of “a finance director who was trying to balance the books and failed to 
recognise the implications of his decision”. Most of the reasons intimated the same 
cause, which was “lack of finance, [and] desperation to make books balance” 
(Respondent 32). These findings substantiate what was reported in HFMA (2017, p.3) 
study where it was discovered that “a total of 83 CCGs reported an overspend against 
plan at the end of quarter two”. Blocking or changing of the decisions by a higher 
authority is a recognised occurrence in the Mintzberg’s continuum of control over the 
decision-making process (Mintzberg 1979), where this exercise of power is attributed 
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to bureaucratic control. This study had, however, an outlier reason ascribed to 
financially connected unfriendly decisions in which one respondent stated that the 
system had “underlying suspicion the GPs [are] over paid and underworked” 
(Respondent 53).  
Regarding the macro level control, the general tone in responses was about the 
hand that NHS England had in influencing decision-making. Respondent 62 put the 
reason simply as, “finances and targets handed down by NHS England”. This appears to 
be the case, especially when considering the assessment framework that the CCGs 
must regard, in which their financial health statuses are appraised (NHS England 2016). 
In the same vein, Respondent 40 gave a more detailed response in which he or she 
stated that “being put into directions by NHSE for being overdrawn dramatically 
increases the workload for CCG staff; merely to provide assurance that something is 
being done.  Unfortunately, NHSE and NHSI do not run to the same rules, so providers 
can go over budget and the CCG has to pay”. Put differently, NHS England dictates the 
course of direction for overdrawn CCGs, and this decision is unfriendly to the GPs as it 
results in increasing their workload to cope with limited funds. The paradox about the 
whole thing that Respondent 40 notes is that other sectors within the health care 
service are dealt with leniently while the CCGs receive a heavy hand. To this, 
Respondent 40 exclaimed that “The system is a nonsense”. 
4.3.3.2 Theme 2: Bureaucracy (Decisions influenced by bureaucratic hierarchy) 
To start with, decision-making bureaucracy is normally characterised by being 
“impersonal and rational” (McAuley et al. 2014, p.76). Considering this, it appears like 
there is obvious bureaucracy at a micro level, as Respondent 62 mentioned, citing that 
his or her CCG was “Led by a few people, where genuine power resides”. Considering 
that, it is unclear whether decisions unfriendly to the GP profession are pushed by 
these “few people” commanding authority. For example, Respondent 18 indicated that 
in his or her CCG senior authorities reached “a decision to push ahead with 7-day 
working in spite of initially saying they would oppose politic rhetoric”. The generally 
expressed view was that senior CCG officers had immense influence. It is not clear if 
the officers in question were managers in their everyday jobs as previous and 
subsequent studies have found that managers were more influential than clinical staff 
(Storey et al. 2018; Holder et al. 2016; Naylor et al. 2013) and that positions of 
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leadership like Accountable Officer were mostly occupied by managers (Checkland et 
al. 2016).  
At a macro level, NHS England was conveyed as the arm through which the grip 
of bureaucracy was experienced. Respondents voiced about “too much pressure from 
NHS England” (Respondent 13). Most respondents decried the undue influence that 
NHS England had over the way that they had to make decisions. Regarding this, 
sentiments such as, “NHSE dictates often over-ride decisions already made” 
(Respondent 50), “pressure from the centre to dictate operational matters and 
sometimes even infringe on our decision-making abilities” (Respondent 60), and “need 
to produce the expected answers for NHS England rather than what we truly believe is 
the right thing. Our autonomy is limited, and constraints are significant” (Respondent 
52), were expressed. The challenge with such methods of bureaucratic control is that 
the leaders wielding power could simply have an ill-defined view of the primary 
purpose of the organisation while at the same time acting as tunnels of “bureaucratic 
virtuosos” (Bauman 1989, p.253, cited in McAuley et al. 2014, p.76). It is possible that 
such interference by NHS England may have compelled the CCGs to produce decisions 
unfriendly to the GPs. This perceived meddling by the centre appears to be eroding the 
supposed liberation from the top-down control that the introduction of the CCGs was 
claimed to bring. Instead of “decision making [brought] closer to the patient” 
(McDermott et al. 2017, p.4), it seems like it is being taken back to the centre. 
4.3.3.3 Theme 3: Clinical implications (Are decisions supportive of, or disregard GP 
interests) 
One of the central factors in the formulation of CCGs was to realise improvement in 
patient care by increasing accountability since the clinicians who were informed about 
the local health care needs directed the system (NHS England 2015; Talbot 2014; 
United Kingdom Government 2012). On the contrary, some decisions that the CCGs 
made undermined this tenet, as perceived by the respondents. For example, 
Respondent 15 reported, “we were forced to stop enhanced services, which has meant 
a reduction in service offer”. Some of the CCGs reported about a reshuffle in the way 
some of the schemes were run, hitherto, with one CCG pursuing  
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“a particular model for unscheduled care that resulted in the contract being 
placed entirely with a secondary care provider that was hostile to the local 
GP OOH [out-of-hours services] co-operative and in turn resulted in the 
ending of that organisation. The secondary care provider subsequently 
failed to deliver the promised model and, combined with the loss of the 
long-established OOH co-operative, this has been detrimental to patient 
care since and will continue to be because it is difficult to re-establish what 
has now been lost” (Respondent 69).  
Notwithstanding the abovementioned weaknesses, several respondents reported a 
positive “recognition of the value of clinical input” (Respondent 67) by their CCGs. The 
sentiments ranged from, “clinical input to commissioning decisions is high” 
(Respondent 25) to the confirmation by Respondent 22 that his or her CCG was 
“clinically led” while, in the same vein, (Respondent 60) mentioned, “GP voice is heard 
and strong representation from NEDs as lay members”. One CCG was even cited as 
being “prepared to back funding decisions that promote primary care” (Respondent 
61). 
4.3.3.4 Theme 4: Workplace culture (Aspects to do with patterns of behaviour and 
generally observed norms) 
Culture in this context was considered from the second and third levels of Schein’s 
levels of culture (Schein 2017), which bore relevance to this study. The second level 
entails standards and protocols defining the behaviour of the organisation internally 
and externally while the third level involves shared unconscious behaviour. For 
example, when the respondents were asked about the aspects that their CCGs were 
good at, some responses gave an interesting insight into behavioural patterns 
observed in decision-making processes. Views expressed included statements such as, 
“all issues are thoroughly discussed and a consensus decision arrived at” (Respondent 
41), “we have a well governed decision-making process” (Respondent 20). Some 
respondents mentioned that their “GP members of GB [were] given equal opportunity 
to contribute and also feedback from members they represent” (Respondent 41).  
In some CCGs, the reported practice appeared sloppy in similar subjects while in 
others bureaucracy weakened the system. Sloppiness was typified by sentiments such 
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as, “Decision making is based upon brief discussion rather than in-depth knowledge” 
(Respondent 18) while bureaucratic patterns were described in Respondent 17’s 
account as, “decisions are made at top level with little consultation and feedback”. 
Some respondents noted that due to the complexity of decisions that ought to be 
made – that is, non-clinical related decisions, the tendency that the GPs assumed when 
faced with such was to roll-over decision-making onus to the management officers. 
This scenario is well illustrated in Respondent 18’s reaction, “Some elements to be 
decided are too complex for a clinician to understand well (e.g. finance) and so a great 
deal of steer is taken from the managers / CFO in these areas”. In some cases, 
discussions that the committees had were reported as being too specialised, thus 
resulting in unintentional exclusion of some committee members, as observed by 
Respondent 72 who stated that, “GB debate has been too heavily focussed resulting in 
some non-clinical members, particularly lay members feeling temporarily “outside the 
loop””.  
Other reported practices included an evasive culture in which there was “a 
tendency to put any controversial matter in the private business, so keeping it out of 
the public meeting and minutes” (Respondent 62). Further, some CCGs were noted as 
simply ignoring the contributions made by other committee members (Respondent 5). 
For example, Respondent 36 indicated that “If one person objects, I do not feel that 
their difference in opinion is factored into the final decision that is made”. Also, some 
processes were reported to be characterised by ‘blind’ decision-making, “not based on 
high quality and relevant evidence” (Respondent 36). A disregard of clinical advice 
(Respondent 69) in some instances with decisions made being “politically motivated 
(Respondent 49) was also described. It is possible that such patterns of behaviour 
could be due to opinionated committee members, a conduct which Respondent 40 
indicated as being unpopular with GPs. Additionally, such personalities were reported 
as thrashing decisions “out either before they get to board or at board” (Respondent 
40). On the contrary, instead of a plain disregard of clinical advice, the sentiment was 
expressed that “it is not always known what the wishes of the members are” 
(Respondent 54).  
To avoid protracted discussions, possibly, and to achieve efficiency, some 
respondents reported a tiered approach to decision-making in their local CCGs. This 
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especially pertained to decisions that have clinical connotations which were left to be 
dealt with by experts in the field – that is, clinicians. For example, to this end, 
Respondent 24 indicated that his or her CCG had “Tiered approach to discussions – 
decisions are made at clinical board or locality level first then representations made at 
governing body”. One interesting observation about the whole puzzle of decision-
making is expressed in Respondent 68’s description, that “it is not always clear how 
the final decisions are made; the local GPs certainly feel that decisions are made 
behind closed doors”. A similar sentiment is also echoed by Respondent 74 who stated 
that “GPs and practice managers are deeply suspicious about how decisions are made 
by the CCG … GP practices are often disappointed that the CCG cannot address their 
problems to the extent they would like. I would say that the CCG is often too slow at 
arriving at a response”. 
Closely linked to the decision-making practices, with regards to culture, were 
planning, communication, and time. For example, regarding planning, there were 
reported occurrences in which the agenda was described as “poorly designed and 
clunky” (Respondent 61). Such big agendas resulted in superficial deliberation over the 
agenda items owing to time constraints (Respondent 68). Consequently, “Decisions are 
pushed for lack of time” (Respondent 56). In the same regard, time factor, the 
respondents complained about the little time was allocated “to clinicians to read 
papers in detail before meetings” (Respondent 18), which Respondent 24 criticised as 
being “Unrealistic scheduling which fails to recognise the need for preparation time 
prior to meetings”. Additionally, other CCGs were noted for “Not planning for 
adequate monitoring of implementation and effectiveness of services to review 
whether to continue with the chosen course” (Respondent 69). Respecting 
communication, there are cases where the relevant members in decision-making 
committees were reported as not receiving “enough reporting back on commissioned 
schemes” (Respondent 73). In the same vein, communication, one respondent 
bemoaned presentations that he or she characterised as being “too long and people … 
not good at expressing succinct points” (Respondent 68). On a positive note, several of 
the respondents expressed that their CCGs had open culture nurturing “transparency 
and openness” (Respondent 72) to encourage free communication, thereby allowing 
members to be “able to professionally challenge” (Respondent 13) anything. This 
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includes challenging of persons with a domineering disposition, something which the 
respondents were asked about regarding how their CCGs handled such occurrences.  
The communication channels identified from the respondents’ answers under 
the subtheme of communication included “regular email communications”, “weekly 
Hot Topics communication”, regular briefings from the leadership, and “direct 
communication with the practice managers”. Open culture is reinforced by several 
other behavioural patterns such as “Regular membership consultation” (Respondent 
19) and members being polite and respectful to each other as well as “informal 
briefings and development sessions to explore ideas and tensions” (Respondent 45). 
What is more, the role of the chairperson in ensuring was widely mentioned by several 
respondents. 
Moving to the way that the respondents perceived the way their local CCG 
members related with one another; on the one hand, some respondents felt that there 
was cooperation in their CCGs, a scenario best expressed in the response from 
Respondent 22 who talked of a “genuinely inclusive (e.g. lay members, Health watch 
on Board are very active and genuinely influential)” behavioural pattern. On the other 
hand, some CCGs were reported as working at variance with the local GPs. This 
sentiment is summarised in Respondent 6’s statement which states that “CCG has 
been challenged on many occasions and has its own political agenda and doesn’t value 
the local GPs”. As a result, some CCGs “have become disconnected to GP practices” 
(Respondent 17). Regarding such environments, which can be viewed as politicised, 
Drake (2016, p.126) cautions that they may present “a risk of being a deterrent to 
some GPs engaging in a committee role”. About the relationships with bodies external 
to their local CCGs, some respondents observed that they had “stable GP 
Commissioner Community, so the relationships are good between GB member GPs 
which helps with discussion and decision-making” (Respondent 24), while others 
indicated that they worked “with other organisations in partnership” (Respondent 4).   
The other interesting pattern of behaviour pertained to the way that Conflicts of 
interest were dealt with. In general, those who reported positive patterns gave a 
picture represented in Respondent 20’s answer which stated that “We have a well-
rehearsed conflict of interest process”. On the other hand, the culture of reviewing 
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issues that were generally portrayed as a positive, had sentiments such as, “Our GB is 
very open and honest” (Respondent 34) and “We encourage robust and healthy 
debate” (Respondent 72). Of note, some CCGs have been portrayed as being overly 
concerned about the subject of conflicts of interest in their approach to the extent that 
such guarded culture “can potentially block some important clinical decisions” 
(Respondent 25). In the same vein, Respondent 38 noted that “Conflict of interest 
sometimes [is] overplayed in reality”. 
Complex as CCGs may be, some members reported “a well governed decision-
making process” (Respondent 20) in their groups. Relatedly, Respondent 43 reported 
about his or her CCG having “clearly understood” governance structure, a view which 
was also echoed by Respondent 60 who added that his or her CCG had “clear lines of 
accountability and decision making”. On the contrary, some CCGs reported their 
setups as having a “poor governance structure and lack of clarity on decision-making 
roles” (Respondent 63). Regarding quality, the culture which was reported largely 
pertained to reports where for example, participants like Respondent 25 indicated that 
their CCG supplied “Good and accurate summaries/figures” while Respondent 48 
stated that they had “Good quality papers”. 
The ‘preoccupied focus’ was another established pattern of behaviour that the 
respondents reported. For example, Respondent 2 described his or her CCG as being 
“Distracted by STP!” while Respondent 53 stated that his or her CCG “Concentrates too 
much on secondary care”. On the other hand, one of the CCGs was reported as being 
“Overwhelming focus[ed] on efficiency/cost-savings” (Respondent 63). All these forms 
of behaviour can potentially stifle a balanced approach to decision-making. 
4.3.3.5 Theme 5: CCG role  
The CCG role was viewed from two perspectives; the way CCG role was understood by 
member practices and the way that the CCGs engaged with their member practices. 
Views were expressed that some of the member practices did not fully understand the 
concept and the role of the CCGs. To this end; Respondent 24 mentioned that “there is 
a wide misunderstanding of the role of the CCG by grass-roots GPs with frequent 
confusion of the role of NHS England with that of the CCG”. Still, in the same vein but 
from a different angle, Respondent 34 observed that in his or her CCG the question of 
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commissioning decisions was a source of tension. The GPs thought that commissioning 
was there only to ‘serve’ their (GPs) interests when in the actual fact CCGs had “to 
make decisions which serve our patients well too” (Respondent 34). Such a mix-up 
about CCGs could be indicative of poor CCG member practice engagement, a feature of 
the CCGs which is discussed next.  
Engagement of the CCGs with their member practices is a vehicle through which 
the CCGs reach out to their member practices to get to know their requirements and 
communicate things like policy and other related issues to them. Some CCGs were 
perceived as being “unable to achieve GP engagement” (Respondent 53), a 
phenomenon consistent with what has been found in previous research that CCGs 
struggle to engage “with all GPs in a local area” (Robertson et al. 2016). To those that 
had active engagement with their member practices, several avenues used to that end 
were identified by the respondents. Engagement was identified as being either direct 
from the CCG through either personnel who are members of the Governing Body or 
using media, or indirect through intermediate committees like locality boards. The 
frequency of engagement ranged from weekly, monthly, and quarterly. The different 
forms of engagement were represented in the following responses: “Bulletins and 
newsletters” (Respondent 14), “Regular meeting with GPs and Practice Managers, 
regular email communications. Annual events” (Respondent 46), “GP Board members 
liaise very closely with Localities, and all practices are regularly visited by Board 
members” (Respondent 52), “Direct communication with the practice managers” 
(Respondent 54), “All practices have a member representing them on a locality board 
[which inputs to the CCG]” (Respondent 21), and “meetings open to all GPs and 
Practice Managers” (Respondent 69). These results go beyond previous reports about 
the method of engagement identified in Chapter 2, Section 2.4.3.  
Owing to time constraints and work pressure, some GPs from member practices 
were identified as not being able to attend meetings through which they can convey 
their opinions to the CCG, as observed by Respondent 21 where he or she states that it 
is “Hard to get every member engagement, as so big and daily life so busy”. What is 
more, some of the relevant bodies that are designed to represent the member 
practices at CCG level were reported to be somehow aloof as illustrated in Respondent 
21’s response, “The 4 locality boards seem to have relatively little input into the whole 
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CCG”. This could be one of the possible reasons that some CCGs expressed a desire to 
fulfil their member practices’ needs but did not know their wishes as exclaimed by 
Respondent 54, “The CCG makes many decisions, and it is not always known what the 
wishes of the members are.  Where those wishes are sought the CCG tries to abide by 
them”.  
4.3.3.6 Miscellaneous theme 
Items that fell into this group did not have any bearing on the main themes but had 
relevant and insightful subjects that played “a significant role in adding to the 
background detail of the study” (Nowell et al. 2017, p.8). For example, when asked 
about the reasons why they thought their CCGs made decisions unfriendly to the GP 
profession, Respondent 73 stated that “sometimes Primary Care [is] unduly examined 
compared to other providers”. On the question of the aspects that they thought their 
CCGs were good at, Respondent 13 mentioned about his or her CCG “standing up to 
the stupidities of NHS England”. In the same regard of good aspects, some 
respondents did not have anything to say about their CCGs, with one simply 
responding, “None specifically” (Respondent 29). Several respondents mentioned the 
balancing factor to the decision-making committees that the lay members had, albeit 
their lack of proficient knowledge in some things. For example, Respondent 62 
indicated that “the lay members are poorly informed, but are bright and ask awkward 
questions quite often.  The committee can be embarrassed into reconsidering things”. 
One of the responses of note served as an indication of the typical GP’s life, which is 
being overworked. Instead of inputting the relevant answer, Respondent 66 said, 
“sorry too tired - doing this at past midnight after doing a 12-hour day at CCG and the 
practice and then 3 hours at home processing patient letters and test results”. 
On the question of the aspects that they thought their CCGs were bad at, 
insightful responses were given. Respondent 45, for example, mentioned that his or 
her CCG was “reactive – i.e. ‘firefighting’ culture, not good at encouraging ‘horizon 
scanning’”. On the other hand, some CCGs were put across as having distracted focus, 
perceived as concentrating “too much on secondary care. Seems unable to achieve GP 
engagement” (Respondent 53).  
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Because of the intuition that wherever people gather, there is bound to be 
overbearing individuals, the participants were asked to describe the arrangements that 
their CCGs had in place to curb such characters. Several of the respondents indicated 
that they either did not know or there were no such arrangements in place at all. One 
respondent gave an observation that such personalities presented a challenge 
“‘behind the scenes’ in influencing what is presented to meetings in terms of content 
and recommendations” (Respondent 69).  
The other thing that the respondents were asked about was to give their views 
about the level of satisfaction that they had concerning the way that decisions were 
made in their local CCGs. One respondent intimated to the fact that they were 
returning to be a PCT even though he or she did not say in what sense. In that scheme, 
the respondent stated that they had “to make decisions for the greater good balancing 
priorities across the health economy, not necessarily for any particular provider or 
professional group. Damned if we do, damned if we don’t probably summarises it!” 
(Respondent 13). Support mechanisms were also highlighted as a cause for concern, 
while other respondents thought that some of the interconnected committees moved 
slowly, which possibly stifled the overall progress in decision-making. Although NHS 
England elsewhere was characterised as being dictatorial, one respondent noted that 
“NHSE Primary care commission is unresponsive” (Respondent 65). 
Concerning the way that the CCGs achieved GP member practice engagement, 
some CCGs indicated that they struggled, while one said they “used to hold three 
monthly meetings and now nothing” (Respondent 6). On a positive note, one 
respondent mentioned that his or her CCG conducted an annual survey in which “GP 
practices are formally asked … to comment on CCG” (Respondent 25). To such, 
Respondent 25 said, “The feedback is strongly positive with high approval ratings”.  
4.4 Conclusion  
In conclusion of this chapter, data analysis has been performed on quantitative and 
qualitative data. First, the descriptive statistical analysis of quantitative data has been 
presented. Alongside this, some of the qualitative data have been quantitised and 
analysed quantitatively using descriptive statistical analysis. Quantitisation of 
qualitative data, which is viewed as being a form of mixing in a mixed methods 
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methodology by some scholars (Creamer 2011), was the first step of mixing performed 
in this study. The results of the descriptive statistics have been presented with the aid 
of graphs and charts for visual illustration. A discussion of the results has also been 
made in which a comparison of the current study results with the findings from the 
literature has been made. 
The next section has been inferential analysis where the causal hypotheses have 
been tested using the Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modelling (PLS-SEM). 
Before that, the fitness of the PLS-SEM path model had to be established in line with 
the PLS-SEM procedures, which prescribe that the outer model should be tested first 
followed by the inner model. If the outer model fails the test, the latent variables and 
observed variables should be rearranged, and the whole model retested, which was 
the case in the current study. While the outer model involves testing of relationships 
between the observed variables and their connected latent variables, the inner model 
tests involve testing of relationships between the latent variables. It is at this point 
that testing of causal hypotheses is done. There are four causal hypotheses which 
were tested in this study. 
The qualitative data were analysed under the guidance of interpretative 
phenomenological analysis (IPA). Five key themes have been identified from the data. 
These are the financial theme, bureaucracy theme, clinical implications theme, 
workplace culture theme, and CCG role theme. The data with further insights that did 
not fall into any of the abovenamed themes have been put into a sixth theme, called 
‘miscellaneous’ theme. Like the quantitative data, a discussion of the qualitative data 
has been made. Interpretation of the qualitative data has also been done from the 
researcher’s understanding of the data, in line with the interpretive phenomenology 
approach discussed in Chapter 3, Section 3.6.2.2.  
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CHAPTER 5  
CONCLUSION 
5.1 Summary of the research 
This chapter provides a summative account to give insight into how I developed my 
study and how the results thereof contribute to, and have implications for, theory and 
practice. Also included is a discussion of the implications for practice and research 
limitations, along with the recommendations for future research based on the findings 
of my study.  
Synthesis of complementary quantitative and qualitative data, referred to as 
mixing under the mixed methods design, a methodology that I adopted for this study, 
is performed in this chapter. The employed strategy is merging (Creswell & Plano Clark 
2011), a basic mixing approach that Creamer (2011) identifies as linking or juxtaposing 
of two types of data with no data transformation conducted. This mixing is the second 
form in the current study. The first form was performed at the analysis phase in 
Chapter 4, where quantification of qualitative data, referred to as quantitisation in this 
thesis, was done. Quantitisation of qualitative data is a form of mixing approach 
advanced by Creamer (2011).  
While mixing of the quantitative and the qualitative findings can “offer insights 
that could not otherwise be gleaned” (Bryman 2007, p.9), not all cases presented in 
this chapter constitute combined findings. The reason for this goes back to the original 
formulation of my study, where, at the onset, I privileged quantitative research strand 
above the qualitative research strand. The conceptual framework, described in 
Chapter 2, Section 2.5, demonstrates this. In this arrangement, the approach was set 
to inform the quantitative research questions first, which were then supplemented by 
the qualitative research questions. Privileging the quantitative study above the 
qualitative study in a mixed methods research has been frowned upon by some 
scholars who perceive mixed methods as relegating qualitative research to a secondary 
status, a mind-set that Creswell et al. (2006) sought to redress, as that is not always 
the case. The eminent value of qualitative study in a mixed methods research is 
demonstrated in this study, as it turned out, subsequently. That is, although I originally 
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designed this study to be quantitatively driven, it turned out that the findings from the 
qualitative data were highly nuanced and provided fine-grained insights that were 
subsequently used to contextualise the quantitative strand results. This occurrence led 
the conclusions to be qualitatively driven, relegating the quantitative strand findings to 
be mainly used in support.  
5.1.1 Recap of research problem  
The focus of this study was decision-making in the CCGs of the English NHS. CCGs are 
entities which resulted from the reforms introduced in 2012, to provide local 
autonomy in the commissioning of the secondary and community health care services 
by decentralising authority to the clinicians who know their local population needs, 
with the aim of improving patient care (Moran et al. 2017b; NHS England 2015; Talbot 
2014; United Kingdom Government 2012). Interest in the CCGs followed the findings of 
a survey by the British Medical Association (2014a), which suggested that the CCGs 
have failed to “deliver overall improvements to patient care or involve more GPs in the 
running of services” (British Medical Association 2014a). The GPs at the practice level 
perceived the policies that the CCGs produced as being restrictive to the efficient 
service delivery, thereby implicating decision-making. For this reason, the current 
study primarily aimed to identify the factors that influence the effective decision-
making process in the CCGs as perceived by the GPs. To achieve the primary aim, I 
developed a hypothesised conceptual model demonstrating factors at play in the 
decision-making process, based on perceived reality in terms of a network of causal 
effects across different latent variables extrapolated from the literature. Secondarily, 
investigation of the CCGs was of interest because previous research identified limited 
awareness of GPs’ activities and roles in their respective CCGs (Checkland et al. 2016; 
McDermott et al. 2015).  
5.1.2 Recap of research methodology 
Mixed methods, a methodology that performs quantitative and qualitative 
investigations in one study, was considered ideal for the current study consistent with 
the literature claims that it facilitates “a more complete understanding of [the 
phenomenon of study]” (Creswell & Plano Clark 2011, p.77) by synthesising 
complementary quantitative and qualitative data. In this arrangement, the 
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quantitative strand provided a predictive framework while the qualitative strand 
provided an interpretive framework. A philosophical position of pragmatism 
underpinned the entire research design. This study considered pragmatism through 
the lens of Morgan (2007) whose technique known as the pragmatic approach is 
stripped of the weight of philosophical knowledge on related underpinnings, only 
embracing the fundamental epistemological implications supporting the general 
approach assumed by the researcher. Emphasis is placed on how the epistemological 
implications of the knowledge generated by the research relate to the methods used 
to produce that knowledge. In this respect, the quantitative strand in the current study 
was aligned with post-positivism which argues that a researcher can discover only 
partial knowledge of reality due to their human limitations (Mertens 2009). By 
contrast, the qualitative strand was aligned with interpretive phenomenology which 
aims to “interpret the embedded meaning in a lived experience” (Charlick et al. 2016, 
p.207). Aligning a single study with multiple philosophical positions can arguably open 
accusations of inconsistency, a phenomenon recognised by the proponents of mixed 
methods as being a source of criticism of this methodology (Creswell & Plano Clark 
2011; Mason 2006). This question is addressed in more detail with specific focus on 
the current study in Chapter 3, Section 3.2 and Section 3.3. 
I collected the data for my study using a survey for both strands, quantitative 
and qualitative. Analysis of quantitative data, in which the hypothesised conceptual 
model was tested, was achieved by the use of Partial Least Squares Structural Equation 
Modelling (PLS-SEM) whereas the qualitative data were analysed under the guidance 
of interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) method. The qualitative strand was 
supported by the research question, “How do the GPs describe their individual 
experiences at their local CCGs regarding the process of decision-making”. At the same 
time, the quantitative strand sought to test the following nondirectional hypotheses: 
Causal Hypothesis 1: A high proportion of GPs in the Governing Body committee will 
improve the decision-making process effectiveness. 
Causal Hypothesis 2: The level of GP influence in the Governing Body will cause a 
difference in the effectiveness of the decision-making process. 
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Causal Hypothesis 3: A high level of GP influence in the Governing Body will increase 
the degree of satisfaction about decision-making. 
Causal Hypothesis 4: The level of GP influence in the Governing Body will cause a 
difference in the degree of GP satisfaction about decision-making dependent on the 
member practice wishes being met, such that satisfaction is more likely to be positive 
if member practice wishes are seen as being met. 
5.1.3 Summary of research findings  
The summary of the research findings outlined in this section is split into two main 
segments in line with the research aims, the primary and the secondary aims described 
in Chapter 1, Section 1.1. The primary aim sought to explore decision-making profiles 
and associated processes within the CCGs to identify’ factors influencing effective 
decision-making process based on GPs’ views whereas the secondary aim simply 
sought to assess the formal roles occupied by the GPs in the CCGs. The findings 
summary for the latter is presented first in Section 5.1.3.1 under the header of “GP 
roles”, as the secondary aim informs the primary aim. The summary of the findings on 
the primary aim are then subsequently presented in Section 5.1.3.2, under the header 
of “Factors influencing perceived effective decision-making”. Before that, an overview 
of the CCGs as decentralised entities within the English NHS is made in the interest of 
recapitulation of the study’s contextual background.  
First, since the CCGs were granted autonomy to run their affairs, I considered 
these entities as decentralised bodies, as per Mintzberg (1979) position in this regard. 
Mintzberg (1979, p.181), considers decentralisation (and centralisation) based 
“exclusively in terms of power over the decisions made in the organization”, which, in 
the case of CCGs, decision-making power for commissioning routines was devolved to 
the local level. Even so, in the concept of decentralisation, the outcome of decision-
making can be influenced by different persons wielding power at different stages of 
the decision-making process, ranging from the stimulus to the execution of the 
decisions made (see Figure 2.7). Regarding the CCGs in this respect, the autonomy 
granted them means that they can collect their information from their local interested 
parties. They can analyse that information themselves and determine the best choice 
from the available options. They do not need to seek authorisation on the choice that 
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they make, as they are the implementers of the decisions made. It is from this mix that 
the GPs in the BMA (2014a) study expressed discontent owing to the policies that the 
CCGs produced. 
There is, however, another dimension to note in this equation. While the CCGs 
can be styled as self-managing teams at micro-level, at macro-level, they receive 
strategic direction along with the allocation of financial resources from NHS England in 
a top-down method (Department of Health 2012; NHS Commissioning Board 2012b). 
This degree of formalisation along with stated autonomy makes CCGs to be identified 
with the professional model in the Mintzberg’s framework of organisational structures 
(Mintzberg 1979). It is across this organisational structure divide, macro and micro-
level, in the CCGs, that my study sought to identify the factors influencing the 
perceived effective decision-making process.  
5.1.3.1 GP roles  
Previous studies have discovered several things, which still apply, regarding the roles 
occupied by GPs in the CCGs. First, was the complexity of the CCGs from the 
standpoint of the variability of roles that the GPs occupy. There are numerous roles 
that the respondents mentioned in their answers, so many that some of the 
respondents did not even bother listing them, but instead, just stated, “too many”, in 
their responses. As suggested by McDermott et al. (2015, p.30), this study validated 
the assertion that “asking what the role of GPs is or should be in CCGs is a complex 
question with as many answers as there are CCGs”. There is, however, an additional, 
and previously unaddressed, area which this study investigated. This was 
ascertainment of the number of roles occupied by individual respondents, which this 
study equated with the weight of responsibilities borne by the GPs. Weighting was 
equated to the number of roles that each GP occupied by quantitising the free text 
answers that the respondents gave detailing their roles. It is not the content, but just 
the quantity in terms of the numerical count of the roles, that this study considered in 
the estimation of the inferred weight of responsibilities. In this regard, it was 
discovered that most GPs held only one role (53.4%) while just over a third of the 
respondents (38.4%) held either two or three roles. There was a ‘handful’ of 
exceptions of those who held five or more roles (8.2%).   
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Also identified in this study were the committees that the GPs sat on. Additional to the 
three mandated by statute that every CCG should have – namely, Governing Body, 
Remuneration, and Audit, there were numerous types of other committees that the 
respondents listed. Most corroborated the previous findings, but there were new 
names not mentioned in the previous studies that were reviewed in preparation for 
the current study. They included roles such as “House of Care Programme Board” and 
“Clinical Senate Council”. The diversity of the committees is vast so much that one of 
the respondents even stated that his or her CCG “Committees have strange names” 
(Respondent 61).  
Like the approach used in the roles occupied by the GPs, the presumed weight of 
commitments that the GPs had was also considered. I did not look into the content of 
the committee, but just the numerical count of committees GPs sat on. The analysis 
discovered that the number of formal roles that a GP has is not necessarily equal to 
the number of committees that the same GP sits on. For example, after quantitising 
the free text, Respondent 2 was found to be occupying two roles while the same 
respondent reported sitting on four committees. A significant proportion of the 
respondents said that they sat on one committee (43.4%); a more substantial 
proportion indicated that they sat on three or more committees (50.9%). 
The rationale for inferring weight to the number of committees and roles that 
GPs occupied assumes that these can be used to estimate the time that they are likely 
to spend in their CCG assignments. GPs’ time is expensive and as such should be used 
prudently, as McDermott et al. (2015) noted. McDermott et al. (2015) discovered that 
there was a conflict of interest over time allocation to the GPs with formal roles in the 
CCGs to perform their CCG work, thereby resulting in GPs working in the evenings and 
weekends, and in some cases with some of the practitioners altogether leaving their 
practice jobs to work full time in the CCG. As a result, in the recommendations that 
they made to the policymakers, McDermott et al. (2015) mentioned the element of 
GPs’ expensive time, which should be used wisely. 
Also discovered about the formal roles that the GPs occupied was that a third of 
the GPs did not sit on the Governing Body. It is, therefore, unclear what impact they 
have on the perceived effective decision-making process when considered from the 
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standpoint of this study. Another interesting finding is the relatively small proportion 
of the GPs (34.3%), who indicated that they had served their CCGs for up to three 
years, when compared with those who had served for more than three years (65.8%), 
as discussed in Chapter 4, Section 4.2.1.1. The observed small proportion of new GP 
entrants to the CCGs corroborates previous studies which identified a lack of 
enthusiasm in the GPs taking up roles in the CCGs (Checkland et al. 2014) as well as a 
decline in GP representation within the CCGs with the roles that the GPs should play 
increasingly being occupied by managers (Rosser 2018; Checkland et al. 2016; Drake 
2016).  
5.1.3.2 Factors influencing perceived effective decision-making  
This section presents a summary of findings regarding factors influencing perceived 
effective decision-making in the CCGs, from the perspective of GPs.  These factors are 
by no means exhaustive. This is especially true when considering the diversity of the 
CCGs which research has established that “no two are exactly the same” (McDermott 
et al. 2017, p.10). Also, these factors should not be viewed as being independent of 
each other as some overlap, thereby supporting each other. For example, financial 
considerations have been demonstrated to be affected by bureaucratic “rules, 
regulations, and procedures”. Another thing worth mentioning is that the qualitative 
data yielded unanticipated insights which are typically conveyed unmixed as there may 
not be any quantitative data to complement them. These include factors such as 
communication and time. 
1) GP Proportion  
Studies on CCGs have not attempted to consider the role that GP proportion plays in 
the decision-making process. The current study sought to determine the significance of 
this factor through testing of hypothesis, which was initially developed in the 
conceptual framework in Chapter 2 and refined at the analysis phase in Chapter 4. 
Here, inference regarding the import of the GP proportion in the Governing Bodies was 
made. Proportion here relates to the number of GPs in the Governing Body when 
compared with professional backgrounds of other Governing Body members. It is 
crucial to state that core insights about GP proportion and its impact on decision-
making in this study were drawn from a purely quantitative measure.  
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The existing literature mentions that the GPs have been perceived to be relatively less 
influential in meetings when compared to the managers (Holder et al. 2016; Naylor et 
al. 2013). As such, the current study sought to understand that, since GPs are 
perceived as being less influential in the Governing Body meetings, does the 
proportion of their numbers in the platform have any significance on decision-making? 
It should be noted that there are no guidelines in the relevant legislation which was 
enacted at the inception of the CCGs about the proportion of GPs concerning the size 
of the Governing Body. Instead, only key specific roles like Accountable Officer, Chair, 
and Clinical Lead along with the corresponding candidate attributes for those roles, are 
outlined (NHS Commissioning Board 2012a; United Kingdom Government 2012). 
Outside the specific roles identified in the guidelines, GPs, in a narrow sense, are only 
described in the literature at representation level of the GP member practices with no 
defined formula on how that should be achieved in the sense of GP numbers or 
proportions. That aspect was left to individual CCGs’ discretion, as mentioned in 
Andrew Lansley’s letter to the CCGs’ clinical and managerial leads (Lansley 2012). In 
this respect, Checkland et al. (2016, p.4) discovered that “the percentage 
representation of GPs on GBs [Governing Bodies] … showed considerable variation”. 
The observations from hypothesis testing and correlation matrix (Table 4.8) in 
the current study established a very high positive correlation between the perceived 
relationship of the latent variable GP Proportion and latent variable Decision-making 
Process Effectiveness. However, there is a caveat to this. This is when it comes to 
voting for specific items in the Governing Body as not all GPs can do that in line with 
procedural regulations depending on the other committees that they sit on, which may 
result in the conflicts of interest (Moran et al. 2017a). Also, the significance of this 
observation may be weakened by other factors such as strong personalities influencing 
the decision-making process and negative groupthink, if these aspects are not 
adequately managed. 
Overall, the reason for the observation that GP proportion has a positive 
influence on decision effectiveness, as discovered in this study, could be linked to 
findings from previous studies. Leading in this is the reason which led to the 
investigation of GP proportion – that is, a relatively low level of GP influence in 
meetings when compared to the managers, as described at the beginning of this 
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section. Logically, GP proportion is a means to achieve influence, which impliedly 
means, the higher the GP proportion, the greater will be the GP influence. This 
assertion is substantiated by the correlation matrix results (Table 4.8) which show a 
high positive correlation between variables GP Proportion and GP Influence (0.837). 
However, as studies have shown, GP representation in the CCGs has been in decline, 
with the roles that the GPs should play increasingly being occupied by managers 
(Rosser 2018; Checkland et al. 2016; Drake 2016)?  
2) Workplace culture 
Workplace culture, discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.3.3, is here viewed from Schein’s 
levels of culture (Schein 2017). The levels relevant to this study were level two and 
level three. To recapitulate, the second level, referred to as ‘Espoused Beliefs and 
Values’, encompasses standards and protocols about the behaviour of the 
organisation, to represent the character of the organisation internally and externally. 
The third level, referred to as ‘Basic Underlying Assumptions’, is about shared 
assumptions manifested through unconscious behaviour.  Existing studies have shown 
that culture may obscure “the rationality of decision-making processes” (Strutton & 
Carter 2013, p.2). A range of contextual factors falling under the umbrella of culture 
influencing the perceived effective decision-making process, has been identified in this 
study, based on GPs’ views. These include leadership, governance, communication, 
and time factor; and are described next.  
Leadership: It is self-evident that leadership is a “critical determinant of success” 
(Williams & Brown 2014, p.11). NHS Leadership (2014) portrays the same thought with 
the words, "without the correct leadership and organisation, the NHS would fail to 
provide the services it is required and expected to do”. The idea about the potency of 
leadership to organisational success as well as its import in influencing decision-making 
is described in the literature elsewhere (Storey et al. 2018; Tyssen et al. 2014; Rolfe 
2011; Avolio et al. 2004). This thesis has also reviewed this concept in Chapter 2, 
Section 2.3.7.  
The respondents in the current study cited good and strong leadership qualities 
as being pivotal in enabling perceived effective decision-making process. These 
qualities were discovered to be pertinent in facilitating orderly meetings, encouraging 
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open communication, curbing strong personalities from domineering during the 
meetings, to mention but a few. The study asked about the background of the 
Accountable Officer in order to ascertain the possible direction that the decisions 
might take. The study revealed that a majority of 60.3% of respondents’ CCGs had a 
manager occupying the position of the Accountable Officer while just over 30% of the 
respondents said a clinician occupied this position in their local CCG. While the 
literature discusses how rewarding it might be to the clinicians to have a GP in this 
position (Storey et al. 2018), it is not clear why in the current study a relatively lower 
proportion of clinicians were found to occupy this position. Could it be that the 
clinicians are not keen on leadership positions as they are not trained for such roles, as 
observed in the current study (Respondent 63) as well as reported in the subsequent 
study (Storey et al. 2018)? The most recent research shows other obstacles that may 
discourage the GPs from taking leadership roles – namely, lack of time, lack of 
incentives, and “lack of influence” (Storey et al. 2018, p.30). Could it, therefore, be the 
case that decisions blamed on CCGs by member GP Practices are promulgated by 
having non-clinical persons in key leadership positions like Accountable Officer, seeing 
how important leadership is to decision-making? An inference from subsequent 
research by Storey et al. (2018) suggests that this blame may not be apportioned to 
managers only, but GP leaders as well. In that study, GPs who accepted leadership 
roles were characterised by their colleagues as being “in danger of switching their 
identity and their allegiances from being first and foremost ‘a working GP’ to a rather 
different stance of being ‘leader–manager–clinician’” (Storey et al. 2018, p.50). 
Meanwhile, the GPs caught in this dilemma are actively encouraged by the system to 
view themselves as leaders of the CCGs – that is, commissioners, as opposed to the 
voice of GP member practices (Baird et al. 2016). 
There is another aspect not exposed in the data from the current study which 
will be addressed with the insights drawn from other settings in the CCGs sector 
because of its relevance to the decision-making process. It is leadership behaviour. 
Recently, Collins (2019) reported about a situation regarding leadership in the Sheffield 
CCG that has the leadership attributes of destructive leadership behaviour, described 
in the literature (Einarsen et al. 2007). Collins (2019) report uncovered a culture of 
“bullying, favouritism, and harassment” administered by the Accountable Officer and 
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other senior CCG staff as being widespread, which led to the breakdown in 
relationships. Furthermore, “poor relationships between members of the governing 
body” were also reported. It would be difficult to achieve perceived effective decision-
making in such “toxic” environments, as a review of Sheffield CCG commissioned by 
NHS England confirms. One of the key findings from that review was an occurrence of 
poor decision-making processes. A case in point to note here is the office of leadership, 
specifically the Accountable Officer, which the literature characterises as having 
power, together with the Chair, to steer the strategic direction of the local CCG (Storey 
et al. 2018). Could it be the destructive leadership behaviour of the Accountable 
Officer which produced the situation in Sheffield CCG?  The report says the problems 
started at the time when the incumbent Accountable Officer was appointed. Can that 
kind of behaviour, destructive behaviour, be classed as a leadership style? Some 
scholars argue that leadership cannot be called destructive as it is only 
characteristically positive (Yukl & Van Fleet 1992 cited in Schyns & Birgit 2013, p.139). 
Instead, it is the behaviour of the leader which is destructive not the office as such. 
Notwithstanding, it would be interesting to establish if there is any correlation 
between the leadership style of different CCGs’ top leadership (Accountable Officer 
and the Chair) and the perceived effective decision-making process, given the key 
position that leadership occupies in determining the success of the organisation.  
Governance: Governance was also identified as influencing the perceived effective 
decision-making process, something that Williams et al. (2018) also alluded to. 
Governance, which Williams et al. (2018) identified with leadership, was likewise 
recognised by one of the respondents in the current study, Respondent 60, who 
regarded “Strong governance and effective leadership” as being one of the areas that 
his or her CCG was strong at. It appears that wherever respondents mentioned good 
governance as being one of the areas that a CCG was strong at, a retinue of other 
positive attributes which support perceived effective decision-making was also named 
alongside. This is possibly due to the involved CCGs taking this phenomenon beyond 
formal lines of performance management, but also to the political practicalities which 
entail “coalition-building, stakeholder engagement and securing the acceptance and 
legitimisation of decisions” (Robertson et al. 2011, p.63). The positive attributes 
aligned with good governance discovered in this study include balanced representation 
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from all committees, the existence of non-agenda meetings to voice any concerns, 
issues discussed beforehand in other committees before the Governing Body sits, 
patient voice being heard, and member practice and GP views considered.  
It is fitting to reiterate that the effective decision-making process in this study 
was viewed as being any action that supports efficient delivery of health care service 
within the CCGs’ decision-making process continuum (see Figure 2.7), as per Mintzberg 
(1979). While the concept of effective decision-making was considered in terms of GPs’ 
perspective, thereby referring to it as perceived effective decision-making, describing 
the technicalities of measuring or testing the predicted outcome was outside the scope 
of this study. Therefore, the attributes mentioned above which were identified as 
being connected to good governance can be viewed as enablers to achieving the 
perceived effective decision-making process. To realise good governance, Drake (2016, 
p.128) proposed that “GP involvement and clear communication” should be fostered. 
Also, establishing “where responsibility for decision implementation lies [is vital,] as 
this will influence the decision making process” (Williams & Brown 2014, p.15). The 
notion about the involvement of the GPs draws attention to the question of GP 
proportion in the Governing Body, in the case of the current study. That is, the higher 
the proportion of GPs, the higher the involvement will be. This could be aligned with 
the results of hypothesis testing which established a positive correlation (0.932) 
between the proportions of GPs in the Governing Body and perceived decision-making 
process effectiveness. 
Turning to the question where respondents stated their CCGs as being 
inadequate in governance, it was discovered that this occurrence was associated with 
a lack of clarity on decision-making roles. What is more, one respondent expressed 
doubts in his or her CCG decision-making effectiveness because of indistinct 
governance, remarking that their decision-making is constrained by forces which are 
“not always easily visible to the wider membership” (Respondent 31). Relatedly, poor 
governance was also blamed at macro-level because of unclear lines of accountability 
between NHS England (NHSE) and NHS Improvement (NHSI). In this respect, one 
respondent stated that, “Unfortunately NHSE and NHSI do not run to the same rules, 
so providers can go over budget and the CCG has to pay” (Respondent 40). Other 
aspects that were identified as influencing the perceived effective decision-making 
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process under the question of poor governance included the “lack of clarity about the 
division of commissioning responsibility between NHSE and CCGs” (Respondent 74) 
which could speculatively lead to uncertainty in decision-making.  
Communication: Communication has been highlighted in the previous studies as being 
pertinent to success, particularly when considering the complexity of the CCGs, as 
discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.3.8.  In this study, insights into communication were 
drawn from the qualitative data. The participants in the current study identified 
excellent communication in their responses as being an enabling factor for the 
perceived effective decision-making process. For example, one respondent mentioned 
that in their CCG they “have a weekly Hot Topics communication, the CEO sends out a 
regular briefing” (Respondent 20). Communication mattered both within and without 
the CCGs. Regarding the former, the respondents stressed that open culture enables 
professional challenge of anything that concerns the CCG, including persons with a 
domineering disposition. The latter commanded a stable and strong relationship 
between the Governing Body and the GPs at the practice level, which in turn aided 
understanding of the respective local needs by the CCGs. Closely connected with this is 
an environment that affords persons in various committees equal opportunity to 
contribute and feedback from member practices they represent. This is consistent with 
what has been found in the McDermott et al. (2017, p.55) study where good 
communication was pointed out as being a mechanism “which enable clinicians 
knowing which forums to address their concerns”. In addition, the two-way 
communication approach demonstrated here resembles what Grunig and Hunt (1984) 
labelled as “the most effective way of communicating” (cited in Park et al. 2014, p.542) 
which promotes a mutual understanding in resolving conflicts and establishing respect 
within the organisational persons. 
Poor communication, on the other hand, was identified as hampering perceived 
effective decision-making at different levels. The current study discovered that poor 
communication stemmed from the leadership who were singled out for not being 
proactive in conveying information in a timely and comprehensive manner on aspects 
like agenda matters. Such affected the efficiency of meetings. Studies have revealed, 
“that employees who felt that their organizations did a poor job of communicating 
with them were 7 times more likely to be dissatisfied at work” (Drake et al. 2005, cited 
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in Park et al. 2014, p.542). Poor communication was also observed on some of the 
ordinary Governing Body members in the current study. They were said to lack 
presentation skills and blamed for taking disproportionately too much time on the 
task. All this culminated in yet another factor influencing the perceived effective 
decision-making process, time.  
Time factor: Numerous respondents indicated time as being a grave concern because it 
was said to be insufficient in many respects. This factor was first identified in 2013, the 
year that the CCGs were launched. For example, a study by Naylor et al. (2013) 
discovered that the GPs pointed out time as being one of the unfavourable elements 
under which CCGs began. Respecting this, the current study discovered that meetings 
were perceived as being rushed and not enough time given to examine presenting 
issues properly. Closely related to this were two observations. One was about the 
agendas which were perceived as being ‘clunky’ while the other related to the poor 
communication skills discussed above in which some members made too many long 
presentations. Unrealistic scheduling of meetings which did not recognise the need for 
the clinicians to prepare by giving them enough time to review relevant materials 
beforehand exacerbated the question of the time factor. As a result, decision-making 
ended up being based on superficial and insufficient knowledge. 
3) Conflicts of interest 
One of the crucial factors identified was the conflicts of interest which may render 
some GPs to be unable to vote in the Governing Body. This topic is reviewed in Chapter 
2, Section 2.4.4. There are two essential things that the results from the quantitative 
data analysis revealed that have a significant import to the question of the conflicts of 
interest. One pertains to GP proportion in the Governing Body, which hypothesis 
testing indicated a positive correlation between variables GP Proportion and Decision-
making Process Effectiveness. The other is about the voting capacity of the GPs in the 
Governing Body of which the quantitative results indicated that most of the GPs who 
said that they sat on the Governing Body also mentioned that they were voting 
members. That is, of the 69.9% who indicated that they sat on the Governing Body, 
98% said they were voting member in the same committee. The setback that the 
management of conflicts of interest brings is that, notwithstanding a high proportion 
of GPs having the voting status, and in some instances constituting a high proportion in 
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the Governing Body, it does not always follow that they can vote in all cases as 
indicated in the current and previous studies (Moran et al. 2017a; Holder et al. 2016). 
In consequence, this situation could be a barrier to the perceived effective decision-
making process on the part of the GPs who may not be able to represent their clinical 
interests in full measure if they happen to be flagged as conflicted.  
The question of the conflicts of interest was in some instances characterised as 
being overplayed to the detriment of clinical decisions, as noted from some of the 
respondents’ free text answers (Respondent 38). Even so, while the question of 
conflicts of interest is crucial to influencing the perceived effective decision-making 
process, overall, there were relatively fewer concerns expressed by the respondents 
about this being mishandled than there were about good and well-rehearsed 
processes and procedures to handle it (Respondent 13; Respondent 20; Respondent 
27; Respondent 33). There is, though, a paradox of note about the question of the 
conflicts of interest that one respondent exposed. The dilemma is that, while the GPs 
were excluded from participating in the voting process if they were found to be 
conflicted, the non-clinical officers who could be equally in the same predicament 
were reported as being exempted from the rule that conflicted persons should not 
vote (Respondent 37). This kind of behaviour was said to occur when decisions that 
affected the future career of the non-clinical officers were in the balance. To illustrate 
this, an insight derived from an incident outside this study, not directly connected with 
commissioning decision-making process, but, all the same, occurred within a CCG 
setting, will be used. Recently, the Health Service Journal reported about a Chair from 
Crawley CCG who breached the conflict of interest rule when he advocated “for a 
technology company that had paid his consultancy firm £35,000” (Clover 2019). A case 
in point about this incident is that, notwithstanding the alleged breach, the Crawley 
CCG Governing Body is reported as having attempted to protect him, a form of 
behaviour which demonstrates Respondent 37’s view cited above. It would appear 
like; appropriate action is taken if GPs are conflicted, whereas when an officer is 
conflicted, the conflict of interest rules are not always enforced accordingly.   
4) Bureaucracy  
While the formation of the CCGs was claimed to rid the primary health care system of 
the central blueprint (Checkland et al. 2016), thereby dubbed by some authorities as 
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locating “the headquarters of the NHS ‘in the consulting room and the clinic’ (The 
King’s Fund 2018), this study has discovered that bureaucracy still plays a significant 
part in the CCGs at a macro and micro level. To this end, some of the respondents 
commented about “pressure from the centre to dictate operational matters and 
sometimes even infringe on our decision-making abilities” (Respondent 60). Also, 
“decisions … made at top level with little consultation and feedback” (Respondent 17) 
were reported.  
Numerous respondents deplored how their CCGs were controlled by higher 
authority both at the micro and macro levels on financial matters. For example, at 
micro-level, financial directors were perceived as imposing decisions in an effort to 
balance their books. Mintzberg (1979) identifies this kind of control in the decision-
making process continuum with bureaucracy, where senior managers exercise their 
power to approve, block, or change decisions (see Figure 2.7). At the macro level, NHS 
England was said to be dictating the course of direction for the CCGs whose budgets 
happen to be overdrawn. Could these actions be a result of the requirements outlined 
in the assurance framework against which the CCGs are measured, as discussed in 
Chapter 2, Section 2.3.6.2? The consequence of this could be a shift back towards the 
bureaucratic model (Mintzberg 1979) as that removes the macro-scale government 
initiative of professional having a key decision-making role. 
Given the ‘draconian’ measures occasioned by the assurance framework, CCGs 
may find themselves with no choice but to pass the same severity to their member 
practices in the form of commissioning policies that they produce if they are to meet 
the expectations of NHS England. Considering this, someone may question if CCGs are 
really autonomous or just “a delivery vehicle for NHS England”, as Respondent 62 
remarked. Are the CCGs genuinely decentralised? In one sense, yes, with respect to 
the NHS. In another, no, because of the high formalisation prescribed by the centre. As 
mentioned above, there may be a shift from the macro-scale government initiative of 
professional model to bureaucracy model (Mintzberg 1979). This view is reinforced by 
a widespread dissolution and merging of CCGs, discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.3.6.1. 
The predicament that could be raised by this move regards the degree of 
decentralisation and member practice representation that this change will achieve. 
Essentially, because of this exercise, a few centres of CCGs ‘dotted’ around England 
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where decisions are made may remain, thereby indirectly moving the system back to 
the centralised bureaucratic model (Mintzberg 1979) that the PCTs operated under. 
The challenge with bureaucracy is that usually, it dampens “moral impulses” of 
the decision-makers, resulting “in the most horrific acts” (Bauman 1989, cited in 
McAuley et al. 2014, p.76). Bauman (1989, p.253, cited in McAuley et al. 2014, p.76) 
characterises the leaders that disproportionately wield the bureaucratic power as 
having an ill-defined view of the primary purpose of the organisation while at the same 
time acting as tunnels of “bureaucratic virtuosos”. Could this be the root of the 
reasons why some CCGs come up with decisions that are perceived as unfriendly to the 
GP profession, a phenomenon substantiated by the PLS-SEM model observed variable 
“GBUnfrieDec”? In this respect, more than a third of the respondents indicated that 
their CCGs have, at one point, come up with decisions that were perceived as 
unfriendly. Apart from this, the PLS-SEM model demonstrated the attributes of 
bureaucratic control through the reflective latent variable Decision-making Process 
Effectiveness. Three observed variables symbolising bureaucracy seemed to reliably 
reflect the bureaucratic impact on the decision-making process. The variables in 
question are SnrVetoDec (Senior Member or Government Official Vetoed Decisions 
Made by Governing Body), GBUnfrieDec (Unfriendly Decisions), and GBDysFunc 
(Governing Body Is Dysfunctional). 
Because CCGs were given much latitude over their decision-making structures, 
some may find it more comfortable to return to bureaucracy. This notion is confirmed 
by one of the respondents who stated that, “In effect we are returning to being a PCT, 
but ours locally was well managed and effective” (Respondent 13).  
5) Financial considerations 
The aspect of financial consideration featured significantly in both quantitative and 
qualitative data. In both instances, the picture of this factor was not positive. To begin 
with, in the free text responses the question of finance was discovered as implicating 
financial gain, cost-savings, micro-level impact, and macro level impact. The root cause 
of all the problems associated with the financial question was identified by the 
respondents in all areas as insufficient funding, which is consistent with the 
established observations reported in the existing literature (Wood & Heath 2014). As a 
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result, this subjected the CCGs to difficult choices which influenced decision-making. 
For example, the respondents accused financial directors of forcing certain decisions in 
“desperation to make books balance” (Respondent 32). In one instance, a finance 
director was portrayed as “trying to balance the books and failed to recognise the 
implications of his decision” (Respondent 24), a typical reason widely ascribed to the 
perceived unfriendly decisions. It was discovered that when the free text of the 
respondents’ answers to the question of the causes of unfriendly decisions that the 
CCGs made was quantitised, financial constraints emerged as a leading cause in the 
descriptive statistics. Additionally, unfriendly decisions also featured in, and were 
supported and sustained by, the PLS-SEM model as being a valid observed variable to 
reflect the perceived character of the latent variable that denoted the decision-making 
process effectiveness. Could the finance question be the case why the Devon CCG was 
reported on the news as having announced that it was going to restrict all routine 
surgery for obese patients and smokers as well as restrict all routine shoulder surgery 
for all patients (The Guardian 2015)? 
6) Member practice engagement  
Engaging with the local GP Practices, a subject reviewed in Chapter 2, Section 2.4.3, is 
crucial if the CCGs are to be adequately informed about the needs of their local 
membership. Notwithstanding, the current study has predominantly shown a lack in 
that regard, a pattern also observed in previous studies (Robertson et al. 2016). Some 
of the CCGs in the current study were criticised for not valuing the local GPs at GP 
Practice level. The wishes of member practices were identified by one of the 
respondents as being not always known (Respondent 54). This intimation was 
corroborated by the general statistical analysis results in which it was discovered that 
more than 40% of the respondents neither agreed nor disagreed if decisions made by 
their CCGs reflected the wishes of their member practices. Could this be a symptom for 
a decline in the perception that GP Practices generally have about their influence on 
CCGs? For example, to this end, Bostock (2016) reported a 15% drop, from 35% to 
20%, of the GPs at GP Practice level who felt that they were able to influence decisions 
in the CCGs in the period spanning a survey in 2014 to the then-recent studies? Could 
such a landscape account for sentiments such as, “We have become disconnected to 
GP practices” (Responded 17)? Like Storey et al. (2018, p.35), “One might expect that 
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at least GPs on the CCG board would be the prime intermediaries and communicators 
with other primary care clinicians”. 
In certain instances, the current study also discovered that some CCGs were 
characterised as being aloof and slow at responding to GP Practices’ problems. The 
CCGs were also accused of being politically motivated, which could be one of the 
reasons why they ignored their core responsibilities to their member practices. The 
other side of the picture concerns the GPs in the member practices at issue. While 
these individuals should, ideally, take their concerns and suggestions to the forums like 
locality boards, which are the conduits through which communication is escalated to 
the CCGs, the study discovered that they are typically overwhelmed with commitments 
in their practices. As such, they do not have time to attend the meetings in question 
which consequently hampers member practice clinical concerns and wishes from being 
escalated to the CCGs, thereby handicapping effective decisions from being made. This 
is consistent with what McDermott et al. (2015, p.96) observed, where concerns were 
raised “that GPs and other clinicians were too busy with their own practices and work 
to become engaged with the CCG”. Conversely, could it be that the meetings in 
question are badly designed and should be proactively adapted to the GPs’ busy 
schedules? In line with the ideas of McDermott et al. (2017, p.9) regarding how CCGs 
struggle “to ensure that their local GPs feel ownership of the work that is done in their 
name”, it can be concluded that poor member practice engagement can only persist 
this occurrence.  
To conclude, this, and other studies (Storey et al. 2018; McDermott et al. 2017; 
McDermott et al. 2015; Naylor et al. 2013) have discovered the question of member 
practice engagement as being a ‘bone of contention’. The possible reasons for this, to 
the best knowledge of the researcher, are (1) excessive GP practice workload, which 
prevents the GPs from engaging with the CCGs, and (2) financial climate. GPs are 
perceived as thinking that spending time with the CCGs, time that they sense could be 
profitably spent with their patients, is not worthwhile, and (3) communication,  in 
which various factors like the volume of information from the CCGs and delays in 
passing information to the GP Practices hinder engagement. Even so, studies have 
shown that CCGs are keen to engage member practices (McDermott et al. 2015; Naylor 
et al. 2013). The most recent research has shown that some of the CCGs have even 
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sought outside specialist help to get this subject of member practice engagement 
addressed (Storey et al. 2018). 
7) GPs’ level of influence 
In the mix of roles within the CCGs where GPs, among other professional backgrounds, 
are selected to represent the interests of their member practices (Naylor et al. 2013), 
it is reasonable to believe that they (GPs) would forcefully promote the patient care 
interest. Important as this may be, numerous previous and subsequent studies have 
indicated that the level of influence that the GPs exert in the CCGs’ various committees 
does not equal that of the managers (Storey et al. 2018; Holder et al. 2016; Naylor et 
al. 2013). Even though the GPs may be keen to advance concerns about efficient 
service delivery in relation to patient care, this may be weakened by the fact that, once 
they are within the CCG context, they “are actively discouraged from being the voice of 
the provider as that would be a conflict of interest” (Baird et al. 2016, p.82). Instead, 
they should view themselves as commissioners. As such, it is unclear whether these 
occurrences could be part of the reason that decisions that appear unfriendly to the 
clinical element are relatively easier to be enforced, as a result. The interesting 
discovery from the current study on the question of GPs’ level of influence is that the 
GPs thought their degree of influence was significant, even though previous studies 
cited above earlier in this section suggest differently.  In reality, the results from 
inferential statistical analysis in the current study generally suggested that the GPs’ 
level of influence was not significant on decision-making, as described next. 
Three hypotheses were tested respecting the question of GP influence in which 
three different causal relationships were portrayed. First, the level of GP influence in 
the Governing Body was tested to establish if it will cause a difference in the 
effectiveness of the decision-making process. Next, the level of GP influence in the 
Governing Body was tested to detect if it will impact the scale of member practice 
wishes being met. Finally, the test of GP influence was done to determine if it will 
change the degree of GP satisfaction about decision-making. The results of the first 
test suggested that the level of GP influence in the Governing Body is not significant to 
cause a difference in the effectiveness of the decision-making process. Similarly, the 
results of the second test indicated that the GP influence is not significant to cause 
member practice wishes to be met. On the contrary, the final test, which indicated 
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that the GP influence in the Governing Body committee is positively associated with GP 
satisfaction about decision-making, was found to be significant.  
5.1.3.3 General observations about the perceived effective decision-making process  
Other than identifying the factors influencing the perceived effective decision-making 
process, the study also drilled down to discover other insights related to decision-
making that could be of interest in the knowledge base. For example, regarding the 
question of decisions that were perceived as unfriendly to the GP interests, an effort 
was made to establish the professional background of the leadership of the CCGs that 
had experienced this. In this respect, just over a third of the participants confirmed 
experiencing decisions that they perceived as unfriendly. Since previous research had 
shown that managers were more influential than the GPs, it was of interest to learn 
what would happen if managers held a top leadership role: would that then lead the 
decisions to be less friendly, from the clinical viewpoint? The role of the Accountable 
Officer was the only one considered in this study to that end. In this context, more 
than half of the respondents who indicated that they had experienced decisions 
unfriendly to the GP profession in their CCGs stated that their Accountable Officer was 
a manager – that is, personnel from a non-clinical background. While the descriptive 
statistics provided certain data about the professional background of the top 
leadership, it was not possible to establish if this phenomenon (professional 
background) has any influence in the development of decisions that could be 
perceived as unfriendly. Besides, the same phenomenon could not be verified with 
inferential tests. Even so, the literature mentions how powerful the offices of the Chair 
and the Accountable Officer are in terms of their influence on the direction of the CCG 
(Storey et al. 2018). To get a complete picture of the hand that the top leadership may 
have in the effectuation of unfriendly decisions, it could have been ideal also to 
investigate the professional background of the Chair. From this standpoint, the 
findings of the current study regarding the top leadership professional background are, 
therefore, not conclusive. 
Another insight worth noting that the current study revealed about the impact 
that the GPs can have in decision-making in the CCGs concerns the supportive 
atmosphere to the perceived effective decision-making process that the participants 
reported. Several things were discovered, to this end. First, over two-thirds of the GPs 
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indicated that they sat on the Governing Body, of which 98% of those stated that they 
were voting members in that board. Over two thirds (65%) of the respondents had 3 or 
more positive things to say about their Governing Bodies. Also, the respondents 
rejected the suggestions which implied inefficiency of their Governing Bodies. For 
example, the suggestion that a few strong personalities influenced their Governing 
Bodies was overwhelmingly rejected as evidenced in the descriptive statistics over this 
factor demonstrated in Figure 4.15. A similar response was also seen in the case that 
hinted that their Governing Bodies were prone to negative groupthink. Groupthink is a 
phenomenon whereby members fall into the trap of “group decision biases” (Janis 
1982, cited in Langfred 2004, p.386), with some yielding their held opinions to others 
in the spirit of what they may perceive as solidarity, to maintain cohesion and unity in 
the group.  
Even though there may be an arguably good presence of the GPs in the 
Governing Bodies, it was discovered that a large number of the Governing Bodies 
(58.8%) were not involved in active primary decision-making routines, with their 
responsibility being mainly to endorse decisions made elsewhere, as demonstrated by 
the results of the descriptive statistics (see Figure 4.11 in Section 4.2.1.2). It is not clear 
whether this occurrence is favourable or unfavourable to the perceived effective 
decision-making process when viewed from the standpoint of this study.  
In some of the cases, the respondents mentioned the incentives to the GP 
Practices which were both historical and current. From the tone of the responses, it 
was difficult to tell if the incentives in question support the process of perceived 
effective decision-making or not. For example, some incentives, like “prescribing 
incentive scheme” (Respondent 24), were mentioned as historically fostering a good 
relationship between the CCGs and the GP member practices but had since been 
removed at the time of this study. On the other hand, incentives which were identified 
as new to the system at the time of this study, such as cash “for reducing referrals to 
an arbitrary level” (Respondent 62), were condemned as being malicious for the 
profession with a propensity of undermining patient trust in the GPs.  
241 
 
5.1.4 Concluding remarks  
This study, which primarily sought to identify the factors influencing effective decision-
making as perceived by the GPs in the CCGs, was prompted by the BMA (2014a) 
research findings which generally indicated that the GP Practices were not happy with 
the policies that the CCGs made. As discussed in Chapter 1 (Section 1.1.1) and Chapter 
2 (Section 2.3.6.1), and many other places in this thesis, CCGs were intended to be 
autonomous so as to improve patient care by aligning health care commissioning 
decisions with local needs. However, this study has discovered that structure alone 
appears not enough to deliver effectiveness. Other factors that seem to come to the 
fore are GP proportion in the Governing Body, workplace culture, conflicts of interest, 
bureaucracy, financial considerations, member practice engagement, and GPs’ level of 
influence. Also, while factors like conflicts of interest, financial constraints, and 
bureaucracy have been identified in the same vein, these have, to a large extent, been 
dealt with in previous studies with comparable findings. A detailed discussion of these 
can be seen in Section 5.3.2. A specific aspect worth stressing is about GP proportion in 
the Governing Body, which seems to be a bigger influence of decision effectiveness, as 
confirmed by statistical hypotheses testing (Section 4.2.2.4).  
There is another aspect worth highlighting, which is, while this study 
determined to investigate only GPs with formal roles in the CCGs, the current findings 
were in many respects consistent with what previous studies have established. Leading 
in this is the observation that, whereas the BMA surveyed all their members, the 
findings of this study identify many similar perceptions among GPs who have been 
closely associated with the CCGs. On the question of the secondary aim, which sought 
to establish the roles occupied by the GPs, comparative similarities with previous 
studies were also found, especially on complexity and diversity of the roles occupied 
by GPs across different CCGs. 
Overall, the results demonstrated a healthy atmosphere in decision-making. This 
was revealed from several standpoints which include: (1) Governing Body members 
expressing satisfaction with the way their CCGs made decisions, (2) not being 
influenced by a few in decision-making routines, (3) an endorsement that their CCGs 
were functional, (4) high level of contentment expressed by the GPs about their level 
of influence in the Governing Body, (5) a suggestion that the respondents’ CCGs’ senior 
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authorities did not veto the decisions that the Governing Bodies made, as indicated by 
descriptive statistical results, and (6) about two thirds of the respondents expressing 
the view that their CCGs have never made decisions that they perceived as unfriendly 
to their profession in patient care.  
In contrast, there were unfavourable results too in almost all instances identified 
above but which were at a lesser proportion. Of all the unfavourable results, two are 
worth mentioning as they are crucial to this study. One involved the question 
regarding whether the CCGs represented the wishes of member practices, where no 
clear-cut position was obtained. The other pertained to the question whether the 
respective local CCGs were GP led as defined in the Health and Social Care Act 2012, to 
which half of the participants concurred while the other half either disagreed or were 
undecided. It remains to be established from CCGs if this finding is a cause for concern 
given that just over 50% of the GPs who represented their practices in this study 
seemed unsure if their CCGs were GP led or not.  
Another noteworthy thing is that, the findings of the study indicated that the GPs 
were more positive on the questions as to whether the CCGs were working effectively 
than they were on questions about ‘unfriendly decisions’ to GP interests being made. 
The effect of this could be that there may be ‘unfriendly decisions’ even if the CCGs’ 
operations are optimal, because of the hard choices that have to be made in the NHS. 
As such, there will always be a need for compromise on the GPs’ side.  
When considered from the grand scheme of things, the findings from this and 
other related studies suggest that the current system in the CCGs is a functioning part 
of the NHS. This study suggests that there are aspects of the philosophy behind the 
CCGs which have been realised, in terms of local decision-making. However, this 
progress is threatened by the signs of creeping reversion back to centralisation.  
5.2 Theoretical contributions 
This study makes two contributions to theory. The first pertains to decentralisation 
under the theory of organisational structure, which underpinned the development of 
this study. I viewed decentralisation through Mintzberg (1979, p.181), where this 
concept is considered “exclusively in terms of power over the decisions made in the 
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organization”.  In this premise, I reviewed the literature centred on the decision-
making structures in the CCGs within the English NHS. At inception, CCGs were 
intended to be autonomous entities led by GPs in commissioning services in the 
English NHS (The King’s Fund 2018; Checkland et al. 2016; Robertson et al. 2016). At 
the same time, NHS England was to give strategic direction along with the allocation of 
financial resources at macro-level (Department of Health 2012; NHS Commissioning 
Board 2012b). When considered from Mintzberg’s framework of organisational 
structuring (Mintzberg 1979), this arrangement characterised the professional model. 
However, the current study findings suggest that the CCGs, in general, seem to be 
moving back towards the bureaucratic structure (Mintzberg 1979), which PCTs 
operated under. The supposed autonomy appears to be eroded due to various lines of 
reporting and accountability discussed in Chapter 2 (Section 2.3.6.2) and confirmed in 
this study. To this end, one of the respondents in the current study even commented 
that their CCG was “returning to being a PCT” (Respondent 13). In summary, the 
theoretical contribution of the current study is an observation of the shift of the CCGs 
from the professional model back towards bureaucratic model in Mintzberg’s models 
of organisational structuring (Mintzberg 1979).   
The second theoretical contribution pertains to negative groupthink, discussed in 
Section 2.3.6.1, a phenomenon where the team can fall into the trap of sub-optimal 
decision-making due to group biases (Wang & Wagner 2018; Pautz & Forrer 2013; 
Langfred 2004). In this context, some members who may hold different views to their 
colleagues’ choices may yield their views even if they do not agree with what has been 
tabled to avoid being perceived as violating trust. The current study suggested that this 
factor did not dominate the decentralised setting of the CCGs. 
5.3 Implications for practice 
Several findings that the current study produced have supported the findings of the 
previous studies. For example, the question of the conflicts of interest, time factor – 
from the sense that it is always limited when contrasted with what ought to be done in 
decision-making routines, bureaucracy, and member practice engagement. However, 
to the best knowledge of the researcher, no dedicated study has focused on 
investigating the factors influencing the effective decision-making process as perceived 
by the GPs in the CCGs. The current study aimed to cover this gap. As expected, the 
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leading contribution in this area is the empirical data on the actual process of decision-
making, its weaknesses, its strengths, its place and role in the health care system, as 
well as how the internal and external factors influence it. Description of the factors 
influencing the perceived effective decision-making process could support not only the 
decision-makers in the CCGs but also policy-makers at macro and micro-levels, by 
informing them about some of the factors to consider in order to formulate decisions 
conducive to supporting the GP Practices in caring for patients.  
5.3.1 Confirmatory implications  
A striking confirmatory implication to practice pertains to the question of whether 
decisions made by CCGs reflect the wishes of member practices. The results of the 
study on a 5-point Likert scale revealed that less than one-third of the respondents 
agreed that the decisions made by their CCGs reflected the wishes of their member 
practices. It is possible that this could be due to the reality of constrained decision-
making environment. To establish likely reasons for this uncertainty, further research 
is necessary.  
5.3.2 Conflicts of interest 
This implication concerns policy-makers who develop guidance on the question of 
conflicts of interest. The results of this study, which substantiate the findings of other 
studies (Storey et al. 2018; Moran et al. 2017a; Holder et al. 2016), suggest that the 
GPs are disconcerted by the way the conflicts of interest policy operates as it limits the 
GPs’ influence on decision-making in the CCGs. A striking example of that is the 
inability of the GPs to vote, cited earlier as one of the factors influencing the perceived 
effective decision-making process. A review of the guidelines, designed in close 
consultation with the GPs, to come up with an amicable policy, could be favourable to 
them.  
5.3.3 Time factor 
The results demonstrated that time is a factor that the CCGs need to consider from 
various angles. First, by giving the GPs ample time to prepare for the meetings than 
pressing them to present at meetings with superficial knowledge. Also, either agenda 
items are to be condensed or time allocated for the meetings is increased to avoid 
rushed meetings. In the same vein, the attendees in various committee meetings 
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should either be trained on how to make their presentations concise but yet effective, 
or more time should be allocated to them, given some of the concerns raised about 
the time wasted in long presentations. 
5.3.4 Bureaucracy 
Bureaucracy, a persistent challenge yet widely accepted in contemporary societies 
(Kumar & Kant 2005), is another implication cutting across the macro and micro 
administration divide. The findings suggest that at macro-level, the central government 
still has a strong influence on the way decisions are shaped at micro-level, an 
occurrence which contradicts the fundamental principles underpinning the tenets for 
establishing the CCGs. As a result, the researcher believes that the CCG leadership is 
left without a choice but to exert the same tone of impersonal measures at the local 
level. For example, it is possible that the Sheffield CCG Accountable Officer reported as 
generating a “toxic” environment at work (Section 2.3.7) was constrained by 
bureaucratic clutches to behave thus (Collins 2019). Such activities flout the primary 
purpose of the CCGs organisations, broadly speaking. Results demonstrate that 
significant consequences such as decisions unfriendly to the GP interests are, thus 
made. What this means is that decisions that negatively impact efficient patient care 
are devised. This situation is aggravated by financial constraints, which the results from 
this study revealed that such were attributable to unfriendly decisions being made by 
the CCGs. It would appear like when resources are tight, local autonomy is constrained, 
or maybe local autonomy is maintained, but difficult choices are pushed down to that 
level because budgets are imposed. An unintended consequence of this may be a shift 
of the CCGs towards the Bureaucratic structure of the Mintzberg’s models of 
organisational structuring (Mintzberg 1979).  
5.3.5 Knowledge vacuum 
There is a likelihood of knowledge vacuum when the GPs who currently occupy formal 
positions in CCGs leave the system. It is essential though, to note that this implication 
is not directly demonstrated in this study as the suggestion of the risk of knowledge 
vacuum is a deduced statement. This suggestion stems from the fact that the current 
study discovered a significant imbalance between the GPs who were relatively new in 
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the CCGs (about 34%) when contrasted with those who had served their CCGs for 
more than 3 years (about 66%). 
5.4 Research limitations 
This section describes the limitations that were not foreseen beforehand when the 
study started and were only discovered as the research progressed. As a result, those 
characteristics impacted the interpretation of the results and possible additional value 
that this study could otherwise have produced.  
5.4.1 Response rate 
To start with, while at the inception of this research I highlighted that access to the 
target population would pose a significant limitation that would beset my study (see 
Section 1.4.3), I did not envisage the response rate to be as low as 6.9%. The reason 
that I gave then for possible low response was that GPs are ‘notoriously’ known to be 
busy people, an occurrence that was even frequently reported in the news media (BBC 
News 2015). This phenomenon was confirmed in the field by some of the respondents. 
For example, when I sent out emails to the pilot study participants asking them why 
they did not respond to my request to complete that pilot study, almost all the reasons 
that I received were characterised by the message of “busyness”. Some of the excerpts 
are, 
“I did receive the invite for the questionnaire but due to a huge workload I didn’t get 
around to responding…” 
“To confirm I did receive your email … Time constraints and prioritising work are the 
main issues” 
“Time constraints…” 
The full emails can be seen in Appendix 2.5.  
I believe, and I have worked under the assumption that the above sentiments are an 
accurate reflection of the circumstances besetting most of the GPs across the board, 
which could be part of the reason that contributed to a low survey response rate of 
6.9%. Besides, it is likely that the response rate was worsened by a cyber-attack called 
WannaCrypt Ransomware which hit many organisations across the globe days just 
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before my online survey went live. This is because my survey was web-based, hence 
the potential respondents might have been cautious about opening web links, as 
substantiated by one of the respondents who mentioned that their IT department 
advised them not to open any web links (see Appendix 2.13 for the email in question). 
5.4.2 Scope of leadership roles 
The research also suffers from the limited scope of the CCG leadership roles that were 
assessed to ascertain the professional background of the roles in question. That is, 
since other studies have shown that the offices of the Chair and the Accountable 
Officer have the power to steer the strategic direction of the local CCG (Storey et al. 
2018), it would have been ideal to establish the professional background, not only of 
the Accountable Officer, but also of the Chair. In doing so, the study could have fully 
established the question of decisions perceived as unfriendly to the GPs as to whether 
the kind of professional background of the leadership has any input in that. As shown 
earlier, while more than half of the respondents in the current study who indicated 
that they had experienced decisions unfriendly to the GP profession in their CCGs 
stated that their Accountable Officer was a manager, this finding cannot be regarded 
as conclusive. Additionally, the PLS-SEM model fitness tests could not accept the 
inclusion of the observed variable “AccOffBG” (Accountable Officer Background) in the 
final model to help establish its position and significance. It is, therefore, not clear if 
the professional background of the CCG leadership has any influence over the 
development of decisions that could be perceived as unfriendly. Unfortunately, the 
findings cited above by Storey et al. (2018) were published after the survey for the 
current study was already completed and, therefore, too late to inform the survey 
questions. 
5.4.3 CCGs’ geographical locations information 
Also, it became evident in data analysis that the lack of information about geographical 
locations of the respondents could be a limitation. While the study was designed to be 
anonymous (not to pinpoint the exact location or district where the respondents’ CCGs 
were, as that was thought would threaten anonymity), it was going to be useful to get 
a rough idea of the region where the respondents’ local CCGs were located. This was 
going to be achieved through the use of England’s statistical regions. England has nine 
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regions, namely North East, North West, Yorkshire and The Humber, East Midlands, 
West Midlands, East of England (East Anglia), London, South East, and South West 
(Office for National Statistics [Open Government Licence v3.0]). Such information was 
going to assist in estimating how representative the study was across England.  
Closely tied to the question of the benefits of disclosure of anonymity is the 
dilemma of getting a disproportionately high number of responses from the 
participants in the same CCG, an occurrence likely to skew statistical insights. While 
there was no obvious suggestion of duplication in the responses received, I recognise 
this as a potential issue as such an occurrence may affect the weighting of variables in 
the PLS-SEM model. However, for respondents’ confidentiality, I could not ask the 
name of the CCGs that they belonged to as this could have prejudiced the response 
rate. 
5.4.4 Use of questionnaire in a phenomenological method 
Another limitation concerned the use of questionnaires as part of a phenomenological 
method. While the current study managed to collect rich qualitative data, the use of a 
questionnaire restricts flexibility. That is, questionnaire surveys are not the most 
obvious way of capturing deep insights of lived experience, with face-to-face 
interviews being the widely utilised approach that allows for unstructured interviews 
which can adapt and change in line with the respondent’s answers (Rose 1994). Semi-
structured questionnaire surveys are not as flexible. Two studies that exemplify 
phenomenological data collection are Davidsen 2013 and Groenewald 2004.  
5.4.5 Quantitative data analysis 
While I feel content and confident about opting for Partial Least Squares Structural 
Equation Modelling (PLS-SEM) for the quantitative strand, which I found very useful for 
the reasons explained in Section 3.6.1.1, the results from the quantitative strand were, 
nonetheless, not as useful in shaping the conclusions as the rich qualitative strand data 
was. As mentioned in the introduction to Chapter 5, Section 5.1, originally, I set this 
study to be quantitatively driven, but it turned out that the conclusions became 
qualitatively driven. Even so, I found out that using PLS-SEM was not only appropriate 
for the reasons explained in Section 3.6.1.1, but this technique also functioned as a 
compass to me in instilling confidence about my research model. PLS-SEM delivered 
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more reliability in my study “than other techniques … especially [with a view] of small 
sample size” (Carrascal et al. 2009, p.681). Nonetheless, there is a phenomenon that 
appeared logically inconsistent about PLS-SEM. It concerns the model fitness tests as 
described next.  
First, in the early phase path model (see Figure 4.32) I linked the observed 
variable GPPropInGB (The proportion of GPs In CCG Governing Body Membership) to 
the latent variable GP Proportion, a relationship which logically looked correct. 
However, that relationship did not meet the model fitness tests. The technically 
acceptable relationships meeting the model fitness tests determined that observed 
variable GPPropInGB should be linked to the latent variable GP Influence (see          
Figure 4.34). Secondly, in the early phase path model, latent variable GP Proportion 
was logically considered as having the capacity to cause a difference in the level of GP 
influence, hence was linked to latent variable GP Influence, which in turn was deemed 
to have the capacity to cause a difference in the effectiveness of the decision-making 
process. However, this presumed chain of causality was broken by model fitness tests 
which resulted in latent variables GP Proportion and GP Influence considered 
separately to cause a difference in the effectiveness of the decision-making process. 
While logically, these two scenarios do not look right, technically, they are correct as 
authenticated by model fitness tests. To realise the predictive capacity that PLS-SEM 
affords, the outer model of the path model should be valid and reliable (Lowry & 
Gaskin 2014; Henseler et al. 2009), which the case was for this study.  
5.5 Recommendations for future research 
The current study has raised numerous opportunities for future research. First, this 
study offers the opportunity to refine and validate the latent variables in the 
conceptual model that were identified with weaknesses in the PLS-SEM model fitness 
analysis phase. Of specific interest was the R2 test of the inner model fitness designed 
to ensure the model’s ability to predict the latent variables. The tests indicated a weak 
R2 result on latent variable Member Practice Wishes Met. As discussed in Chapter 3, 
while a weak R2 result may be suggestive of doubtful “theoretical underpinnings” 
(Henseler et al. 2009, p.303), such less favourable readings may, nonetheless, be used 
as a benchmark for future research, thereby affording subsequent researchers to treat 
their readings “relative to the field”, as suggested by Garson (2016). Therefore, one 
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could devise an explorative study with a model addressing whether, and to what 
extent, the member practice wishes can be met. 
The second research opportunity relates to the results of hypothesis testing, 
from which positive correlation was discovered between variables GP Proportion and 
Decision-making Process Effectiveness. While on paper, in a given situation, the 
indication may be that indeed the GPs constitute a higher proportion in the Governing 
Body, it is, however, not clear what impact the question of the conflicts of interest 
could have on the perceived effective decision-making process, especially on 
components relating to GP interests. 
The next implication for future study relates to the professional background of 
the persons occupying the offices of Accountable Officer and the Chair, CCG top 
leadership offices. While the current study established that about two-thirds of the 
participants indicated that a manager in their respective CCGs occupied the role of 
Accountable Officer, it will be useful for a similar question to be established for the 
Chair. The interesting finding in the current study drawn from the descriptive statistics 
is that more than half of the respondents who indicated that they had experienced 
decisions unfriendly to the GP profession in their CCGs stated that their Accountable 
Officer was a manager. Considering this, the degree of correlation between decisions 
unfriendly to the GP profession and the professional backgrounds of the leadership 
(Accountable Officer and the Chair) remains to be established, if considered in a single 
study. Relatedly, though slightly different, further research would be useful to 
establish if there is any correlation between the leadership style of CCGs’ top 
leadership (Accountable Officer and the Chair) and the perceived effective decision-
making process in general, given the influence that these key positions have in steering 
the direction of the CCG (Storey et al. 2018).  
Another interesting factor relates to the point at which primary decisions are 
made in the CCGs. The current study, along with other previous studies (Checkland et 
al. 2016; McDermott et al. 2015), discovered that primary decisions are not necessarily 
made at Governing Body level as demonstrated in Figure 4.11, page 150. While 
interest in the current study was centred more on the way the Governing Body 
functions concerning decision-making, it would be interesting to explore in future 
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research the level of impact, if any, on the effective decision-making, as perceived by 
GPs, that primary decisions made outside the Governing Body – that is, decisions 
delegated to the sub-committees, have in achieving GPs’ needs. Such delegation of 
decision-making responsibilities could be viewed as decentralisation within the CCG. 
Inversely, the same consideration could be made regarding primary decisions made by 
the Governing Body.  
There is another intriguing observation uncovered by the analysis of results of 
this study which would be useful to explore in a future study. The case in point is, why 
do the GPs have a generally favourable view on the question of the dysfunctionality of 
the CCGs but a negative view on the question of decisions made by CCGs reflecting 
members’ wishes? Could it be that the GPs have come to understand and accept the 
reality that the NHS will always be top down even under the dispensation of the 
purported autonomy designed to be led by the GPs? It is difficult to explain such 
results within the context of the current study.  
CCGs were allegedly created to rid the primary health care system of the central 
blueprint (Checkland et al. 2016), liberating the “‘professionals and providers from top-
down control’” (The King’s Fund 2018). However, the inferential statistical results 
demonstrated the attributes of bureaucratic control through the reflective latent 
variable Decision-making Process Effectiveness, as described earlier in this chapter, 
Section 5.1.3.2. It will be useful to run a dedicated study to establish the extent of 
bureaucracy on the CCGs at macro and micro-levels, and its impact on the perceived 
effective decision-making process. 
The last suggestion for future research pertains to the demographic profile of the 
GPs’ length of service in their local CCGs. The current study discovered a significant 
imbalance between the GPs who were relatively new in their CCGs – that is, served 
their CCGs for up to 3 years, and those who had served for more than 3 years. The 
former presented with a minuscule proportion when compared with the latter. Two 
possible reasons for that come from the findings of previous studies, namely, (1) lack 
of enthusiasm in GPs to take up roles in the CCGs (Checkland et al. 2014), and (2) a 
general a decline in GP representation within the CCGs with the roles that the GPs 
should play more and more being occupied by managers (Rosser 2018; Checkland et al. 
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2016; Drake 2016). The other possible reason worth investigating is the researcher’s 
speculation, which is – all the available roles in the CCGs were filled up until such a 
time that new ones are created, or the existing GPs retire or leave the profession. 
Whatever the case, a definitive study to establish the reason for fewer GPs joining the 
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Appendix 1 Email Communications with BMA 
Appendix 1.1 Request for BMA’s advice and assistance in 
proposed research: 18 February 2016 
 
Dear British Medical Association,  
Re: Request for BMA’s advice and assistance in proposed research  
My name is Mpumelelo Sibanda, a doctoral degree student enrolled on the Doctor of 
Business Administration (DBA) Degree Course at the Sheffield Business School. I am 
writing this e-mail to ask for advice and assistance from British Medical Association 
(BMA) with respect to a research that I plan to conduct on Clinical Commissioning 
Groups (CCGs). This research will seek to gather the opinions of the general 
practitioners (GPs) in connection with the structure of their respective CCGs that they 
work for. This activity will be a follow-up study to a survey which was conducted in 
April 2014 by the BMA on 1,393 GPs to investigate the future of the NHS. From that 
study, the BMA website summarised one of their main findings in the following 
words [1]:  
The survey revealed a lack of engagement between CCGS and GPs, with two 
thirds of respondents stating that they ‘do not feel like a member and have little 
influence on CCG policies and strategy’ or that they were simply ‘told about CCG 
policies rather than able to contribute views’. 
(British Medical Association 2014)  
In view of this, the study that I am planning to carry out will be aimed at identifying 
and developing propositions that will streamline the current CCGs’ structure with the 
intention of mitigating concerns such as the abovementioned. All the research 
questions will be electronically administered to the participants. As such, the 
assistance that I would like to get from the BMA to that end is,  
1.      Getting GPs’ contacts: Basically, my plan is to use GPs who work for CCGs in 
England for my sample population. I therefore need at least 500 GPs’ contact email 
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addresses for that purpose.  My predicament is that I do not know where to get those 
email addresses from. I was wondering if the BMA could help me with that. I am willing 
to go through all the necessary vetting procedures that will enable me to reach the 
GPs. 
2.      Advice on clearance for my research to go ahead in relation to GPs: Given that 
my planned research aims to use BMA members to anonymously respond to questions 
about their working environments, do I need any clearance from the NHS for that 
purpose? Is there any need for me to complete the Integrated Research Application 
System (IRAS)? What clearance did the BMA go through when the BMA conducted 
their survey on GPs in April 2014? As mentioned earlier, my research will be a follow 
up of that research.  
Please note that I live and work in the UK.  
Thank you for your support in advance.  
Kind regards,  
Mpumelelo Sibanda  
References: 
1.      BRITISH MEDICAL ASSOCIATION (2014). General Practitioners Committee. 






Appendix 1.2 BMA’s Reply: Request for advice and assistance in 
proposed research: 18 February 2016 
  
Dear Mr Sibanda,  
Thank you for contacting the British Medical Association.  
As you may know the BMA is a trade union and professional association for 
doctors.  Unfortunately we do not have the resources to assist students with projects 
or address your questions in detail, due to the UK confidentiality laws we are unable to 
release any of our members details, such as email address’, to you. We would be 
unable to pass your questionnaires on to members of the BMA. 
I am sorry we have been unable to assist you in your studies. 
Kind regards 
BMA Public Enquiries 
British Medical Association 




Appendix 1.3 Request for BMA Press Release Email Trail 
MPUMELELO SIBANDA xxxx@xxxx.shu.ac.uk 08/06/2017 to webcontent, info.public
  
Dear BMA Web Content Team,  
I’m writing you in connection with the below email trail. I was wondering how far you 
were with progress about this request.  
Kind regards,  
Mpumelelo   
 
On 7 June 2017 at 11:12, info.public <info.public@bma.org.uk> wrote: 
Dear Mpumelelo 
Your enquiry was emailed to our Web Contact team on 18th May. You may wish to 
contact them directly by emailing webcontent@bma.org.uk  
I hope this helps  
Kind regards  
Public Information 
British Medical Association  
T: 0207 387 4499| E: info.public@bma.org.uk 
 
From: MPUMELELO SIBANDA [mailto:xxxx.xxxx@xxx.shu.ac.uk]  
Sent: 06 June 2017 16:35 
To: info.public 
Subject: Re: Request for a Media Release on BMA Newsletter CRM:0097900004516  
Dear Public information adviser,  
Further to the last communication in this email trail that I sent to you, I was wondering 
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how far BMA was with progress in making a decision about my request.  
Kind regards,  
Mpumelelo  
 
On 18 May 2017 at 00:08, MPUMELELO SIBANDA <xxxx@xxxx.shu.ac.uk> wrote: 
Dear Public Information Adviser,  
Thank you for your reply to my request. I note that in your email you have indicated 
that “BMA is not in a position to contact individual doctors”. My apologies to you if my 
request gave you the impression that I wanted BMA to contact individual doctors for 
me. Instead, all that I’m requesting from BMA is just to feature the survey that I’m 
undertaking in its Newsletter, explaining in brief the aim and rationale of that survey 
and how it is likely to benefit the CCGs. In that way, anyone who is subscribed with 
BMA will then receive the news as part of their regular feeds of the Newsletter. I 
notice that in the email that I sent you on Tuesday I did not give an outline of the 
proposed message for release on the Newsletter. Find below a draft of that message. 
You are free to edit this message in any way that will best suit the publication.  
Message title: Decision-making effectiveness in CCGs 
In June 2014, barely a year after the CCGs were officially launched, BMA conducted a 
survey on 1,393 GPs to investigate the future of the NHS. Interesting findings were 
made in that study which include that “almost three out of ten GPs believe their local 
CCG has introduced policies that have adversely affected their ability to care for 
patients” [1]. Two thirds of the participants (GPs) felt that they had no influence on 
CCGs’ “policies and strategy”, with 50% expressing that they felt powerless “to 
challenge the decision made by their CCG board”[2]. Further to this study, Mpumelelo 
Sibanda, a Final Year doctoral degree student at Sheffield Business School, Sheffield 
Hallam University, is conducting a related survey (not sponsored by BMA) aimed at 
identifying enablers of and barriers to effective decision-making process in the CCGs. 
You can participate in this survey either by responding to the invitations from 









********END OF PROPOSED MESSAGE********  
Please note that I have tried to talk to BMJ as suggested in your reply. BMJ has advised 
me that BMA is the best platform to get my survey published as BMJ does not deal 
with requests of this kind.  
I look forward to your favourable response. I am open to any improvements or 
suggestions on my proposal.  
Kind regards,  
Mpumelelo   
 
On 17 May 2017 at 11:01, info.public <info.public@bma.org.uk> wrote: 
Dear Mpumelelo  
Thank you for contacting the BMA.  
Whilst the BMA is not in a position to contact individual doctors, you wish to contact 
the British Medical Journal (BMJ), as they may have the facility to advertise your 
survey in their various editions.  
I have provided their contact details below:  




WC1H 9JR  
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Telephone: 0207 387 4410  
I hope you find this information useful.  
Kind regards  
Public information adviser 
British Medical Association  
T: 0207 387 4499  | E: info.public@bma.org.uk 
 
From: MPUMELELO SIBANDA [mailto:Xxxx@xxxx.shu.ac.uk]  
Sent: 16 May 2017 21:58 
To: info.public 
Subject: Request for a Media Release on BMA Newsletter  
Dear Sir/Madam,  
Re: Request for a Media Release on BMA Newsletter  
I am writing this email to request a media release on BMA Newsletter of a survey that I 
am undertaking on all the CCGs across England. This survey is largely informed by a 
study that BMA conducted in June 2014 on CCGs, a study which influenced the choice 
of my research topic. In that study, BMA discovered among other things, that “almost 
three out of ten GPs believe their local CCG has introduced policies that have adversely 
affected their ability to care for patients” [1]. It was also discovered that two thirds of 
participants (GPs) felt that they had no influence on CCGs’ “policies and strategy”, with 
50% expressing that they felt powerless “to challenge the decision made by their CCG 
board” [2]. Considering this, my research is designed to gather the thoughts and 
perspectives of GPs about decision-making processes in their local CCGs with the aim 
of identifying enablers of and barriers to effective decision-making process.  
Given the membership base of the BMA, I believe that the BMA Newsletter is a great 
platform to promote my study, which I feel will not only enthuse the GPs, but will also 
possibly yield valuable discoveries which will be helpful to the CCGs.  
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Please note that I am not a BMA member and neither am I a medical doctor. Instead, I 
am a doctoral student at the Sheffield Business School, Sheffield Hallam University. I 
work for the NHS.  
Looking forward to hearing a favourable response from you.  
Kind regards,  
Mpumelelo Sibanda 
(Student: Doctor of Business Administration Degree)  
[1] BRITISH MEDICAL ASSOCIATION (2014a). Clinical Commissioning Groups are failing 
to involve GPs and deliver improvements to care, warns new BMA survey. [Online]. Last 
accessed 15 May 2017 
at http://web2.bma.org.uk/mediarel.nsf/wall/DF0B0AD33416572980257D0000597E72
?OpenDocument  
[2] BRITISH MEDICAL ASSOCIATION (2014b). General Practitioners Committee. [Online]. 









Appendix 2 Communications with CCGs 
Appendix 2.1 Freedom of Information Act 2000 – Information 







Xxxx@xxxx.shu.ac.uk (University Email) 
 
Dear NHS Bristol CCG 
 
Re: Freedom of Information Act 2000 – Information Request 
 
My name is Mpumelelo Sibanda and I am a student at Sheffield Hallam University 
studying for a Doctor of Business Administration (DBA) Degree. I am writing you under 
the Freedom of Information Act 2000 to ask for the following information about GPs at 
your local CCG, NHS Bristol CCG. 
1. Name of the GP 
2. Business email address of the GP 
Please note that I am not looking for information about GPs from individual GP 
Practices in your local district as NHS England is responsible for them. Instead, I only 
need information about GPs who are directly involved in different decision-making 
routines, like Governing Body for example, at your local CCG (NHS Bristol CCG). The 
purpose of collecting this information is for a study that I am planning to conduct in 
which I will invite GPs from various CCGs across England to take part in the study in 
question. 
 
I understand that under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 I am entitled to a 
response within 20 working days of your receipt of this request. I would prefer to 
receive the information electronically. If you require any clarification, I expect you to 
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contact me under your section 16 duty to provide advice and assistance if you find any 
aspect of this FOI request problematic. 
  








Appendix 2.2 FOI Request – CCG Details as in December 2016 
















 ccg@shropshireccg.nhs.uk  Shropshire Clinical Commissioning Group 
William Farr House 
Mytton Oak Road 





 d-ccg.corporateservices@nhs.net  NHS Northern, Eastern and Western Devon Clinical 
Commissioning Group  
Newcourt House 
Newcourt Drive 















 enquiries@newhamccg.nhs.uk NHS Newham Clinical Commissioning Group  
4th Floor,  
Unex Tower,  
5 Station Street,  



















 infobsc@nhs.net  NHS Birmingham South Central CCG 
Bartholomew House 













North & East 
CCG 
 ngccg.enquiries@nhs.net NHS Newcastle MyCity Clinical Commissioning Group 
Goldcrest Way 
Newburn Riverside (Business Park) 





 ngccg.enquiries@nhs.net NHS Newcastle MyCity Clinical Commissioning Group 
Goldcrest Way 
Newburn Riverside (Business Park) 





ask@northkirkleesccg.nhs.uk NHS North Kirklees CCG, Broad Lea House/Dyson 











and Ascot CCG 
BACCG.BACCGenquiries@nhs.net Bracknell and Ascot Clinical Commissioning 
Group King Edward VII Hospital 

















bbccg.contact@nhs.net NHS Basildon and Brentwood CCG, Phoenix House, 





bdccg@barkingdagenhamccg.nhs.uk  NHS Barking and Dagenham CCG, Barking Hospital, 




bexccg.contactus@nhs.net NHS Bexley CCG, 2 Watling St, Bexley Heath, DA7 6AT Yes Yes 
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bhamcrosscity@nhs.net NHS Birmingham Crosscity CCG, 142 Hagley Rd, 
Birmingham, B16 9PA 
Yes Yes 
NHS Brighton 
and Hove CCG 
bhccg.ccg@nhs.net NHS Brighton and Hove CCG, Hove Town Hall, Norton 
Rd, Hove, BN3 4AH 
Yes No 
NHS Brent CCG BRECCG.Brentenquiries@nhs.net Brent CCG 
Wembley Centre for Health and Care 






broccg.contactus@nhs.net NHS Bromley Clinical Commissioning Group 
 
1st Floor Beckenham Beacon 
 














NHS Bath and 
North East 
Somerset CCG 
BSCCG.information@nhs.net NHS Bath and North East Somerset CCG, St. Martins 
Hospital 









c4.ccg@nhs.net  Canterbury and Coastal Clinical Commissioning Group  
NHS Canterbury and Coastal CCG  
Ground floor  





NHS City and 
Hackney CCG 
CAHCCG.cityandhackneyccg@nhs.net NHS City & Hackney Clinical Commissioning Group 3rd 












cannockccg.feedback@northstaffs.nhs.uk Cannock Chase Clinical Commissioning Group 

















CCCG.Contactus-crawleyccg@nhs.net NHS Crawley CCG, Lower Ground Floor Crawley 















NHS Isle of 
Wight CCG 
ccg@iow.nhs.uk  Isle of Wight Clinical Commissioning Group (CCG) 
Building A 
The APEX 
St. Cross Business Park 
Newport 





chilternccg@nhs.net NHS Chiltern CCG 
Ground Floor 
Chiltern District Council Offices 









clccg@nhs.net  NHS Central London (Westminster) CCG,  Ferguson 













commsleedswestccg@nhs.net NHS Leeds West CCG, B5-B9, Wira House, Wira 
Business Park, Ring Rd, Leeds LS16 6EB 
Yes No 
NHS St Helens 
CCG 
Communications.ccg@sthelensccg.nhs.uk
   
NHS St Helens CCG, St Helens Chamber, Salisbury St, 




communications.wiltshireccg@nhs.net NHS Wiltshire CCG, Southgate House, Pans Lane, 




communications@doncasterccg.nhs.uk NHS Doncaster CCG, Sovereign House/White Rose 




communications@kingstonccg.nhs.uk NHS Kingston CCG, Guildhall 1, High Street, Kingston 




communications@sefton.nhs.uk  NHS South Sefton CCG, Merton House, Stanley Rd, 











& Formby CCG 
communications@sefton.nhs.uk  NHS Southport & Formby CCG, 5 Curzon Rd, 




contact.wnccg@nhs.net NHS West Norfolk CCG, Kings Court, Chapel Street, 




contact@dudleyccg.nhs.uk  NHS Dudley CCG, Brierley Hill Health And Social Care 





contactus.coastal@nhs.net NHS Coastal West Sussex CCG, The Causeway, 




contactus.surreydownsccg@nhs.net  NHS Surrey Downs CCG, Cedar Court, 36 Guildford Rd, 




contactus@bristolccg.nhs.uk Bristol CCG, South Plaza, Marlborough Street, Bristol, 













and Rugby CCG 








NHS Greater Huddersfield Clinical Commissioning 
Group 
Bradley Business Park 










contactus@northtynesideccg.nhs.uk  NHS North Tyneside Clinical Commissioning Group 
12 Hedley Court 

















South Gloucestershire CCG, Corum 2, Corum Office 















contactus2@nwsurreyccg.nhs.uk  North West Surrey CCG 








cpr.ccg@nhs.net  NHS Castle Point and Rochford CCG, Pearl House 
12 Castle Road 
Rayleigh 













customer.care@lancashirecsu.nhs.uk NHS Blackburn with Darwen CCG, Fusion House, 




customer.care@lancashirecsu.nhs.uk NHS East Lancashire CCG, Walshaw House, Regent St, 




DARCCG.contact@nhs.net Darlington Clinical Commissioning Group 









ddesccg.enquiries@nhs.net NHS Durham Dales, Easington & Sedgefield CCG, 
Sedgefield Community Hospital, Salters Lane, 














dgs.ccg@nhs.net  NHS Dartford, Gravesham and Swanley Clinical 
Commissioning Group 
2nd Floor, Gravesham Civic Centre 
Windmill Street 
Gravesend 




ecccg.generalenquiries@nhs.net    NHS Eastern Cheshire CCG, 1st Floor, West Wing 










EHSCCG.enquiries@nhs.net NHS Eastbourne, Hailsham and Seaford Clinical 
Commissioning Group  
36-38 Friars Walk 
Lewes 













enquiries.hardwickccg@nhs.net NHS Hardwick CCG 
Scarsdale Hospital 
Nightingale Close 






enquiries.hvccg@nhs.net Herts Valleys Clinical Commissioning Group 
Hemel One,  
Boundary Way, 
Hemel Hempstead, 




enquiries.wcheshireccg@nhs.net West Cheshire Clinical Commissioning Group 
1829 Building, 

























enquiries@camdenccg.nhs.uk NHS Camden Clinical Commissioning Group  
Stephenson House 
75 Hampstead Road, London 
NW1 2PL  
Yes Yes 
NHS Chorley & 
South Ribble 
CCG 
enquiries@chorleysouthribbleccg.nhs.uk Chorley and South Ribble Clinical Commissioning 
Group 
Chorley House 
















enquiries@cumbriaccg.nhs.uk  NHS Cumbria CCG, Lonsdale Unit, Penrith Hospital, 




enquiries@erewashccg.nhs.uk Erewash Clinical Commissioning Group 
Toll Bar House 





NHS Fylde & 
Wyre CCG 
enquiries@fyldeandwyreccg.nhs.uk NHS Fylde and Wyre CCG Derby Road Wesham 




enquiries@greaterprestonccg.nhs.uk Greater Preston Clinical Commissioning Group 
Chorley House 
















enquiries@liverpoolccg.nhs.uk NHS Liverpool Clinical Commissioning Group 
The Department 






enquiries@northsomersetccg.nhs.uk North Somerset CCG, Post Point 11, Clevedon, North 





enquiries@portsmouthccg.nhs.uk NHS Portsmouth CCG, CCG headquarters 
4th Floor 





























enquiries@swindonccg.nhs.uk NHS Swindon CCG, The Pierre Simonet Building 
North Swindon Gateway 








enquiries@telfordccg.nhs.uk  Telford and Wrekin CCG 
























ERYCCG.ContactUs@nhs.net East Riding of Yorkshire Clinical Commissioning Group 
Health House 








feedback@staffordshirecss.nhs.uk NHS East Staffordshire CCG, Edwin House,  




NHS Stoke on 
Trent CCG 




fgccg.enquiries@nhs.net Fareham and Gosport CCG 
CommCen Building 
Fort Southwick 























getinvolved@westsuffolkccg.nhs.uk  West Suffolk Clinical Commissioning Group 
West Suffolk House 
Western Way 







GLCCG.enquiries@nhs.net  Gloucestershire CCG 
Sanger House 
5220 Valiant Court 















GRECCG.NHSGreenwichCCG@nhs.net NHS Greenwich Clinical Commissioning Group 
The Woolwich Centre  
35, Wellington Street 





gywccg.your-views-matter@nhs.net NHS Great Yarmouth and Waveney CCG, HealthEast 
Beccles House 






& Rural District 
CCG 
hardccg.enquiries@nhs.net Harrogate and Rural District Clinical Commissioning 
Group 
1 Grimbald Crag Court 














hccg@haveringccg.nhs.uk Havering Clinical Commissioning Group  
3rd Floor, Imperial Offices, 
2-4 Eastern Road,  
Romford  
Essex  






hf.ccg@inwl.nhs.uk NHS Hammersmith and Fulham CCG, 15 Marylebone 























& Whitby CCG 
HRWCCG.HRWCCGenquiries@nhs.net NHS Hambleton, Richmondshire & Whitby CCG,  Civic 








Horsham and Mid Sussex CCG 
Lower Ground Floor 
Crawley Hospital 









NHS Hartlepool and Stockton-on-Tees Clinical 
Commissioning Group 













NHS Hull CCG HULLCCG.contactus@nhs.net NHS Hull Clinical Commissioning Group 
2nd Floor 
Wilberforce Court 
Alfred Gelder Street 





HWCCG.HWLHCCGenquiries@nhs.net NHS High Weald Lewes Havens CCG 







info@haringeyccg.nhs.uk NHS Haringey CCG, Haringey CCG 
River Park House 
225 High Road 
Wood Green  













info@southamptoncityccg.nhs.uk NHS Southampton City Clinical Commissioning Group 








info@towerhamletsccg.nhs.uk NHS Tower Hamlets Clinical Commissioning Group 
2nd Floor Alderney Building 
Mile End Hospital 
Bancroft Road 





info@westhampshireccg.nhs.uk Omega House 


















NHS Nene CCG involvement.nene@nhs.net NHS Nene Clinical Commissioning Group 













kccg.contactus@nhs.net NHS Kernow Clinical Commissioning Group 






NHS Knowsley CCG, Nutgrove Villa, Westmorland Rd, 




leedsnorthccg@nhs.net NHS Leeds North CCG 
Leafield House 
107-109 King Lane 











South & East 
CCG 
leedssouthandeastccg@nhs.net NHS Leeds South & East CCG 
3200 Century Way 
Thorpe Park 












mail@rushcliffeccg.nhs.uk NHS Rushcliffe CCG 
Easthorpe House 













































nduccg.northdurhamccg@nhs.net  North Durham Clinical Commissioning Group 













NHS North East 
Essex CCG 
neeccg.enquiries@nhs.net  NHS North East Essex CCG, Turner Rd, Mile End, 
Colchester CO4 5JR 
Yes No 
NHS North East 
Hampshire and 
Farnham CCG 
NEHCCG.public@nhs.net NHS North East Hampshire & Farnham CCG 





NHS North East 
Lincolnshire 
CCG 
nelccg.askus@nhs.net NHS North East Lincolnshire CCG, Olympia House 1-2 




ngccg.enquiries@nhs.net NHS Newcastle MyCity Clinical Commissioning Group 
Goldcrest Way 
Newburn Riverside (Business Park) 














nhccg.enquiries@nhs.net North Hampshire Clinical Commissioning Group 
Central 40 
Lime Tree Way 












CW5 5RD  
Yes Yes 
NHS Vale Royal 
CCG 




























ipswichandeastsuffolk.ccg@nhs.net Ipswich & East Suffolk Clinical Commissioning Group 
Rushbrook House 























foi.gmcsu@nhs.net NHS Central Manchester CCG, Parkway 3, Parkway 





None NHS Heywood, Middleton & Rochdale CCG, 3rd Floor 






foi.gmcsu@nhs.net NHS Central Manchester CCG, Parkway 3, Parkway 





foi.gmcsu@nhs.net NHS Central Manchester CCG, Parkway 3, Parkway 





foi.gmcsu@nhs.net NHS Central Manchester CCG, Parkway 3, Parkway 





















public@wiganboroughccg.nhs.uk NHS, Wigan Borough CCG 












































None NHS Bradford Districts CCG, Douglas Mill 






None NHS Bradford City CCG, Douglas Mill 






None NHS Wakefield CCG, White Rose House, W Parade, 













None NHS South Devon and Torbay CCG, Pomona House, 




SCWCSU.FOI@nhs.net NHS East Surrey CCG 
Tandridge District Council Offices  






avccg.foiccg@nhs.net NHS Aylesbury Vale CCG, Second Floor, The Gateway, 


















foi-requests@dorsetccg.nhs.uk Dorset Clinical Commissioning Group 
Canford House 
Discovery Court Business Centre 
551-553 Wallisdown Road 
Poole 







Herefordshire Clinical Commissioning Group 
St Owen’s Chambers 













foi.north@ardengemcsu.nhs.uk NHS North Derbyshire CCG, CCG Headquarters 
Nightingale Close 






















NNCCG.FOI@nhs.net  NHS North Norfolk CCG 






Snccg.foi@nhs.net NHS South Norfolk CCG, Lakeside 400 
Old Chapel Way 
Broadland Business Park 





NHS Mid Essex 
CCG 
foi.meccg@nhs.net NHS Mid Essex CCG, Wren House 














NHS Corby CCG Foi.corbyccg@nhs.net NHS Corby Clinical Commissioning Group 









FOILEAD@enhertsccg.nhs.uk NHS East and North Hertfordshire CCG, Charter 





optumcss.leccgfoi@nhs.net  NHS Lincolnshire East Clinical Commissioning Group 

















None East Leicestershire and Rutland CCG 
Leicestershire County Council 
Room G30, Penn Lloyd Building 
County Hall, Glenfield 




None NHS Leicester City CCG, St Johns House, 30 East St, 
























NHS North Staffordshire CCG, One Smithfield Building 







FOI@barnetCCG.nhs.uk  NHS Barnet CCG, 4 North London Business Park, 




secsu.foi@nhs.net  NHS Croydon Clinical Commissioning Group 
 Bernard Weatherill House 
2nd Floor 
Zone G 
8 Mint Walk 
Croydon CR0 1EA 
No No 
NHS Ealing CCG ccgfoi@nw.london.nhs.uk  NHS Ealing CCG, 3rd Floor, Perceval House, 14/16 












ccgfoi@nw.london.nhs.uk  NHS Harrow CCG, 4th Floor 
The Heights 
59-65 Lowlands Road 





ccgfoi@nw.london.nhs.uk  NHS Hillingdon CCG,  Boundary House, Cricket Field 









ccgfoi@nw.london.nhs.uk  NHS West London CCG 























norwich.ccg@nhs.net NHS Norwich CCG, Room 202 
City Hall 


















office@southlincolnshireCCG.nhs.uk NHS South Lincolnshire CCG 
Eventus 
Sunderland Road 

















office@southwestlincolnshireccg.nhs.uk  South West Lincolnshire Clinical Commissioning Group 
South Kesteven District Council Offices,  







oxon.gpc@nhs.net Oxfordshire Clinical Commissioning Group 
Jubilee House, John Smith Drive, 
Oxford Business Park South, 




patient.enquiries@enfieldccg.nhs.uk NHS Enfield CCG, 116 Cockfosters Rd, Barnet EN4 0DR Yes Yes 
NHS Oldham 
CCG 

















paul.davey3@nhs.net  NHS Guildford and Waverley CCG, 3rd Floor, 





North and East 
CCG 
pet@nottinghamnortheastccg.nhs.uk  South Nottinghamshire CCGs 
Civic Centre 








queries.warringtonccg@nhs.net NHS Warrington CCG, Headquarters, Arpley House, 















rbccg@nhs.net   NHS Redditch and Bromsgrove Clinical Commissioning 
Group  
Barnsley Court, Barnsley Hall Road, Bromsgrove 
Worcestershire 
B61 0TX  
Yes No 
NHS North & 
West Reading 
CCG 
RCCG.NandWReadingCCG@nhs.net NHS North and West Reading CCG  
57-59 Bath Road Reading 




rccg@redbridgeccg.nhs.uk NHS Redbridge CCG, Becketts House 
2-14 Ilford Hill 
Ilford  




ricccg.richmondpals@nhs.net Richmond CCG 
First Floor 
Civic Centre  




















South Yorkshire S66 1YY 
Yes No 




NHS Newark & Sherwood CCG, Lowfield Ln, Balderton, 










SCRCCG.enquiries@nhs.net NHS Scarborough and Ryedale Clinical Commissioning 
Group 
Scarborough Town Hall - York House 
















sehccg.enquiries@nhs.net  South Eastern Hampshire CCG 
CommCen Building 
Fort Southwick 









sessp.ccg@nhs.net  South East Staffordshire Locality Office  
Second Floor 
Marmion House  







SHCCG.ContactUs@nhs.net NHS Surrey Heath CCG, Surrey Heath House, Knoll Rd, 




sheCCG.sheffieldCCG@nhs.net NHS Sheffield CCG 
722 Prince of Wales Road 












SLOCCG.Info@nhs.net NHS Slough CCG, King Edward VII Hospital, St 




solihull.ccg@nhs.net Solihull CCG  
Friars Gate 







souccg.southwark-ccg@nhs.net NHS Southwark CCG  






southend.ccg@nhs.net  NHS Southend CCG, Harcourt House  
5-15 Harcourt Avenue  












Kent Coast CCG 
southkentcoast.ccg@nhs.net South Kent Coast Clinical Commissioning Group  
Council Offices  
White Cliffs Business Park  
Whitfield   










staffordccg.feedback@northstaffs.nhs.uk Stafford and Surrounds Clinical Commissioning Group 














STCCG.enquiries@nhs.net NHS South Tees Clinical Commissioning Group 
North Ormesby Health Village 
First Floor 







stynccg.enquiries@nhs.net NHS South Tyneside CCG, Monkton Hall, Monkton 







NHS Swale CCG swale.ccg@nhs.net NHS Swale CCG, Bramblefield Clinic, Grovehurst Road, 














swbccg.time2talk@nhs.net Sandwell and West Birmingham CCG 
Kingston House 







swccg@worcestershire.nhs.uk  NHS South Worcestershire CCG, The Coach House, 




talk2us@haltonccg.nhs.uk NHS Halton CCG, First Floor Town Hall, Heath Road, 
Runcorn WA7 5TD 
Yes Yes 
NHS Tameside 






thn@thanetccg.info  Thanet Clinical Commissioning Group 
Thanet District Council 
Cecil Street 
Margate 












thurrock.ccg@nhs.net  NHS Thurrock CCG, Civic Offices 
2nd Floor 
New Road 




TRCCG.Mail@nhs.net NHS Trafford CCG, Crossgate House, Cross St, Sale 
M33 7FT 
Yes Yes 
NHS Vale of 
York CCG 










WAMCCG.Info@nhs.net NHS Windsor, Ascot and Maidenhead CCG, King 
Edward VII Hospital, 
St Leonard’s Road, 
Windsor, 















Wandsworth CCG are based at: 

















weccg.comms@nhs.net  NHS West Essex CCG, Building 4, Spencer Close, St 











NHS West Kent 
CCG 
westkent.ccg@nhs.net NHS West Kent Clinical Commissioning Group 
Wharf House 







wfccg.enquiries@nhs.net NHS Waltham Forest Clinical Commissioning Group 
Kirkdale House 





WICCG.InTouch@nhs.net NHS Wirral CCG, 13 Hamilton St, Birkenhead CH41 5AL Yes No 
347 
 









wolccg.wccg@nhs.net Wolverhampton Clinical Commissioning Group 
Technology Centre 







WYRECCG.wfccg@nhs.net  NHS Wyre Forest CCG, Kidderminster Health Centre, 






Appendix 2.3 Invitation to take part in pilot study: 10 & 14 April 
2017 
Dear Dr FirstName Surname, 
Re: Invitation to participate in a pilot study on decision-making practices in CCGs  
The Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) were intended to “devolve power to the 
clinicians such as GPs, consultants, and nurses, so that they could directly run 
healthcare services at the local level, thereby enabling them to improve patient care 
and increase accountability”. In June 2014, barely a year after the official launch of 
CCGs, a study conducted by the BMA found that “almost three out of ten GPs believe 
their local CCG has introduced policies that have adversely affected their ability to care 
for patients” [1]. Two thirds of GPs who participated in the survey felt that they had no 
influence on CCGs’ “policies and strategy” [2]. What is more, 50% of the participants 
“felt that they were not able to challenge the decision made by their CCG board” [2]. 
Further studies published in the British Medical Journal [3] discovered that CCGs’ 
internal structures are too complex to understand, a phenomenon which stifles the 
ability to prudently judge “the factors affecting the success and impact of CCGs” [3]. 
I am using a doctoral research project to try and understand the CCGs on their 
structure and decision-making. This will be realised through a survey of the clinicians 
involved with CCGs. Before sending out the survey to the entire population targeted 
for the study, I have decided to first conduct a pilot test to ascertain the validity of the 
survey. I am therefore asking if you can kindly review my survey questionnaire which is 
on Google Forms and can be accessed through this 
link, https://goo.gl/forms/djJnmpBAOLSwkCko1.  
How will this survey benefit the CCGs? 
It is projected that this survey will facilitate in identifying, amongst other things, 
the enablers of and barriers to effective decision-making process within the CCGs. The 




What is the next step? 
Please complete the pilot questionnaire on the link given above and then kindly 
provide the following feedback to me in reply to this email.  
1. How long did it take you to go through the questions? 
2. Were all the instructions and questions clear? 
3. Are there any questions which were inappropriate? 
4. Are there any critical issues about the subject under investigation that you 
feel should have been asked? 
5. What do you think about the layout of the questionnaire? 
Once I have received comments from the clinicians nominated for the pilot study 
(which you are part of), I will implement the feedback accordingly. After that, I will 
send the survey out to all the CCGs across England. 
I am acutely aware of the time constraints that you may be under. I would really 
appreciate your input in making this pilot study a success by responding to my request 
at your earliest convenient time, possibly within the next two weeks. 
If you have any questions please do not hesitate to contact me. 
Kind regards,  
Mpumelelo Sibanda 
(Student: Doctor of Business Administration Degree – Sheffield Hallam University) 
[1] BRITISH MEDICAL ASSOCIATION (2014a). Clinical Commissioning Groups are failing 
to involve GPs and deliver improvements to care, warns new BMA survey. [Online]. Last 





[2] BRITISH MEDICAL ASSOCIATION (2014b). General Practitioners Committee. [Online]. 
Last accessed 04 April 2017 at http://bma.org.uk/working-for-change/negotiating-for-
the-profession/bma-general-practitioners-committee/surveys/ccgs-one-year-on 
[3] CHECKLAND, K., COLEMAN, A., PERKINS, N. and MCDERMOTT, I. (2016). Complexity 




Appendix 2.4 Invitation to pilot study reminder: 24 April 2017 
 
Dear Dr FirstName Surname, 
Just over a week ago you may have received an email requesting you to participate in a 
pilot study of a survey designed to investigate the Clinical Commissioning Groups’ 
decision-making practices. In that email, I mentioned about how previous research has 
revealed the frustration that GP Practices have about the policies that CCGs make. I 
also mentioned about how previous research has discovered the complexity entailed 
within the structures of CCGs. Due to these reasons, I have decided to use a doctoral 
research project to try and understand the CCGs on their structure and decision-
making. The research is targeted on all CCGs across England. Before sending it out, I 
have decided to conduct a pilot study to ascertain its validity, hence the invitation that 
I made to you. I have noticed that you have not yet responded. I’m asking if you can 
spare just a few minutes filling out the survey. I appreciate the level of busyness and 
competing priorities that you may be faced with as a clinician.  
The survey questionnaire is on Google Forms, a trusted and secure platform, and can 





At the end of the questionnaire there is a feedback section. Could you please kindly fill 
it out as well.  
If you have any questions please do not hesitate to contact me.  
I look forward to your goodwill in participating in this pilot study. Please send your 
response by the end of April. 
Kind regards, 
Mpumelelo 





Appendix 2.5 Replies collection to pilot study ‘entreaty’ email  
 
EMAIL 1: 
On 3 May 2017 at 23:07, XXXX, xxxx (NHS SUNDERLAND 
CCG) <xxxx@nhs.net> wrote: 
 
Hi so sorry for the late reply- 
I did receive the invite for the questionnaire but due to a huge workload I didn’t get 
around to responding - I work a day a week for the CCG only and am a practising GP 
for 3 days a week as a GP partner. I hold some strategic responsibility for urgent and 
ambulatory care for Sunderland so a large remit and limited time. If you wanted to 
resend the questionnaire I could try to find some time to look at it. Sorry again for 
the late reply to your request.  
Best wishes Tracey 
Dr xxxx xxxx 





On 3 May 2017 at 22:43, XXXX, xxxx (TUDOR PRACTICE) <xxxx@nhs.net> wrote: 
 
Dear Mpumelelo, 
To confirm I did receive your email. I do receive many unsolicited emails in my CCG 
role. I am terribly sorry but I just do not have the time to answer all. Time 
constraints and prioritising work are the main issues. 
Best wishes 
xxxx 
Dr xxxx xxxx  
Tudor Practice 
Ashfurlong Medical Centre 








On 3 May 2017 at 23:54, XXXX, xxxx (NHS NORTH TYNESIDE 
CCG) <xxxx.xxxx@nhs.net> wrote: 
 






On 4 May 2017 at 07:17, XXXX, xxxx (HANDSWORTH WOOD 




Thanks for your email  
1. Yes  
2. Time constraints  
And the email link you sent doesn’t work  
Best wishes,  
Prof xxxx xxxx XXXX 
FRCGP FRCP HonMFPH DRCOG DOccMed PGDIP(Cardiology) 






On 4 May 2017 at 08:09, XXXX, xxxx (OAKHAM 
SURGERY) <xxxx.xxxx@nhs.net> wrote: 
 
I am unable to remember if I received the original e-mail. 
I try to respond-however if I did not, it would be pressure of time, and I get a lot of 




On 5 May 2017 at 13:11, XXXX, xxxx (MINCHINHAMPTON 
SURGERY) <xxxx.xxxx@nhs.net> wrote: 
 





On 6 May 2017 at 12:48, XXXX, xxxx (NHS GLOUCESTERSHIRE 
CCG) <xxxx.xxxx@nhs.net> wrote: 
 
Hi - I have now responded! I would not have done due to pressure of work - over 
100 emails every day to manage! 








Appendix 2.6 Hard copy letter announcing forthcoming 
electronic based survey: 22 May 2017 
 
Dear Dr FirstName Surname, 
I’m writing this letter to inform you about a survey that I will be conducting from the 
beginning of June 2017 across all CCGs in England. My name is Mpumelelo Sibanda, a 
Final Year doctoral student in Business Administration at Sheffield Business School, 
Sheffield Hallam University (SHU).  
The reason for contacting you using the traditional hard copy letter is because of the 
recent developments in cyber space in which there has been a widespread 
WannaCrypt Ransomware attack on IT systems across the world. My survey is 
electronic based, and therefore you will shortly receive an email invitation to 
participate in that survey. To allay uncertainty because of unexpected email 
communication from me, I have decided to send this letter beforehand as a 
precautionary measure so that when you receive my email you will be already aware 
of its legitimacy. The email that I will send will clearly show the sender’s name as 
“Mpumelelo Sibanda”, and it will be from a Sheffield Hallam University (SHU) email 
domain. That email will introduce the study and give a Sheffield Hallam University 
recognised weblink to the survey questionnaire.  
Regarding the survey, I think for now it suffices to say this survey is designed to gather 
the thoughts and perspectives of clinicians about decision-making processes in their 
local CCGs with the aim of identifying enablers of and barriers to effective decision-
making process.   
Thank you for taking time to read this letter. If you have any questions please do not 
hesitate to contact me through my Director of Studies, Dr Richard Breese on the 
following address. 
Mpumelelo Sibanda 
C/O Dr Richard Breese (Senior Lecturer) 
Stoddart Building  
356 
 
City Campus  
Sheffield Business School  
Sheffield Hallam University  
Sheffield  
S1 1WB 
Xxxx@xxxx.shu.ac.uk (my email address) 
Xxxx@shu.ac.uk (Supervisor’s email address) 
I am looking forward to your full support in this study which I believe will yield 
fascinating results to support CCGs. 
Kind regards, 
Mpumelelo Sibanda 





Appendix 2.7 Stockton CCG complaint email: 23 May 2017 
 
On 23 May 2017 at 14:44, XXXX, xxxx (NHS STOCKPORT 
CCG) <xxxx.xxxx@nhs.net> wrote: 
Dear Mpumelelo,  
We have today received a large number of letters from you to us here at the NHS 
Stockport Clinical Commissioning Group at Regent House, Stockport.  
The letters are all individually named for Doctors who do not reside at this address. 
We are trying to help by re-directing the mail to the individual GP addresses but would 
appreciate in future that correspondence like this is not sent in bulk to us at the NHS 




Kind Regards,  
xxxx 
xxxx xxxx 
Receptionist / Customer Services 
NHS Stockport Clinical Commissioning Group 
Tel: 0161 426 5046 





Appendix 2.8 Email seeking confirmation from DoS if my study is 
legitimate: 24 May 2017 
 
From: XXXX, xxxx (NHS NORTHUMBERLAND CCG) [xxxx.xxxx@nhs.net] 
Sent: 24 May 2017 08:57 
To: xxxx@shu.ac.uk 
Subject: Mpumelelo Sibanda 
Hi, 
We have received a letter from Mpumelelo Sibanda asking my clinical directors to 
participate in a survey on decision making in the NHS. I have to say it is full credit to 
Mpumelelo that he has recognised the recent cyber-attack and is warning the directors 
to except an email from him with the title etc. I am just checking that the excellent 
letter is legitimate and then I can encourage the clinicians to participate in the 







Head of Commissioning (Planned Care) 
NHS Northumberland Clinical Commissioning Group 
County Hall, Morpeth. NE61 2EF 
Tel: 01670 335162      
Email: xxxx.xxxx@nhs.net  
Website:  www.northumberlandccg.nhs.uk 
 
 
Appendix 2.9 Good idea to introduce yourself: 27 June 2017 
 
On 27 June 2017 at 19:02, XXXX, xxxx (NHS SHEFFIELD 
CCG) <xxxx.xxxx@nhs.net> wrote: 
Thank you Mpumelelo 
This was a good idea to introduce yourself prior to sending the survey request. 
I have just completed the survey and wish you well with your research. 
Dr xxxx xxxx  
Clinical Director – Children, Young People and Maternity Portfolio 
NHS Sheffield CCG 











Appendix 2.10 Happy to take part in the survey: 25 May 
2017  
 
On 25 May 2017 at 12:29, XXXX, xxxx (UNIVERSITY HEALTH SERVICE HEALTH 
CENTRE) <xxxx.xxxx@nhs.net> wrote: 
Dear Mpumelelo 




Dr xxxx xxxx 
Cambridgeshire &Peterborough CCG  
GP Clinical Lead (Planned Care & Demand Management) 
GP Board Member of Clinical Executive, Governing Body and Cambridge Health & 
Wellbeing Board. 





Appendix 2.11 CCG refusal to take part in survey  
 
On 23 May 2017 at 10:52, XXXX, xxxx (NHS HIGH WEALD LEWES HAVENS 
CCG) <xxxx.xxxx@nhs.net> wrote: 
Dear Mpumelelo  
Thank you for your letter which we received this morning addressed to various 
members of our Governing Body regarding your forthcoming survey.  I have however 
been asked to advise that we as a CCG do not wish to take part on this occasion.  
We would therefore request that you do not email your survey to those you addressed 
the letter to.  
We wish you well with your research.  
Kind regards  
xxxx 
xxxx xxxx 
PA to Chair, Chief Officer & Chief Finance Officer 
High Weald Lewes Havens Clinical Commissioning Group 
36-38 Friars Walk, Lewes, East Sussex, BN7 2PB  




Appendix 2.12 Invitation to take part in survey: 04 June 
2017 
 
Dear Dr xxxx xxxx, 
Re: A survey of decision making in CCGs 
I am writing you this email further to a hard copy letter that I sent to you on the week 
commencing 21/05/2017, which I believe you have received by now. In that letter, I 
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mentioned that I was going to contact you by email regarding a survey that I am 
conducting on CCGs designed to identify enablers of and barriers to effective decision-
making. As such, I am kindly inviting you to participate in this survey which will take 
about 10minutes of your time to complete.  
Find below is a brief background to this study along with a link to the questionnaire. 
CCGs were designed to be at the heart of world class standards for healthcare delivery, 
as per Government’s propositions drawn in 2012 [1]. However, the question is – how 
have the CCGs fared to date? 
A study that BMA conducted in June 2014 discovered among other things that “almost 
three out of ten GPs believe their local CCG has introduced policies that have adversely 
affected their ability to care for patients” [2]. Two thirds of GPs who participated in that 
study felt that they had no influence on CCGs’ “policies and strategy”, with 50% of the 
participants expressing that they felt powerless “to challenge the decision made by 
their CCG board” [3]. Further studies published in the British Medical Journal [4] 
discovered that CCGs’ internal structures are too complex to understand, a 
phenomenon which stifles the ability to judiciously judge “the factors affecting the 
success and impact of CCGs” [4]. 
I am using a doctoral research project to try to better understand the CCGs’ current 
structure and decision making. The survey questionnaire which has been tested with 
GPs can be accessed through this secure 
link:  https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLScGW7SiSFivG-
4tOaFsd0P6VgCqEfY2RAf302DQOw35AxPE_Q/viewform?usp=sf_link. 
Your responses will be completely anonymous and analysed in combination with 
responses from other CCGs’ representatives across England. 
If you have any questions please do not hesitate to contact me. 
Would you please be so kind as to acknowledge receipt of this mail.  





(Student: Doctor of Business Administration Degree) 
[1] NHS COMMISSIONING BOARD (2012). Clinical commissioning group governing body 
members: Roles outlines, attributes and skills. [Online]. Last accessed 01 June 2017 at 
https://www.england.nhs.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/ccg-members-roles.pdf 
[2] BRITISH MEDICAL ASSOCIATION (2014a). Clinical Commissioning Groups are failing 
to involve GPs and deliver improvements to care, warns new BMA survey. [online]. Last 
accessed 15 May 2017 at 
http://web2.bma.org.uk/pressrel.nsf/wall/DF0B0AD33416572980257D0000597E72?O
penDocument  
[3] BRITISH MEDICAL ASSOCIATION (2014b). General Practitioners Committee. [online]. 
Last accessed 15 May 2017 at http://bma.org.uk/working-for-change/negotiating-for-
the-profession/bma-general-practitioners-committee/surveys/ccgs-one-year-on  
[4] CHECKLAND, K., COLEMAN, A., PERKINS, N. and MCDERMOTT, I. (2016). Complexity 
in the new NHS: longitudinal case studies of CCGs in England. BMJ open, 6 (1). 
 
 
Appendix 2.13 Instructed not to open weblinks by IT: 05 
June 2017 
 
On 5 June 2017 at 15:38, XXXX, xxxx (OMNIA PRACTICE) <xxxx@nhs.net> wrote: 
Thanks. 
I have received your email and I appreciate you have proper credentials. 
Unfortunately, however in light of recent cyber-attacks – our IT lead has requested us not to 







Appendix 2.14Response from unconventional email address 
category: 05 June 2017 
On 5 June 2017 at 16:32, xxxx xxxx <xxxx.xxxx@beh-mht.nhs.uk> wrote: 
Hi Sibanda 
I cannot forward these E-Mails not on directory its Ok to send one to Patients Experience but 
rest would need to go directly to them. 





Patients Experience Team Advisor 
Barnet, Enfield and Haringey Mental Health Trust 




Appendix 2.15 Reminder invitation email: 20 June 2017 
Dear Dr FirstName Surname, 
REMINDER: A Survey of Decision-Making in CCGs – Sheffield Hallam University 
You may have received an email that I sent to you just over two weeks ago inviting you 
to participate in a survey relating to decision-making in the CCGs. If you have already 
completed the survey, please accept my sincere thanks for your participation. If you 
have not yet completed the survey, may I kindly ask you to support this study by 
sparing about 10minutes of your time filling out the questionnaire. I appreciate the 
level of busyness and competing priorities that you may be faced with as a clinician. 
However, I believe that this study has a potential for injecting ideas to the CCGs’ 
decision-making framework. The study results will be shared with all the participants.  
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The survey is anonymous, and for that reason it is not possible to identify if you have 
completed the questionnaire unless you choose to waive your anonymity at the end of 
the survey by supplying your email contact for follow up questions. The survey 
questionnaire which has been tested with GPs can be accessed through this secure 
link:  https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLScGW7SiSFivG-
4tOaFsd0P6VgCqEfY2RAf302DQOw35AxPE_Q/viewform?usp=sf_link. 
If the link appears as if it does not work, please try one of the following as the link has 
been tested and proved to work. 
1. Use a different web browser. One of the respondents has advised that they 
could not access the questionnaire on Internet Explorer but when they tried it 
on Google Chrome it worked. 
2. Try accessing the questionnaire from a different network environment. It could 
be that security settings on your work network are blocking the link from 
launching; especially in the wake of the recent WannaCry ransomware cyber-
attack, some organisations have intensified their security settings.  
The survey will close at 12am on Sunday 02 July 2017. 
If you have any questions please do not hesitate to contact me. 
Thank you for your support.  
Kind regards, 
Mpumelelo Sibanda 




Appendix 3 Ethical considerations 
Appendix 3.1 Research Ethics Committee approval email 
 
On 15 September 2016 at 09:55, xxx, xxx <xxxx@exchange.shu.ac.uk> wrote: 
 
Dear Mpumelelo  
 
Please find below the feedback from your application to the SBS 
Research Ethics Committee 
  
RESEARCH ETHICS REVIEWER’S FEEDBACK FORM (SHUREC3) 
  
Principal investigator:   Mpumelelo Sibanda                                            
 
Reference number: SBS-105 
  
Other investigators: xxxx xxxx 
  
Title of project: Organizational Structure Impact on Decision-Making: A Mixed 
methods Study of Clinical Commissioning Groups 
  







Approved with attention to the items listed below (1).  Please email the details 
of how the issues have been addressed to the FREC and provide confirmation 
from the supervisor that the issues have been addressed for student projects. 
 
 Referred back to the applicant for a full resubmission to address all the 
conditions listed below (1). 
 
 Not approved for the reasons listed below (2). 
 
 Does not require approval by Faculty Research Ethics Committee. 
 
  
1.    The following issues need to be addressed:  
  
Section B: Question 8: Debriefing refers to providing details of the information 





Question 9 & 12:  the University has recently developed a central storage system for 
data (the Q:drive). It is recommended that  all data is now stored on this. Can you 
please explore using this,  see link: http://research.shu.ac.uk/library/rdm/research-
store.html 
  
There is also guidance available on how to preserve and store your 
data. https://www.shu.ac.uk/research/ethics-integrity-and-practice/research-data-
management-policy This is especially important if you are planning to publish your 
results. 
  
Please provide a copy of the quantitative questionnaire that you intend to use for your 
online survey 
  
It is recommended that you use an informed consent form to obtain consent from the 
GPs you intend to interview face-to-face. Please attach a form to your application (an 
example template is available on the 
central ethics  webpages  https://www.shu.ac.uk/research/ethics-integrity-and-
practice/research-ethics-approval-procedures ) 
  
Section C:  Question 7: you indicate that the project requires a health and safety risk 
assessment. Please ensure this is in place before you visit any GPs. If you needs 
assistance with this, xxxx xxxx is the Head of Health and Safety in the Faculty  
  
We confirm that we do not have a conflict of interest with the project application.  
  
Signature: Dr xxxx xxxx  Date : 15/9/16 
  







Appendix 3.2 Head of Research Ethics email about IRAS 
Dear Mpumelelo 
 
The good news is that you do not need to complete the IRAS form.  As you are 
undertaking your study with NHS staff you simply need University Research ethics 
approval which you now have. In your communication with the doctors you simply need 
to tell that that favourable research ethics review for the study was provided by 
Sheffield Hallam University Research Ethics Committee.  Keep a copy of your approval 
letter in case they want a copy of it.   The research is automatically sponsored by the 
University too so you do not need to chase that up either. 
 




Professor xxxx xxxx MA PHD C Psychol PFHEA  AFBPS. 
Head of Research Ethics/Professor of Health Psychology, Sheffield Hallam University, 
 






Appendix 4 PLS-SEM Path Model Assessment 
Appendix 4.1 Outer Model Assessment 
Reflective measurement models 
Reflective measurement models are assessed for both reliability and validity (Lowry & 
Gaskin 2014; Hair et al. 2012; Henseler et al. 2009). Since I used SmartPLS 3, reliability 
and validity measurements were performed at the same time in a single run. Reliability 
was measured to establish the model’s internal consistency. The term reliability 
denotes the ability to yield consistent results “when the assumption is being made that 
the object being measured has not changed” (Scott & Morrison 2006, p.208). I 
considered the routinely employed methods for reliability measurement, which are 
Cronbach’s alpha and the composite reliability score (Lowry & Gaskin 2014; Henseler 
et al. 2009), where measurement of reliability is based on the interrelationship of 
indicators. Cronbach’s alpha test has a limitation though in that it assumes “that all 
indicators are equally reliable” (Henseler et al. 2009, p.299), thereby compromising the 
internal consistency reliability of the model’s latent variables. In contrast, the 
composite reliability embraces the understanding that “indicators have different 
loadings” but then can be interpreted in a similar way as Cronbach’s alpha. Reflective 
indicators “are expected to correlate positively, given that they are designed as 
alternative indicators of the same underlying construct” (Edwards 2011). 
Measurement values range from 0 to 1. The general recommended reliability 
threshold is 0.7 (Lowry & Gaskin 2014; Henseler et al. 2009), while in exploratory 
studies, such as the current study, a threshold of 0.6 is acceptable (Hamid et al. 2017). 
Anything less than those values is considered as indicating lack of reliability which 
could be suggestive “of poorly designed reflective measures” (Edwards 2011, p.375). 
The higher the value, the more the reliability level. Considering the shortfalls in 
Cronbach’s alpha, I resolved to use composite reliability score only.  
Validity pertains to the degree to which the indicators represent the latent 
variables that they relate to (Edwards 2011). In other words, indicators embody the 
definition of the latent variable, a phenomenon that is empirically “manifested by the 
magnitudes of the loadings relating the measures to the construct” (Edwards 2011, 
p.378). The magnitudes of the loadings are assessed through two subtypes of validity, 
namely, convergent validity and discriminant validity. Convergent validity tests the 
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degree of correlation of a set of indicators linked to the same latent variable to 
determine if the indicators in question are really related. This is established by 
assessing the average variance extracted (AVE) from across the represented indicators 
in which a value of at least 0.5 should be obtained (Henseler et al. 2009). 
Measurement values range from 0 to 1. A reading of at least 0.5 denotes that 
convergence being assessed is valid, thereby indicating that the associated “latent 
variable is able to explain more than half of the variance of its indicators on average” 
(Henseler et al. 2009, p.299).  
Discriminant validity, on the other hand, complements convergent validity by 
determining if the indicators that are not meant to be related are indeed not related. 
Evaluation of discriminant validity helps to ensure that latent variables are truly 
distinct from each other, thus preventing multicollinearity issues (Hamid et al. 2017). 
As such, the likelihood of the latent variables measuring the same thing would be 
eliminated. In other words, discriminant validity helps researchers to ascertain 
“whether results confirming hypothesized structural paths are real or whether they are 
a result of statistical discrepancies” (Farrell 2010, p.324). Without the discriminant 
validity test, researchers are likely to draw incorrect conclusions about their models’ 
relationships. The literature discusses about various ways of evaluating discriminant 
validity which include Cross-loadings, Paired latent variables test, Fornell-Larcker 
Criterion and Heterotrait-monotrait (HTMT) ratio of correlation, and Multitrait-
multimethod matrix (MTMM) (Hamid et al. 2017; Henseler et al. 2015; Lowry & Gaskin 
2014; Farrell 2010; Henseler et al. 2009). For this study, I used Cross-loadings, Fornell-
Larcker Criterion, and HTMT. Unlike convergent validity, discriminant validity does not 
have a standard value to signify the test (Lowry & Gaskin 2014). Instead, valuation is 
dependent on the assessment method used, as explained below. Just like other 
measurements, Cross-loadings, Fornell-Larcker Criterion, and HTMT are computed 
simultaneously in a single run in SmartPLS 3.  
Cross-loadings assesses the correlation of an indicator to its assigned latent 
variable in which it should be higher than its correlation with any other latent variables 
in the model (Hamid et al. 2017; Farrell 2010; Henseler et al. 2009). Any results 
different to this would necessitate a revision of the model for its correctness and 
removal of the redundant indicator (Farrell 2010). With Fornell-Larcker Criterion, the 
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square root of each latent variable’s AVE is compared with the correlations of other 
latent variables. In this, the reflective latent variable should be able to account for 
“more variance with its assigned indicators than with any other latent variable” 
(Henseler et al. 2009, p.299). Cross-loadings and the Fornell-Larcker Criterion “do not 
reliably detect the lack of discriminant validity” (Henseler et al. 2015, p.115). Besides, 
studies have shown that Cross-loadings tends to be more liberal in indicating 
discriminant validity, whereby it “supports discriminant validity when the Fornell-
Larcker criterion fails to do so” (Henseler et al. 2015, p.116).  Because of these possible 
inconsistencies, HTMT ratio of correlation, which Henseler et al. (2015, p.116) refer to 
“as a new approach to assess discriminant validity in variance-based SEM”, had to be 
considered. HTMT is more stringent in detecting possible indiscriminant occurrence 
among the latent variables unlike Cross-loadings and Fornell-Larcker Criterion which 
are deficient in establishing uniqueness amongst the latent variables (Hamid et al. 
2017; Henseler et al. 2015). A Monte Carlo simulation is used in HTMT to achieve 
higher rates of sensitivity. Since SmartPLS 3 performed the calculations for this test, 
this thesis will keep the related technicalities to a minimum. It is worth mentioning 
though that the values from this test are compared with a predefined threshold of 
0.85, which Henseler et al. (2015) argue that the value is debatable and therefore 
suggests 0.9 too. This study adopted the widely used threshold of 0.85. If the HTMT 
value is higher than 0.85, then “there is a lack of discriminant validity” (Henseler et al. 
2015, p.121).  
Formative measurement models   
The formative measurement models can be assessed at latent variable level 
and indicator level. The concepts of reliability and latent variable validity do not exist 
in formative measurement models (Lowry & Gaskin 2014; Hair et al. 2012; Edwards 
2011; Henseler et al. 2009). One of the reasons for this is a theoretical assertion that 
formative indicators may “co-vary with other constructs” (Lowry & Gaskin 2014, 
p.137). Besides, since the formative indicators represent different aspects, “there is no 
necessary reason to expect the facets represented … to correlate with one another” 
(Edwards 2011, p.374-375). This is different in reflective measurement models where 
the correlation of indicators is an expected occurrence for reliability measurement, as 
seen earlier. Unlike in reflective measurement models, assessment of latent variable 
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validity in formative measurement models does not have widely recognised statistical 
approaches (Lowry & Gaskin 2014; Henseler et al. 2009). Different methods, not 
described in this thesis, are discussed in the literature depending on what different 
researchers have used to test the formative outer models. Given the ambiguity 
surrounding formative measurement validity, I resolved that I would not assess it at 
latent variable level. Instead, I focused my assessment on indicators where there are 
significant implications to the credibility of the overall model assessment outcomes 
(Henseler et al. 2009).  
Formative measurement indicators should be assessed at individual level to 
determine “whether each indicator indeed delivers a contribution to the formative 
index by carrying the intended meaning” (Henseler et al. 2009, p.301). Two things 
should be checked to that end. First, if the indicator is relevant for the structure of the 
formative measurement model, and secondly if the model does not suffer from 
indicator multicollinearity. Assessment of indicator relevance contributes primary 
statistics in formative indicators (Hair et al. 2012). This is achieved by determining 
estimated indicator weights in which they should be “roughly equal and all have 
significant t-values” (Lowry & Gaskin 2014, p.137).  
One of the problems, which is comparably bigger in formative measurement 
models than reflective measurement models, concerns collinearity of indicators (Lowry 
& Gaskin 2014; Edwards 2011; Henseler et al. 2009). High correlations impact on the 
indicator loadings to the latent variables by making them unstable and tending “to 
exhibit large standard errors, which create difficulties for estimation and 
interpretation” (Edwards 2011, p.375). What is more, multicollinearity renders 
affected indicators’ information redundant (Henseler et al. 2009). Correlations in 
formative measurement model indicators should be ideally low, thus indicating 
distinctiveness of the aspects that the indicators represent. Correlations can be tested 
through regression in SPSS in which a variance inflation factor (VIF) of the indicators 
should not be more than 10, as “VIFs greater than 10 reveal a critical level of 
multicollinearity” (Henseler et al. 2009, p.302). Even so, Henseler et al. (2009, p.302) 
caution that VIF values that are considerably higher than 1 “should alert researchers to 
the typical problems of multicollinearity”. In SmartPLS 3, the “VIF coefficients should 
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not be higher than 4.0 (some use the more lenient criterion of 5.0)” (Garson 2016, 
p.72).  
Insignificant formative indicators or those affected by high collinearity – that is, 
a VIF of more than 10 in SPSS or more than 5 in SmartPLS 3, should be eliminated from 




Appendix 4.2 Inner Model Assessment 
R² of endogenous latent variables: This test is a primary criterion of inner model 
evaluation which is based on individually explained amount of variance of all 
endogenous latent variables denoted by the coefficient of determination (R²). Three 
rankings to indicate the quality of R² are discussed in the literature, namely 0.67, 0.33, 
and 0.19, interpreted “as substantial, moderate, and weak, respectively” (Henseler et 
al. 2009, p.303). Tests with “weak” R² results are suggestive of doubtful “theoretical 
underpinnings” of the model, meaning that the model is not capable of explaining the 
endogenous latent variable(s). On the other hand, “moderate” R² may be acceptable in 
situations where an endogenous latent variable has only one or two inner paths joining 
to the exogenous latent variable(s). In all other cases where the latent endogenous 
variable has multiple inner paths joining to exogenous latent variables, R² should be 
“substantial”. However, Garson (2016) argues that what may be considered as high R² 
values is relative depending on previous studies. For example, “a value of .25 might be 
considered “high” if the state of the art in the given subject and field had previously 
led to values even lower” (Garson 2016, p.80).  
As demonstrated earlier in The PLS-SEM path model for the current study, 
shown above in Figure 3.10, had all its latent variables modelled in the first-order. This 
means that all the latent variables, regardless of their mode, had direct relationships 
with the associated indicators (Lowry & Gaskin 2014). In contrast, latent variables that 
have relationships with other latent variables are known as higher order latent 
variables. As shown in Figure 3.10, the current study path model was comprised of 
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both formative and reflective indicators.  This path model is complemented by Table 
3.5, which outlines the items that were measured along with the associated indicators 
and latent variables, presented in a format derived from Bharati and Chaudhury 
(2004). The names of the shortened indicators outlined in Table 3.5, as well as those 
outlined in Table 3.6, were derived from the items that were measured, which are 
described in the same tables. 
Table 3.5, the model developed for this study had five latent variables, of which 
two were exogenous and three endogenous. The maximum number of inner paths 
joining to any given endogenous latent variables from exogenous latent variables was 
two, meaning that a test result of at least “moderate” R² had to be attained on the 
current research’s model. In SmartPLS 3, the R² “values are shown inside the blue 
ellipses for endogenous latent variables (factors)” (Garson 2016). 
Significance of path coefficients: Path coefficients indicate the strength of 
relationships between latent variables in inner model paths. Path coefficients are 
standardised weighted factors with algebraic values ranging from -1 to +1 (Garson 
2016). The closer the weight to absolute 1, the stronger the path, with the weights 
closest to 0 reflecting weakest paths.  
Effect size f2: Effect size measures the magnitude of effect between two 
variables; for example, the relative effect that an exogenous latent variable has on an 
endogenous latent variable (Garson 2016; Hair et al. 2012). Unlike statistical 
significance which tells the researcher how likely his or her results are, due to chance, 
effect size demonstrates the degree of importance of the results (Sullivan & Feinn 
2012). Effect size is empirically calculated using means of Cohen’s (1988) f2 where 
“values of 0.02, 0.15, and 0.35 signify small, medium, and large effects, respectively” 
(Henseler et al. 2009, p.304) while a reading below 0.02 indicates no effect. In 
SmartPLS 3, f2 values are automatically generated for the researcher (Garson 2016). 
Prediction relevance Q2: Prediction relevance is a measure which assesses the 
inner model’s capability to predict, and this is achieved using Stone-Geisser’s Q2 
empirical test criterion where the measurement is done by blindfolding (Henseler et al. 
2009). This procedure (blindfolding) only applies “to endogenous latent variables that 
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have a reflective measurement model operationalization” (Henseler et al. 2009, 
p.305).  
SmartPLS refers to blindfolding as ““predictive accuracy” criteria” (Garson 
2016, p.115), and is calculated by running the blindfolding module on the tool. Stone-
Geisser’s Q2 in SmartPLS is outputted as ““1 – SSE/SSO” in the “Total” table of the 
“Construct Crossvalidated Redundancy”“ (Garson 2016, p.118). Cohen (1988) 
suggested that “.02 represents a “small” effect size, .15 represents a “medium” effect 
size, and .35 represents a “high” effect size” (cited in Garson 2016, p.118). The Q2 value 
should be above 0 for the model to be relevant to predict that latent variable (Garson 
2016; Henseler et al. 2009). Q2 estimation is “for each reflectively-modeled 
endogenous factor in the model” (Garson 2016, p.115).  
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Appendix 5 Data Analysis Concepts 
Appendix 5.1 Qualitative Data Analysis: Hermeneutic 
phenomenology concepts 
Like the broader field of phenomenology, hermeneutic phenomenology is about 
lived experience of the individuals being investigated (Tuffour 2017; Gill 2014; Finlay 
2009; Wojnar & Swanson 2007; Laverty 2003). Due to methodological focus consistent 
with pragmatic approach, a handful of hermeneutic phenomenology concepts that 
were relevant to the generation of knowledge in the current study will be considered. 
These include the fore-structure of understanding, the context of the phenomenon, 
and bracketing.  
Fore-structure of understanding: In the quest to understand the lived experience, 
hermeneutic phenomenology believes that the researcher and the participants, both 
have what Heidegger called the fore-structure of understanding, which is relevant to 
sense-making of the phenomenon of study. The fore-structure “is an innate capacity 
that exists in all individuals to intuit the meaning of being” (McManus Holroyd 2007, 
p.3). McManus Holroyd (2007, p.3) further argues that “there can never be a 
presuppositionless stance in any act of interpretation”, thus inferring that the 
presuppositions that a researcher may have are embraced in hermeneutic 
phenomenology. Instead of detaching the researcher from the phenomenon of study, 
hermeneutic phenomenology incorporates the researcher to be part of the study. As 
the researched uses his or her own fore-structure of understanding to interpret his or 
her lived experience, the researcher in turn endeavours to make sense of those 
interpretations through the lens of his or her fore-structure of understanding, the two 
thereby cogenerating a meaningful “understanding of the phenomenon being studied” 
(Wojnar & Swanson 2007, p.175). The fore-structure of understanding in any individual 
is predicated on the context of the phenomenon, which is described next.  
Context of the phenomenon: The context of the phenomenon is a key tenet of 
hermeneutic approach, about which Heidegger stated that, “the understanding of 
individuals cannot occur in isolation of their culture, social context, or historical period 
in which they live” (Wojnar & Swanson 2007, p.174). In other words, lived experience 
can be precisely understood when the participants are viewed from a holistic 
standpoint in which individuals’ fore-structure of understanding is embraced “in 
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relation to the broader social, political, and cultural contexts” (Campbell 2001, cited in 
Wojnar & Swanson 2007, p.174).  
Bracketing: Although the general understanding of the hermeneutic approach 
embraces the researcher’s fore-structure of understanding, IPA prescribes that 
researchers should bracket their preconceptions beforehand (Tuffour 2017). 
Bracketing, as explained earlier in the text, is “a method used … to mitigate the 
potential deleterious effects of unacknowledged preconceptions related to the 
research and thereby to increase the rigor of the project” (Tufford & Newman 2012, 
p.81). Along the same lines, Laverty (2003, p.31) states that bracketing “is one factor 
that is central to the rigor of the study”. Unlike descriptive phenomenology where 
bracketing is applied through the whole process, in IPA bracketing is stated beforehand 
to bring into awareness the researcher’s preconceptions. Otherwise in IPA, “analysis 
always involves interpretation” (McManus Holroyd 2007, p.208). It is worth noting that 
in IPA awareness of the preconceptions that a researcher may have is likely to increase 
as the researcher reads or listens to the participants’ lived experiences. As a result, “a 
cyclical approach to bracketing” (McManus Holroyd 2007, p.208) should be assumed. 
The researcher should guard against his or her own biases to allow the text to “assert 
its own truth against one’s own fore-meaning” (Smith et al. 2009, cited in McManus 
Holroyd 2007, p.208). Striking a balance between bracketing of preconceptions while 
at the same time using them as a source of insight is a challenge that is tackled by 
approaching interpretative descriptions reflexively (Palaganas et al. 2017; Tuffour 
2017; Gill 2014; Brannick & Coghlan 2007; Laverty 2003). Reflexivity and its import to 




Appendix 5.2 Qualitative Data Analysis: Reflexivity  
Reflexivity “is both a concept and a process” (Dowling 2006, cited in Palaganas et 
al. 2017). As a concept, reflexivity is about self-awareness which, in research, 
recognises that “we are part of the social world that we study” (Palaganas et al. 2017, 
p.427) and thus are likely to have presuppositions about the phenomenon of study. 
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Such presuppositions may risk contaminating the study as the researcher may lack 
“the distance and objectivity deemed to be necessary for valid research” (Brannick & 
Coghlan 2007, p.60). Notwithstanding, reflexivity allows the researcher to take 
advantage of his or her presuppositions, and thus “articulate tacit knowledge … and 
reframe it as theoretical knowledge” (Brannick & Coghlan 2007, p.60). To this end, the 
researcher undertakes a process of continuous and intentional introspection, 
“challenging perspectives and assumptions both about the social world and of the 
researcher him/herself” (Palaganas et al. 2017, p.427). Put differently, the researcher 
shifts “back and forth, focusing on personal assumptions and then returning to looking 
at participants’ experiences in a fresh way” (Finlay 2009. p.13). However, caution is 
made that the researcher should not be overly absorbed in the reflexivity process as 
the study may risk being “pulled in unfortunate directions which privilege the 
researcher over the participant” (Finlay 2009, p.13). When rightly implemented, 
reflexivity can richly benefit the research process and its results (Whiting et al. 2018; 





Appendix 6 Data Dictionary 
Appendix 6.1 Data Dictionary: Format 1 Analysis Assigned 
Categories and Codes 
Question 
Number 
Assigned Category – Format 1 
Analysis 
Assigned Code 
Question 3 N/A N/A 
Question 3 Board Member BM 
Question 3 Chair CHR 
Question 3 Director DIR 
Question 3 Executive EXEC 
Question 3 Lead LEAD 
Question 3 Other OTHER 
Question 4a. N/A N/A 
Question 4a. clinical cabinet CC 
Question 4a. Clinical Management Group CMG 
Question 4a. Diabetes clinical forum DCF 
Question 4a. Executive Team EXEC 
Question 4a. Formulary Development FD 
Question 4a. Locality Development LD 
Question 4a. Mental health transformation 
board 
MHTB 
Question 4a. Multi-professional group MPG 
Question 4a. N/A N/A 
Question 4a. Procurement Decisions PD 
Question 4a. Quality Assurance QA 
Question 4a. Statutory role SR 
Question 4a. Workstream update WU 
Question 4b. Audit AUDIT 
Question 4b. Commissioning Committee CC 
Question 4b. Clinical Cabinet CCBT 
Question 4b. Delivery DELIVERY 
Question 4b. Executive EXEC 
Question 4b. Finance FINANCE 
Question 4b. Governance GOVERNANCE 
Question 4b. Health and Well Being HWB 





Assigned Category – Format 1 
Analysis 
Assigned Code 
Question 4b. Membership council MC 
Question 4b. Medicine Management MedMGT 
Question 4b. Ophthalmology OPHTHALMOLOGY 
Question 4b. Other OTHER 
Question 4b. Primary Care Committee PCC 
Question 4b. Prescribing PRESCR 
Question 4b. Quality QUALITY 
Question 4b. Reference Group REFGRP 
Question 4b. Remuneration committee REM 
Question 4b. Steering Group SG 
Question 4b. Sustainability and transformation 
partnerships (STPs) 
STP 
Question 4b. Strategy STRATEGY 
Question 4b. Transformation TRANSFORMATION 
Question 4b. Workforce WORKFORCE 
Question 7 N/A N/A 
Question 7 Both A and B BOTH_A&B 
Question 7 Other OTHER 
Question 13 Jeopardy to doctors DOCJPD 
Question 13 Other OTHER 
Question 13 Political pressure PP 
Question 13 Detrimental to patient care PTNTCARE 
Question 14 Financial reasons  FINANCIAL 
Question 14 Lack of clinical understanding   LCU 
Question 14 Misbalanced authority  MA 
Question 14 N/A N/A 
Question 14 Other OTHER 
Question 14 Political control  POLCNTRL 
Question 15 N/A N/A 
Question 15 Conflict of interest management CIM 
Question 15 Clinically perceptive  CP 
Question 15 Decision making DM 
Question 15 Effective Leadership EL 





Assigned Category – Format 1 
Analysis 
Assigned Code 
Question 15 Membership balance  MB 
Question 15 Membership practice engagement MPE 
Question 15 Mutual Respect MR 
Question 15 Other OTHER 
Question 15 Clinically perceptive PP 
Question 15 Patient/Public Inclusivity PPI 
Question 15 Quality Emphasis QE 
Question 15 Stakeholder Inclusivity  SI 
Question 15 Shared vision  SV 
Question 15 Thorough review of issues  TRI 
Question 15 Trust between members TRUST 
Question 16 N/A N/A 
Question 16 Distracted Dd 
Question 16 Lack of ownership LOO 
Question 16 Inconsistency  Incy 
Question 16 Bureaucracy – NHS England  BEU_NHSE 
Question 16 Constrained Compromise – NHS 
England  
CC_NHSE 
Question 16 Imbalanced decision-making  IDM 
Question 16 Inconsiderate Incdte 
Question 16 Indifferent Indiff 
Question 16 Ineffectual Ineff 
Question 16 Intransegence Intra 
Question 16 Lack of expertise  LOE 
Question 16 Lack of information  LOI 
Question 16 Lack of Synergy  LOS 
Question 16 Lack of Synergy  LS 
Question 16 Other OTHER 
Question 16 Poor communication PC 
Question 16 Poor member practice engagement  PPME 
Question 16 Time factor  TF 
Question 17 N/A N/A 
Question 17 Balanced Committee Structure BCS 





Assigned Category – Format 1 
Analysis 
Assigned Code 
Question 17 Good Gorvenance GG 
Question 17 Gate Keeping GK 
Question 17 More needs to be done  MNTD 
Question 17 Mutual Respect MR 
Question 17 None NONE 
Question 17 Overseen By Leadership (e.g. 
Chairperson/Accountability Officer)  
OBL 
Question 17 Open Culture OC 
Question 17 Other OTHER 
Question 17 Procurement Support PS 
Question 17 Tiered Approach TA 
Question 20 Themes Assigned Code 
Question 20 N/A N/A 
Question 20 Collaborative Decision-making 
Approach 
CDA 
Question 20 Commissioning responsibility not 
clear between NHSE and CCGs 
CR 
Question 20 CCG role poorly understood CRPU 
Question 20 Decision-making based on financial 
constraints 
DMBFC 
Question 20 Decision-making influenced by 
government policy 
DMIGP 
Question 20 Decision-making politically driven DMPD 
Question 20 Decision-making rushed or poor 
due to time constraints 
DMR 
Question 20 Good approval ratings GAR 
Question 20 Imbalanced approach to decision-
making 
IARM 
Question 20 Lack of transparency in decision-
making 
LOTDM 
Question 20 Other OTHER 
Question 20 Partially informed decision-making PIDM 
Question 20 Member practice expectations not 
met 
PMENM 
Question 20 Member practice GPs disregarded 
or poorly engaged 
PMGDPE 





Assigned Category – Format 1 
Analysis 
Assigned Code 
Question 22 Cluster Groups Meetings  CGM 
Question 22 Council of Members Meetings CMM 
Question 22 Engagement events EV 
Question 22 GP representation in key 
committees  
GRKC 
Question 22 Learning events  LE 
Question 22 Locality meeting LM 
Question 22 Mass media  MM 
Question 22 Other networks  ON 
Question 22 Other OTHER 
Question 22 Plenary meetings PM 
Question 22 Practice managers’ meetings  PMM 
Question 22 Practice visits by key senior 
members  
PVKSM 
Question 22 Practice visits by key senior 
members 
PVKSM 
Question 23 N/A N/A 
Question 23 Clinician CLINICIAN 
Question 23 Other OTHER 
Question 23 Post currently unfilled PCU 





Appendix 6.2 Data Dictionary: Format 2 Analysis Assigned 
Categories and Codes 
Question 
Number 
Assigned Category – Format 2 
Analysis 
Assigned Code  
Question 4a. Executive Team ET 
Question 4a. Clinical Cabinet 
Workstream Update 
CC_WU 
Question 4a. Clinical Management Group CG 
Question 4a. Diabetes clinical forum 
Multi-professional group 
DF_MG 






Question 4a. Mental health transformation board 
Statutory role 
MH_SR 
Question 4b. OTHER OT 
Question 4b. CC CC 
Question 4b. AUDIT 
Commissioning CommitteeHealth 














Question 4b. AUDIT 
Primary Care Committee 
QUALITY 
AU_PC_QU 
Question 4b. Clinical Cabinet CB 










Assigned Category – Format 2 
Analysis 
Assigned Code  
Question 4b. Commissioning Committee 
Executive 















Question 4b. Commissioning Committee 




Question 4b. Commissioning Committee 




Question 4b. Commissioning Committee 














Question 4b. Commissioning Committee 
OTHER 
CC_OT 
Question 4b. Commissioning Committee 
OTHERQUALITY 
Sustainability and transformation 
partnership 
CC_OT_QU_ST 










Assigned Category – Format 2 
Analysis 
Assigned Code  
Question 4b. DELIVERY 
FINANCE 
Primary Care Committee 
Reference Group 
DE_FI_PC_RG 
Question 4b. Executive EX 
Question 4b. Executive 
GOVERNANCE 
Health and Well Being 
LOCALITY 
Sustainability and transformation 
partnership 
EX_GO_HW_LO_ST 
Question 4b. Executive 
LOCALITY 
EX_LO 




Question 4b. FINANCE FI 
Question 4b. FINANCE 
GOVERNANCE 
Primary Care Committee 
FI_GO_PC 








Sustainability and transformation 
partnership 
GO_MM_OT_QU_ST 
Question 4b. LOCALITY LO 




Question 4b. Medicine Management MM 

















Assigned Category – Format 2 
Analysis 
Assigned Code  
Question 4b. OTHER 
STRATEGY 
OT_ST 
Question 4b. PCC PCC 
Question 4b. Prescribing PR 
Question 4b. Reference Group RG 
Question 4b. Steering Group SG 
Question 13 N/A N/A 
Question 13 Jeopardy to doctors 
Detrimental to patient care 
DJ_PC 
Question 13 Financial reasons FI 
Question 13 Financial reasons 
Self-interest 
FI_SI 
Question 13 OTHER OT 
Question 13 Detrimental to patient care PC 
Question 13 Political box ticking PP 
Question 13 Political box ticking 
Detrimental to patient care 
PP_PC 
Question 14 Financial reasons FI 
Question 14 Financial reasons 
Other 
FR_OT 




Question 14 Financial reasons 
Political control 
FR_PC 
Question 14 Lack of clinical understanding LU 
Question 14 MA MA 
Question 14 N/A N/A 
Question 14 OTHER OT 
Question 14 Political control PC 
Question 15 N/A N/A 






Question 15 Conflict of interest management 
Mutual Respect 






Assigned Category – Format 2 
Analysis 
Assigned Code  
Question 15 Conflict of interest management 
Thorough review of issues 
CM_TR 
Question 15 Clinically perceptive 
Decision making 
Membership practice engagement 
Other 
CP_DM_ME_OT 









Question 15 Clinically perceptive 
Good governance 
Other 
Thorough review of issues 
CP_GG_OT_TR 









Question 15 Clinically perceptive 
Patient/Public Inclusivity 
CP_PI 




Question 15 Clinically perceptive 
Stakeholder Inclusivity 
CP_SI 
Question 15 Decision making DM 








Thorough review of issues 
DM_MR_OT_SI_TR 







Assigned Category – Format 2 
Analysis 
Assigned Code  
Question 15 Decision making 
Patient/Public Inclusivity 
Thorough review of issues 
DM_PI_TR 


















Question 15 Membership practice engagement 
Patient/Public Inclusivity 
ME_PI 




Question 15 Membership practice engagement 
Stakeholder Inclusivity 
ME_SI 
Question 15 Mutual Respect 
Other 
Quality Emphasis Thorough review of 
issues 
MR_OT_QE_TR 




Question 15 Mutual Respect 
Other 
Thorough review of issues 
MR_OT_TR 




Question 15 Mutual Respect 
Stakeholder Inclusivity 
Trust between members 
MR_SI_TB 
Question 15 Mutual Respect 
Trust between members 
MR_TB 





Assigned Category – Format 2 
Analysis 
Assigned Code  




Question 15 Other 
Stakeholder Inclusivity 
OT_SI 
Question 15 Other 
Shared vision 
Trust between members 
OT_SV_TB 
Question 15 Other 
Thorough review of issues 
OT_TR 
Question 15 Patient/Public Inclusivity 
Thorough review of issues 
PI_TR 
Question 15 Clinically perceptive PP 
Question 15 Quality Emphasis Thorough review of 
issues 
QE_TR 
Question 15 Stakeholder Inclusivity  SI 
Question 15 Thorough review of issues  TRI 
Question 15 TRUST TT 
Question 16 N/A N/A 
Question 16 Bureaucracy – NHS England  BN 
Question 16 Bureaucracy – NHS England 





Question 16 Bureaucracy – NHS England 
Imbalanced decision-making 
BN_ID 
Question 16 Constrained Compromise – NHS 
England  
CC 
Question 16 Dd Dd 
Question 16 Distracted 
Imbalanced decision-making 
Ineffectual 
Lack of expertise 
Lack of ownership 
OTHER 
Dd_ID_IE_LE_LO_OT 
Question 16 Distracted 
Imbalanced decision-making 
Lack of Synergy 
OTHER 
Dd_ID_LS_OT 





Assigned Category – Format 2 
Analysis 
Assigned Code  
Lack of ownership 
Question 16 Distracted 
Poor member practice engagement 
Dd_PE 
Question 16 Inconsistency IC 
Question 16 Imbalanced decision-making 
Ineffectual 
ID_IE 
Question 16 Imbalanced decision-making 
Indifferent 
ID_IN 
Question 16 Imbalanced decision-making 
Lack of expertise 
Lack of information 
Poor member practice engagement 
Time factor 
ID_LE_LI_PE_TF 
Question 16 Imbalanced decision-making 
Lack of expertise 
OTHER 
ID_LE_OT 




Question 16 Ineffectual IE 
Question 16 Ineffectual 
Lack of Synergy 
Poor member practice engagement 
IE_LS_PE 




Question 16 Ineffectual 
Time factor 
IE_TF 
Question 16 Inconsiderate IN 
Question 16 Indifferent IN 
Question 16 Indifferent 
Ineffectual 
IN_IE 
Question 16 Intransegence IR 
Question 16 Lack of Synergy 
Time factor 
LS_TF 
Question 16 PC PC 
Question 16 Poor communication 
Time factor 
PC_TF 
Question 16 Poor member practice engagement  PE 





Assigned Category – Format 2 
Analysis 
Assigned Code  
Question 17 N/A N/A 
Question 17 Balanced Committee Structure BC 





Question 17 Balanced Committee Structure 
Gate Keeping 
BC_GK 
Question 17 Balanced Committee Structure 
Mutual Respect 
Overseen By Leadership 
OTHER 
BC_MR_OL_OT 
Question 17 Balanced Committee Structure 
Open Culture 
BC_OC 
Question 17 Balanced Committee Structure 
OTHER 
BC_OT 
Question 17 Conflict of interest management 
Good governance 




Question 17 Conflict of interest management 
Mutual Respect 
CM_MR 









Question 17 Conflict of interest management 
Mutual Respect 
Overseen By Leadership 
CM_MR_OL 
Question 17 Conflict of interest management 
Overseen By Leadership 
Open Culture 
CM_OL_OC 
Question 17 Conflict of interest management 
OTHER 
CM_OT 











Assigned Category – Format 2 
Analysis 
Assigned Code  
Question 17 Gate Keeping 
Overseen By Leadership 
GK_OL 
Question 17 More needs to be done 
Overseen By Leadership 
MD_OL 
Question 17 More needs to be done 
Tiered Approach 
MD_TA 
Question 17 MR MR 
Question 17 Mutual Respect 
Overseen By Leadership 
MR_OL 
Question 17 Mutual Respect 




Question 17 NONE NN 
Question 17 OC OC 
Question 17 Overseen By Leadership OL 
Question 17 OTHER OT 
Question 17 TA TA 
Question 20 N/A N/A 
Question 20 Collaborative Decision-making 
Approach 
CA 
Question 20 Collaborative Decision-making 
Approach 
Imbalanced approach to decision-
making 
CA_IA 
Question 20 Collaborative Decision-making 
Approach 
Member practice GPs disregarded or 
poorly engaged 
CA_PD 
Question 22 Council of Members Meetings CM 
Question 22 Council of Members Meetings 
GP representation in key committees 
Learning events 
Practice visits by key senior members 
CM_GR_LE_PV 
Question 22 Council of Members MeetingsGP 
representation in key committees 
Mass media 
Other networks 
Practice visits by key senior members 
CM_GR_MM_ON_PV 
Question 22 Council of Members Meetings 






Assigned Category – Format 2 
Analysis 
Assigned Code  
Practice visits by key senior members 
Question 22 Council of Members Meetings 
Mass media 
CM_MM 
Question 22 Council of Members Meetings 
Mass media 
Practice visits by key senior members 
CM_MM_PV 
Question 22 Council of Members Meetings 
Other networks 
Practice visits by key senior members 
CM_ON_PV 
Question 22 Council of Members Meetings 
Practice visits by key senior members 
CM_PV 
Question 20 CR CR 
Question 20 CCG role poorly understood CU 
Question 20 Decision-making based on financial 
constraints 
DF 
Question 20 Decision-making influenced by 
government policy 
DP 
Question 20 Decision-making politically driven 
Imbalanced approach to decision-
making 
DP_IA 
Question 20 Decision-making politically driven 
Member practice GPs disregarded or 
poorly engaged 
DP_PD 
Question 20 Decision-making rushed or poor due 
to time constraints 
Imbalanced approach to decision-
making 
DR_IA 
Question 20 Decision-making rushed or poor due 
to time constraints 
Imbalanced approach to decision-
making 
Partially informed decision-making 
DR_IA_PI 
Question 20 Decision-making rushed or poor due 
to time constraints 
OTHER 
DR_OT 
Question 22 EV EV 
Question 22 Engagement events 
GP representation in key committees 
EV_GR 
Question 22 Engagement events 






Assigned Category – Format 2 
Analysis 
Assigned Code  
Question 22 Engagement events 
Other networks 
EV_ON 
Question 20 Member practice GPs disregarded or 
poorly engaged 
GD 
Question 22 Cluster Groups Meetings  GM 
Question 22 Cluster Groups Meetings 
GP representation in key committees 
GM_GR 
Question 22 Cluster Groups Meetings 
Other networks 
Practice visits by key senior members 
GM_ON_PV 
Question 20 Good approval ratings GR 
Question 22 GP representation in key committees GR 
Question 22 GP representation in key committees 
Learning events 
GR_LE 
Question 22 GP representation in key committees 
Learning events_Mass media 
GR_LE_MM 













Practice managers’ meetings 
Practice visits by key senior members 
GR_LE_MM_ON_PM_PV 
Question 22 GP representation in key committees 
Learning events 
Mass media 
Practice visits by key senior members 
GR_LE_MM_PV 








Question 22 GP representation in key committees 
Mass media 
GR_MM 





Assigned Category – Format 2 
Analysis 
Assigned Code  
Mass mediaOther networks 
Question 22 GP representation in key committees 
Mass media 
Other networks 
Practice managers’ meetings 
GR_MM_ON_PM 
Question 22 GP representation in key committees 
Mass media 
Other networks 
Practice visits by key senior members 
GR_MM_ON_PV 
Question 22 GP representation in key committees 
Mass media 
Practice visits by key senior members 
GR_MM_PV 
Question 22 GP representation in key committees 
Other networks 
GR_ON 
Question 22 GP representation in key committees 
Other networks 
Practice managers’ meetings 
GR_ON_PM 
Question 22 GP representation in key committees 
Plenary meetings 
GR_PM 
Question 22 GP representation in key committees 
Practice managers’ meetings 
GR_PM 
Question 22 GP representation in key committees 
Plenary meetings 
Practice visits by key senior members 
GR_PM_PV 
Question 22 GP representation in key committees 
Practice visits by key senior members 
GR_PV 
Question 20 Imbalanced approach to decision-
making 
Member practice GPs disregarded or 
poorly engaged 
IA_PD 
Question 22 Learning events 
Locality meeting 
Other networks 
Practice visits by key senior members 
LE_LM_ON_PV 
Question 20 Lack of transparency in decision-
making 
LT 
Question 22 Mass media 
Other networks 
MM_ON 
Question 22 N/A N/A 
Question 22 ON ON 





Assigned Category – Format 2 
Analysis 
Assigned Code  
Question 22 OTHER OT 
Question 20 Member practice expectations not 
met 
PE 
Question 22 PM PM 






Appendix 7 Statistics Tables  











1 N/A N/A 
 
1 




2 LEAD Lead Clinical Lead, Children’s 1 
2 LEAD Lead Clinical Lead, Prescribing  1 
3 CHR Chair 
 
1 
4 CHR Chair Clinical chair 1 




5 LEAD Lead Clinical Lead, Planned care 1 
6 OTHER Other GP principal single handed 1 
7 EXEC Executive Locality member 1 
8 LEAD Lead Clinical Lead, Unplanned 
clinical care 
1 




9 LEAD Lead Clinical Lead, Prescribing  1 
10 CHR Chair Clinical chair 1 
11 N/A N/A 
 
1 
12 CHR Chair Locality chair 1 
12 OTHER Other Member of medicines 
committee 
1 




13 LEAD Lead Clinical Lead 1 
14 DIR Director Clinical director mental health 1 




15 CHR Chair Vice chair 1 
16 LEAD Lead Clinical Lead, Prescribing  1 
17 EXEC Executive Executive member 1 

















18 CHR Chair Locality chair 1 
19 CHR Chair Clinical chair 1 
19 LEAD Lead Clinical Lead, various areas 1 
20 CHR Chair Clinical chair 1 
20 LEAD Lead Clinical Lead 1 
21 LEAD Lead Clinical Lead, care homes 1 
22 CHR Chair Clinical chair 1 
22 LEAD Lead Integration lead 1 
23 LEAD Lead Clinical Lead, diabetes 1 
24 CHR Chair Vice Chair of our locality 
group 
1 
25 OTHER Other GP advisor to the CCG 1 
25 OTHER Other GP represntstive for the GP 
practices that make up the 
CCG 
1 
26 LEAD Lead Clinical Lead, Planned care 1 
27 DIR Director Unplanned (urgent and 
emergency) care  
1 








29 LEAD Lead Clinical Lead, quality 1 
29 LEAD Lead Safety Lead 1 
30 CHR Chair 
 
1 
31 LEAD Lead Clinical Lead, innovation 1 
31 LEAD Lead Clinical Lead, medicines 
optimisation 
1 




32 LEAD Lead Clinical Lead, Prescribing Lead 1 
32 OTHER Other never event panel 1 
33 CHR Chair Vice chair 1 













33 LEAD Lead Clinical lead on governance  1 
33 LEAD Lead Clinical lead on mental health 1 
33 LEAD Lead Clinical lead on primary care 1 
33 LEAD Lead Clinical lead on training & 
education 
1 




35 LEAD Lead Clinical Lead, cancer 1 




36 LEAD Lead Clinical Lead 1 
37 LEAD Lead Clinical Lead, Mental health 
and equality 
1 
38 EXEC Executive Joint Locality Executive Board 1 
39 CHR Chair Locality chair 1 




40 CHR Chair chair finance risk and 
governance 
1 
40 LEAD Lead clinical lead for CCG in 
Rightcare commissioning for 
value 
1 
40 LEAD Lead clinical lead for elective care 1 
40 LEAD Lead clinical lead for out of 
hospital (community care) 
1 




41 FINANCE Finance 
 
1 
41 OTHER Other attend and contribute to 
monthly clinical focus group 
1 
41 OTHER Other Most importantly I am 
involved in scrutinising 
Serious Untoward Incidents 
incurred by our providers. 
1 




42 CHR Chair Vice chair 1 















44 LEAD Lead Clinical Lead 1 




46 LEAD Lead Clinical Lead, Planned care - 
particularly MSK and diabetes  
1 




47 OTHER Other Governor, Children’s Hospital 1 
47 OTHER Other Other, Health and Wellbeing 
Board 
1 
47 OTHER Other partner governor for Sheffield 
Children’s Hospital 
1 
48 CHR Chair 
 
1 




50 EXEC Executive Clinical 1 
51 OTHER Other attend CMG meeting 1 
51 OTHER Other PTE meetings to discuss 
different issues 
1 




52 CHR Chair chair various committees and 
groups 
1 
52 OTHER Other sit as a member of several 
other committees and groups 
1 




53 LEAD Lead Clinical lead, Locality 1 
53 OTHER Other Other, representative of part 
of the city’s GP practices 
1 
54 LEAD Lead Clinical lead, Locality 1 
55 DIR Director Clinical director mental health 1 
56 EXEC Executive Executive GP 1 
56 OTHER Other Caldecott guardian 1 
56 OTHER Other MSK 1 
57 N/A N/A 
 
1 













59 OTHER Other Partner 1 




60 EXEC Executive GP and Clinical Lead 1 
60 LEAD Lead Clinical Lead 1 
61 LEAD Lead Clinical Lead, cancer 1 
61 LEAD Lead Clinical Lead, ENT 1 
61 LEAD Lead Clinical Lead, eyes 1 




63 LEAD Lead Clinical lead, numerous areas 
of service re-design 
1 




64 CHR Chair Vice chair 1 
64 LEAD Lead Clinical lead for primary care 1 
64 LEAD Lead Clinical lead for urgent care 1 
64 LEAD Lead Lead for finance 1 
65 CHR Chair Chair 1 
65 DIR Director Urgent and unscheduled care 1 
66 CHR Chair GP cluster chair 1 
66 OTHER Other contribute to design of GP 
practice visit programme and 
issues relating to deprivation 
1 
66 OTHER Other sit on ophthalmology, cross 
CCG and secondary care 
group 
1 




67 LEAD Lead Clinical lead for community 
contract 
1 
67 LEAD Lead Clinical lead for medicines 
management 
1 
68 AUDIT Audit 
 
1 
68 LEAD Lead Clinical Lead 1 
68 LOCALITY Locality 
Development 
Attend locality meetings 















68 OTHER Other Violence against women and 
girls 
1 
68 OTHER Other Prevention champion and 
linking with the voluntary 
sector working on community 
resilience 
1 




69 OTHER Other Other, various other 
committees 
1 




70 CHR Chair CCC chair 1 
71 CHR Chair 
 
1 
72 CHR Chair Chair 1 
73 DIR Director Primary Care 1 
74 DIR Director Children, young people and 
maternity 
1 






















































































































































CCBT clinical cabinet 
 
39 1 









DELIVERY Delivery Delivery, A+E delivery board 64 1 
EXEC Executive Executive, Exec Team 
Committee 
14 1 
EXEC Executive Executive, Locality executive 17 1 
EXEC Executive Executive, Clinical executive 19 1 
EXEC Executive Executive, Executive board 27 1 
EXEC Executive Executive, Executive board 37 1 
EXEC Executive Executive, Clinical executive 42 1 






FINANCE Finance Finance, Finance and 
Performance 
8 1 
FINANCE Finance Finance, Finance and activity 15 1 
FINANCE Finance Finance, Quality 
























FINANCE Finance Finance, Finance and 
Performance 
72 1 
GOVERNANCE Governance Governance, Integrated 
Governance 
19 1 
GOVERNANCE Governance Governance, Integrated 
Governance 
33 1 
GOVERNANCE Governance Governance, risk and 
governance 
40 1 
GOVERNANCE Governance Governance, Integrated 
Governance 
52 1 




















HWB Health and Well 
Being 
Health and Well Being, 










LOCALITY Locality Locality, Joint Committees 
with Local Authority 
19 1 
LOCALITY Locality Locality, Local A&E Delivery 
Board 
27 1 
LOCALITY Locality Locality, Local cluster 32 1 
LOCALITY Locality Locality, Citywide Localities 
Group 
47 1 


























































OTHER Other Other, Clinical Senate 
Council 
3 1 
OTHER Other Other, House of care 
programme board 
5 1 
OTHER Other Other, MSK 10 1 
OTHER Other Other, Community Support 
Services (CMG) - clinical 
membership group 
11 1 
OTHER Other Other, Dementia Strategy 
Board 
14 1 
OTHER Other Other, Medicines Safety 
Committee 
16 1 
OTHER Other Other, Service Development 16 1 
OTHER Other Other, Mental Health Board 17 1 
OTHER Other Other, Service redesign 20 1 
OTHER Other Other, Primary Care 
development Group 
20 1 
OTHER Other Other, Integration Board 22 1 
OTHER Other Other, clinical pathway 
development 
24 1 













OTHER Other Other, Clinical policy 31 1 
OTHER Other Other, CCG clinicians group  32 1 
OTHER Other Other, Never event panel 32 1 
OTHER Other Other, Charitable Funds 33 1 
OTHER Other Other, Community Education 
Providers Network (CEPN)  
33 1 
OTHER Other Other, Mortality surveillance 
group 
45 1 
OTHER Other Other, Cancer Clinical 
Programme Group 
52 1 
OTHER Other Other, about 5 more 
committees 
52 1 
OTHER Other Other, Clinical Effectiveness 
Group 
52 1 
OTHER Other Other, CVD Clinical 
Programme Group 
52 1 
OTHER Other Other, Assurance 55 1 
OTHER Other Other, etc [exact words of 
the respondent] 
55 1 
OTHER Other Other, standardisation of 
care 
60 1 
OTHER Other Other, Out of hospital 60 1 
OTHER Other Other, Committees have 
strange names 
61 1 
OTHER Other Other, learning disability 
Healthchecks working party  
66 1 
OTHER Other Other, CG 68 1 
OTHER Other Other, CSc 68 1 
OTHER Other Other, EPEC 68 1 
OTHER Other Other, Estates 68 1 
OTHER Other Other, IGP 68 1 
OTHER Other Other, SMI 68 1 
OTHER Other Other, Violence against 
women and girls 
68 1 
OTHER Other Other, IFR 69 1 
OTHER Other Other, ACO 72 1 
OTHER Other Other, Various Committees 73 1 















































QUALITY Quality Quality, Quality and 
Performance 
15 1 
QUALITY Quality Quality, Primary Care Quality 
Committee 
16 1 
QUALITY Quality Quality, Performance and 
Finance 
20 1 






QUALITY Quality Quality, Primary Care Quality 
& Development 
33 1 
QUALITY Quality Quality, Quality and Safety 45 1 
QUALITY Quality Quality, Integrated 
Governance and Quality 
Committee 
52 1 




QUALITY Quality Quality, Quality meetings 67 1 





Reference Group, New Care 
Models Reference Group 
45 1 











Group Reference Group 
REFGRP Reference 
Group 





NULL 47 1 
REM Remuneration 
committee 
NULL 72 1 
SG Steering Group 
 
59 1 
SG Steering Group Steering Group, practice visit 
steering group  
66 1 



























STP, Reducing Clinical 
Variation Group 
52 1 













































Assigned Code Code Description Comments Code 
Frequency 
Count 
1 N/A N/A (blank) 1 
5 DOCJPD Jeopardy to doctors Not allowing list closure…risk to doctors 1 
5 PTNTCARE Detrimental to patient care Not allowing list closure. Danger to patients… 1 
15 PTNTCARE Detrimental to patient care Forced to stop enhanced services, which has meant a reduction 
in service offer  
1 
18 PP Political pressure A decision to push ahead with 7-day working in spite of initially 
saying they would oppose politic rhetoric without evidence of 
need. 
1 
20 DOCJPD Jeopardy to doctors Asking GPs to do too much…at a time when General Practice 
was beginning to really struggle. 
1 
20 FINANCE Financial reasons Financial gain 1 
20 SI Self-interest Asking GPs to do too much in order to win extra enhanced 
services and hence funding 
1 
24 FINANCE Financial reasons Financial gain 1 
24 FINANCE Financial reasons Removal of prescribing incentive scheme after the work had 
been done (2011). 
1 
32 FINANCE Financial reasons Financial gain 1 









40 PP Political pressure NHSE has undue influence over local decisions, chronic 
underfunding 
1 
40 PTNTCARE Detrimental to patient care Primary care forced to alter the way it works due to dissimilar 
rules between NHSE and NHSI 
1 
42 OTHER Other Deployment of resource 1 
47 DOCJPD Jeopardy to doctors Peer reviewed referral management increases GP workload 1 
47 PTNTCARE Detrimental to patient care Peer reviewed referral management, while it is good it may 
adversely affect patient care 
1 
48 FINANCE Financial reasons Financial loss 1 
62 DOCJPD Jeopardy to doctors Cash incentives for reducing referrals to an arbitrary level - is 
pernicious for the profession… 
1 
62 PTNTCARE Detrimental to patient care Cash incentive to increase bowel cancer screening rate (as 
opposed to properly informing people about it). Morally 
questionable. 
1 
62 PTNTCARE Detrimental to patient care Cash incentives for reducing referrals to an arbitrary level ... 
may undermine patient trust. 
1 
63 PTNTCARE Detrimental to patient care Poor understanding of system design issues, epidemiology, 
academic literature or implementation science by most who sit 
on GB 
1 







Assigned Code Code Description Comments Code 
Frequency 
Count 
65 PTNTCARE Detrimental to patient care Community work transferred to GP practices without additional 
resources. 
1 
68 DOCJPD Jeopardy to doctors Population based contracts are difficult to enact. 1 
68 PP Political pressure There is pressure from NHSE and finances. 1 
68 PTNTCARE Detrimental to patient care Struggling with daily work; access targets QOF, etc. 1 
69 PTNTCARE Detrimental to patient care Loss of Out-of-hours services has affected patient care. 1 
70 FINANCE Financial reasons Cost saving 1 
73 OTHER Other Contractual issues around Primary Care 1 









Assigned Code Code Description Comments Code Frequency 
Count 
5 LCU Lack of clinical 
understanding   
Do not understand clinical issues and the real problems at 
the Coalface 
1 
15 FINANCIAL Financial reasons  Finances 1 
15 POLCNTRL Political control  NHSE direction 1 
18 POLCNTRL Political control  Political agendas dictated by DoH / Whitehall 1 
20 LCU Lack of clinical 
understanding   
The complex system we work in where there is often no one 
accepted way to deliver ... poor understanding of what it is 
really like at the clinical front line 
1 
24 FINANCIAL Financial reasons  A finance director who was trying to balance the books and 
failed to recognise the implications of his decision.  
1 
29 N/A N/A N/A 1 
32 FINANCIAL Financial reasons  Lack of finance, desperation to make books balance 1 
40 FINANCIAL Financial reasons  Money or the lack of it 1 
42 OTHER Other What is best for the population 1 
47 FINANCIAL Financial reasons  (blank) 1 
48 LCU Lack of clinical 
understanding   
They were not wrong decision but they did not favour GPs 1 





Assigned Code Code Description Comments Code Frequency 
Count 
understanding   CCG doesn’t  understand the  commercial reality of GP. 
62 FINANCIAL Financial reasons  (blank) 1 
62 POLCNTRL Political control  (blank) 1 
63 FINANCIAL Financial reasons  (blank) 1 
63 OTHER Other Lack of leadership 1 
65 OTHER Other Patient safety 1 
66 LCU Lack of clinical 
understanding   
An attempt to be even handed with GPs as with any other 
provider and not to be seen to be favouring them because 
they have a place at the table.  
1 
68 FINANCIAL Financial reasons  (blank) 1 
68 OTHER Other Targets 1 
68 POLCNTRL Political control  Patient safety 1 
69 MA Misbalanced authority   rules applying to FTs that allowed the secondary provider to 
‘hold to ransom’ the CCG 
1 
69 MA Misbalanced authority  strong influence of senior CCG officers 1 
70 FINANCIAL Financial reasons  (blank) 1 
72 OTHER Other NHS civil service does not always have the same 
understanding and sensitivities of local issues 
1 
73 OTHER Other Primary Care unduly examined compared to other providers 1 












Mechanism Code Description  Comments Code Frequency 
Count 
1 N/A N/A Response not usable to the question --> “aa” 1 
2 OBL Overseen By Leadership (e.g. 
Chairperson/Accountability Officer)  
No formal, but this is a role of the Chair 1 
3 N/A N/A Response not usable to the question --> “All 
major decisions go through governing body” 
1 
4 CIM Conflict of interest management conflicts of interest policy 1 
4 OTHER Other various policies 1 
5 NONE None None 1 
6 NONE None None 1 
7 NONE None None 1 
8 NONE None None 1 
9 NONE None None 1 
10 OBL Overseen By Leadership (e.g. 
Chairperson/Accountability Officer)  
Effective chairing of board. 1 
11 OBL Overseen By Leadership (e.g. 
Chairperson/Accountability Officer)  
Accountable officer of CCG 1 
12 N/A N/A Not sure 1 







Mechanism Code Description  Comments Code Frequency 
Count 
13 MR Mutual Respect culture of being able to professionally challenge 1 
13 OC Open Culture Open culture 1 
14 OTHER Other Layered approach to decision-making. Executive 
team is decision making, Gov Body is the 
assurance. 
1 
15 BCS Balanced Committee Structure Good balance and review of committee 
structures. Lay members excellent as acting as a 
balance in meetings  
1 
16 NONE None None 1 
17 NONE None None 1 
18 OBL Overseen By Leadership (e.g. 
Chairperson/Accountability Officer)  
An alert chair who ensures all voices are heard 1 
19 CIM Conflict of interest management Conflict of interest committee 1 
19 GG Good governance Integrated governance 1 
19 OBL Overseen By Leadership (e.g. 
Chairperson/Accountability Officer)  
Appraisal by the chair 1 
19 OTHER Other Audit committee 1 
19 OTHER Other Deep dives into previous decision and 
implementation 
1 
19 OTHER Other Regular membership consultation 1 







Mechanism Code Description  Comments Code Frequency 
Count 
20 BCS Balanced Committee Structure well balanced clinical and non clinical members, 3 
lay members from the start, stable membership, 
GP members from all localities 
1 
20 OTHER Other Code of conduct set out on laminate present at 
each meeting 
1 
21 OTHER Other I dont know 1 
22 MR Mutual Respect respect each other 1 
22 OBL Overseen By Leadership (e.g. 
Chairperson/Accountability Officer)  
As Chair I would be able to manage any 
imbalance - not needed to so far 
1 
23 BCS Balanced Committee Structure Strong locality representation 1 
24 MNTD More needs to be done  There are some domineering personalities in the 
group and I feel that this has not been addressed 
systematically or consistently 
1 
24 TA Tiered Approach Tiered approach to discussions - decisions are 
made at clinical board or locality level first then 
representations made at governing body 
1 
25 MR Mutual Respect respectful meetings 1 
25 OBL Overseen By Leadership (e.g. 
Chairperson/Accountability Officer)  
Well run meetings and leadership 1 
25 OC Open Culture Open meetings 1 









Mechanism Code Description  Comments Code Frequency 
Count 
26 NONE None None 1 
27 NONE None None 1 
28 OTHER Other Discussions at GB meetings 1 
29 NONE None None 1 
30 CIM Conflict of interest management  rigid adherence to  COI policy 1 
30 MR Mutual Respect Mutual respect 1 
30 OBL Overseen By Leadership (e.g. 
Chairperson/Accountability Officer)  
exceptional AO 1 
30 OBL Overseen By Leadership (e.g. 
Chairperson/Accountability Officer)  
Strong chairmanship 1 
31 BCS Balanced Committee Structure Good committee structure 1 
31 MR Mutual Respect Freedom and support to challenge 1 
31 OBL Overseen By Leadership (e.g. 
Chairperson/Accountability Officer)  
strong chairs 1 
31 OTHER Other Freedom and support to challenge 1 
32 MR Mutual Respect other members of Board willing to challenge 1 
32 OBL Overseen By Leadership (e.g. 
Chairperson/Accountability Officer)  
Strong chair 1 
33 CIM Conflict of interest management Excellent conflict of interest management 1 







Mechanism Code Description  Comments Code Frequency 
Count 
working in the area 
34 OBL Overseen By Leadership (e.g. 
Chairperson/Accountability Officer)  
We have a good chair 1 
35 TA Tiered Approach all decisions re policies have to go through a 
series of ‘bodies’ for discussion and decision 
1 
36 OBL Overseen By Leadership (e.g. 
Chairperson/Accountability Officer)  
This is the chair’s job, effectiveness in completing 
this varies between meetings 
1 
37 NONE None None 1 
38 OBL Overseen By Leadership (e.g. 
Chairperson/Accountability Officer)  
good chairing 1 
39 CIM Conflict of interest management conflicts of interest policy 1 
39 OBL Overseen By Leadership (e.g. 
Chairperson/Accountability Officer)  
Effective chairing of discussions 1 
39 OC Open Culture transparency of decision making 1 
40 OTHER Other Decisions are usually thrashed out either before 
they get to board or at board. 
1 
40 OTHER Other PMO approach to development of ideas and 
processes 
1 
41 BCS Balanced Committee Structure All GP members of GB given equal opportunity to 
contribute and also feedback from members they 
represent. 
1 







Mechanism Code Description  Comments Code Frequency 
Count 
transparency 
42 NONE None None 1 
43 GG Good governance accountability 1 
43 TA Tiered Approach Separate GPs for delivery and for oversight 1 
44 MR Mutual Respect Informal “being polite in meetings” rules 1 
45 OC Open Culture Discussion in open session, informal briefings and 
development sessions to explore ideas and 
tensions  
1 
46 BCS Balanced Committee Structure Deductions are made by committee 1 
46 OTHER Other I am not aware of ‘mechanism’ to avoid 
domineering 
1 
47 NONE None None 1 
48 OTHER Other adherence to nolan principles, development 
sessions with external facilitation 
1 
49 NONE None None 1 
50 OC Open Culture Open discussion at governing body 1 
51 NONE None None 1 
52 GK Gate Keeping thorough attention to these potential problems 
in organisational development sessions and our 
regular informal meetings 
1 







Mechanism Code Description  Comments Code Frequency 
Count 
Chairperson/Accountability Officer)  
53 NONE None None 1 
54 N/A N/A I am not aware of any 1 
55 OBL Overseen By Leadership (e.g. 
Chairperson/Accountability Officer)  
Term of reference for each committee with an 
empowered chair to discharge the ToR. 
1 
56 NONE None None 1 
58 OTHER Other I don’t know if there is any formal arrangement. 1 
59 OBL Overseen By Leadership (e.g. 
Chairperson/Accountability Officer)  
Not sure there was any all meetings have chair  1 
60 BCS Balanced Committee Structure All committees have balanced representation. 
Everyone is involved 
1 
60 GG Good governance Governance is strong with clear lines of 
accountability and decision making 
1 
60 GK Gate Keeping Regular non agenda meetings to air any concerns.  1 
60 TA Tiered Approach Issues are discussed before hand in committees 1 
61 OTHER Other There really is little apart from the odd comment 
about probity and conflict 
1 
62 NONE None None I think 1 
63 NONE None None 1 
64 GG Good governance Good governance arrangements 1 







Mechanism Code Description  Comments Code Frequency 
Count 
64 OC Open Culture open discussions 1 
65 BCS Balanced Committee Structure Distributed leadership model 1 
65 GK Gate Keeping board coaching; sound induction policies 1 
66 MR Mutual Respect General consensus and team working 1 
67 BCS Balanced Committee Structure ensuring all committees have a wide 
representation and that quoracy requires broad 
reperesentation 
1 
68 NONE None None 1 
69 MNTD More needs to be done  The bigger problem with domineers is ‘behind 
the scenes’ in influencing what is presented to 
meetings in terms of content and 
recommendations and I don’t think the 
mechanisms for checking that are present. 
1 
69 OBL Overseen By Leadership (e.g. 
Chairperson/Accountability Officer)  
Mainly down to discretion of the Chair during 
meetings but that hasn’t generally been a 
problem 
1 
70 NONE None None 1 
71 NONE None None 1 
72 CIM Conflict of interest management Strict adherence to conflicts of interest guidance, 
particularly in PCCC and any potential 
procurements 
1 







Mechanism Code Description  Comments Code Frequency 
Count 
72 OC Open Culture Culture of transparency and openness 
particularly at Governing Body 
1 
72 PS Procurement Support Expenditure of over £100, 000 must go to 
Governing Body for a decision. All other 
expenditure (<£100,000), for example 
operational costs, are reviewed by our SMT and 
reported to Finance and Performance 
Committee. 
1 
73 NONE None None 1 
74 BCS Balanced Committee Structure The committee is made up of clinicians, it has 
wider representation - Decisions that are 
significant in scale and those with clinical 
connotations should come before the monthly 
Clinical Commissioning Committee which has 
wide representation across the CCG (not just 
clinicians) 
1 













Assigned View Code View Code Description Comments Category 
Frequency 
Count 
1 N/A N/A (blank) 1 
2 OTHER Other Large CCG, many GPs with varying views. 1 
6 DMPD Decision-making politically 
driven 
CCG has been challenged on many occasions and has its own political 
agenda 
1 
6 PMGDPE Member practice GPs 
disregarded or poorly 
engaged 
Doesn’t value the local GPs 1 
11 N/A N/A Not Applicable 1 
13 DMIGP Decision-making influenced 
by government policy 
We are trying our best under the most difficult of circumstances.  In effect 
we are returning to being a PCT, but ours locally was well managed and 
effective 
1 
14 DMR Decision-making rushed or 
poor due to time 
constraints 
Some decisions need to be made quickly and can happen outside Exec  1 
14 IARM Imbalanced approach to 
decision-making 
Also it is a balance of how much detail to give to GP members who are 
overwhelmed with workload issues, and range in their interest with CCG 
decisions made; the ones that affect primary care directly tend to be the 
ones of most interest. 
1 
17 IARM Imbalanced approach to 
decision-making 






Assigned View Code View Code Description Comments Category 
Frequency 
Count 
17 PMGDPE Member practice GPs 
disregarded or poorly 
engaged 
W e have  become disconnected to GP practices 1 
19 CRPU CCG role poorly 
understood 
Whereas the general beliefe in decision-making is that CCGs benefit the 
GPs, the fact is that CCGs are led and guided by GPs for the benefit of the 
population. 
1 
22 PMENM Member practice 
expectations not met 
Practices often wish for unrealistic things 1 
24 CRPU CCG role poorly 
understood 
There is a wide misunderstanding of the role of the CCG by grass-roots GPs 
with frequent confusion of the role of NHS England with that of the CCG. 
1 
25 GAR Good approval ratings GP practices are formally asked every year to comment on CCG .The 
feedback is strongly positive with high approval ratings. 
1 
31 LOTDM Lack of transparency in 
decision-making 
My satisfaction of the decisions made relies upon an understanding of the 
facts and also the constraining forces within which we operate this is not 
always easily visible to the wider membership 
1 
34 CRPU CCG role poorly 
understood 
The role of CCGs is poorly understood. Most of our commissioning is of 
acute and community care. Naturally there will be tension in 
commissioning decisions which can not be made purely to ‘serve’ GPs - we 
have to make decisions which serve our patients well too. 
1 
36 DMR Decision-making rushed or 
poor due to time 
constraints 
Decision making feels rushed 1 






Assigned View Code View Code Description Comments Category 
Frequency 
Count 
decision-making their difference in opinion is factored into the final decision that is made 
36 PIDM Partially informed decision-
making 
Decisions are not based on high quality and relevant evidence. 1 
37 DMPD Decision-making politically 
driven 
The old cultural rivalries between NHS officers and clinicans remain. It’s 
not always easy to work with colleagues when it’s clear  they think GPs are 
lazy and greedy - an attitude that remains especially in NHS E 
1 
37 IARM Imbalanced approach to 
decision-making 
When times are hard and difficult decisions have to be made it’s just 
another NHS body- with decisions made influenced as much by officers 
and their agendas as it is  by clinical leadership. GPs can be excluded from 
decision making in view of ‘conflict o 
1 
39 CDA Collaborative Decision-
making Approach 
Our GPs are very engaged and support the CCG 1 
40 DMBFC Decision-making based on 
financial constraints 
Member practices do not appreciate the fact that CCGs cannot deliver to 
the extent that they would otherwise have them to due to financial 
constraints --> “The difficulty with member practices is lack of 
understanding of the restrictions rules and regulations CCGs have to work 
to.  In an ideal world, funding would be ample and we would have a 
chronic shortage of GPs in our area.  Sadly the CCG has to make the books 
balance....” 
1 
45 DMIGP Decision-making influenced 
by government policy 
GP practices are quite heterogeneous - some have very good 
understanding of public health issues and the limits of CCG powers 
because of government policy others are less well informed 
1 
49 DMPD Decision-making politically 
driven 






Assigned View Code View Code Description Comments Category 
Frequency 
Count 
49 PMGDPE Member practice GPs 
disregarded or poorly 
engaged 
Our CCG seems to disregard GP views and only politically motivated-we 
work hard in this area and achieve a lot but get funded very poorly by the 
CCG and they don’t listen 
1 
54 CDA Collaborative Decision-
making Approach 
Where member practice wishes are sought, the CCG tries to abide by 
them.   
1 
54 PMGDPE Member practice GPs 
disregarded or poorly 
engaged 
The CCG makes many decisions, and it is not always known what the 
wishes of the members are 
1 
56 OTHER Other Not enough staff to deal with agenda  1 
60 OTHER Other STP may change all of the above as the intention seems to be to delegate 
decision making to regional unconstitutional committees ie STP 
1 
62 DMPD Decision-making politically 
driven 
The CCG is viewed more as a delivery vehicle for NHS England. 1 
62 PMGDPE Member practice GPs 
disregarded or poorly 
engaged 
There is no good involvement from practices. 1 
64 DMR Decision-making rushed or 
poor due to time 
constraints 
GB doesn’t have time to deal with all matters 1 
64 OTHER Other Some other committees move too slowly 1 
65 OTHER Other NHSE Primary care commissions is unresponsive 1 






Assigned View Code View Code Description Comments Category 
Frequency 
Count 
decision-making certainly feel that decisions are made behind closed doors. 
69 N/A N/A Not Applicable 1 
70 PMGDPE Member practice GPs 
disregarded or poorly 
engaged 
Very poor engagement form local GP Practices 1 
72 CDA Collaborative Decision-
making Approach 
We have good engagement with Member Practices through our 
Membership Council meetings and Member Briefing 
1 
72 IARM Imbalanced approach to 
decision-making 
As with all CCGs it is difficult to fully engage everyone on everything and 
we are starting to improve on how we co produce some pieces of work 
1 
73 N/A N/A Not Applicable 1 
74 CR Commissioning 
responsibility not clear 
between NHSE and CCGs 
There is still a lack of clarity about the division of commissioning 
responsibility between NHSE and CCGs. 
1 
Grand Total 



















1 N/A N/A Not Applicable 1 
2 GRKC GP representation in key 
committees  
GPs involved in key work areas 1 
2 MM Mass media  Website, newsletters, emails from Chair 1 
2 ON Other networks Member networks 1 
2 PVKSM Practice visits by key senior 
members  
Direct 1 
3 GRKC GP representation in key 
committees  
Commissioning forum 1 
3 ON Other networks CCG liaison 1 
3 ON Other networks patient reference group  1 
3 PMM Practice managers’ 
meetings  
Practice managers group 1 
4 EV Engagement events Personal engagement 1 
4 ON Other networks Regular meetings 1 
5 GRKC GP representation in key 
committees  
Local care teams meet bimonthly 1 
5 LE Learning events  Monthly protected learning time 1 
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6 OTHER Other Used to hold three mthly meetings and now nothing 1 
7 GRKC GP representation in key 
committees  
Through locality working 1 
8 ON Other networks Clinical Membership group 1 
9 GRKC GP representation in key 
committees  
There is a locality structure with all practices represented at the locality 
level 
1 
10 GRKC GP representation in key 
committees  
Quarterly CCG meetings with OOH cover provided for all practices. 1 
10 MM Mass media  Email alerts 1 
11 MM Mass media  Email alerts 1 
11 ON Other networks Two monthly CMG meeting 1 
12 ON Other networks Meetings 1 
13 ON Other networks Board GP members, Advisory fora 1 
14 GRKC GP representation in key 
committees  
Locality meetings 1 
14 LE Learning events  Protected learning afternoons, education sessions provided 1 
14 MM Mass media  Bulletins and newsletters 1 
14 PVKSM Practice visits by key senior 
members  
Practice visits 1 
15 GRKC GP representation in key 
committees  
Monthly locality meetings (5) at which we encourage input feedback and 
challenge as well as informing on commissioning planning etc 
1 
15 PM Plenary meetings Regular plenaries for all practices … at which we encourage input feedback 




16 GRKC GP representation in key 
committees  
Many GPs are involved at the CCG from a number of local practices 1 
16 LE Learning events  Protected learning time events 1 
16 MM Mass media  Clinical Bulletins 1 
16 ON Other networks Governing Body representatives feedback to their aligned practices and 
take comments from their members back to the CCG board. 
1 
17 GRKC GP representation in key 
committees  
Small group meetings and representation on the locality board, which 
feeds into the CCG executive committees 
1 
18 N/A N/A We used to have quarterly locality meetings, but funding for these has 
been withdrawn and as such there are no means to meet formally now 
1 
19 GRKC GP representation in key 
committees  
We have monthly locality meetings which covers all practices 1 
19 GRKC GP representation in key 
committees  
We run a locality group for salaried and locum GPs. 1 
19 LE Learning events  We support and run academic halfdays with protected time 1 
19 MM Mass media  We have a weekly e- bulletin 1 
19 ON Other networks We have about 3 full membership body meetings per year 1 
19 PMM Practice managers’ 
meetings  
We have regular practice manager meetings. 1 
19 PVKSM Practice visits by key senior 
members  
We undertake annual practice visits to all practices 1 
20 CMM Council of Members 
Meetings 
On average 75% member practices attend the council of members meeting 




20 GRKC GP representation in key 
committees  
We have 6 weekly locality commissioning forums across all localities 1 
20 MM Mass media  The CEO sends out a regular briefing 1 
20 ON Other networks We have a weekly Hot Topics communication 1 
20 PVKSM Practice visits by key senior 
members  
We have visited practices annually except for last year and plan to 
reinstate this 
1 
21 EV Engagement events Hard to get every member engagement, as so big and daily life so busy. 1 
21 GRKC GP representation in key 
committees  
All practices have a member representing them on a locality board 1 
22 GRKC GP representation in key 
committees  
GP Forum 1 
22 LE Learning events  Regular educational/discussion meetings where CCG pays for OOH cover 
and most GPs can therefore attend 
1 
22 MM Mass media  Lively email debates 1 
23 GRKC GP representation in key 
committees  
Monthly locality group meetings 1 
23 MM Mass media  Regular bulletins on the web-site and newsletter 1 
24 ON Other networks We have a resilience project running which has increased this supportive 
role for primary care, with some benefit to the CCG/GP relationships 
1 
25 GRKC GP representation in key 
committees  
Through the GP Members committee which repesents 7 localities with 
Rotherham which feedsback to and from the GP member practices. 
1 
25 LE Learning events  Regular discussion of commissioning issues at the PLT events which 
directly ask for view of primary care concerning clinical and comissioning 




25 MM Mass media  Surveys and email bulletins  1 
26 CMM Council of Members 
Meetings 
Council of members quarterly meetings with member practices 1 
26 MM Mass media  Information about CCG emailed out to practices 1 
27 GRKC GP representation in key 
committees  
Monthly members’ meetings in each of the 4 localities of Northumberland. 1 
28 GRKC GP representation in key 
committees  
LMC involvement, weekly briefing 1 
29 CMM Council of Members 
Meetings 
GP Members Council 1 
30 EV Engagement events High level  of  locality engagement 1 
31 EV Engagement events  We are split into 5 loclalities with a structure that encourages engagement 
from GPs. There is always a range of engagement but that is a 2 way 
process. The future direction of our board is to further enhance the level of 
engagement from the governing body and throughout the organisation 
1 
32 CGM Cluster Groups Meetings  Board members linked to local cluster groups 1 
32 GRKC GP representation in key 
committees  
Quarterly general assembly 1 
32 GRKC GP representation in key 
committees  
Quarterly open GP meetings 1 
33 CMM Council of Members 
Meetings 
Monthly Council of Members meeting at which the GB is held accountable 
to the members; regular dialogue and engagement with GPs 
1 
34 GRKC GP representation in key 
committees  
We have a ‘membership senate’, we have an online membership 





35 GRKC GP representation in key 
committees  
Local sector meetings 1 
36 GRKC GP representation in key 
committees  
Locality meetings  1 
36 MM Mass media  By email contact 1 
37 ON Other networks General member practices group 1 
38 GRKC GP representation in key 
committees  
Locality meetings monthly  1 
39 CMM Council of Members 
Meetings 
Council of members meetings for all GPs across the CCG 1 
39 GRKC GP representation in key 
committees  
Strong locality focus, regular locality meetings 1 
39 LE Learning events  Educational meetings for all GPs ... a yearly educational meeting for all GPs 
across the CCG. 
1 
39 PVKSM Practice visits by key senior 
members  
Visits of locality chairs to individual practices 3 times a year 1 
40 GRKC GP representation in key 
committees  
Commissioning forum 1 
40 GRKC GP representation in key 
committees  
We have link GPs and are moving towards locality working 1 
41 GRKC GP representation in key 
committees  
4 federations each represented by a GP GB member. They in turn meet 





42 ON Other networks Joint meetings with membership, good working relationship with 
federations 
1 
43 CMM Council of Members 
Meetings 
The membership council meets 2-3 times a year, with all GPs 1 
43 GRKC GP representation in key 
committees  
Locality chairs represent membership voice in clinical cabinet, … hold 
monthly locality meetings 
1 
43 PVKSM Practice visits by key senior 
members  
they undertake 4 practice visits a year 1 
44 CMM Council of Members 
Meetings 
Invitation to full council meetings 1 
44 PVKSM Practice visits by key senior 
members  
Member practice visits by CCG officers 1 
45 CGM Cluster Groups Meetings  Group meetings of ‘clusters’ whole CCG meetings 1 
45 ON Other networks Via direct communication 1 
45 PVKSM Practice visits by key senior 
members  
Visits to individual practices 1 
46 GRKC GP representation in key 
committees  
Regular meeting with GPs 1 
46 MM Mass media  Regular email communications 1 
46 ON Other networks Annual events 1 
46 PMM Practice managers’ 
meetings  
Regular meeting with ... Practice Managers 1 
47 GRKC GP representation in key 
committees  
Locality structure with regular meetings 1 
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47 MM Mass media  Weekly email 1 
47 ON Other networks Regular citywide meetings 1 
48 CMM Council of Members 
Meetings 
Council of Practices meets to discuss strategy 1 
48 GRKC GP representation in key 
committees  
Locality meetings 1 
48 PVKSM Practice visits by key senior 
members  
Practice visits 1 
49 ON Other networks Occasional events 1 
50 CMM Council of Members 
Meetings 
Regular council of members 1 
51 OTHER Other By CMG meetings 1 
52 GRKC GP representation in key 
committees  
GP Board members liaise very closely with Localities 1 
52 MM Mass media  All GPs know and use our telephone numbers and emails 1 
52 PVKSM Practice visits by key senior 
members  
All practices are regularly visited by Board members 1 
53 GRKC GP representation in key 
committees  
Locality meetings 1 
53 ON Other networks Some one-to-one  meetings 1 
54 GRKC GP representation in key 
committees  
Through locality leads and meetings 1 




55 GRKC GP representation in key 
committees  
There are 10 GPs both elected and appointed representing the whole GP 
membership on GB 
1 
55 GRKC GP representation in key 
committees  
Locality structure (clinical council & exec for local GP Practices), supported 
by defined locality managers 
1 
55 LM Locality meeting Executive Team members are ‘attached’ to each of the localities 1 
55 ON Other networks The CCG engages with ‘expert’ GPs and nurses when embarking on specific 
programmes/projects of work in a ‘co-produced’ manner. 
1 
56 PVKSM Practice visits by key senior 
members  
There is good engagement with practices with regular meetings and a 
senior manager involved in dealing with practices 
1 
58 CMM Council of Members 
Meetings 
Counci if Members meetings 1 
58 MM Mass media  Weekly email  1 
58 PVKSM Practice visits by key senior 
members  
Individual practice meetings ad hoc 1 
59 OTHER Other Often struggle 1 
60 GRKC GP representation in key 
committees  
There is GP representation - “We have regular locality events as well as 6 
weekly time out weddings facilitated by the ccg with all practices” 
1 
60 PMM Practice managers’ 
meetings  
There is GP representation - “We have ccg practice manager groups” 1 
61 GRKC GP representation in key 
committees  
This is done through the 15 localities that make up the CCG - they response 
and involvement is totally dependednt on the lead GP for that locality and 
their involvement 
1 
62 ON Other networks There are regular meetings, but they tend to be one way, with the CCg 1 
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informing practices of decisions 
63 PM Plenary meetings Mostly through PLENARY meetings.  1 
64 LE Learning events  Bi-monthly GP parliament and education 1 
64 LM Locality meeting Monthly meetings with LMC 1 
64 ON Other networks Informal contact with other GPs 1 
64 PVKSM Practice visits by key senior 
members  
Regular practice visits 1 
65 GRKC GP representation in key 
committees  
Locality 1 
65 LM Locality meeting Locality meetings 1 
65 OTHER Other Full membership meetings 1 
66 CGM Cluster Groups Meetings  Cluster boards system 1 
67 GRKC GP representation in key 
committees  
Monthly locality meetings 1 
67 PM Plenary meetings Two or three meetings per year - all practices invited 1 
67 PVKSM Practice visits by key senior 
members  
Meetings within individual practices  1 
68 GRKC GP representation in key 
committees  
We have monthly locality meetings 1 
68 PVKSM Practice visits by key senior 
members  
Each practice has a visit from a clinical lead and team twice a year 1 
69 CMM Council of Members 
Meetings 
Mainly through the Council of Members 1 
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69 ON Other networks Also clinical network of practices model that is still developing. 1 
69 ON Other networks Occasional meetings open to all GPs and Practice Managers 1 
69 PVKSM Practice visits by key senior 
members  
Individual practice visits occasionally by officers 1 
70 EV Engagement events Regular meetings and engagement events but poorly attended 1 
71 GRKC GP representation in key 
committees  
Locality meetings 1 
71 PM Plenary meetings CCG wide meetings 1 
72 N/A N/A Not Applicable 1 
73 CGM Cluster Groups Meetings  Through Clusters 1 
74 GRKC GP representation in key 
committees  
Our GP practices all belong to one of 4 localities. Each locality has reps on 
GB and CCC. There is a monthly City wide Locality Group attended by the 
reps and other senior CCG officers. 
1 
Grand Total 






Appendix 7.8 Question 4b. Please list the “other 
committee(s)” that you sit on 
 
Committees falling under code OTHER  
Accountable Care Organisation 
Assurance 
Cancer Clinical Programme Group 
CCG Clinicians Group  
Clinical Guidelines 
Charitable Funds 
Clinical Effectiveness Group 
Clinical Pathway Development 
Clinical Policy 
Clinical Senate Council 
Community Education Providers Network 
Community Support Services 
Contact Management Board 
Care Staff Committee 
Cardiovascular Clinical Programme Group 
Dementia Strategy Board 
Empowering Parents, Empowering Communities 
Estates 
GP Members Committee 
House of care programme board 
Individual Funding Request 
Integrated Governance and Performance 
Information Management and Technology Programme Board 
Integration Board 
Learning Disability Healthchecks 
Local Digital Roadmap 
Medicines Safety Committee 
Mental Health Board 




Committees falling under code OTHER  
Never event panel 
Out of hospital 
Primary Care development Group 
Service Development 
Service redesign 
Standards for microbiology investigations 
Standardisation of care 
Violence against women and girls 
 
